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Volume XVI Spring 1972 Number 1

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Reviews — *Walter F. Hahn, Gaddis Smith, Willard Barber, Robert R. Sullivan*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
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Reflections on the Quarter

Hanoi's Aggression and U.S.-Soviet Relations

THE linkage between the war in Viet Nam and the relationship between the superpowers was once again revealed by events occurring in the wake of the massive North Vietnamese "Easter Invasion" across the demilitarized zone. Contrary to the expectation of most experts, Moscow adopted a rather moderate attitude toward President Nixon's decision to mine several of the major ports and rivers in North Viet Nam, including the key port city of Haiphong, and to resume extensive bombing of the North. Considerations of the possible gain to Moscow of a SALT agreement, and the desire to obtain ratification of the *Ostpolitik* treaties and achieve general improvement in relations with the West, probably influenced the low-key reaction. Moreover, there were indications that, even though the USSR had provided the equipment for the North Vietnamese offensive, Hanoi had acted independently and timed its attack to signal its concern over the implications of the Nixon visit to Moscow, following so closely after the one to Peking.

Whatever the motivation, the Soviets chose to continue their policy of normalizing relations with the United States while making it possible for the North Vietnamese to carry on the war. Barring a serious defeat for Hanoi, there would exist little reason for Moscow to alter this policy drastically—except to preserve its reputation as the major protagonist of revolutionary change. And even if a North Vietnamese defeat occurred, Soviet priorities might still militate against an abrupt return to a "hard line" attitude in Moscow's dealings with the United States. For these reasons the level of risk accepted by the Nixon Administration in Viet Nam vis-à-vis the superpower relationship was not nearly so high as many critics of American policy claimed.

U.S. willingness to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union over Viet Nam was governed by two objectives. The first need was to prevent a North Vietnamese conventional attack, made possible by extensive Soviet aid, from altering the military environment in Viet Nam to the point where a settlement of the tortuous conflict would amount to a *de facto diktat*. The mining of harbors and the bombing were clear indications of the White House determination to continue to support South Viet Nam's efforts to become militarily self-reliant. At the same time generous options were given to Hanoi to end the war on relatively advantageous terms. In addition, the Administration continued to pursue its policy of dealing with both Moscow and Peking on the subject in the hope that they would see some

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mutual benefit in helping to bring the conflict to an end. As in the past, negotiations along this line have not yet proved fruitful.

The dramatic American initiative appeared to mean that the White House had not accepted the view that "Vietnamization" was a failure. Though the success of the initial thrust of the DRVN's army into the South had shown "Vietnamization" deficient in handling a massive conventional attack, it was clear that the program had succeeded in reducing the effectiveness of the communists' guerrilla warfare. It had also permitted a reduction of U.S. troops from more than 550,000 in 1969 to less than 60,000 by April 1972. From these considerations "Vietnamization" can be judged as at least a partial success.

The ARVN's initial failure to cope with a conventional thrust, for which its military posture was not designed, may be attributable to a lack of sufficient time to complete the process of "Vietnamization" rather than to inherent weakness. Indeed, a possible cause of the North Vietnamese offensive was a fear on the part of Hanoi that, given enough time, the South Vietnamese might attain an ability to counter conventional as well as guerrilla operations. Rather than risk this, Hanoi chose to change the terms of reference by launching a massive conventional attack with nine-tenths of its army, supported by mobile and heavy armor and artillery supplied by the Soviet Union. In order to deny Hanoi the possible benefits of its gamble, the United States revised its approach to the struggle by resuming large-scale bombing and for the first time blockading the North Vietnamese coast. The immediate tactical aim was to stymie the North Vietnamese offensive. Once this was accomplished, attempts to arrive at a negotiated settlement could be resumed.

A second objective undergirding President Nixon's willingness to risk confrontation was the need to demonstrate, to both domestic and foreign audiences, the essential linkage between regional instability and the general global balance of power. The Soviet Union's fueling of the North Vietnamese attack was one more indication that the Soviets would seek to destabilize regional military balances whenever it was advantageous for them to do so. This tendency, added to Moscow's attempts to gain as much psychological benefit as possible from what it perceived to be a shift in the strategic balance in its favor, forced the United States to an explicit linkage of regional and global balance of power considerations. Moscow was thus put on notice that lasting improvements in relations between the superpowers would be greatly inhibited if it persisted in attempting to upset regional military balances in sensitive areas such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

By its initiatives in Viet Nam the Nixon Administration let Moscow know that it was unwilling to neglect its regional interests and responsibilities in order to reach accommodations on strategic global

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matters. The Soviet willingness to go ahead with the Nixon visit in spite of American actions was an indication that the advantages the Soviets expected from the summit were deemed to be more important than the need to give unequivocal and belligerent support to Hanoi.

The events occurring after the U.S. decision to blockade North Viet Nam suggest that to date the Nixon Administration has been successful in pursuing its two seemingly conflicting policies: providing increased sea and air support to South Viet Nam in order to stabilize the military situation, while at the same time achieving limited technical pacts and perhaps more far-reaching arms control and trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are indications that the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has not been seriously damaged, although the Chinese have commented on the possible short-run detrimental effects.

In the Declaration of Principles issued in the joint communiqué signed by President Nixon and the Soviet Communist Party Chairman, Leonid I. Brezhnev, both leaders agreed "that there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations for peaceful coexistence." At the same time they set forth their clearly divergent views with regard to the continuing war in Viet Nam and the situation in the area of Indochina as a whole. While the fuller implications of the Moscow visit will be discussed in the next issue of ORBIS, the lesson that might tentatively be drawn from recent developments is that neither Moscow nor Peking is willing to sacrifice relations with Washington in order to placate Hanoi. At present the imperatives involved in the triangular relationship of these three great powers appear to transcend the more narrow considerations of the Viet Nam war.

The Aftermath of President Nixon's Peking Visit

THE initial euphoria surrounding President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China is being replaced by a more balanced perspective. The immediate consequences of the visit were twofold: (1) the statements and agreements embodied in the joint communiqué issued in Shanghai at its end, and (2) the political "atmospherics" arising from the new communications between the two parties.

Agreement was reached as expected on the principle of expanding people-to-people contacts in areas such as science, technology, culture, sports, journalism and trade. These will provide part of the substance of the negotiations to be conducted by the ambassadors of each country in Paris. The agreement to "stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time" represented a modest step toward more regular relations.

The most important part of the communiqué concerned Taiwan. The United States acknowledged "that all Chinese on either side of

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the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." In expectation of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, the United States affirmed "the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes." At a news conference after the Shanghai communiqué was made public, Dr. Kissinger declared flatly that the announcement of future troop reductions from Taiwan was "a general statement of our policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occasions and in innumerable forms." At the same time he reaffirmed the portion of the President's 1972 State of the World message concerning the maintenance of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty which asserted that "our new dialogue with the People's Republic of China would not be at the expense of friends. . . . With the Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment."

Nevertheless, although the statement in the joint communiqué represented no significant departure from previous policy, the fact that the visit occurred at all has been damaging to the international position of the Republic of China. The United States initiative has greatly speeded Peking's diplomatic re-emergence on the world stage and granted the Communist Chinese the perhaps as yet unwarranted status of a world power. The Republic of China's diplomatic position is eroding, as evidenced by Britain's decision to terminate all diplomatic contact in order to raise British representation at Peking to the ambassadorial level. Mainland China's undoubted goal is first the isolation of Taiwan from international support and ultimately its subordination to Peking's rule.

What the United States affirmed in the communiqué and in Kissinger's addendum, although *sotto voce,* is that the People's Liberation Army cannot be used in this endeavor. In short, the Shanghai communiqué contained a trade-off. The Chinese communists said nothing about liberating the island by force. This was probably making a virtue of a necessity, as the strategic facts of China's international situation require that they maintain substantial forces on both the Soviet and Indian borders. Even with adequate naval support, the People's Liberation Army is not credited with the capability of invading Taiwan, and at this juncture, when the army plays so large a role in stabilizing Chinese internal affairs, such a move seems out of the question. By not directly stating that we would use force to defend Taiwan against aggression, the United States tacitly accepted private Chinese assurances of nonintervention. The effect was one of the goals of the conference: a de-escalation of rhetoric.

In acknowledging "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a

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part of China," the United States removed its long-standing caveat regarding the international status of the island. This decision is in perfect accord with the positions of both the People's Republic and the Republic of China and therefore on its face can be objectionable to neither. What it does damage severely, if not fatally, are the aspirations of those promoters of an independent Formosa who reject the possibility of delivering the 85 per cent of the island's population who are native Taiwanese to communist control. If the United States adheres to its present position, we are in effect acquiescing in whatever solution short of force the Chinese are able to devise between themselves. In this maneuvering, the PRC holds many of the most powerful cards—as long as the Taiwan government contends that it is the government of all China. What the U.S. position would be in the event the Republic of China's leadership declared its "independence" as the "Chinese Republic of Taiwan" and rejected the idea of one China to which "all Chinese" presently subscribe, is an undetermined question. A "Chinese Republic of Taiwan" would seem an unlikely possibility even in the post-Chiang Kai-shek era. But the United States has been careful to avoid stating that "Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China"—the position to which Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at first gravitated before being hastily pulled away by his foreign minister.

Ultimately, any hope of preserving a noncommunist Taiwan lies in the long-run credibility of the U.S. defense commitment. President Nixon's State of the World message of 1972 states that our bilateral security treaty with the Republic of China is one of the "touchstones" of regional stability and that military redeployments will be made only after "thoroughgoing reviews" with our allies. The Republic of China has contended that the announcement of force reductions was made without discussion as postulated by the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty. Whether or not this charge is accurate, it reflects the Nationalists' concern for their military security. One option they may explore is an approach to the Soviet Union and other communist nations. On the thesis that "the enemy of our enemy is our friend," the Nationalists have been slowly thawing toward the Soviets. In this fashion they also chide the United States for having disappointed them.

The U.S. portion of the communiqué regarding Japan was brief: "The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds." The Chinese were moderately polemical in their statement: "It [China] firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral Japan." There was probably little else that the United States could have said, and the Chinese state-

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ment was well within Peking's general policy of maintaining arm's-length contacts with Japan while seeking to erode Japanese-American ties. Premier Sato has expressed public support for the visit, which was deemed effective in reducing Asian tensions, and has implied that greater efforts will be made by Japan to improve relations with Peking. Nevertheless, U.S.-Japanese relations have been sorely tried in the last year and refurbishing the close ties between the two allies must be an urgent priority of American policy. Japan sees the dichotomy between its retarded diplomatic and advanced economic relations with the mainland and can be expected to seek ways of normalizing its diplomatic position. Presumably, it would like a reversal of the present situation which would allow formal relations with the PRC while continuing close and profitable economic links with Taiwan.

More sentiment is likely to be voiced within Japan for neutrality, abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement and reductions in defense expenditures. The logic behind these feelings is that in an era of decreased tension controversial defense budgets are unnecessary, and in a multipolar world Japan would gain the most by remaining equidistant from China, the Soviet Union and the United States. But increased defense spending can also be justified as essential in a more hostile world complicated by less axiomatic U.S. assistance. Those who recognize the value of the Mutual Security Treaty and the essentially unaltered hostility between the competing socialist and capitalist systems have been put in a difficult position as defenders of the status quo.

The United States explicitly reaffirmed "its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea." Perhaps equally important for Korean sensitivities, the Republic of Korea was mentioned before Japan. The Chinese, in turn, voiced their support of the North Korean program for "peaceful unification" and called for the abolition of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. South Korea's reaction to the visit and the communiqué was modest. Its position was more explicitly reaffirmed than that of any other of the U.S. Asian allies.

This is not to imply, however, that all was calm within the Republic of Korea. Official responses have had a slightly apprehensive "we believe you because you want us to say we do" tone. The government, although overtly assured by Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's visit, has but one touchstone: the substantial U.S. troop presence on the peninsula. To prevent being boxed into a situation similar to Taiwan's, the government is expected to take initiatives to counter North Korea's recent drives for international recognition and exploit the Red Cross talks at Panmunjom if they show any signs of thaw.

Concerning Viet Nam, the communiqué expressed China's "firm support for the seven-point pro-

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posal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam." Failure to mention Hanoi by name may well indicate the coolness of Chinese-North Vietnamese relations as a result of the Sino-American rapprochement. The United States reaffirmed its pledge of ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina and its position on a negotiated settlement.

The Saigon government expressed qualified support of President Nixon's China endeavor. Hanoi's reaction has been predictably harsh. The North Vietnamese have withheld news of the visit from their population since the original announcement in July 1971. On March 3, 1972, the official party newspaper *Nhan Dan* bitterly attacked the U.S. position as set forth in the joint communiqué, while labeling the communiqué a "recent document" rather than the product of the President's visit. There was a strong hint of criticism of Peking for receiving the President, although a direct verbal attack was avoided.

Hanoi recognizes that Peking might be willing to reach some compromises with the United States for longer-range purposes which might be detrimental to North Viet Nam's position. Yet North Viet Nam has long been adept at playing off the two communist giants, and the Soviet Union, flushed with the success of its South Asian venture in Bangla Desh, is seeking to bolster its position in Southeast Asia as well. One of the primary means of doing so will be to continue and even to increase aid to Hanoi, as evidenced by the Soviet equipment used by communist forces during their April invasion. This is a relatively cheap investment compared with the far greater price paid by the United States in Indochina. Peking, on the other hand, limited itself to a delayed and *pro forma* verbal support of the April invasion.

One may only speculate about what was said in private between Nixon and Chou En-lai on the subject of Viet Nam. That China no longer views the American effort in Viet Nam as a direct threat to its own security would seem unreasonable. Peking could also be expected to worry about Hanoi's drift toward the Soviet Union. But it remains highly doubtful whether the Chinese could or would seek to influence Hanoi toward easing the U.S. departure from Viet Nam. Any results of the visit in this regard may take some time to unfold and may be matters of political "atmospherics" rather than concrete actions.

The Soviet Union has reacted warily but opportunistically to Nixon's China visit. The official Soviet press betrayed alarm in hinting darkly that "there was something more to the negotiations than what was said in the communiqué." At the same time, however, the Soviet leadership has mobilized a skillful diplomatic campaign to turn the Sino-American rapprochement to whatever advantage it can.

Soviet sensitivity toward the talks in Peking was revealed when TASS delayed a dispatch on the final communiqué for seven hours before

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issuing a straightforward summary of the text. On the one hand, press commentaries have inveighed against Sino-American collusion directed against the USSR. On the other hand, the Soviets seek to disparage the new contacts, claiming that they yielded no concrete results. Thus, it is noted that the President's 1972 State of the World message mentions the Soviet Union several times as a source of "danger" without once citing China as a danger. The Chinese are said to have "acclaimed" the movement of ships from the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistan war. And days after the Nixon visit, *Pravda* charged China with secretly agreeing to "get from Hanoi conditions advantageous to the United States for ending the Viet Nam War" in exchange for the U.S. commitment to withdraw all American forces from Taiwan.

In East Asia the USSR has made gains at American expense as a result of the Sino-American rapprochement. The Soviet diplomatic response to the President's visit has intensified the competitive aspects of both the Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relationships. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's conciliatory trip to Tokyo in January, a month before the Nixon visit, capped a vigorous effort by Moscow to wean the Japanese away from their close relationship with the United States—an effort that may be expected to continue with equal vigor in the future. Moscow has asked Japan, which in 1971 became the USSR's leading noncommunist trading partner, to grant a $1.5 billion commercial loan to finance the development of Siberia. Closer economic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union will work to Moscow's political advantage against both China and the United States. Further, the Soviet-Japanese agreement to hold a Sato-Kosygin summit in a future exchange of visits points up the difficulties confronting the United States in its attempt to play balance of power politics in Asia.

In South Asia, with Pakistan dismembered, India and the beneficiary of its foreign policy, Bangla Desh, have moved closer to Moscow since Nixon's initiative toward India's Chinese enemy. Sheik Mujib's warm reception in Moscow in early March and his acceptance of the Soviet position on Indochina and the Middle East have underscored the waning of American influence in South Asia as the United States has appeared to shift its interest from New Delhi and Tokyo to Peking and Rawalpindi.

The political advantages the United States may obtain from the current China initiatives are predicated upon a multipolar balance of power model of the international system. This model does not yet exist in reality. Until it does, the dilemma in our new relations with Peking is how to calculate the costs of American concessions to the PRC, which are immediate and tangible, against American gains, which are largely potential and may prove illusory.

In view of the long-term fears this dilemma has raised among our

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Asian allies, it would be most useful to convene a conference with them on Asian security issues. Because of election year restraints, such a conference could not be held prior to 1973, but preparatory meetings could take place during the course of this year. An announcement that a conference was being planned would help to restore Asian confidence in the U.S. guarantee. It might even contribute to the resolution of a perplexing question inherent in the Nixon Doctrine: how to reconcile partnership with allies with negotiations with adversaries.

The Prospects for European Defense Cooperation

IN Europe a substantial distrust of the motivations underlying Soviet foreign policy continues to drift through the overall climate of détente. In objective terms, the threat to European security—on the ground in Central Europe and the northern flank areas and on the seas in the Baltic and the Mediterranean—is perceived by many observers to be on the rise. The re-evaluation by the United States of its role in the world arena, as symbolized unmistakably in the Nixon Doctrine, along with the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union, have nourished doubts that the current NATO posture of flexible response will be adequate for the 1970's.

These developments over the last few years have prompted a growing discussion of possible means for augmenting the West European defense posture. On several occasions both the British and French governments have hinted at an interest in some measures of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Conceivably, such cooperation, if it materializes, could gradually fashion an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent which could be coordinated within the framework of a broader European defense association to give the German Federal Republic and other European NATO countries a voice in planning and strategy.

In Britain the departure of several prominent leaders from the Labour Party shadow government has left the party in disarray. On April 10, Roy Jenkins, Deputy Leader of the party and shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Thomson, shadow Defense Minister, and Harold Lever, shadow Minister for Fuel, Steel and Company Law, resigned over a decision by the shadow cabinet to seek a referendum on British entry into the Common Market. The three representatives of the pro-European section of the party will now be free to abstain in future votes in Commons over British entry and are likely to carry with them a sizeable block of Labour MP's, perhaps as many as thirty-five. Passage of the enabling legislation on British entry is now virtually assured.

Beyond this, the split in the Labour Party is so deep as to raise the prospect of the Conservative Party calling a general election, possibly as early as next fall. Overall, the Heath Government's ability to undertake the formulation

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and initiation of fundamentally new policy directions has been strengthened. Prime Minister Heath, a consistent supporter of increased political and defense cooperation with the EEC countries, may now feel sufficiently strong to pursue more earnestly some form of nuclear cooperation with France, which he has advocated.

In France the situation following the referendum of April 23 on British entry is somewhat more ambiguous. Some observers have argued that the relatively large number of French voters who abstained from voting on the issue implies a lack of confidence in Pompidou's plans for strengthening the European Community. But a poll conducted several weeks prior to the referendum indicated that a majority of the French electorate either felt that a referendum was not necessary for sanctioning British entry or were unsure as to whether one should be held. More than a majority of those polled expressed little or no interest in the issue.

Perhaps a more plausible interpretation of the referendum results is that the lack of substantial opposition to British entry leaves President Pompidou's hands free for pursuing further steps toward West European integration. Pompidou has expressed an interest in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, although, as is the case with the British, the form such a cooperative effort might take has not been clearly articulated. At the same time, the known views of "hard-line Gaullist" Defense Minister Michel Debré suggest that even if Pompidou opted for cooperation he would have to overcome some internal hurdles.

In the German Federal Republic the recent success of the CDU/CSU in local elections and the dramatic events in the Bundestag—including the first vote in West Germany's postwar history on a no-confidence motion in the government (defeated by the narrowest of margins), in the midst of the debate which culminated in ratification of the treaties with the Soviet Union—suggest that the Brandt Government may feel constrained in its pursuit of *Ostpolitik*. The crucial question regarding Bonn's future policies has to do with the priority assigned to *Ostpolitik* relative to Germany's participation in West European projects, notably defense cooperation. Further *Ostpolitik* momentum may rule out German association with any Anglo-French nuclear endeavor. Moreover, the SPD, and especially its increasingly assertive left wing, has tended in general to take a dim view of nuclear weapons in the theater defense of Western Europe. It is not unlikely that the SPD would oppose a policy of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, regardless of what concessions were made to West Germany's participation or influence in such a cooperative project. A positive West German response may thus hinge on the outcome of the national elections to be held in 1973 (if not earlier). The past record of the CDU/CSU suggests that the opposition party would be more favorably disposed

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toward the endeavor, provided it had the support of the United States.

Meanwhile, the signing of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on strategic arms limitation has quieted, temporarily at least, West European worries about possible agreements between the superpowers that would forbid the transfer of strategic weapons systems technologies, or fail to limit the deployment of ABM systems, or prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons by either superpower in Europe. However, the inclusion of these issues, as well as the U.S. forward based systems in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union, as topics for negotiation in a second phase of the SALT would have important implications for European security. An agreement that categorically prohibited the transfer of strategic weapons technologies would serve as a spur to Anglo-French cooperation, but at the expense of preventing the United States from assisting Britain and France in the development of their nuclear forces. Since both countries would then have to depend exclusively on their own efforts to secure a viable deterrent force for the 1980's, and the costs to each alone would be prohibitive, a logical alternative for them might be to pool their knowhow and resources. Conversely, if a no-transfer agreement is not reached, the United States would be free (depending upon Congressional approval) to support an Anglo-French endeavor. Active support by the United States could be decisive in assuring the outcome.

With respect to an ABM agreement, Europeans fear that a Soviet expansion of ABM capabilities would downgrade the ability of British and French missiles to reach targets in the Soviet Union. Thus the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed in Moscow on May 26 to limit ABM would yield another incentive for maintaining, and even improving, British and French deterrent capabilities. If the Soviet Union, in the absence of the ABM agreement, had chosen to expand greatly its antiballistic missile defense, the problems facing Britain and France in developing a nuclear deterrent adequate to the needs of the late 1970's would have been formidable, and perhaps insurmountable.

Finally, from the West European perspective, a prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons by either superpower would gravely impair the current NATO doctrine of flexible response. In the European view, deterrence of a Soviet-bloc invasion rests largely on the threat of rapid escalation to the nuclear strategic level, and the validity of this threat resides in part in the ability to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. If the United States were to accept constraints upon this option, the European powers might be encouraged to seek a viable tactical nuclear force of their own. The French Pluton weapon, expected to come within the inventory by 1973, is a harbinger of this possibility.

British strategic analysts are convinced that the U.S. commitment to European defense will remain vital for the foreseeable future. But

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a British deterrent is deemed necessary as an insurance policy redeemable in the event of Soviet aggression followed by an American loss of will. The British have four ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN's), of which a minimum of one and frequently two are on station at all times. They are thought to be reasonably secure against detection and targeting by the Soviet Union. The SSBN's are capable of striking at least several large Soviet cities or industrial complexes. They will probably retain this capability throughout the 1970's, but there is a growing conviction that a new generation of weapons will have to be developed for defense in the 1980's. The appropriate time for reaching a tentative decision is rapidly approaching.

Theoretically, three alternative courses of action are open to the British: (1) to create a more viable independent strategic deterrent, (2) to acquire a more viable deterrent from the United States, or (3) to build a more viable deterrent in cooperation with one or more of the European allies. The economic facts of life, however, suggest that creation of a significantly improved deterrent force without the assistance or cooperation of Britain's nuclear allies is, practically speaking, an impossibility. Any meaningful upgrading of the deterrent would be exceedingly expensive. Realistically, then, two choices are open: (1) the purchase of a more viable deterrent from the United States, or (2) the creation of a more viable deterrent in cooperation with France.

On first consideration, past history suggests that Britain would tend toward the former choice, which would entail less cost and risk over the short run. The cost of purchasing an advanced weapons system such as Poseidon, even if it included a proportion of the R&D costs incurred by the United States, would not approach the price tag of an independent effort. The reliability of the system having already been demonstrated, the risk of spending large sums to develop a workable system would be obviated. The choice would also be consonant with the well-established habit of close Anglo-American cooperation.

Yet, several important factors argue for Britain's choice of nuclear cooperation with France. To purchase the technology for an advanced U.S. weapons system would intensify British dependence on the United States, already considerable via the present Polaris arrangement, and make it more difficult for the British to go it alone in future years. Then there are the French to consider. Their distaste for the intimate Anglo-American relationship contributed mightily to the French decision to withdraw from the integrated commands of NATO and to de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the EEC. British observers have warmly welcomed the apparent thaw in French attitudes toward European defense cooperation. An Anglo-American agreement renewing and extending British strategic dependence would be ill-received in France, and thus might jeopardize Britain's entry

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and role in the European Community. Moreover, at a time when British strategic thinking favors substantial upgrading of European conventional forces and considers French participation integral to the success of such efforts, it is unlikely that the British will want to incur French displeasure in the nuclear realm.

Intimately associated with this factor is common British and French resentment of American economic dominance. A combining of their technological know-how and research and development efforts would enhance both countries' ability to compete with the United States not only in advanced weapons technologies but also in their industrial-civilian spin-off.

There are a number of assets specific to the nuclear endeavor that are attractive to the British. France has natural uranium, although its importance is somewhat diminished by the wide availability of the material on the world market. She possesses sophisticated instrumented facilities for flight-testing strategic missiles. Admittedly these facilities may not be presently capable of handling multiple-warhead tests or of simulating a sophisticated ABM environment, but they could provide a useful foundation for the creation of such facilities. France has also developed launchers that can orbit satellites to collect intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and deployments. The French missile industry is sufficiently advanced to promote development of a new-generation delivery system.

Britons interested in a cooperative effort note compensating assets that should be attractive to France. These include the most advanced indigenous computer industry in Europe, superior capabilities in nuclear submarine propulsion, and extensive knowledge and experience in the development of thermonuclear explosives and missile warheads. Most important, Britain has had access to U.S. nuclear information under the 1954 and 1958 amendments to the McMahon Act.

While Franco-British relations have improved markedly since 1969, the leaders of both countries will have to feel reasonably sure that continuing differences between the two societies and existing prejudices will not undermine the close cooperation required for such a complex endeavor. Disagreements would have to be resolved concerning the allocation of costs and benefits to each.

Of critical importance would be the policy choices for the United States and the other West European states, especially West Germany. British strategic thinkers appear to agree that any Anglo-French nuclear effort should be worked out within the NATO framework so as not to jeopardize the U.S. strategic commitment to Europe. It is anticipated that the United States would look askance at an endeavor conducted outside NATO. Past French aversion to NATO, and more particularly to U.S. domination of European strategic interests, is well known. Equally important is the past

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French policy of going it alone on strategic questions, which, if continued, would preclude joint agreement on the targeting and use of strategic weapons. British observers have noted with satisfaction recent statements by French leaders that suggest a qualitative change in French thinking with regard to the prospects for defense cooperation. Future progress toward Anglo-French nuclear cooperation will hinge critically on the degree to which British and French thinking have come into accord.

Allende's Policies and Problems

POLITICAL and economic events in the last six months have dramatically increased the pressure on the Marxist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. The deterioration of the economy probably poses the greatest single threat to Allende's continued control. Foreign exchange reserves are dangerously low and Chile's ability to obtain foreign exchange through copper exports is declining. The balance of payments crisis arises in large part from lower copper earnings. Average world market prices for copper in 1970 were sixty cents a pound and have been between forty-eight and forty-nine cents in 1971. Chilean production costs are nearly fifty cents a pound, although some producers' costs are lower.

The nation has also had to import more and more of its food. It cannot continue on this course indefinitely. Poor harvests this year may engender more protests against food shortages like the one that occurred in Santiago in December 1971. In a sharp reversal of previous policy, the subsidy of basic foodstuffs was ended in February 1972, and costs of such items as bread, milk, sugar, oil and tea rose by an average of 25 to 30 per cent. Public transportation costs increased 60 per cent at the same time.

In addition, Allende's security policies appear to have contributed to domestic unrest. There are charges that the government is not doing enough to suppress left-wing terrorists, and the police apparently are becoming restive under terrorist attacks. Allende's Interior Minister, José Toha, who was recently impeached by the Congress for allegedly abusing his authority over the country's police forces by developing leftist armed brigades, was subsequently appointed by Allende as Minister of Defense. Moreover, there are complaints of a government effort to send militant communist organizers into the armed forces as recruits. *El Mercurio,* the conservative Santiago daily newspaper, has charged the Communist Party with carrying out a vast plan to infiltrate young Marxists of military service age into the nation's armed forces. While the extent of such infiltration efforts is uncertain, it is well known that the Allende Government has been carrying on an intensive propaganda campaign in the lower ranks of the military.

Congressional opposition to the government has been stiffened by these events and by threats of further erosion of Chile's democratic

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traditions. Thus, Allende's efforts to form a single party of the revolution were countered by a Congressional threat of Christian Democrat and National Party leaders to form a single party for the maintenance of democracy. In March 1972 an interim compromise was reached for the 1973 elections, whereby each of the parties will run its own candidates, but all votes will subsequently be allocated into a "Right" and "Left" coalition. Congressional opponents of Allende also regard his proposal for nationalization of all credit institutions and the ninety-one private corporations which account for 55 per cent of national production as a direct threat to the country's democratic institutions. They believe this would eliminate the economic base for any anti-Marxist democratic opposition. With state control of these key enterprises, private advertising would cease and independent newspapers and radio stations could not survive. To prevent this contingency Congress passed a constitutional amendment to block executive takeovers of private enterprises without Congressional approval. The amendment would also retroactively invalidate many of Allende's earlier purchases of banks and industries.

In early April Allende vetoed the anti-expropriation amendment. This represented a failure on his part to avoid a constitutional confrontation through a compromise with the opposition Christian Democrats. While Congress is expected to try to overrule the veto, it is not yet clear whether it will need a simple or a two-thirds majority to do so. In any event, it appears unlikely that any compromise will resolve the fundamental conflict between the executive and the legislature over control of the Chilean nationalization program.

Threats to freedom of the press from the government's efforts to control the paper-producing (newsprint) industry have likewise aroused opposition. The government has entered into negotiations with Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones, the nation's largest papermaker. (It may be recalled that Perón used a government paper monopoly to control the press in Argentina. Because of newsprint "shortages" in Peronist Argentina, newspapers came to depend for their survival on the government's good will.) Opposition papers in Chile are properly fearful. Already all government advertising has been removed from *El Mercurio,* and the newspaper cannot get the short-term loans it needs for operating costs. In addition, all of the nation's TV channels are effectively under government control, and there is a major government drive to instill a "socialist conscience" in the people.

Other Allende-inspired assaults on the present Chilean political system include: (1) the plan to dissolve Congress at least once during its six-year period; (2) the effort to nationalize between ninety and two hundred companies in order to "develop socialism" in Chile; (3) the "people's assembly" bill which, requiring that all judges serve only six years on the bench,

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would force all present judges to resign and permit Allende to reshape the high court; and (4) the drive for a unicameral legislature to replace the present bicameral system. Each of these measures is provocative in the Chilean context.

Allende has recently suffered a number of Congressional setbacks. By-elections on January 16 resulted in the election of two opposition candidates; he shortly thereafter had to reshuffle his Cabinet. In early April all seven deputies from the Radical Left Party (PIR) withdrew from Allende's Unidad Popular coalition. As a result, the opposition is only one seat away from having a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Hence, although Allende suspended Congress for a week in late March to gain more time to negotiate with the Christian Democrats over the anti-expropriation bill (an attempt which failed), it is unlikely that he will risk dissolving Congress and holding his threatened referendum. Such a threat can have little credence when one recalls that Allende received only about 36 per cent of the votes in the 1970 election, and that there is widespread discontent with inflation (over 20 per cent last year) and food shortages.

The results of the April elections at the University of Chile, when 82,000 academics, students and employees of the university voted for a rector and a governing council, represented another setback for Allende. Political rather than academic issues dominated the bitter campaign for the rectorship between the major candidate of the Center-Right, Edgardo Boeninger who had been Director of the Budget under Frei, and Felipe Herrera, the Unidad Popular (UP) candidate of the Left. Boeninger received about 53 per cent of the vote to Herrera's 43 per cent, while minor candidates of the Left (including Allende's nephew) divided the remainder. Correspondingly, Boeninger's supporters won fifty-seven of the 100 council seats, wresting control from the UP. Since the university runs radio and television stations and disposes about 3.5 per cent of the national budget, Boeninger's victory was not merely symbolic.

In the major external problems she faces—the expropriation/compensation issue and the question of debt renegotiations—Chile has temporarily succeeded in gaining a brief respite. Yet it is evident that both of these problems may become worse over the next twelve months. The Chilean and U.S. positions on the issue of compensation for seized U.S. copper companies remain incompatible. Allende had originally pledged in July 1971 that compensation would be made. By late 1971, however, Chile had decided to assess the copper companies, retroactively, $774 million in excess profits taxes and informed them that this decision was not appealable. The official U.S. position has been to consider this action as nationalization without compensation. But the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. government agency charged with insuring private U.S. investment abroad, has

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not yet paid compensation to the affected companies. Meanwhile, some of the companies have taken retaliatory measures. In March 1972, Anaconda, following Kennecott's example, attached the assets of several Chilean-owned firms in the United States for nonpayment of debts stemming from the expropriations. (Such attachments could prove painful in time to Chile, since the Chilean companies will find it difficult to purchase replacement equipment for use in the mines.) In response, Chile resumed some compensation payments to Kennecott in late March and had Kennecott's attachments vacated.

The problem of debt renegotiations, which had threatened for many months to push the United States and Chile toward a direct confrontation, has temporarily been resolved by the April 30 agreement in Paris. The United States and eleven other creditor nations agreed to grant Chile a major degree of credit relief. They decided that she need pay only 30 per cent of all her debt and interest payments falling due from November 1971 through December 1972, and would have six years to repay these debts in full. Chile, in turn, promised "just compensation for all nationalization, in conformity with Chilean and international law." The creditors also promised to study "with goodwill" the refinancing of those debt payments that fall due in 1972.

While Chile has thus obtained temporary relief on debt payments and secured some new loans, her debt problems remain an important irritant in relations with the United States. Negotiations over debts which fall due in 1973 will undoubtedly be resumed in the near future. Allende's financial latitude is therefore still circumscribed and he will be forced to renegotiate Chile's 1973 debt repayments shortly before the spring Congressional elections.

Even with a new debt repayment schedule, there are many reasons for believing that Chile is headed for a payments crisis. These include the flight of domestic capital abroad, the policy of increasing money in circulation while holding down industrial prices, the continued erosion of foreign reserves, and the increasing difficulty in attracting new capital from abroad.

Wayward international events, too, can have an influence on Chile's volatile political scene. For example, columnist Jack Anderson's publication in March 1972 of purported I.T.T. documents dealing with the I.T.T.'s role in Chile's 1970 elections proved to be of considerable political importance to Allende. His utilization of these documents not only put the United States and the Chilean opposition on the defensive, but afforded him a convenient pretext for seizing I.T.T.'s holdings in Chile, which amounted to about $200 million. His blatant attempt to stir up popular support for his regime was evident in all of the government pronouncements on the affair.

Allende has had to rely heavily in the past year on his acknowl-

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edged skill at political survival. But it appears that with all his efforts he has only attained temporary respite from his difficulties. The trade union elections in May, the slim balance of power in the Senate, the measured pressure of the United States on the compensation issue, the need to renegotiate Chile's international debts before 1973, and the watershed Congressional elections coming up next spring, all suggest that during the next twelve months the problems of the Allende Government will increase considerably.

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THE REVISED "TWO CAMPS" DOCTRINE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

by R. Judson Mitchell

THE decade of the 1960's appears, in retrospect, to have been a crisis period for the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth, marked by a number of spectacular failures in foreign policy, most of which were associated with the initiatives of Nikita Khrushchev. Eight major areas of Soviet failure may be pointed out: (1) the economic decline which affected the entire East European subsystem in the early 1960's; (2) the political fragmentation of the East European subsystem, featuring the cases of Rumania and Czechoslovakia; (3) the alienation and withdrawal of China from the Soviet bloc; (4) the general breakdown of cohesion in the world communist movement; (5) setbacks in Soviet relations with the Third World, especially in Africa south of the Sahara; (6) the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent loss of Soviet prestige in terms of both great-power and world revolutionary politics; (7) the absence of payoff by way of a political settlement in Central Europe from Khrushchev's pressure tactics vis-à-vis Berlin (although this situation was somewhat stabilized by erection of the Berlin Wall); and (8) the disastrous outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 for Soviet aspirations in the Middle East.

The Soviet leadership, not surprisingly, subjected its foreign policy to an "agonizing reappraisal"; the second half of the decade was marked by a gradual, although sometimes violent, reorientation of policy. The main lines of the resulting new approach are now clear. Its most striking feature is a much stronger emphasis on military power as an instrument of foreign policy. There are several notable indications of this: the impressive rise in military expenditures in the Soviet budget since 1965; strenuous and apparently successful efforts to establish nuclear parity with the United States; expansion of the Soviet navy and, particularly, development of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean; the deployment of nearly one million men along the Sino-Soviet frontier; the suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment by military force; and the increasing coordination of, and reliance upon, the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

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The Soviets have also sought to restore the lost cohesion of the world communist movement. They have had some moderate success in this endeavor, highlighted by the 1969 Moscow meeting of parties and the establishment of closer contacts with some of the nonruling parties, especially that of France, where the expulsion of Roger Garaudy has pointed toward a closer rapport with the Moscow line. More important initiatives during this period include the alliance with India, which prepared the way for the favorable outcome of the recent Indian-Pakistani war; overtures toward normalization in Central Europe, culminating in the 1970 treaties between the German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and the 1971 four-power Berlin agreement; and the continuation of certain aspects of peaceful coexistence policy, mainly in regard to nuclear nonproliferation and control and the attempted expansion of technical and trade contacts with the United States and other Western countries. The only other major area of interest has been the Middle East, where the USSR has gone to great lengths to redress the Arab-Israeli military balance and where the Soviets' continued presence exacerbates tensions in what is perhaps the world's most sensitive trouble spot.

Soviet policy and behavior over the last seven years thus gives much credence to Chinese charges that the Soviet Union's motivations are simply those of a great power and lacking in revolutionary substance. Moscow's approach to international politics during this period involves a mixture of conflict and accommodation and appears on the surface to be geared more to a somewhat restrictive conception of Soviet national interest than to the promotion of world revolution. This, of course, would be nothing new, as amply demonstrated by the "socialism in one country," Popular Front and Nazi-Soviet Pact phases of Stalinist foreign policy. But while this rather superficial interpretation, which is favored both by Peking and by many Western circles, may indeed have validity, it can at best demonstrate only the continuities in Soviet policy and could, perhaps, be utilized in developing a cyclical theory of Soviet international behavior. Such an interpretation can tell us nothing about what, if anything, is new in Soviet motivations governing foreign policy. For answers to questions of this sort we must turn to Soviet ideology.

Soviet policymakers operate within the framework of general systemic norms that require the justification of behavior in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ideology does not, however,

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simply serve a legitimating function; it also provides operational guidelines. The policymaker or ideological spokesman must relate a continuously changing social reality to the constants of the ideology. From a purely theoretical standpoint, the only constant in Marxism-Leninism would appear to be the dialectic. But from a broader ideological perspective, the constants would include the contradictions of capitalism and the historical progression toward the worldwide achievement of socialism and communism. The practical task of the Soviet interpreter is to analyze the changes in development of the socialist system, the capitalist system and the general world political system and relate these to the broader ideological perspective. Major foreign policy departures are then explained on the basis of that analysis. It is thus the Soviet analysis of social development that provides coherence for the general foreign policy line in any given period. Since that analysis varies from period to period, innovative ideological inputs are a common feature of Soviet foreign policy.[1]

In the last several years Soviet foreign policy analysis has been dominated by a revised "two camps" doctrine which differs both qualitatively and quantitatively from the old Stalinist formulation of "two camps" and offers a striking contrast to the "three camps" and "peace zone" analysis of the Khrushchev era.

The "two camps" doctrine of Stalin's day was intimately connected with the concept of "capitalist encirclement": it expressed the reality of the precarious and isolated position of the Soviet Union in a world where capitalism maintained an overwhelming hegemony. When Soviet isolation was most pronounced, as in the "class against class" Comintern period, 1928-1935, "two camps"— the idea of two hostile, implacable, irreconcilable forces confronting each other — was most strongly emphasized. During the early Cold War period, starting with the Cominform's campaign against the Marshall Plan in 1947, the "two camps" doctrine was again given pointed emphasis. The balance of forces in the world, while undergoing change, was still favorable to the capitalist camp; "capitalist encirclement" was regarded as a continuing reality.

Khrushchev, in 1959, declared that "capitalist encirclement" of

[1]Cf. Richard Lowenthal, "Development versus Utopia in Communist Policy," *Survey,* Winter-Spring 1970, pp. 3-27; Robert G. Wesson, "Soviet Ideology: The Necessity of Marxism," *Soviet Studies,* July 1969, pp. 64-70; Vera Pirozhkova, "The Recent Events in Czechoslovakia and the Fundamentals of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR,* October 1968, pp. 5-13.

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the Soviet Union had ended and that the victory of socialism in the USSR was both "complete and final," with no possibility for the restoration of capitalism.[2] A year later, the end of "capitalist encirclement" was proclaimed for the East European states in the Soviet bloc.[3] The announcement that "capitalist encirclement" had come to an end was based on Khrushchev's analysis of the change in the world balance of forces; from this also he conceived his major theoretical innovations relative to world politics.

Khrushchev made three significant, interrelated contributions to Marxist-Leninist analysis of the relationship between social systems: the concept of "three camps"; the reformulation of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence"; and the new doctrine concerning the possibility of the "peaceful transition to socialism." According to his reasoning, a vastly enlarged and powerful socialist camp had emerged from the Second World War, to which had been added the anti-imperialist, newly liberated countries which formed a "third camp." Not only were the countries of the "third camp" strongly opposed to imperialism; their developmental needs would necessarily incline them toward socialism. The two camps together constituted the formidable "peace zone." Under these circumstances it would be madness for the imperialists to unleash war. "Peaceful coexistence" was therefore not merely a matter of temporary respite and stabilization, but a quasi-permanent feature of international politics, pending the final collapse of capitalism.[4] Also, as Khrushchev saw it, the changed balance of forces in the world favorable to socialism and unfavorable to imperialism now made possible, in some countries, the "peaceful transition to socialism": here existing democratic institutions could be utilized for the transfer of power and the establishment, in one form or another, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[5]

It should be noted that Khrushchev did not rule out an eventual polarization of social forces; such a polarization would seem to be implicit in his expectation that "peaceful coexistence" would prepare the way for the triumph of communism. However, his formulation did nullify the *necessity* for a final cataclysmic strug-

[2]*Pravda,* January 28, 1959, p. 9.

[3]Dan N. Jacobs, *The New Communist Manifesto* (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 19.

[4]*Pravda,* February 15, 1956, pp. 2-3; *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), pp. 60-66; W. W. Kulski, *Peaceful Coexistence* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), pp. 127-137.

[5]*Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit.,* pp. 44-45.

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gle, and consequently provided an ideological basis for tactical flexibility surpassing any previous development in Marxism-Leninism. But tactical flexibility yielded a low payoff in strategic successes, and the record of foreign policy failures outlined above surely was a major reason for Khrushchev's ouster. In view of that record, it is not surprising that Khrushchev's successors have produced a new formulation of Soviet international relations theory. Still, there appears to be nothing inevitable about the reversion toward the idea of "two camps." The current version of the "two camps" doctrine seems in certain important respects to be less optimistic than the old Stalinist model.

The Brezhnev Doctrine

The experimentation of the "Prague Spring," the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the repercussions resulting from the crisis triggered the new Soviet formulation, although the Czech crisis was only one of the developments requiring a general theoretical reorientation.

S. Kovalev's front-page article in *Pravda* on September 26, 1968, which initiated the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, pointed toward a renewed emphasis on "two camps":

> Each Communist Party is free in its application of Marxist-Leninist and socialist principles but it cannot deviate from these principles if it is to remain a Communist Party. This signifies concretely that each Communist Party must, above all, take cognizance of such a crucial fact of our time as the conflict between two antithetical social systems — capitalism and socialism. This conflict is an objective one not dependent upon the will of the people and is determined by the division of the world between two antithetical social systems.

Kovalev also maintained that every communist party is responsible not only to its own people but to all socialist countries and to the entire movement of world socialism, which is "indivisible." The sovereignty of any particular socialist country cannot be placed above the interests of the world revolutionary movement. "The weakening of any link in the world socialist system" affects the entire system and this must always be taken into account.

L. I. Brezhnev, in his November 12, 1968 Warsaw speech, further pursued the concept of the "weakest link of socialism" and the idea of "two camps":

> They [the imperialists] are seeking out the weak links in the socialist front, pursuing a course of subversive ideological work inside the socialist countries, attempting to sow dissension, drive wedges between them and

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encourage and inflame nationalist feelings and tendencies, and are seeking to isolate individual socialist states so that they can seize them by the throat one by one. In short, imperialism is trying to undermine socialism's solidarity precisely as a world system.[6]

The "weakening of links" in the socialist system was attributed to what Brezhnev called "difficulties."[7] This euphemism, subsequently employed by all Soviet spokesmen in references to the "weakest link" problem, was used to describe social phenomena that are otherwise universally identified in Marxist theory as "contradictions." Marxist theoreticians have in the past made a distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions, the socialist system allegedly being free of the former.[8] It is clear from Brezhnev's account of the "difficulties," however, that he was referring to antagonistic contradictions. Moreover, these contradictions were appearing not at the inception of socialism but at an advanced stage of socialist development.

This critical situation is diagnosed as providing an opening for the imperialists, whose basic strategy is determined by the shift in the world balance of forces. As the contradictions of capitalism increase in intensity, the imperialist camp grows progressively weaker relative to the socialist camp, and the capitalists become desperate. Unable to resort to open warfare due to the nuclear balance and the overall strength of the socialist camp, they must resort to more subtle tactics, variously described by Soviet spokesmen as "peaceful infiltration," "peaceful counter-revolution" and "creeping counter-revolution." If successful (and their failure is not claimed to be historically inevitable), such tactics will result in bourgeois restoration, "reversing the course of history."[9] Such a capitalist offensive is feasible, with the outcome presumably in doubt, "even after creation of the foundations of socialist society."[10] Although the immediate target is the "weakest link of socialism," the capitalist counteroffensive is really aimed at the Soviet Union, the center of the world socialist system.[11]

Brezhnev's prescription for the crisis produced by the "weaken-

[6]*Pravda*, November 13, 1968, p. 1. Quoted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, December 4, 1968, p. 3.

[7]*Ibid.*

[8]See Sh. Sanakoev, "The Basis of the Relations Between the Socialist Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1958, p. 27.

[9]See Brezhnev's speech to the International Parties Conference, *Pravda*, June 8, 1969, pp. 1-4, and A. Sovetov, "The Present Stage in the Struggle Between Socialism and Imperialism," *International Affairs*, November 1968, pp. 3-9.

[10]I. Oleinik, "Leninism and the International Significance of the Experience Gained in Socialist Construction," *International Affairs*, February-March 1970, p. 30.

[11]Sovetov, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

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ing of links" and the capitalist counteroffensive is a fourfold program that indicates clearly the content of the new variant of the "two camps" idea. It calls for:

(1) Intensification of ideological warfare against bourgeois ideology — i.e., revisionism and ideological nonconformity[12]— with renewed emphasis on Lenin's dictum that there are only two ideologies, the bourgeois and the socialist.[13]

(2) Strengthening the role of the communist party throughout the socialist commonwealth.

(3) Fostering increased coordination of the activities of the socialist countries in all fields — according to Brezhnev, the "sharper the contradictions between the new and the old world," the greater becomes the importance of such coordination.[14]

(4) Applying coercion on an international or interparty basis to meet immediate crises caused by the "weakening of links," through a strengthening of the socialist commonwealth's primary coercive arm, the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[15]

At the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev stated that the Warsaw Treaty Organization "has been and continues to be the main centre for coordinating the foreign policy activity of the fraternal countries."[16] Earlier, following the restoration and consolidation of system control in Czechoslovakia, he had affirmed the efficacy of coercion under the WTO aegis in dealing with the "weakest link" problem. "Czechoslovakia has been and remains a socialist country," the CPSU leader said in October 1969. "Czechoslovakia has been and remains a firm link in the socialist commonwealth."[17]

It can scarcely be imagined that the events in Czechoslovakia alone, important as they were, produced this toughening of the Moscow line and a major reordering of the Soviet approach to international politics. The Soviet leadership was threatened on various fronts, especially the Chinese; under the circumstances, it was essential to tighten control of the inner bloc.[18] Justifying the

[12]*Pravda,* June 8, 1969, p. 4.

[13]See V. I. Lenin, *What Is to be Done?* (New York: International Publishers, 1929), p. 41.

[14]*Pravda,* June 8, 1969, p. 2.

[15]"In Defense of Socialism and Peace," *International Affairs,* September 1968, p. 5.

[16]*24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), p. 11. See also Sh. Sanakoev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and Effectiveness," *International Affairs,* June 1971, pp. 8-9, and O. Selyaninov, "Internationalism of Soviet Foreign Policy," *ibid.,* July 1971, p. 12.

[17]*Pravda,* October 28, 1969, p. 1.

[18]See Michel Tatu, "L'Invasion de la Tchecoslovaquie et la Détente en Europe," in Jerzy Lukaszewski, editor, *Les Democraties Populaires Après Prague* (Bruges, Belgium: De Tempel, 1970), pp. 95-106.

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tightening in terms of the ideology was equally necessary. What is most interesting about that justification is the centrality of the admission of developmental crisis within the socialist system.

The admission of a developmental crisis points up the difference between the Brezhnevian approach and those of Stalin and Khrushchev. Stalin's "two camps" and "capitalist encirclement" formulation justified internal coercion under conditions of a seriously unfavorable world balance of forces. Although he maintained that contradictions increase during the building of socialism, his projections were based upon progressive and unilinear development: the contradictions of capitalism remained the definitive element in the struggle. Under Brezhnev, the vision of unilinear development has all but vanished and, in any case, is no longer deterministic; the contradictions of socialism now open up the possibility of capitalist victory. Although the world balance of forces has allegedly changed decisively in favor of the socialist system, neo-Stalinist methods must be employed because contradictions reappear at an advanced stage of socialist development. Thus, from the perspective of historical development, Brezhnev offers a more pessimistic view of the world than did Stalin.

Against the Khrushchevian reliance on natural processes (perhaps only on the theoretical level), Brezhnev poses the necessity for coercion. Khrushchev's concepts of "three camps," the "peace zone" and "peaceful coexistence" reflected a facile assurance that the processes of history were moving inexorably in a direction favorable to the world communist movement. Brezhnev obviously takes a less optimistic view, which has been expressed in a new formulation of the "two camps" doctrine. Over the past three years, the Soviet leadership has moved gradually to integrate all major areas of foreign policy into this revised interpretation of world politics.

The Third World and National Liberation Movements

Khrushchev regarded national liberation movements as being secondary to the relationships between the capitalist and socialist camps:[19] the progressive decay of capitalism and the growing strength of the socialist camp were the decisive variables in his historical equation. Nevertheless, the "third camp" was acknowledged to be vitally important in the world balance of forces. While communist power was viewed as the agent primarily

[19]Bernard S. Morris, *International Communism and American Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 145.

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responsible for the end of colonialism,[20] the newly emerging countries were considered as an independent and — even though they were noncommunist for the most part — progressive force. Khrushchev identified four elements in the "national front," all of them progressive: the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie, and the democratic intelligentsia.[21] These varied forces, following their own interests, would combine to defeat feudal and neo-colonial elements; this combination born of the realities of social development was tilting the world balance more and more in favor of socialism: "The national states become ever more active as an independent force on the world scene; objectively, this force is in the main a progressive, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist force."[22]

Khrushchev thus stopped short of designating the third camp as the decisive element in world revolution. That possibility had posed a crucial issue for the world movement since the early Comintern days and was at the heart of the "weakest link of imperialism" concept. The principal after-the-fact justification for the occurrence of revolution in Russia, in defiance of Marx's analysis, had been this "weakest link" doctrine.[23] Mao was thus in the great Leninist tradition, dating back to Lenin's 1916 pamphlet, *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* when he posited the centrality of the "Third World." However, in the 1960's Mao developed his own "two camps" doctrine; when he depicted a conflict between the "world town" and the "world village," he was turning the "weakest link" concept against Moscow itself. This was too much for the Soviets. The Kremlin's reply to this Maoist thrust featured those same elements seen earlier in its response to developments in Eastern Europe: polarization and subjectivism.

Soviet analysts now divide the newly free countries into three categories: those with a socialist, noncapitalist orientation; those with a capitalist orientation; and those that have not yet made their final choice. Even among the first group there are two possibilities: "either a gradual change, to the positions of scientific socialism or desertion of the originally proclaimed socialist goals

[20]Michael P. Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 45; Karen Brutents, "The Doom of Colonialism," *New Times* (Moscow), October 1961, p. 10.

[21]*Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit.,* p. 51.

[22]*Ibid.,* p. 54.

[23]*Ibid.,* p. 15.

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and movement along the road of bourgeois nationalism."[24] Missing is Khrushchev's description of a diversity of progressive social forces; there is no middle ground. Moreover, the outcome lies in the realm of contingency and not in that of historical determinism: "Which of these two tendencies will triumph depends on a number of factors, among them whether a close alliance and proper ties are set up between the revolutionary-democratic parties and all the progressive forces, including Marxist-Leninists. . . ."[25]

To Mao's contemptuous classification of the Soviet Union among the forces of the "world town," the Soviets have responded with protestations that "the World Communist Movement is the vanguard of anti-imperialism"[26] and "the Soviet Union is the decisive force of the Socialist community and the reliable mainstay of the world revolutionary and liberation movement."[27] This seems to amount to a claim that the USSR is the center of both the socialist camp and the anti-imperialist movement. It might well be recalled that Khrushchev maintained that there was not even a single center for the socialist commonwealth. "At present," he said in 1961, such a center "is both impossible and unnecessary."[28]

China

It is surely no exaggeration to regard China as the major area of concern in Soviet foreign policy today; therefore, the perceived Chinese threat must be central to the reformulation discussed here. How does China fit into the revised "two camps" doctrine? The answer is obvious: in an extraordinary application of the Leninist principle on the polarization of ideology, the Soviets have placed the Chinese, although accused of "Leftism," in the capitalist camp.

The Soviets proceeded slowly and somewhat fitfully toward this stark exclusion of the Chinese. In 1968 Brezhnev was accusing the Chinese of "revisionism," "Leftist adventurism," "nationalism" and "chauvinism," but he still included the Chinese Communist Party as a "detachment of the Communist movement."[29] In April

[24]A. Iskenderov, "New Stage in the Development of the National Liberation Movement," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, August 1971, p. 12.
[25]*Ibid.*, p. 13.
[26]Brezhnev's speech, *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents, op. cit.*, p. 26.
[27]Sovetov, *op. cit.*, p. 4; cf. Brezhnev's speech to the International Parties Conference, *Pravda*, June 8, 1969, p .2.
[28]N. S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories in the World Communist Movement," *Kommunist*, January 1961, p. 34.
[29]*Pravda*, November 13, 1968, p. 2.

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1969 two Soviet analysts, Yu. Alimov and V. Polyansky, writing in *International Affairs,* appeared to place China in a separate category, independent of the two camps:

> The Mao group in its efforts to intensify the struggle against the Socialist community is trying to profit from the contradictions between the two systems. It has openly set itself up in opposition to the World Communist Movement and is trying to organize an international "Maoist" movement.[30]

The following two years witnessed armed conflict on the Ussuri, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Peking, and the signing of a trade agreement. This mixed record was reflected in Brezhnev's remarks on China to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress. There he denounced Maoism as a distortion of Marxism-Leninism and rejected the "slanderous inventions concerning the policy of our Party and state," but he again included China within the ranks of the world communist movement and called for the normalization of relations with the People's Republic.[31]

Moscow ended its hesitation in September 1971, following the partial Sino-American détente of that summer. A *Pravda* editorial made definite the relegation of China to the opposition camp and denounced Maoism as a "petty-bourgeois ideological movement basically alien to Marxism-Leninism." More specifically, Chinese theories of "the super-powers" and of "town versus village" were ascribed to nationalistic, great-power motives as opposed to the class approach of Marxism-Leninism. The "super-powers" theory was particularly condemned as "class betrayal"; according to *Pravda,* Peking plays down the confrontation between two world systems, thus avoiding the struggle against imperialism. Because the Maoists, by their anti-Soviet policies and their ideological deviations, had placed themselves beyond the pale of Marxism-Leninism, the editorial proceeded to the damning conclusion: they had "objectively" placed themselves in the other camp.

> . . . Maoism, in its present struggle against Marxist-Leninist theory, against the communist movement and the socialist community, objectively converges with all the various political forces hostile to socialism — the imperialists and racists, the Trotskyites and reformists — forming a kind of united front with them.[32]

[30] "The Struggle Against Imperialism and Anti-Imperialist Unity," p. 21.

[31] *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents, op. cit.,* pp. 15-16.

[32] "The Word and the Deed: China's Leadership in Action," *Pravda,* September 4, 1971, p. 2.

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Relations with the Capitalist Camp

The new "two camps" approach involves an intensification of struggle between systems. However, the basic strategic considerations governing Khrushchev's formulation of "peaceful coexistence" are still applicable. Nuclear war must be avoided and any moves tending to lower tensions that might escalate into nuclear confrontation serve the interests of both camps. But, as indicated above, the capitalists, faced with increasing contradictions, have adopted more subtle tactics of subversion. The struggle now becomes, more than ever before, one of ideological conflict.[33] Since the "objective factors" have receded into the background (these allegedly favor the socialists but are no longer necessarily decisive), the strength of the socialist camp vis-à-vis the capitalist is today largely determined by the degree of its ideological uniformity and internal organizational cohesion.

The continuing efforts to reach agreements with the United States under "peaceful coexistence" have been integrated with this analysis. Such measures as the nuclear limitation and control treaties are referred to under the rubric "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds."[34] Significant international agreements with the countries of the capitalist camp reflect recognition by "Western ruling circles" of the "existing balance of world forces."[35]

The concrete political meaning of this interpretation becomes clearer when our focus turns to Soviet efforts toward "normalization" in Europe. Here the major Soviet emphasis has been the "inviolability of frontiers."[36] Since it was the East European bloc, not the Western, that was most subject to fragmentation and disintegrative tendencies in the 1960's (admitted by the Soviets in their "weakest link of socialism" discussions), it seems unmistakable that with respect to Europe the "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds" is designed to secure the stabilization and consolidation of the socialist camp.

The New "Two Camps" Doctrine

The polarization concept that forms the core of the revised "two camps" doctrine was well summarized by a Soviet analyst in the August 1970 issue of *International Affairs*:

[33]See Philip Bart, "Two World Systems Today and Tomorrow," *World Marxist Review*, January 1971.
[34]Sanakoev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and Effectiveness," *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[35]*Ibid.*
[36]*Ibid.*, p. 11.

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Since the world has been split into two opposing social camps, the decisive factor in the foreign policy of every state has been first of all its membership of one of these camps. Neither the geographical position of a state nor any other specific can deprive this social, and, in the final analysis, class factor of its determining role.[37]

That statement could easily have been written during the Stalinist era. But the developmental analysis of the present period and the conclusions drawn by the Soviet leadership add a significant element and yield a substantially different "two camps" doctrine. The main outlines of the revised version may be summarized as follows:

(1) The world is divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps, the capitalist and the socialist. There is no possibility of a "convergence" between the two social systems.[38]

(2) The center of the socialist camp is the Soviet Union; the center of the capitalist camp is the United States.

(3) The criterion for membership in the socialist camp is adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology as interpreted by the CPSU. Third World political systems that are tending in this direction may be provisionally included. All others are "objectively aligned" with the capitalist camp.

(4) International agreements with countries of the capitalist camp are feasible and desirable but they reflect the "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds" and are designed to strengthen the position of the socialist camp in the "world balance of forces."

(5) Soviet military power is the guarantor of the security of the socialist camp against overt attack by the capitalists.

(6) Since the strategic balance precludes overt conflict between the camps and since the "difficulties" — i.e., the contradictions of socialism — in the socialist camp make possible capitalist restoration, the struggle is now primarily an ideological one, with the outcome open-ended. The crucial variables for the outcome are the ideological dynamism and organizational cohesion of the socialist camp.

(7) Application of coercion across state boundaries on an interstate and interparty basis is a legitimate and sometimes necessary method for providing favorable conditions in the ideological struggle and promoting cohesion in the socialist camp.

Several important inferences may be drawn from the above formulation. First, it reflects the virtual shattering of Soviet confidence in historical determinism. Subjective factors are given a precedence heretofore unknown in Marxism-Leninism. It is ironic that the Soviet response to the Chinese challenge has been built around a subjectivism akin to Maoism, although there remain

[37]O. Selyaninov, "The International and the National in the Policy of the Socialist States," pp. 14-19.

[38]See O. Selyaninov, "Proletarian Internationalism and the Socialist State," *International Affairs*, November 1969, p. 10.

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other significant differences between the two ideological approaches.

Second, the new "two camps" doctrine involves a certain narrowing of Soviet concerns and goals, at least for the short run. That narrowing can perhaps best be understood as expressed in William Riker's concept of the "blocking coalition."[39] The struggle is still conceptualized in zero-sum terms and there remains the possibility of Soviet expansionism, as in India and the Middle East, but there is a definite movement away from the high-risk confrontations of the Khrushchev era and toward the husbanding of what Riker calls "fixed assets." The main emphasis now is clearly on protection of the organizer's base bloc and on the denial of victory to the other side.

Finally, the current emphasis on coercion as a legitimate method for promoting bloc cohesion points up the continuing fundamental weakness in the Soviet approach to integration of the socialist commonwealth. Amitai Etzioni's proposition that "the relation between the application of coercive power and the success of unification is curvilinear"[40] appears to be highly relevant for this system. If that proposition is valid (and the history of the socialist commonwealth provides ample empirical evidence in its support), we might reasonably predict continuing crises of integration at high levels of development for the socialist system. In that case, the Soviet theoretical response to the integration crises of the 1960's would itself be a major contributing factor to the integration crises of the 1970's.

[39]William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 103-104, 211-246.

[40]Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 94.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF CASTROISM*

by Jaime Suchlicki

IN the 1970's the Cuban revolution faces new and critical problems. Internally, mounting economic difficulties have inspired a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in the hope of stimulating productivity. One result has been the expanded influence of the military in society, and its increasingly important role in both economic and political life. Although the position of the Cuban Communist Party has continued to strengthen, military influence within the party seems dominant. Meanwhile, the regime pursues its aim of transforming Cuban society in accordance with a new set of values and with the ultimate end of creating a new socialist man. Externally, Cuba has moved closer to and become more dependent on the Soviet Union, but it has, at least temporarily, reduced its ongoing commitment to revolution in Latin America. Castro's leverage with Moscow has, therefore, been severely curtailed. On the other hand, the Cuban leadership is attempting to break out of its isolation in Latin America, perhaps as a means of reducing its political dependence on the USSR.

In more specific terms, the most significant recent trends have been: (1) an increase in the Soviet Union's influence and presence in Cuba; (2) a down-playing of Cuba's commitment to export revolution to Latin America; (3) a progressive collapse of the multilateral embargo; (4) a *cul-de-sac* situation for the economy; (5) growing regimentation and militarization in an effort to regain momentum; (6) a continuing emphasis on the development of the new socialist man; and (7) an institutionalization of the revolutionary role.

The Soviet Presence and Influence

Although past Cuban-Soviet relations were punctuated by frequent instances of Castro's insubordination and attempts to assert his independence, since mid-1968 relations have entered a period of apparent close collaboration and even friendliness. A turning

*This article is based on the author's Introduction to *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution*, a collection of essays on contemporary Cuba to be published under his editorship by the University of Miami Press in the summer of 1972.

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point occurred in August 1968 when Castro supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. His response to the invasion was dictated primarily by political and economic considerations. First, he came to believe that Cuba would enjoy greater protection through continued membership in the Soviet bloc than by espousing the principle of sovereignty for small countries. Second, poor sugar harvests in 1967 and 1968 increased the need for more Soviet economic aid and highlighted the extent to which Cuba's future development was dependent on outside assistance. Third, the failure of Castro's guerrilla activities, particularly the Bolivian fiasco, removed an important irritant in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. A guerrilla movement brewing in Latin America would have hindered his rapprochement with Moscow. After Che Guevara had failed, Castro could more easily accept Soviet ideas on the peaceful road to power in Latin America. Fourth, Castro's distrust of President Nixon and his policies also influenced his decision to move closer to the Soviet Union. He perceived Nixon as the same man who had connived, in 1960, in U.S. support for armed intervention in Cuba, and feared that, as the war in Viet Nam came to an end, Nixon might turn against Cuba. Finally, Castro's ideas contrasted markedly with those of the Dubcek group in Czechoslovakia. The Cuban leader considered himself to the left of the Soviets as well as of the Czechs, and therefore could not sympathize with the liberalization taking place in Prague. For internal reasons also he could not logically support liberalization abroad while maintaining orthodoxy at home.

In the months following his Czech stand, Castro's accommodation with the USSR became increasingly manifest. In November 1968 he welcomed a delegation from the East German Communist Party with great ceremony and signed a joint communiqué on the "Necessity of Fighting Against All Forms of Revisionism and Opportunism." In his yearly Anniversary of the Revolution speech on January 2, 1969, he drew up a balance sheet of ten years of revolution and concluded by expressing deep gratitude to the socialist camp and particularly to the Soviet Union for their aid and solidarity.[1]

In other ways the Cubans went out of their way to demonstrate their new spirit of collaboration with the Soviets. In June 1969 Castro reversed one of the rare collective decisions by the Central Committee of Cuba's Communist Party, namely, that Cuba would not participate in the World Conference of Communist Parties

[1]Havana Domestic Radio, January 3, 1969.

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convened by the Soviet Union. According to the new line, he sent as an "observer" to the Moscow conference Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the most steadfast theoretician of the former Partido Socialista Popular and a member of the secretariat of the ruling Communist Party of Cuba. Rodríguez delivered a speech unstinted in its praise of the Soviet Union, which closed with this pledge: "We declare from this tribune that in any decisive confrontation, whether it be an act by the Soviet Union to avert threat of dislocation or provocation to the Socialist system, or an act of aggression by anyone against the Soviet people, Cuba will stand unflinchingly by the USSR."[2]

This show of solidarity had wide implications. Several other ruling communist parties, such as the Chinese, the Vietnamese and the Korean, had refused to attend the conference precisely because its main objective was to enlist support for a crusade against Peking. Cuba's attendance and Rodríguez' statement showed support for the Soviet position — Castro was casting his lot with the USSR. This was followed by calls of the Soviet navy at Cuban ports and by the visits of Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko in 1969 and Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in 1971. In turn, Cuban Minister of Armed Forces Raúl Castro visited Moscow in April-May 1970 and again in October 1970.

In the early 1970's Soviet military and economic aid to Cuba increased substantially. The result has been greater direct Soviet influence in the island. Diplomatic observers report that Soviet technicians are now extensively involved in managerial and planning activities at the national level, a significant new departure. The total number of Soviet military and technical advisers has increased considerably, and since April 1971 numerous economic advisers have arrived. These are particularly influential in the Ministry of the Sugar Industry and the Ministry of the Armed Forces, where a joint Soviet-Cuban advisory commission has been organized. Of special significance has been the new long-term agreement between Cuba and the USSR (1971-1975) which has had the effect of gearing the Cuban economy into the Soviet Five-Year Economic Plan. Under the provisions of the new accord, an Inter-Governmental Coordinating Committee has been established giving the Kremlin considerable leverage on Cuban developments.[3] The Soviet influence and presence is therefore

[2]*Ibid.*, June 23, 1969.

[3]See Ambassador Foy D. Kohler's essay, "Cuba and the Soviet Problem in Latin America," in Suchlicki, editor, *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution* (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, forthcoming).

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more extensive today than at any other time, with the possible exception of the period immediately preceding the 1962 missile crisis.

Castro's Export of Revolution

As a result of his own economic problems as well as mounting Soviet influence, Castro has begun to turn inward. The Soviets have long been pressuring the Cubans to curb their activities in Latin America and to concentrate on revitalizing their sagging economy. Quite significant in this connection, an article in *Pravda* bluntly asserted that "the Cuban people and the Cuban Communists realize that Cuba's main contribution to the world socialist system and the general revolutionary process *now* lies in economic building and creating a developed socialist society on this base."[4]

Since 1968 Castro's speeches have been virtually devoid of references to Latin American revolutions. They have concentrated instead on domestic political and economic issues. Official Cuban media continue routinely to call for revolutionary action, but without declaring, as was customary, that armed struggle is the only way. One of the most recent publications of the Cuban-engineered Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE) urges Latin American students to devote themselves to the struggle "to its final consequences." It proposes "new forms of organization to confront imperialist violence," but it strikingly omits any reference to the once-standard demands for guerrilla warfare.

Prior to 1968 Castro had been the foremost proponent of violent revolution. Latin American revolutionaries received training in Cuba and were sent back to their native countries to lead insurgencies, and Cuba had been channeling funds, arms and propaganda to rebel groups in various Latin American nations. Even areas where conditions did not seem propitious for violence were considered targets. Castro, Che Guevara and the French intellectual, Regis Debray, advocated reliance on a group of vanguard guerrilla fighters rather than on a mass movement. They believed that guerrilla campaigns could create the conditions necessary for revolution.

The implementation of these ideas brought Castro into conflict with Moscow and the communist parties of Latin America. For several years the Soviets have called for the formation of popular

[4]B. Gorbachov, "The Vanguard of the New Class," *Pravda,* October 2, 1970. (Emphasis added.)

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fronts and mass movements. They criticized Castro's emphasis on armed struggle as "left-wing opportunism which leads the masses to adventuristic actions." In their view it could jeopardize their economic offensive in Latin America as well as their attempts to increase political influence in the area. They perhaps also were afraid of being drawn into involvements and confrontations with the United States not of their own choosing.

Most of the traditional communist parties in Latin America have followed the Soviet lead. They particularly resented Castro's claim to supremacy over the revolutionary movement and disliked his branding of communists who oppose armed struggle as "traitorous, rightist, and deviationist." Having achieved a secure and comfortable position in most Latin American countries, the communist parties and their middle-aged leaders fear that a call to violence would lead to failure, persecution and exile. They are working toward creating "the necessary conditions for revolution" through propaganda, infiltration, popular fronts and even elections, but they show little inclination to plunge into armed struggle.

All of the above circumstances have led to a reappraisal of Cuba's revolutionary strategy. Castro has come to recognize that there are "different roads to power." While not completely renouncing his original goal of exporting his own brand of communism, he has at least become more selective in furnishing Cuban support.

Latin American guerrillas, for their part, appear to have grown disdainful of Cuban leadership and interference in what they consider to be the internal affairs of their countries. In September 1970, for example, four guerrilla leaders of Guatemala's Rebel Armed Forces stated in an interview appearing in *Prensa Gráfica* (El Salvador) that they did not approve of Cuban domination of the Guatemalan guerrillas. "The unrest within our organization," one guerrilla explained, "is increasing because of the presence of Cuban fighters, who are replacing Guatemalans in positions of command."[5]

There are several recent indications of Cuba's new position with respect to Latin America. Guerrillas such as Venezuela's Douglas Bravo claim that Castro has abandoned them at Soviet urging. A Latin American diplomatic offensive has been unleashed in favor of Cuba's readmission into the Organization of American States, although Castro has rejected these overtures, vowing that Cuba

[5]Havana Domestic Radio, September 21, 1970.

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will not return to a "Yankee-dominated OAS."[6] Cuba supported the candidacy of Marxist Salvadore Allende in the Chilean elections, and Chile, among the strongest advocates of its return to the inter-American system, has renewed trade and diplomatic relations with Havana. Since relations with Mexico and Jamaica were never interrupted, there are now three countries of the OAS which have official contacts with the Castro government. Meanwhile, possibilities have arisen for quite close relations with Peru. Despite the military nature of the Peruvian regime, Cuba has praised its attempts at reform, thus seemingly accepting the existence of various paths toward socialism.

To offset his apparent move toward "moderation," Castro has given increasing attention to students in both Latin America and the United States and to American blacks. Cuban failures in Latin America coincided with the birth of the militant black movement and student activism in the United States. Castro seized the opportunity to identify with American blacks. As early as September 15, 1966, the Cuba-based Solidarity Organization of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America issued a declaration stating that "the Afro-North American movement is seeking new means of political expression, that as a result, revolutionary violence would inevitably be adopted." This was followed by numerous expressions of solidarity and support for the blacks' struggle "against oppression." In a speech in April 1968 Castro emphasized that Cuba "identifies strongly with the heroic struggles of the black in the United States because the black movement has demonstrated such vigor that it resembles the Viet Cong."

About 1,000 foreign youths, mostly Americans, have visited Cuba to help in the sugar harvest as part of the so-called Venceremos (We Shall Win) brigades. These young people have received a full dosage of Castroite propaganda. They have met with Viet Cong representatives, viewed communist films about the Viet Nam war and been subjected to the ideological views of the Cuban leaders on revolution. More significantly, they have become familiar with the techniques of terrorism and urban violence. They have thus been exposed to both the theoretical and the practical aspects of urban violence and guerrilla warfare.

Verde Olivo, Cuba's military magazine, quoted New Yorker Julie Nichaim, organizer of the "Venceremos" brigade, as follows in its issue of December 21, 1969: "All of us are involved in the same struggle against yanqui [*sic*] imperialism . . . and we know

[6] *Ibid.*, April 20, 1971.

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that we will leave here with a new dedication to bringing back to our brothers and sisters a dedication to destroy the imperialist monster from within just as the rest of the world is destroying imperialism from without."

Anxious, nevertheless, not to create a new source of tension between Cuba and the United States, Cuban officials have denied that these youngsters are being trained to foment revolution in their home country. Lately, Castro himself has been rather moderate in his public pronouncements regarding the "Venceremos" brigade. Yet Cuban officials obviously draw satisfaction from the spectacle of American youths cutting cane in Cuba, for this represents a violation of the U.S. blockade and a show of solidarity with the Cuban revolution. It also affords Castro an important propaganda weapon. Not only does it help to cast Cuba in the light of a small, struggling country oppressed by a large, inflexible power; it also offers an opportunity to influence American youths who will bring back to the United States Cuba's message: "The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution."

In general, it can be said that Castro is emphasizing Latin America far less than in the earlier days of the revolution, and that the Soviet Union and Cuba have apparently found a *modus vivendi* concerning revolution in the area. One might ask, however, whether Castro is merely tacking in the face of strong winds created by his increased dependence on Moscow and the lack of success of his earlier tactics, and whether he will not seize upon the first promising opportunity to revert to his old ways. The answer to these questions could be importantly affected by developments in Latin America. Should new guerrilla movements arise in the continent, Castro might well attempt to capture the leadership of them. Still, for the time being, Cuba is concentrating more on internal development and normalizing relations with leftist Latin American regimes.

The Collapsing Multilateral Embargo

The United States seems to be losing out in its attempt to isolate Cuba from the other countries of the Americas. Today Cuba trades freely with most of the countries of the world, including Canada, Mexico, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Eastern and Western Europe. It can also buy many American products from Canada. The Commonwealth Caribbean[7] is seeking closer

[7]The term "Commonwealth Caribbean" is used to denote the English-speaking countries of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the West Indies Associated States.

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ties with Havana. As noted above, Jamaica and Mexico never suspended trade or diplomatic relations. By 1971 Panama, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela had indicated a willingness to resume relations and to consider Cuba's readmission into the inter-American system. Should Castro continue to refrain from promoting violence in Latin America, it seems probable that relations between Cuba and the rest of the Americas might soon return to normal.

The changing nature of the hemisphere system seems also to favor the readmission of Cuba into the OAS. There is a marked upsurge of nationalism in the area, even as regional integration is becoming a reality, and more countries are evincing interest in trading with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Increasing skepticism about the worth of foreign aid, primarily from the United States, has stimulated the Latin American drive for development through efforts of the area's own choosing, including pressures on the United States for better trade terms. Latin American nationalism and anti-Americanism, furthermore, seek to distinguish between the two Americas, that of the developed North and that of the developing South. Cuba, irrespective of its ideology, fits into the latter category. If Castro persists in his "good behavior," the principal obstacle to the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system will have been eliminated. Also, as the Soviet Union increases trade and aid to Latin America, the Kremlin will expand its leverage with these countries and will be able to pressure them into trading and establishing relations with Cuba. The Soviet Union has been urging the Latin Americans on such a course. The development of closer ties between Cuba and other Latin American countries would be claimed by Havana and Moscow as a major political success and as an important step in the isolation of the United States.

A Cul-de-Sac Situation for the Economy

The many problems confronting the Cuban economy were highlighted by Castro in his speech of July 26, 1970. After acknowledging that Cuba had failed to reach its goal of a 10-million-ton sugar crop and that total production for the year would be only 8.5 million tons, he used the failure as a point of departure for deep soul-searchings with regard to the whole range of past economic policies and practices. Noting that the effort invested in the sugar crop had been detrimental to most of the other

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sectors of the economy, he cited low productivity of such vital items as milk, bread, vegetables and clothing and explained that industrial production was badly lagging behind established goals. The lack of spare parts, failures in the transportation system, and decreasing productivity throughout the consumer sector were plaguing the economy. "Insufficient production in the face of increasing expenditures," he said, "has resulted in growing difficulties." Worker absenteeism had aggravated the situation, but a too small work force also was a factor.

Castro laid the blame for the economic failures on "the bureaucracy" as well as on himself. In a calculated gesture, he told the Cubans that "we have a certain underdevelopment in leadership" and that the people could change leaders "right now, at any moment they wish."[8] He acknowledged Cuba's deepening dependence on the USSR, admitting "that we have had large imbalances in our foreign trade, particularly with the Soviet Union." In conclusion, he warned the Cubans not to expect any significant economic improvements in the years immediately ahead and demanded more sacrifice, discipline and productivity for the building of socialism.[9]

Castro's exhortations and admonitions were echoed by other government officials. Labor Minister Jorge Risquet attributed the country's mounting economic problems principally to "widespread passive resistance" by workers. Discussing the reasons for labor inefficiency, Risquet complained that there was no rapport between Cuban workers and the state administrators and Communist Party and labor union officials who were their superiors. He reported that productivity among sugar workers was so low that the cost of the 1970 sugar harvest was three times higher than its value on the world market.

Because of these difficulties Cuba's leadership is being forced to re-examine economic policies and in effect go back to the drawing board in an effort to devise more workable economic plans. Production goals are being reduced and presumably tailored to the realities of the situation. Recently the regime has been encouraging decentralization in the implementation of centrally-determined policies and programs and has shown an increasing preoccupation with economic – as opposed to social – objectives. Castro himself admitted that in the period of socialist construction certain economic incentives still had to be employed, thus signal-

[8]Havana Domestic Radio, July 26, 1970.
[9]*Ibid.*

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ing perhaps a partial departure from emphasis on moral incentives. There has also been a reorientation toward the production of more consumer goods. Nevertheless, reliance on moral incentives is continuing, primarily because of Castro's commitment to this policy and because of the Soviet Union's inability or unwillingness to deliver large quantities of consumer goods to entice the labor force to increased productivity.

The Kremlin has been unhappy with Castro's management of the economy and with Cuba's repeated failures to meet its production goals and international obligations. Castro acknowledged Soviet displeasure when, in an interview published in the Soviet magazine *Ogonek* in May 1970, he confessed that "previously we did not fulfill many pledges and accordingly — very naturally and justifiably — a certain skepticism developed concerning our economic plans."

For how long and to what extent the Soviets are going to continue to support Cuba's economy is a critical question. Moscow is committed to the preservation of the Castro regime and seems willing to continue to aid in Cuba's development. Yet the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Cuban revolution has exceeded $3 billion since 1960. In 1971 this support amounted to between $1.25 and $1.5 million per day.[10] Prospects for Cuba's sugar production remain clouded and it is doubtful whether anything as large as the 1970 crop will be produced in the near future. The 1972 crop will probably be about five million tons, almost a million tons below last year's, thus further complicating the economic picture. The Soviets are, therefore, urging Castro to put his house in order so as to make Cuba a more viable economic partner of the Soviet bloc. This in turn is resulting in growing Soviet influence and in Cuba's closer integration into the bloc.

The Growing Regimentation and Militarization of Society

In an attempt to stimulate productivity and forestall any further slackening of revolutionary momentum, Castro's July 26, 1970 speech has been followed by an increased regimentation and militarization of society. The standard holidays (traditionally of great significance in Cuban life) have been de-emphasized. Military officers have been appointed to important civilian posts — including the naming of the armed forces training director as education minister — and the armed forces have become a super-

[10]See Leon Goure and Julian Weinkle, "Soviet-Cuban Relations: The Growing Integration," in Suchlicki, *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution, op. cit.*

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agency supplying administrators for both central and local organizations dealing with political, economic and educational matters. Development organizations, both at the national level, such as the National Agricultural Livestock Development (DAP), and at the local level, such as the Camagüey West Citrus Plan, have come under the aegis of the military. In line with this trend, the army has established special centers to train low-level cadres for jobs in various national and local organizations.[11] Under the control of Fidel Castro's brother, Raúl, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces has become the most powerful and influential Cuban institution.

On the ideological front, greater emphasis is now placed on the need for sacrifice: the building of socialism demands high investment rates coupled with maximum technical and scientific knowledge and minimum consumption. The regime has thus embarked on tighter regimentation, arguing that workers' good will is not enough, and that under certain circumstances coercion is unavoidable in the interest of "building a socialist society." In his July 26, 1970 speech, Castro bluntly warned that "the next five years will be hard ones," with little hope of prosperity before 1975-1980. These pressures and demands will certainly rest heavily on the Cuban population. Yet, assuming no breakdown from internal problems, the power of the regime will continue to limit the ability of disaffected Cubans to transform their discontent into concrete resistance.

In keeping with increased regimentation and militarization, the party, which now numbers about 200,000 members, has been further streamlined and strengthened. The aim is for greater party conformity to the needs of socialist building, with principal emphasis on the acquisition of a higher level of ideological training and specialized knowledge by party members.

Here it is important to note that, although the Communist Party of Cuba is organized along classic lines, there is a preponderance of military representatives in its higher echelons, particularly in the executive organs. Coupled with this is the exclusion of "old guard communists" from leadership roles. The party is controlled by Castroites rather than pro-Soviet communists. Eighty per cent or more of the 100-member Central Committee consists of pro-Castro officers and comrades from the anti-Batista struggle. The Political Bureau (Politburo) that heads the committee is made up of six rebel army majors, including Fidel and Raúl Castro, and

[11] *New York Times*, July 9, 1970.

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only two civilians: President Dorticós and Party Organization Secretary Armando Hart. "Old guard communists" are represented in the seven-member party secretariat, but even there they are outnumbered by the Castroites.

The party is, of course, devoting particular attention to economic development. It is now involved in implementing large-scale projects by supervising the mobilization process and directing a large number of industrial and agricultural enterprises. Castro has been especially critical of the party for its inability to carry out tasks in the agricultural sector and keeps prodding for greater effectiveness in this area.[12] Until mid-1970 party members managed enterprises while at the same time exercising their political functions. Recently the two functions have been separated and now it is usual for one party official to perform administrative functions while another handles the political aspects. Perhaps making use of Mao's ideas, particularly as expressed in his essay *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,* Castro is attempting to neutralize popular discontent and to provide a more rational framework for the management of the economy. In addition to the division of functions, secret elections for trade union leaders at the local level were permitted last year. This seems to be providing a channel for the expression of workers' grievances. Reports by recent refugees indicate augmented production of such items as shoes and textiles. Yet it is too early to discern the long-range impact of these measures.

Both the party and the military have been enlisted in a fight against *burocratismo* (bureaucratism). To be a bureaucrat is said to be an enemy of the revolution. Castro and his followers take every opportunity to blame the bureaucracy for the various failures suffered by the Cuban economy. The effect of such attacks is to reduce rather than increase the efficiency of those responsible for implementing the goals of the revolution. For one thing, the attacks have almost completely destroyed the initiative of lower-echelon functionaries. Also, the demands made by the party for more sacrifices and more dedication are greatly taxing the resources of higher government functionaries, resulting, among other things, in increasing absenteeism.

Within the bureaucracy itself marked class distinctions are developing. The intermediate and high-level cadres, furnished either by the army, the party or the state administration, exercise a sort of paternalistic-authoritarian leadership at all levels.

[12]Havana Domestic Radio, March 17, 1970.

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Although it is premature to speak of a "new class" in Cuba, a new elite is emerging which enjoys living conditions that contrast with those of the average population. Better housing, clothing, transportation, and even more food are some of the privileges reserved for this group. They have, therefore, a vested interest in the preservation of the regime as well as in the consolidation of their own power and position.[13]

The militarization process has also importantly affected the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). This massive apparatus, with more than three million people out of a total of some eight million, is assigned the task of mobilizing and controlling the population. Recently combined CDR-FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias) committees have been organized. According to a government official, their purpose is "to instill patriotic sentiment into our people and in addition to do joint work in the development of our Revolution."[14]

Born a decade ago, the CDR's continue to be an organ of neighborhood vigilance. During the Bay of Pigs invasion they were a key factor in keeping the population under control and rounding up real and suspected counterrevolutionaries within hours after the outbreak of fighting. Over the years, however, they have become much more than committees of revolutionary vigilance. María Teresa Malmierca, the national organizer of the CDR's, defines them as "a mass organization that aids other state organs."[15] Just as the CDR helps the Ministry of Interior in its fight against counterrevolutionaries, so it helps the Ministry of Education in school enrollment and attendance, the Ministry of Public Health in its special campaigns, the National Bank in savings campaigns.

The CDR also has a vital role in local government, serving as a link between the municipal administration and the neighborhood. A well-functioning committee keeps an eye on the quality of services at local stores and brings shortcomings to the attention of the manager or his superiors.

In early 1968 the CDR's played a major part in the execution of the "revolutionary offensive" which led to the expropriation of close to 55,000 bars, nightclubs and other small private businesses in Cuba. The very day the government decreed the nationalization of almost all remaining private businesses in the

[13]See Lowry Nelson, "Revolutionary Changes in the Social Structure," in Suchlicki, *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution, op. cit.*

[14]Havana Domestic Radio, September 21, 1970.

[15]Prensa Latina (the government-controlled press agency), June 30, 1970.

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island, the neighborhood CDR's in country, town and city assigned volunteers to guard the local stores and officially took them over in the name of the revolutionary government. They appointed "People's Administrators" and opened the stores for business, thus assuring the nationalization in a single day.

In order to raise the ideological level of members, the CDR's have in the past year placed much emphasis on study-seminars at the neighborhood level. The Cuban government estimates that more than 1.3 million people a month take part in these seminars. Recent themes of study include Cuban history, the sugar harvest, the struggle of the Vietnamese people, the fight against bureaucratism, Cuba's new role in the world socialist system, and the need for more sacrifices to increase productivity. Still, the effectiveness of the seminars is questionable. Participants have pointed out that the ideological level of the instructors is rather low and that the population is usually bored with the repetitious and monotonous lectures.

The Development of the "New Socialist Man"

Faithful to Lenin's ideas that the school should "educate and prepare members of the Communist society," the Castro revolution is using education as the instrument to build the new society — to develop the socialist man. Speaking of the educational aims of the revolutionary regime, Party Organization Secretary Armando Hart described the objective of socialist education as "the ideological, scientific, and technical formation of whole generations capable of actively constructing socialism and communism." "The task of teaching and the ideological struggle are intimately related," he emphasized. "It is necessary to educate man against the individualistic ideology and to instill in him the work methods derived from the Marxist-Leninist concept."[16]

Creation of the new man requires a change in the values and attitudes of most Cubans. Allegiance must be transferred from the family to the party and the fatherland. The church's faltering influence must be eliminated completely. The aversion of Cubans to manual labor, together with the tradition that woman's place is in the home, must be eradicated. The belief that events are determined by nature must be transformed. The orientation toward the present must be modified.[17]

[16]Armando Hart, "Objetivos de la educación secundaria en Cuba," *Boletín de la Universidad de Chile,* June 1965, p. 26.

[17]See Jaime Suchlicki, *University Students and Revolution in Cuba* (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969), pp. 105-109.

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The new man and the new society envisioned by Castro and his regime will have to be significantly different. Devotion to the cause of communism and love of the fatherland will prevail. Man will consciously labor for the welfare of society, each working for all and all for each. The collective interest will supersede the individual one. "That is what is meant by revolution," explained Fidel, "that everyone shall benefit from the work of everyone else."[18] Racial prejudices will be eliminated. Honesty and truthfulness will guide everyone's life. The young will be taught to respect and admire party leaders, especially Fidel, and to obey party discipline. Consciousness of social duty and intolerance of any violation of social interest will predominate. The new socialist morality will preserve those virtues demonstrated by Castro's rebel army while fighting in the mountains against Batista: abnegation, a spirit of sacrifice, courage and discipline. Speaking to a graduating class of teachers, after emphasizing that communism was a question of developing human awareness as well as material wealth, Fidel described the type of man his regime proposed to create: "We will bring up human beings devoid of selfishness, devoid of defects of the past, human beings with a collective sense of effort, a collective sense of strength."[19]

The new society will be abundant in material wealth, but man will be less concerned with obtaining material goods for himself, preferring to work to produce for the whole society. "From an early age," explained Fidel, "children must be discouraged from every egotistical feeling in the enjoyment of material things such as the sense of individual property, and be encouraged toward the greatest common effort and the spirit of cooperation."[20] Not only is society to enjoy material wealth but money will be abolished. In a speech to the association of small farmers, Castro voiced his dream: ". . . there will arrive the day when money will have no value. Money is a vile intermediary between man and the products man creates."[21]

Other material incentives would similarly be eliminated. Recalling Che Guevara's preachment of the superiority of moral

[18]For this interesting speech in which Castro described some of his regime's educational objectives, see *Granma*, February 5, 1967. See also Miguel Rodríguez, "El entrenamiento del hombre nuevo," *Juventud Rebelde*, October 15, 1966, p. 3; this is the first of four articles published by *Juventud Rebelde* dealing with the development and training of Cuba's youth.

[19]*Granma*, December 17, 1967, p. 3.

[20]See Lee Lockwood's interview with Castro published in *Playboy*, January 1967, p. 79.

[21]*Granma*, May 19, 1967.

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over material incentives, an editorial in *Granma*, the official newspaper of Cuba's Communist Party, lashed out at "economism," which it described as "the tendency to consider that men produced more and better as they received more and better," and stressed that the new communist ideology will be developed only through a gigantic effort to organize the productive, social, educational and cultural activity of the Cuban people. "Men produce more and better," concluded *Granma*, "as they improve the organization of work, as technical training is improved, technological and scientific resources are more extensively employed, and Communist awareness becomes greater."[22]

In foreign affairs the Cuban masses have to be irreconcilably opposed to the enemies of the fatherland, especially the United States. Cubans should demonstrate solidarity with the peoples of developing countries, of the socialist camp, and particularly of Latin America, as well as friendship and brotherhood toward the peoples of the Soviet Union. As James Reston pointed out after a trip to Cuba, "a remarkable new generation of Cubans, more literate and disciplined than any other, is being indoctrinated systematically with the idea that the United States is the embodiment of everything that is narrow, selfish, and evil in the world today."[23] A new brand of nationalism has been developing in Cuba, a fierce anti-United States version based on intense internal struggle and commitment, not to be mistaken for more moderate Latin American versions as in Chile or Mexico.

All efforts have to be directed toward committing the younger generation to these principles, for if the drive to create the new socialist man fails, the revolution will fail too. Without the proper attitudes, the millennium cannot be reached. The Castro regime seems convinced that, under the direction of the party, education can be used as an indispensable tool in developing the ideal society. Particularly from intellectuals and writers the revolutionary leadership demands commitment to the revolutionary goals; *homo poeta* (the intellectual) must support the dominant role of *homo faber* (the revolutionary).

It is too early to tell how successful the regime has been in rooting out the old habits and the old values. A little over a decade of revolution can hardly be expected to have destroyed all that was

[22]*Granma Weekly Review*, March 3, 1968, p. 5.

[23]*The Miami News*, August 4, 1967. For a fine discussion of Cuban propaganda against the United States see Richard R. Fagen, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 20 (1966), pp. 254-271.

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"bad" in Cuba's cultural legacy. Castro himself confessed that the greatest obstacle had been creating the "proper way of thinking" in the present generation, and complained that "outside cultural values" were influencing the young because of "our massive ignorance, our low cultural level."[24] "There remains," said Fidel, comparing his present struggle against the "vices of the past" to his 1953 attack on the Santiago military barracks, "the most difficult Moncada of all, the Moncada of the old ideas, of old selfish sentiments, of old habits of thinking and ways of viewing everything, and this fortress has not been completely taken."[25]

This attack on the past has not meant a total rejection of Cuba's cultural tradition. On the contrary, the Castro regime emphasizes certain aspects of the past, such as Negro cultural contributions, as well as Cuban sacrifices at the time of the wars of independence. The cult of Marti flourishes, though Marti's writings have been carefully screened to select those which reflect his anti-Americanism and his admiration for some socialistic ideas. Nationalism guides the revolution's efforts at cultural changes. It seems as if the regime is attempting to find a new identity in what it considers "good" in Cuba's past. At the same time it seeks to preserve a continuity in Cuba's political tradition, the basic themes of which are nationalism, anti-Americanism and reformism. Castro and the Cuban leadership present the revolution as the embodiment of the ideas of the independence movement and the frustrated 1933 revolutionary process.[26] A history of Cuba written especially as a text for the members of the Cuban armed forces concluded by pointing out that the failure of the 1933 revolution proved that true progress for Cuba could only be achieved in opposition to the United States.[27] This search for a nationalistic identity is definitely influencing present cultural directions and certainly will shape the thinking of the new socialist man.

There is no doubt that the emerging Cuban intelligentsia will differ significantly from that of pre-Castro times. The latter was cosmopolitan and had been exposed to both Western and Eastern ideas. Its origins were chiefly middle- or upper-class. Today a small part of the new intelligentsia has worker and, in some instances, rural backgrounds. Its view of other cultures, particularly that of

[24]Havana Domestic Radio, April 27, 1971.
[25]*Granma,* July 27, 1967.
[26]See Jaime Suchlicki, "The Intellectual Background of the Cuban Revolution," *The Annals of the Southeastern Conference of Latin American Studies* (1972).
[27]*Historia de Cuba* (La Habana: Dirección Política de la F.A.R., 1967), p. 611.

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the United States, has been deliberately distorted to conform to the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party by reason of the unavailability of diverse reading materials and the educational policies of the Castro regime.

Going far beyond the sphere of formal education, the whole of society had to be geared toward producing the proper conditions for the development of the new man. A massive social apparatus was thus devised to mold the minds of the growing generation. It included the press, the mass communications media, social, cultural and workers organizations, and even the Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción (UMAP or forced labor camps). The party, the Union of Young Communists (UJC) and the army all provide political instruction. An article in the theoretical journal *Cuba Socialista* indicated the regime's awareness of the important role movies, radio, television and the press play in the "cultural and ideological formation of the masses."[28] University of Oriente Rector José Antonio Portuondo, writing also in *Cuba Socialista,* reiterated that the efforts of all the revolutionary leaders, beginning with Fidel Castro, were directed at making radio and television "informational and educational vehicles through which the masses could be both *informed* and *formed.*"[29]

Recognizing early that one of the most stubborn obstacles to the ideological conversion of the Cuban people was the cultural and political legacy documented in the works of Cuban writers, the Castro government launched a purge of all literature incompatible with the communist view. Not only were old textbooks eliminated but many were rewritten to justify the Castro revolution and its movement into the communist camp. The government also embarked on a massive effort to disseminate the writings of foreign and particularly communist and socialist authors.[30]

[28]Edith García Buchaca, "Las transformaciones culturales de la revolución cubana," *Cuba Socialista,* January 1964, pp. 47-48.

[29]José A. Portuondo, "Los intelectuales y la Revolución," *ibid.*, June 1964, pp. 62-63. (Emphasis in the original.)

[30]A list of books published in Spanish by the Government Publishing House includes the following: Lenin, *Complete Works,* 29 volumes; Marx and Engels, *Selected Works,* 3 volumes; Kelly and Kovalzon, *Forms of Social Conscience*; G. Cogniot, *Religion and Science*; V. Perlo, *The Empire of High Finance and United States Imperialism;* Mao Tse-tung, *On Ways of Resolving Contradictions Within the People*; A. Kahn, *Scandal in the United States*; V. Afanasyest, *Fundamentals of Philosophical Knowledge*; L. I. Gurvich, *The Role of Natural Wealth in the Development of Productive Forces*; Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War — People's Army*; V. D. Sokolovski, *Military Strategy.* For a more complete list see Ladislao G. Carvajal, "Sin libros no hay conciencia, no hay comunismo," *Cuba Socialista,* March 1964, pp. 42-52.

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Before his death in Bolivia in 1967, Che Guevara described how the educational system worked in Cuba. The process of educating the young, he explained, was twofold: on the one hand society acted upon the individual by means of direct and indirect education while, on the other hand, the individual underwent a conscious phase of self-education. Direct education was the job performed by educational institutions, the party information organs and the mass media. Indirect education consisted mainly in the pressure exerted by the educated masses and the social apparatus on the uneducated individual. "The individual receiving the impact of the social power," wrote Guevara, "realizes his inadequacy and tries to adjust to a situation. He is educating himself."[31]

Institutionalization of the Revolution

Visitors to Cuba and students of the revolution agree that Castro is still dominant. He remains "the revolution," "the maximum leader." The evidence seems to indicate that large segments of the Cuban people remain attracted by his personalized style of government. Some regard him as a protection against the state structures, resembling a traveling "ombudsman" ready to change or challenge policies of which he is the author. His lengthy speeches before huge throngs serve both as a pedagogical device and as an instantaneous plebiscite.

To all appearances, Castro is in absolute control of his government, with no other public figure in a position to challenge his undisputed authority. Speeches by ranking government and party officials are replete with laudatory remarks about the commander-in-chief. Lest the failure of the 1970 harvest be attributed to him, the government launched a propaganda campaign around the theme "Turn Defeat into Victory." The national leaders of the CDR proclaimed as their new slogan "With Fidel Until Victory."

K. S. Karol, in his recent book, *Guerrillas in Power*, asserts that one of the problems besetting the revolution is the concentration of power in Castro's hands. Karol laments the absence of "organized popular initiative" and a "concretely formulated socialist plan." As he sees it, the party and other organs of the state are merely instruments carrying out Castro's orders. He argues that Castro's leadership has created an institutional void which is at the heart of the Cuban problem.[32] The vertical political structure,

[31]Ernesto Che Guevara, *Man and Socialism in Cuba* (Havana: Book Institute, 1967), pp. 20, 24-25.

[32]K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1970).

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with power concentrated at the top in the hands of a small elite, coupled with the "de-bureaucratization" campaign, has produced a system which I. Joshua, an economist who worked in Cuba from 1963 to 1967, describes as "authoritarian centralization coupled to anarchic decentralization" — the worst of two worlds.[33] Karol also concludes a recent article with the remark that "the building of socialism cannot be the business of one man or a single group of men, however well-intentioned."[34]

The stability of the regime is based primarily on the strength of the armed forces. This is undoubtedly the most vital of the three "legs" on which the revolution stands. The other two — the party and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution — serve, under increased military supervision, to control, mobilize, socialize and indoctrinate the population. The bureaucracy that has grown up around these institutions has a vested interest in the continuity of the revolution.

Continuity of the revolution seems assured through the organization and strength of these institutions. Yet for the regime the problem of succession is a crucial one. No totalitarian regime has been able to devise a smooth system of transition, and Castro's disappearance could touch off an internal power struggle. Most likely, however, this power struggle would take place within the revolutionary ranks rather than outside them. Despite Castro's overwhelming presence, it seems doubtful that the revolution would collapse were he to die or become incapacitated. He is, unquestionably, the motor that maintains the revolutionary momentum. With a replacement the machinery might slow down but nevertheless continue to work.

Prospects

The Cuban revolution has reached a critical stage in its development. The failure of revolutionary ventures in Latin America, persistent structural and managerial problems in the domestic economy, and inability to break away from economic dependence have reduced Castro's leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. His collaboration with the Kremlin has led to the growth of Soviet influence and control within the island and to the closer integration of the Cuban economy with that of the USSR.

The recent U.S.-Soviet "understanding" concerning the Soviet

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 464.
[34] See K. S. Karol, "What Happened to Castro?," *Scanlans*, September 1970, pp. 6-17.

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naval presence in Cienfuegos and elsewhere in Cuba has demonstrated that, as in the 1962 missile crisis, the two great powers prefer to settle issues of security in the Caribbean on a bilateral basis. While Castro, unlike in 1962, has not publicly commented on Moscow's reaffirmation of the previous understanding with the United States, it is possible that this has hurt his pride and sharpened his distrust of Soviet motivations and willingness to consider Cuban interests. Even if there are no signs of such an inclination at present, this might enhance his desire to reduce his reliance on the Soviet Union and find some sort of accommodation with the United States.

Uncomfortable as he may feel in the embrace of the Russian bear, Fidel's options now are limited. Although relations with China have improved from their 1967 low, the Chinese seem unable or unwilling to take Cuba on as an expensive client. Castro's more moderate stand in Latin America and his support of Moscow's policies are decried by Peking as "revisionist" and his denunciations of Mao in the late 1960's are still remembered with bitterness and anger by the Chinese. Recently Castro dispatched various delegations to China to promote trade relations, but with little success.

Increased commercial ties with Western Europe and Japan would be a healthy development from Cuba's standpoint. However, the ability of these countries to absorb the island's sugar exports is limited, and Cuba has scant cash reserves with which to buy European and Japanese goods. Its heavy economic commitment to the Soviet Union and the East European countries is an additional deterrent to broadening the range of trading partners, while U.S. pressures on the Western allies tend to limit their willingness to trade with Cuba.

Rapprochement with the United States would seem to be an alternative for the Castro regime. It could lead to a loosening of the embargo, and, if the United States were willing to buy Cuban sugar, to access to an important and proximate market. It could also improve Cuba's security position and provide Castro with leverage in his dealings with the Soviet Union. U.S. recognition would mean an important psychological victory for Castro. In Latin America it would be interpreted as a defeat for "Yankee imperialism" and as an acceptance of the Castro regime as a permanent, albeit irritating, phenomenon in the Caribbean.

Yet a move in this direction would pose some major problems for the Kremlin. The Soviets may not be averse to some ameliora-

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tion in Cuban-U.S. relations, especially if this results in reducing Cuba's heavy demands for Soviet aid and moderates Castro's ardor for violent revolution at a time when Moscow is expanding economic relations with Latin America. But, as West German efforts to establish diplomatic and trade relations with Eastern Europe have shown, the Kremlin might be fearful that ties with the West could foster increasing independence in the Soviet bloc and lead to progressive internal liberalization. Although Cuba is not as critical to the Soviet Union as Eastern Europe, a resumption of relations with the United States and a significant weakening in Soviet-Cuban ties could be seen as leading to the eventual subverting of the revolution and the renunciation of membership in the "socialist camp." Moscow would view Cuba's possible defection as a blow to its prestige and as damaging to the Soviet power posture vis-à-vis the United States.

A rapprochement with the United States would be fraught with danger and uncertainties for the Cuban leadership, too. It would apparently require a loosening of Cuba's military ties with the Soviet Union and the complete abandonment of support for violent revolutions in Latin America, two conditions Castro is not willing to accept at this time. He perceives these conditions as a U.S. attempt to isolate Cuba and strengthen anti-Castro forces within the island, thus posing a severe threat to the stability of his regime. Moreover, the embargo engenders in Cuba a sort of siege mentality which facilitates the mobilization of the population and justifies the constant demands of the government for more work and sacrifices, while at the same time providing a ready-made excuse for economic failures. The close ties of the Cuban economy to the Soviet Union would prevent a rapid reorientation toward the United States even if this were politically feasible.

Castro, therefore, does not appear able or willing to become the Tito of the Western Hemisphere. His political style and ideology and his apprehensions about U.S. motivations make him more prone to deviate to the left than to the right of the Soviet line. His awareness of Cuba's vulnerability is reinforced by the hostile activities of Cuban refugees. Preservation of a radical position is felt to be necessary for the defense of the revolution and to encourage the anti-U.S. struggle in Latin America.

At least for the present, then, serious Cuban overtures to the United States seem unlikely, all the more so because of the prospect of a continuing erosion of the multilateral OAS embargo. Both Castro and the Soviet Union prefer to make the U.S. boycott

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an important issue in their anti-U.S. campaign in Latin America. Although of little economic significance for the revolution, Latin American moves toward re-establishing economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba are viewed by Havana and Moscow as a major political defeat for the United States, which could result in its further isolation in Latin America and its being pressured to recognize the Castro government, as well as in increased Soviet penetration of the area.

This is not to say that Cuban-Soviet relations are without serious irritants. Moscow's claim to leadership of the "socialist bloc" and its interference in Cuba's internal affairs clash with the forces of nationalism. Given Castro's personality and past policies, his suspicion, if not dislike, of the Soviets, and his desire to play a leading role in world affairs, or at least in Latin American affairs, he is likely to remain an unstable and unpredictable Soviet ally. The failure, as of now, of popular fronts other than the Chilean Unidad Popular to gain power in Latin America through ballots instead of bullets, the possible failure of the Allende regime in Chile or the Peruvian military junta, could encourage him to engage in new revolutionary ventures in the continent despite the discomfort such activities would cause the Kremlin. For the time being, however, Castro has no choice but to follow Soviet leadership while attempting to emerge out of his isolation in Latin America and improve Cuba's faltering economy.

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BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY: DEVELOPMENTALISM AND BEYOND*

by H. Jon Rosenbaum

THROUGHOUT most of Brazil's 149-year history as an independent nation, foreign policy was traditionally determined by a European-oriented elite, which sought to embellish the country's international image. Brazilian diplomats were known for their skill, erudition and devotion to legal principles, and they endeavored to impress the developed countries by creating the illusion that Brazil was a votary of European civilization and an especially pacific nation.[1] Unfortunately, however, this yielded few real advantages. With some exceptions, perhaps due mainly to its size, the established powers treated Brazil much the same as they did any other impoverished or developing country.[2]

New political forces began to emerge in Brazil as early as 1930, but it was not until the mid-1950's that they were able, with the encouragement and leadership of President Juscelino Kubitschek, to reorient the country's foreign policy. Speaking in 1958, Kubitschek expressed his dissatisfaction with Brazil's role in international affairs when he stated that "On the world scene we do not participate except symbolically in the directing of international relations, nor are we often heard or consulted. . . . All this is no longer agreeable. . . ."[3] Nevertheless, he realized that Brazil could not become a potent international influence until it underwent substantial economic development.

This conviction has endured, and Kubitschek's successors frequently have claimed that developmental considerations were paramount in determining foreign policy. During the past fifteen years nearly every Brazilian President has expressed the view that

*This article was developed from a paper prepared with the valuable assistance of Professor Brady Tyson of The American University and presented at the Yale Workshop on Brazil during April 1971.

[1]For a study of the Brazilian diplomatic corps see H. Jon Rosenbaum, "A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service," *Journal of Developing Areas,* April 1968, pp. 377-392.

[2]José Honorio Rodrigues, "The Foundations of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* (London), July 1962, pp. 324-328, and Delgado de Carvalho, *História Diplomática do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editôra Nacional, 1959).

[3]Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Seção de Publicações, *Operação Pan-Americana* (Rio de Janeiro, 1958), p. 1.

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foreign policy, if wisely formulated and skillfully applied, could produce economic benefits. However, several obstacles have affected the ability of Brazil's leaders to manipulate policy successfully for this purpose. First, the necessity of establishing a secure domestic political base often has led them to use foreign policy primarily to attract support from certain segments of the population or interest groups. Second, the definition of development and, therefore, the calculation of developmental requisites have been modified significantly and repeatedly. Third, fear of real or imagined external threats has caused the developmental goal to be subordinated occasionally. Fourth, while increased national independence and international influence have been the expected by-products of economic development, sometimes Brazil's leaders have behaved as if their country already had attained these objectives and thus may have jeopardized economic progress.

The Past Ten Years

Jânio Quadros, though he was Kubitschek's political opponent, was elected President on a platform of "more and better of the same." That is, Quadros promised a continuation of national development *and* the eradication of bureaucratic corruption. If Kubitschek was inclined toward the belief that the most efficient method of developing Brazil was to entice foreign capital and to integrate the country firmly into the Western economic system, Quadros was less certain of this. He espoused the view that involvement with the developed nations, and especially the United States, might be an impediment to development. As he wrote for a North American audience:

> . . . What solidarity can there be between a prosperous nation and a wretched people? What common ideals can, in the course of time, withstand the comparison between the rich, cultivated area of the United States, and the famine-ridden zones of the Brazilian Northeast?[4]

The "independent foreign policy" initiated by Quadros in 1961 and continued by President João Goulart was thus an attempt to combine the means and ends of Kubitschek's policy. Instead of believing that international influence and "real" independence would result only from economic advancement, Quadros thought that the development process itself might be used to increase Brazil's prestige and that an exercise of greater independence

[4]Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1961, pp. 22-23.

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might improve the country's economic position. He sought, therefore, to enhance Brazil's stature in the Third World, where there was great interest in new development models, and tried to stimulate foreign trade with Eastern Europe and Africa and attract economic assistance from new sources by declaring his independence from the Western bloc led by the United States.

At the same time, Quadros endeavored to mobilize broad domestic support for his regime while maintaining the backing of the nationalists and populists and those in the business community who had favored his election. This was an additional reason for his efforts to develop new markets for Brazilian products in the Third World and Eastern Europe and also partially explains his moves to protect Brazilian industry from the encroachments of foreign, particularly Western, business interests.

But Quadros was in office only seven months. After his dramatic resignation, in a period of national confusion, Goulart assumed the Presidency in September 1961 with drastically reduced powers. Like Quadros, he also attempted to use foreign policy to develop the country; however, in Goulart's case the directions chosen were aimed at consolidating his own position since his accession had been opposed by powerful elements within the military and by other influential members of the polity. Evidently feeling reliant upon the populist and ultra-nationalist groups and some industrialists and bankers who were concerned about competition from foreign and multinational corporations, he designed his policy to expand his base among them rather than to build a coalition such as Kubitschek had constructed and Quadros had attempted to recreate. Unfortunately for Goulart, he only succeeded in unifying the opposition and, in the process, he alienated the United States government and American private investors, which retaliated by respectively withholding assistance and delaying new investments. This would not have been critical to the country's economic development had Goulart succeeded in attracting sufficient foreign assistance and investment from alternative sources, but in this he failed too.[5]

Almost immediately after the March 31, 1964 coup which

[5]Among the important works on the Quadros-Goulart period are the following: Frank Bonilla, "Operational Neutralism," *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service,* East Coast South America Series (New York, February 1962); E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* April 1967, pp. 195-212; Newton Carlos, *Caminhos Brasileiros de Independência à Interdependência* (Petrópolis: Editôra Vozes, 1966); San Tiago Dantas, *Política Externa Independente* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1962); and Quadros, *op. cit.*

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replaced Goulart with a military-dominated government, the dramatic style and innovations characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy from 1955 onward, but particularly during the Quadros and Goulart administrations, were supplanted by less spectacular foreign policy management. Nonetheless, Brazilian policy has undergone subtle but significant modification continuously since Goulart's ouster. In 1964 it was subjected to what then seemed nearly a total reorientation and what now, with the benefit of hindsight, appears to have been largely an exigency of interregnum, during which the country's foreign affairs rhetoric was moderated and its operational mode revised. This is not to imply, however, that there have been no important substantive differences between Brazil's pre- and post-"revolution" foreign policies, for clearly there are essential distinctions at least as far as specific policies are concerned. Rather, the suggestion is that the contrast is less than generally supposed by many observers of Brazilian politics in the wake of the revolution:[6] except for a relatively brief period both before and after the coup (1963-1965), when the first priority of policy was to support the consolidation of the Goulart and Castelo Branco regimes, the basic developmental goal and "independent" nature of Brazilian foreign policy have been reaffirmed by the post-coup governments.

The most direct cause of the 1964 coup was the widespread fear that the military establishment was being subverted by unions of enlistees and noncommissioned officers supported by the government. These unions, together with other groups imagined to be subversive, such as the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) and the Peasant Leagues, were thought by many Brazilians to be communist-front organizations and the agents of unscrupulous demagogic politicians. The apprehension that Goulart was attempting to establish a "Syndicalist Republic" not only helped to produce the "Revolution of March 31, 1964" but also unified the middle and upper classes. Their anti-populist bias persists and has had an important effect on both domestic and foreign policy.

The real or imagined involvement between Goulart's government and populist, reform, radical and Marxist groups was seen as an insidious Cold War danger, to which the coup was a justified

[6]For example, Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic states that "The Brazilian Revolution of April, 1964, represents a turning point in Brazilian foreign policy." See his "Brazil's New Foreign Policy: From Nonalignment to Solidarity with the West," in Carlos A. Astiz, editor, *Latin American International Politics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 274.

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ideological response. The military and its middle- and upper-class allies not only appealed for domestic support by criticizing populism but professed adherence to the "Christian Western civilization," which they perceived as being threatened by an international conspiracy. This attracted the United States' political and economic support. Both the U.S. government and American investors had been alarmed by Goulart's brand of nationalism and populism and were relieved by his ouster.

To the new President, Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, security and development were intimately related. Brazil could not be secure until it achieved economic progress, but development could not proceed unless his government and the values it espoused were secure. Preoccupied though he was with consolidating his regime and restoring "order," he still affirmed that "We are Pan-Americanists, Westerners, and world citizens, but in everything devoted to our [national] development and to world peace."[7]

The first leaders of the "revolution"— Castelo Branco, the President; General Golbery, the strategist; and Roberto Campos, the Minister of Planning — were all admirers of American power and efficiency. They believed Brazilian development could be achieved most easily by cooperating with the United States at all levels and felt that harmonious relations were natural and represented no betrayal of Brazilian national interest.

Under Castelo Branco and his two Foreign Ministers, Vasco Leitão da Cunha and Juracy Magalhães, relations with the United States were exceptionally cordial. The Brazilians appreciated the importance of U.S. economic assistance, and a substantial increase in aid was soon forthcoming since Washington decided to grant Brazil preferred status, though not exclusive preference, in its relations with Latin America. Aware that Brazil's natural endowment and potential for development might eventually permit the country to become the leader of South America and increasingly prominent in world affairs, and sympathetic to the domestic mission of the new regime, the Johnson Administration urged a stronger international role for Brazil and offered to share with its government responsibility for Latin American security. Brazil reciprocated by fully approving the American recommendation that an Inter-American Peace Force be created to counter hemispheric subversion, by sending troops to the

[7]Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Departamento Cultural e de Informações, *Textos e Declarações Sobre Política Externa* (1964-1965) (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), p. 33.

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Dominican Republic to participate in and legitimize the 1965 U.S. intervention there, and by severing diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba. These initiatives, no matter that they were to some degree responses to economic bribes, were undertaken because they were considered consistent with Brazil's overall national interests.

Nevertheless, even within the Castelo Branco government there was criticism that Brazil was becoming too closely aligned with the United States and making more concessions to Washington and American businessmen than national interest would warrant. It should be noted that the Castelo Branco policy of approximation or near-total identification with American foreign policy was applied, in general, only to what the Brazilians defined as East-West issues. At the United Nations, for example, Brazil voted against United States-supported non-Cold War positions more often than it had under the Goulart regime.

Castelo Branco's openly pro-American posture was modified somewhat by his successor, Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva. The anti-nationalist charges to which the previous administration had been subjected were disturbing to the new leaders and Costa e Silva's foreign policy represented an effort to protect Brazil from becoming completely "Canadianized" or "Puerto Ricanized," as some critics asserted it would from continued close association with the United States. Likewise, Costa e Silva and his advisers thought it necessary to regulate foreign investors more fully to insure against denationalization of the economy, though care was taken not to discourage the private investments considered of value to Brazil's development.

The promotion of economic development quickly became the preoccupation of foreign policy. In the first foreign affairs address by a member of the new administration, Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto stated that "We want to mobilize the potentialities of this House [Foreign Ministry] in order to put diplomacy at the service of prosperity."[8] Shortly thereafter, President Costa e Silva reaffirmed that his government was committed to the mobilization of diplomacy for the purpose of stimulating economic progress, and the title of his initial foreign policy pronouncement, "A Diplomacy of Prosperity," became the principal policy theme.[9]

[8]Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria Geral Adjunta para o Planejamento Político, *Documentos de Política Externa* (15 March to 15 October, 1967) (Rio de Janeiro, 1967), p. 2.

[9]Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Gestão Magalhães Pinto* (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), pp. 13-17.

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As originally formulated, the diplomacy of prosperity was to focus on three major topics: foreign commerce, economic cooperation and technical assistance. The government was to encourage foreign commerce through the expansion and diversification of markets and exports; seek higher prices for Brazilian products sold abroad; promote commerce in Eastern and Western Europe; consolidate and extend international accords for primary products; increase commercial interchange with the developing countries, particularly those in Latin America, and improve the terms of trade between the developed and developing nations. For purposes of economic cooperation, it wished to acquire additional financial assistance, favorably alter the conditions of borrowing, and diversify the sources of aid by depending more heavily on multilateral lenders.

These aspects of the diplomacy, however, were generally replications of policies espoused by previous regimes. Technical assistance was another matter. Former Brazilian governments had sought foreign technical assistance, but none as avidly as that of Costa e Silva. The President and his advisers were convinced that scientific and technical advancement was an indispensable prerequisite for economic development and that the country had to obtain as much assistance in this area as possible. Particularly crucial, they believed, was the need to nuclearize Brazil rapidly and peacefully. Without nuclear-energy development the nation would be unable to compete economically in the future with the world powers.[10]

Throughout the Costa e Silva presidency anxiety mounted about Brazil's ability to preserve its "options" and still gain unobstructed access to modern scientific and technical knowledge. This apprehension perhaps was responsible for the most striking single policy decision of the period — to refrain from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty[11]— and for Brazil's cosponsorship of an amendment to the Moratorium on Seabeds Exploration and Exploitation calling for a "freeze" on all exploration and exploitation of the seabeds until the treaty was ratified.

Meanwhile, the government, aware that the intensity of the

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[11]For a detailed discussion of Brazil's position see H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* (London), January 1970, pp. 74-90.

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Cold War had been relaxed, sought a little room for maneuver. Costa e Silva, although firm in his belief that history, culture and geographical position bound Brazil to the Western community, emphasized that in foreign relations his country would be motivated entirely by national interest.

Costa e Silva's foreign policy largely survived his death in 1969, and support of the nation's development continues today as the avowed policy priority. No less attention is being given to the stimulation of foreign commerce, the attraction of investment from external sources, and the enticement of economic assistance. As the new President, Emílio Garrastazu Médici, said in one of his first statements dealing with foreign policy, "The essential goal of my Government can be summed up in a single word: development."[12]

Yet, Brazilian policy may be in a transitory phase, with partially fulfilled goals being replaced or joined by newer ones. Substantial economic development has been achieved and considerable political stability attained during the last few years. Although the newly acquired wealth has not been distributed as evenly as some might wish and the political stability imposed by the military may be only ephemeral, it appears that foreign policy formulators need no longer be as concerned with promoting development and generating domestic support as they once were. While Brazil is not yet economically self-dependent, and probably never will be in this era of international interdependence, the country need not conform to every wish of donor nations, such as its North American patron, in order to obtain the economic assistance, investments and political support that once were so important.[13] Likewise, the promulgation of foreign policies appealing to the masses but often harmful to the economy is superfluous, since the apparent stability of the nation is not based on public support.

The Médici Administration is staunchly defending what it considers to be Brazil's interests and is pursuing what might be termed a "Brazil First" policy. The President has sought to protect the nation's options even more aggressively than did Costa e Silva. Fear of scientific isolation has grown during the last few years, and Médici makes reference to it in almost all of his foreign policy

[12]Embassy of Brazil, Washington, *News From Brazil* (mimeo.), "Address by President Emílio Garrastazu Médici at the Ceremonies of Graduation of Diplomats of the Classes of 1968 and 1969 of the Instituto Rio Branco, Brasilia, April 20, 1970."

[13]U.S. economic assistance to Brazil has declined from $250 million in the mid-1960's to less than $100 million a year at present.

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proclamations. His speech before a graduating class of the Rio Branco Institute (the Foreign Ministry school for diplomats) is an example. In it he explained that

> . . . Brazil wishes to have its hands free in all sectors of scientific research and of peaceful application of its unlimited sources of energy, and refuses to compromise its future in binding itself to international commitments in which it is denied the rights and prerogatives allegedly the privilege of some.[14]

These words were not mere rhetoric. Médici has been more vehement than his predecessor in refusing to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has expanded Brazil's territorial sea limits to 200 miles in order to protect the nation's security and contiguous-zone resources, and has advocated collective action by the developing countries to promote their interests at meetings of the Special Latin American Coordinating Committee (CECLA) and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC). Not only is the decree concerning the 200-mile sea limit the strongest put forth by any Latin American country, since it is a territorial claim which includes jurisdiction of overflights, but the Brazilian government has proselytized both in Africa and at the Montevideo conference on the sea for the 200-mile limit, which is now accepted by nine Latin American states.[15]

The government's increasingly assertive and neo-independent foreign policy seems to have a purpose beyond the expression of national independence and the promotion of the economy — namely, the expansion of the country's international influence.[16] President Médici appears to believe that Brazil is now emerging as a great power and that by the year 2000 it will attain the status of a world power. He reputedly is supported in this belief by his Foreign Minister, Mario Gibson Barbosa. The latter, thought by many to have been a proponent of the "independent" course taken in the early 1960's, would also like to convert the country's

[14]Embassy of Brazil, *op. cit.*

[15]The first 100 miles from the Brazilian coast may be fished only by Brazilians or by foreign nationals employed by Brazilian firms. A license from the Brazilian authorities is needed by foreigners wishing to fish in waters located 100 to 200 miles from the coast. These regulations may be particularly damaging to foreign firms that have traditionally sought to catch shrimp within the first 100 miles off the Amazon coast. Several U.S. companies have been catching shrimp in this area.

In March 1972 reports circulated that the United States and Brazil had come to an agreement designed to prevent the seizure of American vessels fishing in waters claimed by Brazil. Details of this agreement are not available at this time.

[16]Brazil's international power, present and future, is analyzed by Pimental Gomes in *Porque Não Somos uma Grande Potência?* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965) and *O Brasil Entre as 5 Maiores Potências* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Leitura, 1969).

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new wealth into international stature. Nevertheless, other policymakers evidently do not fully share the President's enthusiasm for Brazil's aggrandizement. Some military officers are more concerned with employing foreign policy for the purpose of eradicating or controlling Latin American terrorism and preventing the appearance of additional Marxist or populist regimes in South America. Delfim Netto, the Minister of Finance, as befits his position, reportedly would prefer that policy continue to serve primarily as an instrument for the furtherance of economic development.

Despite these and perhaps other disagreements among policymakers, the view prevails that Brazil must circumvent, destroy or gain access to the preserves of privilege the developed countries have monopolized for so long. The current leaders realize that it is not yet a member of the exclusive club composed of the industrialized nations and that it has different interests, but they refuse to accept the permanence of its exclusion and are intent upon doing their utmost to protect its prerogatives.

At present, Brazil is depending upon a variety of tactics to further its international standing and to preserve its options. To enhance its power it is seeking strength in numbers and therefore associating more and more with nations having similar interests, particularly in Latin America. Moreover, the Médici regime has not been content merely to espouse a policy but has often attempted to convert other nations to the same position, forming shifting informal alliances that are evidently calculated to disperse any retaliation for this behavior. To coordinate policy, discussions with other Latin American countries are being conducted on a bilateral basis, in part because Brazil became somewhat disenchanted with multilateral channels when the 1971 OAS meeting on terrorism and political kidnaping failed to support the Brazilian government's position. The Médici Administration recently invited Latin American foreign ministers to visit Brazil individually for consultations.

This branching out does not necessarily mean that the so-called special relationship with the United States upon which Castelo Branco, and to a lesser extent Costa e Silva, relied is being terminated. If the flexibility of the current policy is any indication, there may be a measure of agreement with Washington, particularly on peripheral issues that do not concern Brazil greatly. However, the United States will probably find it difficult to persuade Brazil to adopt positions that are against its interests;

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mutual need will most likely be the only rationale for cooperation on subjects the Brazilians consider important.

Some Projections for the Next Ten Years

What Brazil will do with its expanding economic and military power is causing anxiety among the country's smaller and weaker South American neighbors and considerable interest in other foreign capitals.[17] The remainder of this article will therefore be devoted to a discussion of the possible courses Brazilian foreign relations may take in the coming ten or fifteen years.

Commentators never seem to tire of observing that Brazilians are concerned more with the future than with the present or the past. This generalization is certainly accurate when applied to most Brazilian and non-Brazilian authors who write about Brazil's foreign relations. Spanish-American writers who analyze their own nations' foreign policies favor the historical and legal approaches. Often, former victories are acclaimed anew, past defeats excused, and ancient disputes reconsidered. Only in Brazil can a bookshop browser find numerous works that deal with the contemporary and prospective foreign policies of a Latin American country. Elsewhere in the region the only foreign policy books he may come across will discuss hemispheric problems, United States foreign relations, and even Brazilian imperialistic ambitions.

During the past decade a multitude of articles and books, some scholarly and others polemical, have either ascribed to Brazil certain expansionist designs which it will seek to realize alone or in consort with other nations, or have recommended that Brazil achieve greater international influence by joining or forming alliances. Additional predictions and prescriptions have been expressed by Brazilians and other Latin Americans in speeches and casual conversations. The following is an attempt to categorize and appraise these alternative, but not always mutually exclusive, Brazilian foreign policy futures. Only the most commonly mentioned prospects will be discussed, and the reader is cautioned at the outset that none or not even a combination of these future policies may be adopted eventually. They are delineated here simply to stimulate further thought about the direction of Brazil's foreign policy.

[17]For a brief discussion of Brazil's projected international status in which little mention is made of foreign policy, the reader may refer to James Theberge, "Brazil's Future Position in the Hemisphere and the World," *World Affairs*, June 1969, pp. 39-47.

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Prospect I: "Mexicanization" or a Cordially Independent Foreign Policy

It is difficult to determine exactly what influence foreign policy has had on Brazilian economic development. The policies followed may have contributed to the country's current rapid economic growth, retarded it, or had little effect upon it at all. Most likely, however, Brazil's present leaders are generally content with their foreign policy because it *seems* that it has been fairly successful in promoting economic development. Thus, the incumbent regime or a succeeding one of similar political complexion may hesitate to alter policy radically if economic development remains the guiding focus.

The Médici Government realizes that its policy options are limited. Brazil, although now relatively prosperous, could hardly divorce itself entirely from the Western economic system and expect to maintain its current dramatic rate of growth. For the near future it still needs the investments and technological transfers that only the large multinational corporations, Western-dominated multilateral lending institutions, and developed North Atlantic countries seem willing to provide in appreciable amounts.

Nevertheless, the present government and those regimes that follow may seek subtle increases in the nation's freedom of action. The already observable tendency toward a more independent stance and a "mature" relationship with the United States, in which some transactions are harmonious and others marked by dissension, may continue. Given both the internal dynamics of the military officer corps and the nationalist sentiments that characterize one of its factions and are shared widely by other influential members of the society, policy formulators may feel that it is politically comfortable to behave more independently in foreign affairs as long as this does not jeopardize Brazil's relations with the developed Western nations.[18] A modest degree of nonalignment might also be advantageous in attracting the cooperation of the developing countries when Brazil confronts the developed powers on economic issues.

So far the Médici Administration has taken care not to antagonize the United States unnecessarily — in the style of policy

[18]After the 1964 revolution many proponents of a more independent foreign policy for Brazil wrote in the journal *Política Externa Independente*. Most of these articles favored a return to the type of policy practiced by Quadros and Goulart. The journal has ceased publication.

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practiced skillfully by the Mexicans for the past thirty-five years.[19] Although maintaining a posture of independence in foreign affairs, Mexican governments have guarded against provoking the United States intentionally. In addition, while Mexico has often adopted positions contrary to those favored by Washington, it has refrained from organizing or leading other nations that may also disagree with American policy. Occasional disputes between Mexico and the United States have arisen, but acrimonious relations have been prevented because both countries have been tolerant and cautious.

Of course, there are some unique aspects to Mexican-American relations that may prevent the Mexican model from being applied successfully in Brazil, the most important perhaps being the guilt many Americans feel about their country's former imperialistic reach south of the Rio Grande. These emotions may account, at least in part, for America's indulgence of Mexican independence in foreign affairs. Moreover, Mexico's proximity to the United States has no doubt caused it to be circumspect. These distinctions, however, do not preclude Brazil's adapting the Mexican model. Brazil's size and continental importance could be a sufficient inducement for the United States to treat it as a "mature partner" — unless its leaders persist in proselytizing for policies Washington considers repugnant.

However, the Brazilians seem intent upon trying to play a leadership role in Latin America and the developing world, and the complete "Mexicanization" of the country's foreign policy, including refraining from proselytizing, might lead to the forfeiture of this opportunity. Symbolic acts of national freedom or polite opposition to the policies of the great powers may not be forceful enough to generate enthusiasm among potential followers in the Third World. Neither might such a policy satisfy the desires of some Brazilian nationalists.

On the other hand, a "Mexicanized" foreign policy could represent an expedient compromise between nationalist aspirations for great-power status and the present Brazilian reality. Brazil would not be a satellite nor would it risk being economically isolated from its traditional trading partners and aid suppliers.

The rhetoric and symbolic acts of antagonism that alienated the

[19]Brazil's relations with Mexico are treated in Alfonso García Robles, "Las Relaciones Diplomáticas entre México y Brasil," *Foro Internacional* (Mexico City), January-March 1964, pp. 347-378.

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United States during Brazil's previous experience with an independent foreign policy could not be employed if a policy of cordial independence based on the Mexican example were to succeed. Such an approach would have to be undertaken by a pragmatic, sober and stable Brazilian regime, willing to subordinate its independence temporarily and only partially for a tangible goal such as the continued attraction of investments and assistance from traditional external sources.

Prospect II — "Fortress Brazil" or a Form of International Withdrawal

While Brazilians, preoccupied with their vast territory's development, are looking inward currently, foreign relations certainly are not being ignored. Yet a few forecasters — whose prediction is not taken seriously by many — believe Brazil may retreat from active participation in world affairs. Some of these prophets suggest an almost total isolation; others foresee a selective withdrawal.

Conditions much different from those prevailing today would have to exist for Brazil consciously to adopt a policy of disengagement, whether complete or not. Such a choice would represent a dramatic abandonment of the country's traditional aspiration for increased international influence. This type of policy, therefore, if adopted voluntarily, would need to be motivated by fear or despair. If Brazil's leaders thought, for instance, that they were surrounded by hostile neighbors or were being unfairly and unbearably criticized by the international community, they might assume an insular position. A national paranoia might develop which would find legitimacy in a reinterpretation of the current doctrines of "security and development."

Brazil's isolationist foreign policy might be defended in a manner similar to that used by Portugal in rebutting criticism of its colonial policy. Brazil might argue that it (like Portugal) is defending Western civilization while the United States and the West European nations naively ignore the international communist menace. Brazilian nationalism would tend to become chauvinistic and xenophobic, and the existing "security consciousness" of the armed forces and their supporters might become an obsession and an official state ideology.

For this to occur, the international political environment and the perceptions of the Brazilian leadership, or the leadership itself, would have to be drastically transformed. Nevertheless, there are

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some slight indications that such a metamorphosis may be in the offing. The Brazilian government is being censured by the international press for allegedly mistreating political prisoners and for other acts of political repression. Several South American countries are currently ruled by populist or Marxist regimes that Brazil finds ideologically alien. In turn, these governments hardly look with favor on the politics being practiced in Brazil. Yet the Latin American countries — unlike the United States and some European nations — have not publicly expressed their distaste for the Brazilian government's repressive policies, and even Peru and Chile are cooperating with Brazil in several joint enterprises such as the espousal of the 200-mile territorial sea limit.

A policy of nearly absolute isolationism could harm Brazil by jeopardizing its economic development. For example, it produces only 40 per cent of its petroleum needs and has about twenty years of known reserves; an insularity that included a refusal to trade with oil-exporting nations could be disastrous. On the other hand, partial withdrawal might not be so injurious to the country's welfare and might even have some fringe benefits. Other nations, such as the Soviet Union, Communist China and Rhodesia, have been segregated from most of the world or have chosen solitude at one time or another, and their economies have not been severely damaged. It might even be argued that a policy of relative isolation based on real or imagined fear can inspire greater nationalism, which can motivate a population (as in the case of Cuba) to accept discipline and sacrifice willingly for the national cause. This resolution can be of substantial value to a developmental effort.

Still, voluntary isolation is only a vague possibility. Brazil is currently using trade and private foreign investment on a larger scale than ever before and broadening its contacts with Europe and the rest of the world in its drive to industrialize. Until the Latin American countries begin voicing concern for the Brazilian government's repressive domestic policies and these same policies interfere with arms sales and investments from Europe and the United States, or until economic sanctions are instituted, Brazil is unlikely to retreat from the world.

Prospect III: *Privileged United States Satellite*[20]

During the Castelo Branco years some Brazilian nationalists and

[20]This "prospect" is discussed in Rogelio García Lupo, "Brazil and the U.S.: The Privileged Satellite?," translated from Montevideo's *MARCHA* in *Atlas*, November 1965, pp. 286-287.

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foreign commentators asserted that Brazil was accepting the role of the United States' primary South American subordinate. In fact, ever since the turn of the century many South Americans, particularly Argentines, have assumed that a special relationship has existed between Brazil and the United States,[21] whereby Brazil, as Washington's loyal junior partner or chief agent in South America, was benefiting from American largess more than any other Latin American nation. But while it is true that a warm relationship with the United States was fostered by Brazilian Foreign Minister Rio Branco at the beginning of the century and that Brazilian participation on the Allied side in World War II was appreciated by the United States, Brazilian-American relations have not been extraordinarily amicable throughout the 1900's. Since World War II Brazil has not been the chief Latin American beneficiary, on a per capita basis, of U.S. foreign assistance or private investment, and until 1960 the economic assistance provided by Washington was meager. If a privileged satellite relationship ever existed, it was during the period immediately following the 1964 Brazilian "revolution," and even then complete subservience to Washington's wishes was not forthcoming. It would be difficult to prove that the Castelo Branco regime's initiatives on certain issues were taken in return for economic favors from the United States.

In recent years, the United States has had "correct" relations with Brazil but has been increasingly careful not to become too closely identified with the nondemocratic Costa e Silva and Médici regimes, and Brasilia and Washington have had bitter disagreements about several matters, including instant coffee exports to the United States, arms control, territorial sea limits and terrorism.

However, it is always possible that Brazil may try to become a privileged U.S. satellite. In such a configuration Brazil probably would accept the United States' ideological leadership and would be assigned the task of suppressing communist subversion in South America. In return, it would expect to be treated as a favored nation by the United States and receive a large share of American assistance to the area.

[21]So many countries are supposed to have had "special relationships" with the United States, it often seems that the phrase is meaningless. In a recent article it is stated, for example, that the United States and Chile have had a "special relationship." Claudo Veliz, "The Chilean Experiment," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1971, p. 452.

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This type of alliance, which probably would not be formally announced, most likely would be supported only by a Brazilian government which believed that it had to participate in the defense of "Western civilization," at a time when political terrorism appeared uncontrollable and increasingly menacing. A rightist government under such circumstances might feel compelled to sacrifice some of its independence in order to secure substantial U.S. support. The establishment of Marxist or populist regimes in the majority of South American states might also provoke a rightist regime into accepting almost any American terms in order to obtain assistance.

Although some Brazilian geopoliticians believe that such an arrangement would be mutually advantageous, and that the United States should be encouraged to delegate authority to their country, it is unlikely that the conservative nationalist military rulers of Brazil would find an outright dependency relationship acceptable. Certainly if such an arrangement included the relaxation of restrictions on American investors, Brazilian capitalists could be expected to object strenuously unless they understood that their very existence was endangered by some threat to the present economic system.

Clientalism, nevertheless, is an established part of Brazilian political culture, and a foreign patron might be unconsciously sought. Needless to say, a more populist regime than the one now in power would find it even more difficult to enter into a patron-client arrangement with the United States. Any attempt to do so would alienate many of such a regime's supporters who would not countenance the conspicuous sacrifice of the country's independence.

It is difficult to imagine Brazil acting as the United States' South American policeman without the approval of Argentina. Argentine ambitions in the southern part of the continent have not dissipated greatly, and Brazilian involvement in the internal affairs of Bolivia and Paraguay, in particular, would hardly be favored by Buenos Aires unless Argentina were a participant. More important, one would imagine that the U.S. experience in Viet Nam will make Washington cautious about sponsoring or becoming involved in any large-scale South American counter-insurgency operations.[22] Finally, it is doubtful that Brazil will

[22]Many Latin Americans, however, were alarmed by President Nixon's 1971 statement, issued during President Médici's visit to Washington: "We know that as Brazil goes so will go the rest of the Latin American continent." They interpreted these words as meaning that Brazil had American approval or sponsorship for the establishment of hegemony over the continent.

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ever again be content to be a satellite of any nation; Brazilians would be insulted if their country were so considered.

Prospect IV: *"The Greater Eastern South American Co-Prosperity Sphere" or Expansionism*[23]

Brazil's dynamic economic growth and the relative weakness of its South American neighbors might provide the basis for a policy of expansionism. Military dominance or economic and political tutelage might be rationalized easily. For example, Brazil's leaders might convince themselves that it was their mission to "liberate" certain neighboring countries from the scourges of "chaos, corruption and communism," or they might depend on "self-defense" for a justification. They might even argue that it is Brazil's manifest destiny to unite the weak and divided Spanish-speaking South American countries for the purpose of mutual development.

The growing realization that Brazil is becoming more powerful daily in relation to its neighbors has provoked some fear and suspicion. It is much larger than it was in 1494, and although this territorial growth has been achieved peacefully and large underpopulated areas still exist, some South Americans wonder whether it has additional territorial ambitions the satisfaction of which may require the use of force.

Bolivians have trepidations about Brazil seizing the rich Oriente oil fields. Similarly, Paraguayans think Brazil may be covetous of their hydroelectric energy sources. Throughout the Plata region there is apprehension that Brazil will seek to establish suzerainty over the area. Only in Chile and Ecuador, the two countries not bordering on Brazil, and in Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, which are distant from Brazilian population centers, is there less alarm.

The distrust felt by nearby countries has been engendered in part by the publications and remarks of some Brazilian military officers. Examples are the following statements attributed to an elderly colonel: "I am only in favor of one nationalism, the imperialism of Brazil"; and to a naval engineer: "Imperialism is the external manifestation of nationalism. What is nationalism for us

[23]There is an extensive body of literature dealing with alleged Brazilian imperialist designs. For examples consult the following: Raúl Botelho Gosálvez, *Proceso del Imperialismo del Brasil* (La Paz: publisher unknown, 1960); Santiago Hechen, *Proyección Internacional de Brasil* (Sante Fe, Argentina: Libería y Editorial Castellví, 1964); and Limeira Tejo, *Brasil: Problema de um Continente* (São Paulo: Emprêsa Gráfica Carioca, 1964).

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is imperialism for Paraguay."[24] Likewise, the frank advocacy of expansionism by certain Brazilian intellectuals, such as P. H. da Rocha Corrêa,[25] and rumors of impending Brazilian invasions, such as those provoked by the Uruguayan Tupamaro kidnaping of Brazilian diplomat Dias Gomide in 1970, have done nothing to reassure Brazil's neighbors.

Despite Brazilian insistence that the country has no aggressive intentions, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances that might lead to armed intervention by Brazilian forces in the affairs of neighboring states. Continued instability or the election of a Chilean-style regime in Uruguay could stimulate Brazil to react forcefully,[26] as could the establishment of a Marxist regime in Guyana. If Venezuela were to seek a settlement of its border dispute with Guyana by force of arms or if Brazilian guerrillas were permitted to use neighboring countries as havens, the Brazilian military might be prompted to act. On its part, if Brazil were to decide that it required a cheap and relatively close source of petroleum to augment its own production, the seizure of Bolivia's Santa Cruz wells might be sanctioned.

Having mentioned these possibilities, one must emphasize that there are strong restraints against them. Nonintervention seems firmly established as a principle of both Brazilian foreign policy and inter-American relations, and the current Brazilian government affirms adherence to it.[27] The overt violation of another country's sovereignty would almost certainly be censured by the Organization of American States and, if moral suasion were unsuccessful, some type of collective action would no doubt be organized.

Although Brazil's industry may need markets and sources of raw materials abroad, it is hard to conceive of a resort to force to obtain them. Bolivia's Santa Cruz oil would be expensive to transport and would not fully meet Brazil's increasing needs, and

[24]Mário Afonso Carneiro, "Opinião militar," *Cadernos Brasileiros,* November-December 1966, pp. 324-338.

[25]Rocha Corrêa offers detailed justifications for Brazilian expansionism in *O Brasil e as Guianas* (Catanduva, São Paulo: Irmãos Boso Editôres e Livreiros, 1965) and *Rumos do Brasil* (Catanduva, São Paulo: Irmãos Boso Editôres e Livreiros, 1965).

[26]During the 1971 Uruguayan presidential election it was widely believed in Uruguay that a victory of the leftists would result in a Brazilian invasion. The Brazilians exercised caution, however, and even canceled planned military exercises near the border in order to calm Uruguayan suspicions.

[27]During his July 1971 tour of Central America, Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa stressed that his country had no expansionist intentions. He explained that Brazil was preoccupied with its own problems: agricultural production, industrial development, illiteracy and national integration.

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the country has adequate hydroelectric sources without those possessed by Paraguay. Intervention in the Venezuela-Guyana dispute, which is currently being negotiated, would alienate Venezuela, an oil supplier. While Guyana has attempted to attract Brazilian support for its case, the Brazilian government has not become involved, despite some sympathy because of Guyana's weakness.[28] As for direct Brazilian intervention in Uruguay, that small buffer state, like Belgium, would probably elicit the moral support of much of the world and the action would almost certainly provoke armed involvement with Argentina. After the Tupamaro kidnaping of Gomide, Brazilian emotions ran high for a time, and there was talk of imminent invasion, but the government soon relaxed its attitude and Brasilia will in all likelihood continue to be circumspect in its relations with Montevideo.

From the present perspective the only real possibility, and it is a slight one, is a Brazilian intervention resulting from Bolivian political instability. Since many Latin Americans think that Bolivia is politically and economically unviable and that it might be better if it did not exist as an independent entity at all, Brazil might be able to exercise its will over Bolivia — if intervention did not include the use of armed force and did not arouse a vigorous, organized retaliatory effort by other hemisphere nations.

Nevertheless, Brazil may be interested in expanding its informal sphere of influence. It is now the industrial power of the continent, and its exports to neighboring countries are in growing demand. Eventually Brazil may establish trade preferences with its less developed neighbors, thereby promoting a co-prosperity sphere. Trade ties and respect for Brazilian economic development may also foster cultural contacts and penetration. In the Santa Cruz area of Bolivia Portuguese is already spoken by many residents, although the city's expanding population is composed mainly of immigrants from northern Argentina and Bolivian highland Indians. A cultural and economic sphere of influence would most likely include the poorest of Brazil's neighbors, Paraguay and Bolivia,[29] but might eventually attract Uruguay if

[28]The Guyanese government is constructing the first road link to Brazil, perhaps in the belief that this will allow Brazil to provide assistance in the event of a Venezuelan attack.

[29]It was reported that many Brazilians were pleased by the 1971 Bolivian coup led by President Hugo Banzer because they expected the new government to encourage the importation of Brazilian products. Offers of technical and financial assistance were made by the Brazilian telecommunications authority (EMBRATEL) and there was renewed activity by the Banco do Brasil in Bolivia. "Bolivia: Changing Step," *Latin America,* September 10, 1971, pp. 292-293.

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Brazilian industrial development continued to outpace the growth of the Argentine economy. Though the present Brazilian Foreign Minister, Gibson Barbosa, has stated that his country is against "the division of the world into spheres of influence," he has also declared that "In her new diplomatic policy, Brazil considers her progress inseparable from the enrichment of all Latin America."[30]

Prospect V: Luso-Tropical Alliance[31]

For at least a decade the Portuguese have been seeking to generate closer relations between their country and Brazil. Although Lisbon's policy has been inspired by an awareness of a shared cultural heritage and a desire to promote trade with its former colony, some Portuguese leaders also have been courting Brazil in the hope that the Brazilians will assist them in retaining their African territories. Portugal is engaged in costly wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea and knows that Brazil's manpower and geographic proximity to Africa would be useful if Brazil were committed to the Portuguese cause.

The Brazilians have preferred not to become involved in the African struggle and, at times, have tried gently to persuade the Portuguese to grant independence to their African possessions. Nonetheless, some Brazilian military leaders, fearful of Soviet naval penetration in the South Atlantic and communist influence in West Africa, have been cautious in opposing Portuguese activities in Africa. The specter of communist guerrillas seizing control of Angola and Guinea is alarming to those who participated in World War II and are conscious of Africa's strategic importance for Brazilian security.

Other Brazilians support a strengthened Portuguese-speaking commonwealth because they feel that it could be the world's salvation. They believe the world is menaced by a racially-inspired holocaust which can be prevented by a united Portuguese community. The Chinese, American, Russian, and other peoples are

[30]Quoted in "Brazil Asks End to Inequalities," *The Times of the Americas,* April 28, 1971, and "Brazil Hails New Diplomacy," *ibid.*, May 12, 1971.

[31]The Luso-Tropical alliance is discussed in the following: Eduardo Metzner-Leone, *O Brasil e o Colonialismo Português* (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Olímpica Editôra, 1962); José Beja Neves, "Projecção Futura da Comunidade Luso-Brasileira," *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa,* January-December 1969, pp. 23-34; Gilberto Freyre, *Um Cultura Ameaçada: A Luso-Brasileira* (second edition; Rio de Janeiro: Edições de Cultura da C.E.B., 1942); Gilberto Freyre, *Uma Política Transnacional de Cultura para o Brasil de Hoje* (Minas Gerais: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Minas Gerais, Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1960); Amilcar Alencastre, *O Brasil, a África e o Futuro* (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1969).

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racists, they argue, but the Portuguese-speaking populations of Brazil, Portugal, Timor, Angola, Mozambique and Macão are racially tolerant. Miscegenation, they claim, has been practiced wherever the Portuguese have settled and is proof that cultures with Portuguese traditions harbor no feelings of racial prejudice.

Whether these assertions are valid or not — and there are many reasons for doubting them — it is fanciful to conceive of the scattered islands of Portuguese influence, most of which have also been affected by other cultures, protecting the world from racial conflagration. If there were to be a racial conflict of international proportions, it might well begin because of Portugal's reluctance to grant independence to its African colonies.

In any event, it is unlikely that any Brazilian government would encourage or participate in a romantic, crusading Luso-Tropical alliance, especially one that meant Portuguese leadership and partial Brazilian responsibility for the administration of Portugal's African colonies. Such an arrangement would benefit Portugal far more than Brazil. Independent Black African states would be alienated and oppose a leadership position for Brazil in the Third World. Perhaps more important, Brazil's own black and racially mixed population would be revolted, and the country would be identified with colonialism in world opinion.

A much more likely prospect is that Brazil will attempt to mediate between Portugal and its African provinces. In 1964 President Castelo Branco subtly hinted that his government would be pleased to serve as a mediating agent.[32] While this offer was not accepted by the Portuguese, the Brazilians probably remain willing to assist. Such a role would contribute to Brazil's prestige and bolster its image as a pacific nation. Moreover, the termination of Portuguese colonialism would remove an irritant in its relations with both Portugal and Black Africa. At present, Brazil is criticized by the Africans for failing to condemn Portuguese colonialism and by the Portuguese for refusing to support their colonial endeavors.

Prospect VI: Argentine-Brazilian Axis

Rivalry between Argentina and Brazil has been a constant feature of South American regional politics for over 150 years. Now, however, many Argentines realize that Brazil has become much more powerful militarily and economically than their own country and that this cannot be reversed. This realization may

[32]James C. Brewer, "Brazil and Africa," *Africa Report*, May 1965, p. 28.

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permit a relaxation of the traditional competition and pave the way to greater Argentine-Brazilian cooperation. Currently both nations are governed by conservative but increasingly nationalistic military regimes that have several common concerns. Both are apprehensive about Bolivia's and Uruguay's chronic political instability and are fearful that communism is quickly becoming South America's dominant political ideology. In addition, they share a conviction that local industry must be protected from dynamic multinational firms.

It is conceivable, therefore, that they may form a protective military alliance in which Paraguay is a junior partner.[33] Since this arrangement would be based largely on ideological compatibility, however, it might last only as long as both countries were ruled by similar governments. Argentine disdain for Brazil and the absence of complementary economies could thwart the development of an alliance that transcended merely military purposes. In a few years, for instance, Brazil may no longer need the wheat which now comprises a substantial export item for Argentina. Finally, such an alliance would not be composed of equals, and one wonders whether Argentina, as the inferior principal, would be content to defer to Brazilian judgment. Argentina is still being urged by some to meet the Brazilian challenge by forming unions with its Spanish-speaking neighbors.

If the two do decide to intervene together in the affairs of a neighboring country the target would most likely be Bolivia. There is little that either now covets in Paraguay, and involvement in Chilean affairs would in all probability require the use of armed force, which would be too costly. On the other hand, to enforce stability in Bolivia or to alter that country's government might require only the provision of funds and military equipment to certain Bolivian groups and the cessation of normal assistance and trade. Admittedly the likelihood of such a joint venture is remote, even though retired General Hugo Bethlem, former Brazilian Ambassador to Bolivia, recently stated that he favors intervention by Argentina and Brazil in Bolivia with "the hand of a brother, not an emperor."[34] The envisaged informal

[33]Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay currently are engaged in joint transportation and water resource development programs, and a billion-dollar Brazilian-Paraguayan hydroelectric project for the Guaira Falls is being planned. Recently Argentina and Brazil increased their importation of Paraguayan wood and cement.

[34]*Jornal do Brasil* interview, reported in "Intervention Is Favored," *The Times of the Americas*, June 16, 1971.

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alliance still would probably deteriorate after the initial objectives were attained.[35]

Prospect VII: An Alliance of the Relatively Prosperous Southern Hemisphere Nations

In 1969 the President of the Association of Graduates of the Superior War College in Brazil (ADESG), Vice Admiral Acyr Dias de Carvalho Rocha, wrote in his association's official journal, *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, that in the event of a nuclear war the nations of the southern hemisphere would probably survive. In such an eventuality, he concluded, "The most advanced nations of this [the southern] hemisphere, Brazil, Australia, Argentina and the Republic of South Africa, will have the important role of reconstructing the world."[36]

In another issue of the same publication, which represents the views of Brazil's most important "think tank," one that is intimately associated with the armed forces and some leading technocrats in the present government, a Major Brigadier of the Brazilian Air Force evaluated the racial situation in South Africa as follows:

> It seems that "separate development" [apartheid] has had excellent results, in view of the present level of accelerated progress that can be seen today in an area that has never been as prosperous as now. . . . [Apartheid] is not, in summary, a racist system. . . . Above everything else, a unique solution, fitting the situation, is being tested and put into practice in the light of the particular situation that exists in that country.[37]

In April 1969 Rio de Janeiro was so full of rumors during an "unofficial" visit of Minister Hilgard Muller of South Africa that the Brazilian Foreign Office found it necessary to deny officially that a treaty had been signed by Brazil, South Africa and Argentina to "confront together the Soviet threat in the South Atlan-

[35]Relations between Argentina and Brazil deteriorated during the first few months of 1972. The visit of Argentine President Lanusse was not as cordial as the Brazilians had expected. Before the visit, Lanusse had been instrumental in generating Latin American resistance to Brazilian leadership, and it seems that the old rivalry has been re-established. In addition, the Argentines feel that Brazil has obstructed the importation of Argentine products and are irritated by Brazil's failure to consult with them before constructing hydroelectric plants along the Parana River.

[36]Acyr Dias de Carvalho Rocha, "República da África do Sul," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Ano XVIII (1969), No. 134, p. 125.

[37]Augusto Teixeira Coimbra, "O Problema Racial na República da África do Sul," *ibid.*, Ano XVIII (1969), No. 133, p. 139. While it is true that the Brazilian Superior War College (ESG) is not as influential today as it was when Castelo Branco was President, *Segurança e Desenvolvimento* is still used frequently by the government to float "trial balloons."

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tic."[38] Notwithstanding the denial, speculations were again voiced later in the month after the initial flight between Brazil and South Africa by South African Airways.

Evidently some Brazilians suspect that their government is considering a South Atlantic alliance of Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, perhaps later to be joined by Australia, which would have as its mission the obstruction of communist penetration in the southern hemisphere and opposition to the liberal tendencies of the Western powers. Such an arrangement, it has been conjectured, might be formed to ward off the diplomatic and economic isolation caused by the enlargement of the EEC, South Africa's racial policies, Brazil's repressive practices, and maybe even Australia's unwillingness to accept large numbers of non-Caucasian immigrants.

Apparently, however, no important reciprocal interests now exist that could motivate such an alliance. If an alliance were established, it would probably be without much substance, born of frustration or desperation, and at least initially limited merely to joint patrol of the South Atlantic.[39]

Appraisal

The preceding examination is not a complete survey of the range of possibilities that may be entertained concerning the future of Brazilian foreign policy. Almost all the hypothetical positions discussed have been based on the assumption that a populist or Marxist regime will not come to power in Brazil during this decade and that the present political system will not be radically altered. Certainly if Brazil experiences a drastic change in its political leadership, structure or values, foreign policy positions that the present government is unwilling even to consider might then be embraced. For example, not only might relations with Cuba, the People's Republic of China and North Viet Nam be established, but Brazil might attempt to lead an anti-United States coalition of Latin American or Third World countries enamored with some brand of populism or Marxism.[40] Finally, it

[38]Embassy of Brazil, Washington, *Boletim Especial,* April 11, 1969.

[39]South African relations with Brazil and Argentina are appraised in Bill Minter, "Brazil: A New Afro-Asian Policy and Its Reversal," *NACLA Newsletter* (New York: North American Congress on Latin America), September 1970, pp. 14, 17.

[40]Direct trade between Communist China and Brazil was established in early 1972 when Peking purchased 100,000 metric tons of Brazilian sugar. However, the present Brazilian government remains opposed to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and so far has shown no interest in fostering such relations with the People's Republic of China or the regime in Hanoi. Brazil voted against the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971.

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must be emphasized again that the "prospects" analyzed were considered to be available options for the next ten or fifteen years. Both domestic and external factors may offer Brazil still other opportunities in the more distant future.

It is the author's belief that for the near future the neo-independent foreign policy which has been evolving since 1966 will be continued. The "mature" U.S.-Brazilian relationship mentioned earlier will probably become more visible.[41] Discord, owing mainly to opposing views on issues that affect the developed and developing countries differently, will no doubt frequently disturb the association but not destroy it. The relative decline in Brazilian trade with and military procurement from the United States also may lessen Washington's influence.

U.S. respect for the intraregional political status quo will probably be welcomed. Brazil will want to protect its standing as the largest and most economically powerful country in Latin America and prevent or balance any union of Spanish-speaking South American nations. To accomplish this it will most likely attempt to expand its economic influence and persuade its neighbors that it can provide the leadership necessary for overcoming certain common problems. To this end, Brazil has recently been consulting with Peru about the development of the Amazon and the enforcement of the 200-mile territorial sea limit, perhaps in an effort to preclude a political arrangement among Peru, Bolivia and Chile at its expense.[42] For the same reason it may try to fill the political vacuum in South America it feels has been left by the United States in the latter's current concern with domestic problems.

Brazil will most likely continue to seek private investment by American and other foreign and multinational corporations, although it will be subjected to greater regulation than formerly. The Médici Government seems to feel that economic develop-

[41]The U.S. interpretation of the "mature" relationship concept is presented by Robert W. Dean, Country Director for Brazil, Department of State, in "Brazil—U.S.: A Changing Relationship," *Latinamericanist* (Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida), December 20, 1971, pp. 2-3.

[42]A recent account appearing in the *New York Times* reported that since mid-1971 Brazil had provided $13.5 million in official credits to Bolivia, $7.5 million to Uruguay and $6 million to Guyana. It is assisting Paraguay in the construction of two roads and a bridge. Brazilian technical advisers are active in Bolivia, Paraguay and Guyana. Brazilian military assistance programs have been established in Paraguay and Bolivia. In April 1972 Brazil and Bolivia signed a formal agreement providing for Brazilian participation in the development of the Santa Cruz area and financial assistance for Bolivian road construction. Joseph Novitski, "Brazil and Bolivia Sign Pacts Making Aid Formal," *New York Times,* April 5, 1972.

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ment can be assisted better by foreign investment than through bilateral assistance arrangements with foreign countries, because private business interests can be controlled and do not endanger Brazil's independence.[43]

[43]The government also appears to favor reliance on multilateral lending authorities for loans. Brazil is now the largest borrower of both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. However, it has been critical of IBRD President Robert McNamara's statements on birth control and environmental protection.

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EUROPE AND THE NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic

THERE is an objective geopolitical linkage between China and Europe: both are the principal neighbors of an expanding Soviet Union. China's emergence as a nuclear power has made this linkage strategically relevant, but until the early 1970's the prevailing opinion in Europe was that the rise of China would not produce any shift in the international balance of power before the end of the present decade. This assessment changed with the United States' diplomatic opening toward the People's Republic and President Nixon's trip to Peking. This major diplomatic event catapulted China into the role of a superpower sooner than the world had anticipated, and before China herself was ready to assume the role. While the future impingement of China on the world balance of power had been foreseen by Adenauer, de Gaulle and Macmillan even in the 1950's, few would have predicted that it would be the United States which would speed up the process.

Since 1969 the European governments have perceived that Washington has been trying for a rapprochement with Peking. Of the major European states, France made known her approval of this development by offering to be the go-between in the delicate initial phases of contacts; England welcomed the new approach and so did Italy; but the government of West Germany remained aloof and the Soviet Union had serious reservations. Moscow had been suspicious of U.S. overtures to China since 1967,[1] and when the first signs of the new policy began to materialize the Soviets repeatedly warned that this could lead to the sharpening of world tensions.

Significantly, this apprehension was not evident in Western Europe. Europeans, who are interested in a greater international role for their countries and for Western Europe as a whole, felt that they could benefit from the new U.S. policy and Soviet suspicions of it. Europe's relatively parochial role in world politics — performed in the shadow of the two superpowers — was an involuntary one; the political elites instinctively welcomed a global

[1]*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 8, 1967, p. 8.

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development that could lead to a diminishing of superpower predominance in the international system. Whether more fluidity in the system would be better or worse for the preservation of peace, few dared to guess, but most agreed that it would offer opportunities to Western Europe to improve its international position.

The Germans' reserve is not shared by other traditionally cautious sources of political comment such as the Vatican; Pope Paul was reported to have said that President Nixon's visit to China might "change in no small way the face of the earth."[2] Whether this could be the outcome is a matter of conjecture, but what can be observed now is that the new U.S. policy toward China is generally approved in Europe.[3] The European endorsement springs from five basic motivations: (1) interest in a new international system; (2) "third force" aspirations; (3) considerations of security; (4) "revanchist" sentiments in Eastern Europe; and (5) the strengthening of peace. Pessimistic assessments derive from (1) ideological considerations; (2) concern with the fate of Taiwan; (3) concern for the preservation of peace; and (4) criticism of the "style" of United States diplomacy.

Interest in a New International System

President Nixon's initiative is regarded as heralding a change in the international system that would allow the medium powers more effectiveness. China is envisaged as one of the pillars of the new system; the others, in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, are likely to be Western Europe and Japan. Nixon's new China policy implies a more modest role for the superpowers and correspondingly greater stature for other countries that are able to assert their will on the international scene. The transition to multipolarity will be slow and may be fraught with dangers to peace, for the USSR may not be able to adjust to the change in the balance of forces, but West Europeans generally feel that, once established, a multipolar system will be more secure and thus better for Europe than the present one based on the predominance and continual contest of the two superpowers. The United States' readiness to help bring this diffusion of power about is appreciated as a proof of Washington's flexibility and President Nix-

[2]*The Daily Telegraph*, July 19, 1971.

[3]Even the Czech communist paper *Rudé Právo*, while viewing the new policy with suspicion, conceded on July 20, 1971 that world opinion was generally welcoming it.

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on's statesmanship. U.S. acceptance of the idea of a "third force" in international relations contrasts with the Soviet attitude that "there can be no genuine third force in the world scene in our times . . . there is no room for one any more. Those who try to become such a force have come too late in history."[4]

Soviet statements like this, along with Moscow's opposition to West European integration[5] and advocacy instead of an all-European security system with built-in limited sovereignty, make the current U.S. international position and some aspects of Chinese diplomacy attractive for Europe. The Europeans have little sympathy with Peking's revolutionary designs, epitomized in its conception of the "world countryside" (the underdeveloped countries) encircling the "cities" (the developed countries), but they follow with interest Chinese comments on European developments. With respect to the enlarged European Economic Community, for example, the Chinese observed:

> the admission of Britain and three other countries into the Common Market will mean further development of the economy and then defense and diplomatic union of West European countries. . . . Such a new situation in Western Europe will constitute a serious obstacle to the United States and the Soviet Union in pushing their policies for hegemony in Europe.[6]

While the Europeans do not concur in China's view of the United States' objectives, they nevertheless basically welcome the diminution of U.S. power, provided Soviet power is also diminished, so that Western Europe can shape the future of the Continent and assume a more significant role in the world.

Third-Force Aspirations

Western Europe aspires to a third-force position and the broadening of its relations with China is one of the means to achieve this goal. Third-force adherents who advocated cooperation with China as long ago as the early 1960's have found their cause strengthened by Chinese attitudes toward Europe since 1968, and the recent U.S. initiative has added a new group of supporters: those who because of loyalty to the alliance with the

[4]These are the words of a Soviet commentator, as quoted by Neville Maxwell in "Russia and China: The Irrepressible Conflict," *Pacific Community* (Japan), July 1970, p. 563.

[5]Brezhnev's observation that the Soviet Union recognized the reality of the European Common Market, made in March 1972, does not imply that Moscow has abandoned its goal to replace the Common Market with a wider system to include Soviet participation.

[6]*Hsinhua* (New China News Agency), June 29, 1971, p. 7.

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United States had been hesitant to support a rapprochement. Nixon's new diplomacy enables America's allies to pursue an active China policy without antagonizing Washington.

In 1964 de Gaulle's recognition of the People's Republic had strained U.S.-French relations. The political negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and China conducted secretly in Switzerland in the same year caused apprehension in the United States. Germany intended to use negotiations with the PRC as a lever for negotiations with the Soviet Union. There were important political personalities in West Germany, in all leading parties, who favored relations with the Peking government. In 1954 FDP Deputy Thomas Dehler had recognized the Soviet dilemma with regard to China and declared that Soviet ambitions might be broken by the will for independence of the Asian peoples, who "are our allies for all practical purposes."[7] In 1956 SPD Deputy Erich Ollenauer spoke out in favor of normalizing relations with China.[8] No rapprochement could have been made at that time, however, because U.S. and Chinese policies left little room for European diplomatic maneuvering. The irony is that when international conditions changed and Washington became flexible on the China issue in 1970-1971, the Federal Republic did not seize this opportunity: Bonn feared that rapprochement with China would jeopardize its *Ostpolitik*. Just as it had shown no real desire to reach an accord with the PRC in 1964 because of a consideration of U.S. sensitivities, it now had reservations about entering into political discussions with the Chinese because of a consideration of Soviet sensitivities.

Elsewhere in Europe, diplomacy toward China took a positive turn. Great Britain began to aim for an early exchange of ambassadors, and Prime Minister Heath hoped to be invited for a visit in due time. Italy, Turkey and Belgium, as well as neutral Austria, no longer felt constrained in building political bridges to China. The Common Market's Brussels headquarters, impressed by Peking's favorable reaction to England's decision to join the European Economic Community, showed interest in the establishment of a Chinese mission to the Community and began studies for a coordinated West European approach to the PRC.[9] The Vatican was said to be informally engaged in talks to restore

[7]Ernst Majonica, "Relations between the FRG and China" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), quoting from the *Proceedings* of Session 61 of the German Parliament, December 15, 1954, p. 3903 ff.

[8]*Bonner Rundschau*, November 21, 1956, as quoted by Majonica, *op. cit.*

[9]*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 27, 1971.

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diplomatic relations.[10] In 1971 France increased the frequency of official visits to Peking.

The reaction of European governments to the U.S. opening to China thus depended on the particular stage of their relations with China and the Soviet Union. Austria considered it consistent with her neutrality to begin to pursue an evenhanded policy with respect to both countries, whereas West Germany, whose *Ostpolitik* acknowledged the "realities" of Soviet power, refused to recognize the "political reality" of the People's Republic. German government circles were privately critical of the suddenness of the Nixon initiative, finding in this criticism a defense for their unwillingness to introduce a new element into their policy. Actually, the U.S. policy had not developed suddenly but had been in the making since 1969. Nixon's implementation of it was embarrassing to the Brandt Government, for it raised not merely searching questions but concrete opposition demands that Germany also institute contacts with Peking. Accusations were made that the government pursued a policy of accommodation in dealing with the Soviet Union and that one of the proofs of this was its non-policy toward China. Chancellor Brandt found it necessary to state that West Germany cannot afford to engage in global politics and that it is not a great power which can use the Chinese card in its diplomacy.[11] In the French view, on the other hand, the new U.S. China policy was a late step in the right direction. France regarded the Nixon trip to Peking as a vindication of her farsighted policies, designed to create a new world balance of power. According to Maurice Thorez, France even had a secret agreement with China about nuclear armament.[12]

In Eastern Europe it was the Rumanians and Yugoslavs who praised President Nixon's initiative, for his nonideological approach appeared to them to be propitious for the survival of their own independent foreign policy course. The new U.S. policy confirmed China as a world power, and thus China's limited military presence in the Balkans (in the form of bases in Albania) could be perceived by the Balkan countries as normal, almost routine great-power behavior, and not as part of a plan to split Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, as the Soviets asserted. To the Rumanians, their China policy of nearly ten years' standing began to appear as

[10] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1971.
[11] *Ibid.*, September 12, 1971.
[12] *Hindustan Times*, March 30, 1964.

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proof of their statesmanlike foresight in anticipating China's forthcoming global role.

Basically, governments that consider the Soviet Union to be a steadily expanding power, such as Britain (concerned especially about Soviet succession to the British naval overlordship in the Indian Ocean), France,[13] Rumania and Yugoslavia, support a Sino-American rapprochement because it could balance the growing strength of the USSR. Governments such as the West German one, which perceive the Soviet Union as a satiated status quo power, tend to view the U.S.-China opening with reserve, for they fear that it could affect the precarious "good will" of the Kremlin toward the West.

Undoubtedly the Soviet Union intends to compensate for the strategic disadvantage a U.S. rapprochement with China would pose for her. Never was the Soviet search for new partnerships more intensive than in the current period. Seeking to gain allies and to neutralize areas in the sphere of its adversaries, Moscow has redoubled its efforts for closer ties with the German Federal Republic, France, Yugoslavia, India and Japan in the wake of Washington's diplomatic advance to Peking. As for the United States, the more it wanted to cut its military commitments in Asia, the more its diplomatic activity had to increase. The pace of world diplomacy has thus accelerated, and Europe does not want to be left behind. Events may acquire their own momentum.

Soviet efforts to prevent the USSR's encirclement are directed as much to Europe as to Asia, thus increasing Western Europe's bargaining position. If Chancellor Brandt had delayed his *Ostpolitik* a little longer and had not signed the Moscow Treaty in 1970 he probably could have obtained a more advantageous treaty for Germany a few years later. Time does not work for the Soviet Union: China's nuclear capability, the Washington-Peking rapprochement, expressions of nationalism in Eastern Europe, and progress in West European integration — all are developments the Soviets must eventually adjust to.

Nixon's diplomacy revived old expectations that approaches to China could be used by Europe as a lever in its dealings with the USSR. Even Brandt, who now rejects this idea, subscribed to it in the 1960's.[14] In the past, however, the middle powers individually

[13]The French evasion of a friendship treaty with Moscow, proposed by Brezhnev during his Paris visit in 1971, was indicative of the French government's assessment of the Soviet Union.

[14]*Izvestiya* (March 29, 1968, p. 3) quoted Chancellor Brandt as saying: "China is far away, but nevertheless in the political game [West] Germany can hold the Chinese card, which should not be put aside or ignored."

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carried too little weight to make such maneuvering effective — and China was not receptive. Although, in the 1960's, Mao Tse-tung proposed an "intermediate zone" of which Western Europe would be a part, this concept faded away during the Cultural Revolution. It is still unrealistic today, but cannot be excluded as a possible development late in this decade.

Since World War II, the United States has helped to awaken Europe to its capabilities, first by means of the European recovery program and now through the new world diplomacy. The Marshall Plan and the Nixon Doctrine of retrenchment in Asia, to which the China initiative was the logical sequence, may stand as the two most momentous decisions in American postwar policy. In one Europe found economic rebirth and in the other an opportunity for political self-expression. Now Europeans are waiting to see how the United States will fare with the new China policy; they endorse it, for they may one day reap benefits from its strategic implications. European diplomacy is steeped in balance of power politics; this, however, does not yet assure that Europe will make use of the opportunities a new world balance of power will offer. History is full of examples of missed opportunities.

Security Considerations

The dangers to Europe contained in specific Soviet threats, such as the Berlin ultimatums or the invasion of Czechoslovakia by nearly half a million Warsaw Pact troops, have subsided or have been overshadowed by other events. The increase of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean and the building of a Soviet naval base in Egypt are the latest indications that an East-West détente was an illusory concept. Nevertheless, aside from its periodic imperial assertions, the Soviet Union's overall military superiority over NATO poses a permanent threat to Europe's security. This imbalance of force is for some countries a stimulant to reach formal security arrangements with Moscow. For others, which consider this path a dubious means of securing peace, the desideratum is that the United States' military presence in Europe be strengthened to confirm the American commitment and dispel the impression that the United States is in the beginning phases of a neo-isolationist policy.

Those who favor the American presence in Europe generally welcome the new China policy, for it implies that the United States will have only one front to face: the Soviet Union in Europe and the adjacent area of the Mediterranean. They hope the

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military disengagement from Asia may make maintaining U.S. force levels in Europe more acceptable to the economy-conscious Congress.

It seems plain, however, that the United States is not ready to increase its European presence; on the contrary, one branch of the government would like to diminish it. Western Europe may therefore have to consider alternatives to strengthen its security or at least to give the appearance that something is being done in that direction. For example: A gamble might be taken on a security treaty with the Soviet Union — but the Europeans would first have to convince Washington that such a treaty would be a useful expedient for achieving a more stable peace in Europe.[15] Or Western Europe could embark on a crash rearmament program to try to bridge the gap between the NATO and Warsaw Pact military levels of preparedness — but this option is highly unlikely because of the European political climate. Or it could build, in partnership with the United States, a wider security system on a global scale, embracing China and/or Japan as additional partners. Western Europe could secure U.S. support for such a policy. President Nixon's China diplomacy is an indication that the United States might not be averse to this type of security broadening; the thrust of his China approach is to restore the world balance of power, which is tilting in favor of the Soviets.

To appreciate the objective link of mutual security interests between China and Europe one has to view China as the neighbor of Europe's neighbor: the Soviet Union. The quasi-strategic nuclear power of China[16] on the USSR's eastern flank could signify the first overall containment of this Euro-Asian empire. Granting that China's geopolitical position can be strategically relevant for Europe's security only under propitious international conditions and only at an advanced level of Chinese military technology, both of these possibilities seem to be in prospect.

With the launching of their second earth satellite in March 1971 and of a nuclear submarine in March 1972, the Chinese gave proof of their global military potential. Premier Chou En-lai has

[15]While the Chinese view on this is not relevant for the European decision-making process, it is of interest to those circles in Europe which oppose a security treaty with Moscow. According to the Chinese, such a treaty would signify the subjugation of the European nations and be a menace to world peace.

[16]According to the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, in 1971 China had twenty to twenty-five ready to launch medium-range rockets, nine of them with a range of up to 1,500 km., and enough atomic fission material for 150 A and H bombs. It is estimated that she will have intercontinental rockets with a range of 12,000 km. by 1973. *The Military Balance 1971-72* (London, September 1971), p. 405.

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declared that China does not intend to become a superpower, but nevertheless she has shown the will to be present in Europe by virtue of her bases in Albania. Chinese naval and rocket installations are to assist in Albania's defense. Militarily they may not be significant, but they may present a good case for China's participation at a European security conference, which Chinese diplomats have reportedly indicated that they would seek.[17]

The moderation in the U.S. attitude toward Peking certainly has brought the day nearer when West European countries can contemplate some form of policy coordination with China, should the Soviet Union again assume a threatening posture. Moscow perceived this possibility rather prematurely in 1969. That the Europe-China linkage is on the minds of Soviet leaders can be seen in their reaction to the coincidence of tensions in Europe and Soviet Asia. For example, Soviet support of the East German government in blocking Western access to Berlin faded when the Ussuri River Sino-Soviet military clash occurred on March 2, 1969. The result was that the intended blockade was suddenly scaled down to mere brief harassment. In true Russian tradition, the Soviets viewed the Ussuri incident with the suspicion that it might have been timed in collusion with West Germany. Politburo member Peter Shelest declared in Kiev before a meeting of officers that Mao Tse-tung had "stabbed the Soviet Union in the back"[18] at a time when it was in the throes of a Berlin crisis. The unintentional effect of this and similar comments, repeated in the East German press, has been to draw attention to the USSR's strategic disadvantage.[19]

The most important security factor for Europe is that the Soviet Union has two fronts to face and has apparently opted for strengthening the eastern one. In 1971, for the first time in Soviet history, the disposition of Soviet military forces was greater in Asia than in Europe.[20] The difference is still slight, but considering the low level of forces in Soviet Asia only a few years ago,[21] the significance of military emphasis becomes clear. The more the Soviets are concerned about the security of their Asian border —

[17]*Die Welt*, December 1, 1971, quoting a Yugoslav source.
[18]*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 27, 1969.
[19]For discussion of this subject see my article, "The 'China Peril' Theme in Soviet Global Strategy," in *Bulletin* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR), June 1971.
[20]*The Military Balance, op. cit.*
[21]In 1965 the USSR had not more than fourteen divisions on the Chinese border; in 1970 thirty-five or forty divisions were stationed there. *Abendzeitung*, August 3, 1970.

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the longest in the world — the greater will be the military buildup in Asia and the more likely it will be that Soviet forces in Europe will be thinned out. To this extent Europe's security is already linked to China's strength. Should Moscow feel a more pressing need to dispose with the European front, Western Europe's bargaining position would be fortified. It might extract a price for this easement if it does not follow West Germany's pattern of negotiations with the Soviet Union in accepting a settlement without receiving real counter-concessions.

For China, Washington's diplomacy improves her strategic position by opening the prospect that she now has only her northern frontier to be concerned about.[22] How this might benefit European security depends, however, on the evolution of Peking's foreign policy in general and on Sino-Soviet relations in particular. Reconciliation and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union would adversely affect the strategic situation of both Western Europe and the United States. If a U.S. détente with China broadens Chinese links with the West and gives the Chinese leadership an alternative to any politically-conditioned economic offers that may come from Moscow, Sino-Soviet cooperation is less likely. The value of the United States' China diplomacy must be judged not merely by positive achievements, but also by the criterion of what it may prevent.

Just as the West at times becomes uneasy about a possible Chinese-Soviet reconciliation, China is apprehensive of U.S.-Soviet cooperation and/or a Western Europe-USSR détente. Her comments about the dangers of a Soviet-European détente and her sharp criticism of the Soviet-West German treaty of 1970, which is one of its cornerstones, indicate how much she is aware of her strategic links with Europe and how concerned she is about the spread of Soviet influence to the West. The Chinese perception is that both superpowers constitute a threat to Europe. Moreover, in an interview with a Yugoslav newspaper Chou En-lai imparted an important nuance to this concept. Criticizing comments which portrayed the U.S.-China rapprochement as a threat, he pointed out that, although the press in Europe did not view U.S. rapprochement with the Soviet Union as a danger, it was actually this combination which threatened Europe's independence.[23] A

[22]In underwriting the Indian invasion of Pakistan, Moscow may well have hoped to create a second front for China by involving her in a war on the Indian subcontinent.

[23]Interview granted to Zagreb's *Vjesnik*, as announced by Tanjug (the Yugoslav Telegraph Agency), August 27, 1971.

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superpower arrangement deciding the fate of Europe has in fact been a nightmare of some Europeans since the Yalta Conference. For them — as for China — the new direction of Washington-Peking relations is a reassurance that the United States does not intend to strive for a tacit U.S.-Soviet condominium over the world.

While the Chinese were still pointing to what they perceived as superpower collusion in European matters, they were in reality more apprehensive of a Soviet-West German duopoly of power.[24] Considering that Peking used to be primarily occupied with the struggles of the developing world, its sensitivity to European developments is extraordinary. Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (which could also provide the Soviets with an excuse for intervention in China), the Chinese have given close attention to the course of events in Europe. As an indication that some of their views coincide with European interests, they praised Western Europe's effort toward integration as a way of strengthening its independence (in sharp contrast to Soviet opposition to the integration movement) and expressed concern about the great increase of Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean,[25] which was similar to the NATO reaction.

Since Western Europe does not intend to remain a political dwarf forever, Chinese declarations in favor of European emancipation from superpower interference fell on fertile ground. In welcoming a Chinese ministerial delegation to Paris, President Pompidou stressed that France and China had chosen to resist the tutelage of the superpowers and added significantly that "both countries try to obtain the means to do so."[26] Somewhat earlier Mao had advised France to redouble her effort in the production of nuclear arms.[27] Similarly, shortly after an Italian government delegation returned from Peking in 1971, Italian papers reported that China had offered to cooperate with Italy in the field of nuclear energy for military uses.

To the extent that China aims at diminishing Soviet power and influence, she is an ally of Europe. Their correlation should not be viewed as momentary, for it is rooted in the objective fact that

[24]An editorial, "Soviet-German Treaty — Dangerous Plot Against People of Europe and the World," stated: "As compensation for the recognition of the Soviet revisionist domination in Eastern Europe, Bonn has secured from Moscow support for its economic and political expansion in Western Europe." *Peking Review* (reprinted from *Zeri i Poppullit* [Tirana]), September 18, 1970, p. 15.

[25]*Hsinhua,* December 2, 1968.

[26]*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* October 4, 1971.

[27]*Die Zeit,* August 7, 1970.

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Europe and China complement each other strategically and geopolitically; one possesses more technological resources and the other more human resources and space, and together they outflank the Euro-Asian USSR, which both regard as a danger to their security.

With the exception of the French,[28] West Europeans do not as yet perceive the possibility of an early security partnership with China, but in Southeastern Europe Albania and Rumania already have security links with Peking. Chinese promises of fraternal assistance to Rumania in case of Soviet aggression have convinced the Rumanians that China constitutes an element of their security. The nature of Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Tepavac's trip to Peking in 1971 indicates that Yugoslavia thinks in much the same terms. The determination of Albania, Rumania and Yugoslavia to defend their sovereignty finds such ardent support in China that the Soviet Union has accused Peking of interference in the Balkans.

There are three elements that could weaken the concept of West European-Chinese strategic cooperation: (1) internal unrest in China connected with succession problems, which could temporarily paralyze Peking's policy; (2) a European-Soviet détente; or (3) a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. A European-Soviet détente is a distinct possibility if Europe follows the pattern of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*. (Chinese displeasure with West German foreign policy might find expression in a veto of the Federal Republic's admission to the United Nations when the question comes up on the UN agenda.) A Sino-Soviet reconciliation is unlikely in the current epoch considering the national interest of both countries, their rivalry for primacy in the world communist movement, and Chinese fears that the Soviet Union would use any reconciliation as a lever to influence China's internal affairs.

Moscow sees the Chinese-European diplomacy as a provocation, which appears the more serious in the context of the United States-China rapprochement. A Yugoslav commentator viewed the new U.S. policy and Nixon's visit to Peking as "one of the greatest failures" of Soviet policy.[29] But Soviet concern should not restrain American or European efforts to build bridges to China. It would be preposterous to allow Soviet displeasure to dictate Western policies. Nixon's arrangement to visit Moscow after his visit to China is enough of a concession to those who would form foreign

[28]French Deputy Alain Peyrefitte declared in Peking: "France and China are objective allies." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 30, 1971.
[29]*Radio Free Europe Research* (mimeo.), July 20, 1971.

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policy on the basis of whether it would or would not strain relations with the Soviet Union, rather than on the basis of national interest. The Western interest is the establishment of a balance of forces in the world, assuring that the Soviet Union cannot gain predominance.

"Revanchist" Sentiments in Eastern Europe

It is one thing to look at China as a contributing factor in building this new balance of forces and another to view her as striving for a fundamental change in the world status quo, by which the map of Asia and Europe would be altered. The people of Eastern Europe look at China's historic role in the latter context.

While no public opinion poll exists to attest to this, the strong feelings of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe undoubtedly foster the memory that the Soviet Union detached territories from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, absorbed Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and subjugated other countries to Soviet predominance and periodic military interventions. Some states, such as Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania, have had to live in fear of Soviet interference and possibly invasion. Soviet expansion changed the face of Europe and Moscow apparently intends to keep it that way forever. In an age of emancipation of nations all over the world, the Soviet Union may be taking on an impossible task. The question is what forces of history will assist the eventual process of change, for obviously the countries involved have not the power to emancipate themselves.

In 1964 Mao Tse-tung chided the Soviets for their expansion in Europe, noting that they had taken what they could, and significantly added that one day they would pay the bill for their actions. From that moment on Mao's China became a popular country with the communist, noncommunist and anti-communist forces in Eastern Europe which aim for independence from the USSR. No Western spokesman, since John Foster Dulles issued his declaratory concept of liberation, had been as explicit in condemning Soviet overextension.

The countries of Eastern Europe are fully aware that the USSR is unable to engage in partnerships based on equality — the main cause of China's defection from the Soviet-led socialist camp, and the reason for the previous expulsion of Yugoslavia. China appears to be a champion of equality among socialist countries and thus has a great reservoir of good will in Eastern Europe despite the

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fact that the trend among the European communists is revisionist and she still poses as the ideological opponent of revisionism. Peking leaves no stone unturned to harass the Soviets in their domain. The Chinese-sponsored broadcasts from Radio Tirana have increased in hours of transmission. When the December 1970 Polish workers' uprising broke out, Peking alerted the revisionist Poles to a possible Soviet invasion, and at the same time issued a stern warning to the Soviets against any interference.

Although they cannot put it in writing, the East Europeans welcome the United States' move to bring China into the mainstream of world politics, for this is nourishment to their theory that the rise of China to global power status must eventually spell the decline of the Soviet empire. While this view is speculative, it might yet become valid. Prosperous Western Europe does not want to think about China becoming a world power in the same "revanchist" terms. It is primarily interested in strengthening its half of the divided continent, but there, too, opinions are voiced that China might become the catalyst of an eventual change in the European status quo.

Prospects for Strengthening Peace

The United States' rapprochement with China must be examined in respect to a fundamental criterion: does the new policy strengthen the prospects for peace? It is likely to do so, at least in the sense that it is aimed at eliminating tensions between the two countries. In a global perspective, it may also be viewed as a fundamental contribution to peace, if one adheres to the theory that the establishment of a multipolar world balance of power can enhance the prospect more than a system of two blocs could.

The new policy is a testimony to the United States' flexibility and sense of reality, for her diplomacy can be successful only by sacrificing U.S. military positions on the mainland of Asia. The "low profile" she is turning toward the East is linked with her effort to establish with China new "rules of the game" which would bring peace to Southeast Asia. It is an indication of President Nixon's and the Chinese leaders' resourcefulness and statesmanship that they are trying to reconcile Sino-American differences after two decades of hostility. On China's part this cannot be achieved without scars on her image as a country committed to world revolution. Many professional diplomats have been surprised by this diplomatic *volte-face*.

The Europeans, because of their tradition, have an un-

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derstanding of policy based on the balance of power principle; they appreciate the relative swiftness and grand manner with which America is ready to cut her losses in Asia and gain some advantages by a new distribution of power that would mean less costly global peacekeeping for her. Moreover, Europe has even more reason than the United States to welcome the rise of China, for it may benefit from the resulting change in the international system without incurring losses of positions in Asia.[30]

While the East European press reaction to the rapprochement was mostly adverse, some positive comments could be found. In reading between the lines one gets a vague impression that the Poles would like to believe the whole world, including Eastern Europe, could profit from this development. An expectation of some practical results from Nixon's visit was indicated by their welcoming of "all steps including meetings of heads of states with different political systems."[31]

Adverse European Attitudes Toward the New U.S. Policy in Asia

Concern with the Ideological Issues

Western observers who put all communist regimes into one adversary category do not accept the proposition that the national interest of communist countries prevails over their ideological considerations. Their own ideological commitment makes them oblivious to opportunities for the West stemming from the Sino-Soviet struggle. There are also those who avoid the ideological issue when it comes to questions of cooperation with the Soviet Union but raise it when it comes to relations with China. They present distinctions, such as that the Chinese revolution is younger and thus more radical and dangerous, while the Soviet system is now presided over by a semi-bourgeois elite, with whom one can deal. This view, prevailing in some West German government circles, ignores the obvious consideration that a bourgeois elite can engage in expansionist policies just as well as any other.

Concern with the Fate of Taiwan

Some critics of the new U.S. diplomacy view it as a *de facto*

[30]The fate of the British and Portuguese enclaves, Hongkong and Macao, is in China's hands irrespective of the current shifts in the world balance of power. The fact that China did not take over Macao (as India took over Portuguese Goa) is only a testimony that she is not bent on expansion as the Soviet Union would like to make us believe.

[31]*Radio Free Europe Research* (mimeo.), August 10, 1971.

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abandonment of Taiwan, an ally of the United States. They forget that U.S. protection of Taiwan stemmed from security measures taken in connection with the Korean War, and that as circumstances changed the Taiwan issue became what it was at the beginning when the defeated forces of Nationalist China transferred their seat to the island: a purely internal Chinese question.

To treat the Taiwan matter as a reflection on the reliability and credibility of the United States as an ally is to show little understanding of international politics, for there is no such thing as a permanent ally or a permanent enemy. One could here apply the famous statement of John Quincy Adams: "I do not recollect any change in policy, but there has been a great change in circumstances." The circumstance to bear in mind is that China is becoming a strategic nuclear power, and that she is guided by her national interest rather than by a commitment to a foreign-based ideological center; the Soviet Union is her primary adversary rather than the United States. Long-standing U.S.-Taiwan ties must eventually be adjusted to the changed realities.

Concern with Peace

It is concern about the prospects for peace which may provide a legitimate basis for criticizing the new policy. There is a theory prevailing in some European circles that the Soviets, perceiving a peril from China, might use this as an excuse to embark on an aggressive policy in Europe, perhaps in the Balkans. (The Soviets now appear to be preparing an alibi for such a step by accusing China of interference in Balkan affairs.) The fallacy in this type of reasoning is that if the Soviet Union is bent on aggression in the Balkans she will not be deterred by either a passive or an active U.S. China policy. It is possible, however, that she may revert to a Cold War course if she feels that a plan for a tacit alliance with China lies beyond the new U.S. diplomacy. The question is whether the Soviet Union could afford a Cold War in Europe in view of the improved Chinese strategic situation and a possible U.S.-Chinese détente.

I believe it is more likely that the Soviet reaction will be to try for a rapprochement with China after Mao's death to counter the U.S. diplomacy. If a renewed Cold War in Europe should come about it will be less in response to a U.S.-China policy than to Moscow's problems with the East European nations. Formerly the Soviets attempted to justify interventions in Eastern Europe by evoking the peril of West German interference, but since they

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decided on a détente policy with West Germany they cannot very well continue with this rationalization, and now have to present another. The danger of Chinese "splittist" subversion might give Moscow adequate excuse to introduce a Cold War against its own Warsaw Pact allies, should they again become restless.

The specter of increased tensions was raised in Eastern Europe. The East European press, emulating the Soviet approach, viewed Nixon's visit to Peking as a maneuver of the United States and China directed against the Soviet Union. It was a danger to peace and was bound to fail. The East German press believed Nixon's trip was aimed at splitting the anti-imperialist world,[32] and the Hungarian press doubted the honesty of the U.S. China policy.[33]

The striking aspect of the official press reaction was its low-keyed criticism of American diplomacy. To the extent that the U.S. policy was a recognition of realities — i.e., that the People's Republic was the only government representing China — it was considered a positive move. China bore the brunt of attack. The Polish paper *Zycie Warszawy* noted that the Chinese policy was motivated by an anti-Soviet hysteria, and contrasted Peking's agreement to Nixon's planned visit with its refusal to permit French Communist Party deputies to visit China.[34] The Slovak paper *Směna* termed China's policy disruptive and registered an interesting complaint: "Some socialist countries seem to agree with Mao's policy."[35]

The Soviet Union will no doubt try to gain some advantage from the obvious setback of the Sino-American rapprochement. Under the pretext of guarding the unity of the socialist commonwealth against Maoist influence, Moscow may try to justify placing the socialist camp under more stringent control and attempt to integrate Eastern Europe even more closely into the Soviet system. A return to the Cold War against Western Europe is doubtful, since it is against Soviet national interest to maintain two fronts. Instead, Moscow will woo Western Europe even more in order to use it as a supersized PX for the consumer goods-oriented Soviet bourgeoisie, and to use Europeans as developers of Siberia — which would amount to logistic support in the USSR's continuing struggle against China.

Criticism of the "Style" of U.S. Diplomacy

The fact that the United States did not consult her allies in ad-

[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, July 21, 1971.
[35] *Ibid.*, July 29, 1971.

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vance about President Nixon's plan to visit Peking was considered upsetting in some quarters. The secretive nature of the new U.S. approach to China makes it difficult, so the critics say, for some of the allies, especially Japan, to coordinate their policies with Washington's. But one has to remember that it is essential for every nation to conduct certain aspects of policy in secret. Consultation of allies — as well as open discussion in the United States itself — could have delayed, or perhaps even blocked, the execution of a controversial policy such as the China initiative.

Conclusion

The European countries with a tradition of imperial interests, such as England and France, recognize the significance of the rise of China as a nuclear power and the effect the United States' diplomatic revolution could have on the world power balance. Although not interested in changing the European status quo, they realize that China's emergence as a political superpower presents a good bargaining situation for Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The current leaders of Germany, with their essentially parochial outlook on world affairs,[36] are slower to acknowledge the strategic linkage between Europe and China and to perceive the implications of the new U.S. policy for China's overall strategic position — which in turn would alter the strategic position of the Soviet Union.

The fact that Moscow must engage in an agonizing reappraisal of its global policy and strategy due to the distinct possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement is of vital interest to the countries of Eastern Europe. They welcome the new era in international diplomacy opened by the U.S. initiative and hope that it will lead toward a rearranging of the world order at the expense of Soviet interests.

China's opposition to the two superpowers makes her foreign policy now of great interest to all of Europe, for Western Europe with its growing economic power does not intend to remain a junior political partner of the United States, and Eastern Europe hopes not to remain the last large dependent region in the world. While China herself can currently contribute little to a change of the status quo in Europe, she is the only great power whose

[36]The West German government recognizes the realities in Europe, but geographically distant realities, such as the rise of China to nuclear power and political superpower status, are studiously ignored.

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declared policy it is to assist in bringing about the end of Soviet supremacy over the socialist states.

The new policy toward China will mean sacrifices for the United States in Asia, but there may be compensations for her and advantages for Western Europe: (1) The United States will no longer have to play the costly role of global policeman. (2) Her chief rival, the Soviet Union, which is also posing a potential threat to Western Europe, will be contained globally. (3) The new world balance of power (more precarious for the present superpowers than was the bipolar world) will give Western Europe more political room for maneuver and will establish it as a third force provided its integration advances. (4) In the long run a tacit United States-Western Europe-China understanding may be established in which Japan may join; this would render attempts by the Soviet Union to gain a preponderance of power a hopeless task.

Europe, by approving Nixon's trip to Peking and the new U.S. China policy, in essence approves a transition to a multipolar system. The triangular diplomacy of Washington, Moscow and Peking will soon become uncomfortable, because of its inherent instability. Western Europe is likely then to lend its efforts to building a new global security system.

The low-profile military policy of the United States and complementary increase in her diplomatic activities may induce the Soviet Union and China also to lower their military profiles because of the risks of a possible reversal in alignment: a coalition of any two forces against the one which at any particular time appears more belligerent. This is, at least, the philosophy behind the new U.S. diplomacy. There are few risks for Western Europe in the opening to China, but rather possible gains, for if global tensions should heighten as a result of the U.S. policy, and even if another war should erupt in Asia, the Soviet Union would try to keep Western Europe out of the triangular contest, and for this she would have to pay a price. If a general low military profile is adopted it will make the world more secure. But there are consequences for Eastern Europe. Whether the Soviets adopt a less menacing military posture toward the West or not, they are likely to react to a Sino-American détente by firming their grip over Eastern Europe. They are sensitive to signs of restlessness within the socialist camp, and a new wave of unrest could be set in motion by the shifting world balance of power.

Soviet countermeasures could be expected in the face of a fun-

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damental change in the world constellation of forces. However, Moscow would be careful to select the low-risk type – a new small war by proxy in Asia, for example – and thus would be both unable to reverse the trend of a Washington-Peking reconciliation and unable to rectify the resulting strategic disadvantage. The new U.S. China policy has put the Soviet Union at least temporarily on the defensive; this is welcomed by Europe and all countries that are apprehensive of Soviet expansion. If the United States and China continue on the course initiated by President Nixon, the USSR would find herself, for the first time in her history, globally contained. It would be an irony if, at this historic juncture, West Germany's new relationship with Moscow jeopardized the success of this policy.

The jointly declared opposition of the United States and China to the spheres of influence concept[37] is a challenge to Soviet policies. The United States is withdrawing from Asia and is not asserting her will in Europe. As long as the Soviet Union does not also show a low profile, Washington's relations with Peking are likely to strengthen, and most of the West European and some of the Balkan countries will strive to intensify their ties with China. A U.S. détente with China cannot be made at the expense of Europe, but a U.S.-Soviet détente could. For this reason Europe instinctively favors the former over the latter.

[37]The joint communiqué of February 27 issued in Shanghai states: "Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interest of the peoples of the world . . . for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest." *Peking Review,* March 3, 1972, p. 5.

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TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERVENTION

by Roland A. Paul

THE Viet Nam conflict has called into question the principles that have guided American leaders since the end of World War II in deciding when and where to use our military power abroad, and new rules and guidelines are being offered in their place. Two such proposals were contained in the article by Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," in the January 1970 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, and the piece by Paul Warnke and Leslie Gelb, "Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy," in the Winter 1970-71 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

Allison, May and Yarmolinsky offer their guidance in terms of certain presumptions. They say that there should be a presumption toward American intervention when one of our treaty allies is attacked by another country, but a presumption against such intervention when the victim is not one of our allies, and an even stronger presumption against intervention when the conflict is one of internal subversion, even if the insurgency is supported from outside the country in question.

Warnke and Gelb would generally restrict our military role to situations in which one of our allies, or possibly a non-ally, is threatened directly by the Soviet Union or Communist China. In other cases where a country is attacked from without, they say the United States should intervene only along with other countries in what may truly be considered an international effort. With respect to an insurgency, they believe that military equipment and training should be the extent of our help.

Although each of these guidelines may coincide with correct policy in a number of cases,they seem inadequate for dealing with several hard situations this country may have to face in the coming years, in places such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea and Israel. Allison, May and Yarmolinsky try to argue away some of these hard cases. Warnke and Gelb simply carve out exceptions to their general rules for two of the trouble spots.

Allison, May and Yarmolinsky concede that their principles may encourage the Arabs to attack Israel. Literally taken, their rules would even encourage the Arabs *and the Soviets* to attack

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Israel. Perhaps their presumption against intervention in that situation would be overridden, but it does tend to undermine their formula. They also concede that their recommendations may encourage insurgencies, are likely to turn Laos over to the communists[1] and will place Thailand at a serious disadvantage. They regret these things, but conclude that all other courses of action are unacceptable to the American people.

A few nearly forgotten historical examples cast some doubt on these conclusions. In 1964, with the help of a few American-manned transport aircraft, some Belgian paratroopers and a handful of American personnel, the government of the Congo was able to put down a serious rebellion. In 1966 an American-manned unit of twenty-five helicopters and eighteen transport airplanes assisted the Thais in suppressing the communist insurgency in the northeastern region of Thailand. Contrast, if you will, the recent Nigerian civil war in which U.S. policymakers followed the rules suggested by these authors. Instead of providing logistical, advisory or air support to the central government (the side the Soviet Union favored as well), our government chose not to become involved, the civil war dragged on, and hundreds of thousands of people died who otherwise probably would not have died — this in spite of the fact that the Biafrans were for a long time receiving all their ammunition and supplies through a single airfield.

One who would adopt the Allison-May-Yarmolinsky point of view should also reflect upon the war in northern Laos. Through advisers, logistics support and, most important, heavy air support, the United States has been shoring up a shaky noncommunist government there for more than eight years. We have been doing this because we do have some interests which are furthered by the continued vitality of that regime, namely, keeping the communists away from our SEATO ally Thailand and facilitating interdiction of communist traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. For these eight years, American casualties in Laos have been few, and the American people have acquiesced in the involvement, a military role which has included more than a hundred sorties a day by U.S. tactical aircraft over areas well away from the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Allison, May and Yarmolinsky try to argue away the admittedly serious disadvantage Thailand would face under their theory by suggesting that perhaps the communists would decide not to strike

[1]This term is used for purposes of identification, without intending any ideological significance.

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or the Thais would be able to handle the situation by themselves. But if either of these favorable eventualities came to pass, it would not make much difference whether American policymakers had adopted the position of these authors or that of their critics.

Warnke and Gelb treat Israel and Korea as exceptions from their general propositions. They recognize that these are two of the most important countries where U.S. intervention may be necessary and that the rules laid down for other places may be inappropriate in these special cases. So they conclude that we should defend Israel because of the Nazi legacy and our role in creating the new state, and should perhaps defend South Korea because of the UN action taken there in the early 1950's and the continued presence of our troops. Perhaps, instead, these two exceptions undercut the validity of their general propositions.

Both articles offer some useful doctrine. They remind us that American interests must take into account (1) the expectations of other important countries, which may lead them to acquire nuclear weapons, or lead this country to become "a cloistered citadel of fear and repression," and (2) matters of domestic importance, such as the survival of Israel. Allison, May and Yarmolinsky correctly assert that U.S. foreign policy decisions must relate to our commitments, our interests, the probability of success and the risk of escalation, but they fashion their intervention/nonintervention categories too much on the basis of our formal treaty commitments and too little on the basis of American interest. Our formal commitments are not nearly so important in determining the nature and extent of our effort as these writers assume. The President was right when he said on February 18, 1970:

> It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our *interests* over the long run with a sound foreign policy. . . . Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.[2]

Warnke and Gelb wisely observe that American interest in particular foreign situations depends to a large extent on the proximity of our chief international rivals, the Soviet Union and Communist China. But they slide from this sensible observation into a statement that the United States should never intervene (except in an internationalized effort) unless one of these two

[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 7.

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countries is directly involved militarily. In judging power in the world, other countries sagely avoid making neat distinctions between direct and indirect forces.

II

I would like to suggest instead a set of five tests that — as broad as they may seem at first — can be used by reasonably informed men to analyze most situations calling for American intervention.

Two preliminary comments: First, there exists what might be called the deterrence-defense dichotomy (or the deterrence-disengagement dilemma). Stated simply, this means that often a posture that aids deterrence during the pre-crisis period increases the obligation to fight should deterrence fail, and conversely, a position that does not obligate us to intervene in the event of crisis is often weak as a deterrent. Second, military involvement may take several forms: advisers, transportation and logistics support, air and naval combat units, ground combat units of various sizes, and nuclear forces.

The first of the five tests is *whether the American interest being served is at least as great as the American effort in question.* Although these terms, interest and effort, may seem rather abstract, they can be weighed against each other; such balancing is done all the time, either explicitly or implicitly.[3]

Actually, in broad outline, the major elements of American interest in a given situation are fairly well known. For instance, the U.S. interest in the war in northern Laos is essentially twofold. As mentioned above, we first want to keep the communists away from Thailand, our SEATO partner. If the North Vietnamese or Chinese (who now have more than 10,000 support troops in Laos) were operating freely all along the Thai border, that would seriously complicate Thailand's defense problems and increase our own concern.[4] Second, keeping a noncommunist government in being in Laos facilitates our continued interdiction of North Vietnamese traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

[3]See the Memorandum from Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, February 7, 1965, as quoted in the *New York Times*, June 15, 1971 (p. 19): "Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program [sustained reprisals in North Vietnam] seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide — as it may — the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost."

[4]Although the United States interest in Thailand itself may not be great, there is, nevertheless, some American interest in that country of a geographic, psychological and moral nature.

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When one looks at U.S. interests in various parts of the world, he soon realizes that they form a sort of gradient of ascending importance. American interests in Laos are relatively minor; in Japan they are crucial. Our interest in a particular situation is greater when the opposing military force is Soviet or Chinese than when it is that of a second-rate communist power (and considerably less when it is not communist at all); this for the reason that in most places our security interest is one of perception, or expectation as Allison, Warnke and their colleagues put it. Thus, our interest in one country relates to our interest in other countries. Except for a few places, like Western Europe, Japan and parts of the Western Hemisphere, we have no really vital strategic interests abroad in the traditional military sense. But in this nuclear age we do have security interests of an intangible, psychological nature in many situations.

It should be noted that our treaty and other commitments abroad are just one of the factors in the overall pattern of American interests. The language in all our treaties is ambiguous, the obligation under our other commitments even more indefinite. The main way they bind is through their effect on the expectations of other important countries.

As to the other side of the equation, the effort in question is usually definite and specific enough to be almost quantifiable. The basic criteria are expected American casualties and expenditures. Implicit in these two figures are the likelihood of domestic dissension and the degree of attention by top-level decision-makers to the operation. To cite our participation in the war in northern Laos again, this operation costing fifty to two hundred American lives over an eight-year period and $400 to $600 million a year can be weighed against its efficacy in slowing communist traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in preventing further communist advance in Southeast Asia.

In many instances, this initial question is not hard to answer. Often the proposed effort is small and the interest clearly greater. This was so in Laos, in the Congo in 1964 and in Cambodia in 1970. The harder questions, which are dealt with below, concern how to keep the dynamics of events from requiring us to increase our effort beyond our interest.

The second question, also an easy one, at least for purposes of analysis, is *whether the effort is reasonably likely to accomplish the end sought,* which is usually military victory or stalemate. In most cases there is no purpose served in needlessly wasting lives or

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assets.[5] Furthermore, the American people will accept, or tolerate, a successful operation such as the invasion of the Dominican Republic or the risking of nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis, but will not do so where success is slow in coming as in Viet Nam.

The three final questions are the most difficult, but they are by no means insoluble. Number three is *whether, after making the effort in question, the United States can disengage from the conflict if the proposed effort does not achieve its purpose.* This depends in large measure on the extent of American prestige committed to the cause we are supporting. It may turn on whether the American people and the rest of the world will continue to view the contest as another country's struggle in which we are assisting, or, instead, our own cause in which that country is participating.

A comparison between the U.S. involvements in Laos and Viet Nam provides a clue as to how to help another country and still retain the ability to disengage. In Laos, even though the United States is substantially involved in combat in the air, and in logistics and advisory support on the ground, it is unlikely that we will send our own combat troops to defend the noncommunist government there. The Laotian operation is a classic case of low profile, conveniently cast in the shadow of the larger enterprise next door in Viet Nam. Our former Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, put it this way in 1969 before Senator Symington's Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Commitments Abroad: "We used to use as a rule of thumb our ability to make it [our presence in Laos] reversible and terminate it within eight hours. It would probably take twenty-four hours now, but it still could be done."[6]

On the other hand, in the early 1960's we made the war in South Viet Nam appear as the ultimate test of whether "we" could stop communist-supported insurgencies. This was vividly portrayed as early as 1963 in the presence of more than 16,000 American military advisers in the country and interminable visits by high American officials, who would return home to espouse new concepts prescribing how "we" could contain the communist threat.

[5]This is not intended to preclude the rare situation in which "hopeless" military operations are undertaken in the expectation that they will enhance the national interest elsewhere or at a later time. A classic example of this was Churchill's dispatch of British forces to Greece in the early days of World War II in the face of overwhelming military odds. This is sometimes called the potlatch principle.

[6]Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Part 2, Laos) (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 521.

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On the heels of our success in the Cuban missile crisis, the consummation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the reversal of the potential missile gap through our Minuteman and Polaris programs, we tended to believe that insurgency was the one remaining form of belligerency to be checked. In early 1964 Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, in talking to his staff, summed up this sentiment in these words: "Bob [McNamara] believes we are in good shape at the upper end of the spectrum. He would like to do something with respect to the lower end." With this attitude, and the ever-worsening situation in Viet Nam, we plunged into the struggle there with too little concern for the risks of overinvolvement. Our identification with the overthrow of the Diem regime only served to tie the knot tighter.

The fourth question is, in some ways, the converse of the third: *Will the proposed action succeed so well that the other side will be likely to escalate in a way compelling us to respond beyond our inherent interest in the situation*? It is one thing to let a minor communist power such as North Viet Nam or North Korea take over one of its neighbors; it is a much more serious matter to let an American combat force be swept from the field by the Communist Chinese. One of the best examples of an operation that succeeded too well was the American advance to the Yalu in 1950, which precipitated Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Escalation could occur in the same theater, as in the case of that Chinese intervention, or elsewhere, as in the case of Moscow's threat (if it was credible) to unleash Soviet missiles in response to the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956.

Several corollaries can be suggested. Acts that are clearly defensive or status quo-oriented are not likely to appear so spectacularly successful as to bring forth disastrous reprisals. The recent installation of Soviet air defense missiles west of the Suez Canal, even though in violation of the Middle East cease-fire arrangement, was accomplished in such a manner that the Soviets and Egyptians could be reasonably certain the United States would not intervene and Israel would not take any measures more serious than she had been taking just prior to the cease-fire. The sending of U.S. ground forces to South Viet Nam in 1965 was the same sort of operation. It was not likely to change the ground rules under which the other side was operating.

Saying that the other side will not escalate in such cases does not imply that it will not increase its effort. In these cases that is precisely what happened. The United States supplied Israel with

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more F-4 fighter-bombers after the Soviets installed their missiles, and North Viet Nam increased its infiltration after the United States intervened in South Viet Nam. But these were not qualitative or dramatic shifts in the nature of the conflict. They were such obvious consequences of the intervention in question that they served as part of the context for the decision to intervene itself.

Another requirement that follows in some cases from this fourth proposition is that there be a long-drawn-out denouement to allow both sides to mute the original purpose for which they were fighting. Such a period existed during the extended peace talks and military stalemate in the Korean War. A similar process may now be at work in the Middle East. Although the traditional temperament of the American people is not well geared to such stretched-out, inconclusive conflict, we may be learning to adapt to this feature of the nuclear age.

The fifth question is the moral one: *Does the American interest being defended by intervention justify the sacrifice that may ensue for the local populace?* In starkest terms, some decisions by the United States to support its interests will result in more people being killed in the area than would be if we refrained from intervening. This, of course, is not always the case. In the Nigerian civil war it is possible that some form of American intervention on the side of the central government could have saved lives by shortening the war. Likewise, sending the *Enterprise* into the Indian Ocean may have played a part in terminating hostilities in West Pakistan.

One way to approach this question is to ask whether the effort, with all its present sacrifices, is reasonably likely to reduce significantly the risk of greater hostilities in the future. Perhaps another way is to ask whether the people involved are willing to undergo the ordeal continuation of the war will entail. When it comes to defending the State of Israel, for instance, the answer should be easy. The Israelis are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to preserve their country.

Another factor worth mentioning is which side's principles are the nobler, irrespective of the number of casualties involved. However, where a consequential American security interest is involved, rarely will the morality of the side opposed to American interests be so superior to that of the side we would be likely to support as to cause us to abandon the interest. American interests

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are usually consistent with some moral purpose; often it is the avoidance of greater killing and destruction at a later time.

III

Let us now apply these five questions to four difficult cases: the Viet Nam intervention of 1965, the incursion into Cambodia in 1970, a hypothetical resumption of the Korean War, and a renewal of hostilities in the Middle East.

Viet Nam

The main interest served by our intervention in Viet Nam in early 1965 was to forestall doubt that could have arisen in many quarters around the world about our willingness to use, and our effectiveness in using, military power to defend our friends and allies.[7] Our effort in the war has by now resulted in more than 45,000 American servicemen killed in action and an annual cost at one time as high as $28 billion, now down to about $10 billion.

By early 1965 American prestige had already been heavily committed to the survival of a noncommunist South Viet Nam. On January 1, 1965 we had 23,000 military advisers in that country.[8] The demonstration of U.S. force that has ensued in Southeast Asia has been relevant in turning Indonesia away from communism, maintaining democracy in India and South Korea and, most significantly, keeping Japan oriented toward the West and nonnuclear. Détente with the Soviets has continued (though perhaps with some delay) through the SALT talks, and we even see a thaw in our relations with Communist China. On the other hand, the

[7] "The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the Communist world would certainly draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war." Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk, July 1965, as quoted in the *New York Times*, June 20, 1971, p. 27.

See also the Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton to Secretary of Defense McNamara, March 24, 1965, as quoted in *ibid.*, June 15, 1971, p. 20: "U.S. aims: 70% — To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). . . . Evaluation: It is essential — however badly SEA may go over the next 1-3 years — that U.S. emerge as a 'good doctor.' We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the U.S. will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations — regarding U.S. policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems."

[8] "That fact [heavy U.S. engagement in South Viet Nam, especially since 1961] accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist 'war of liberation.' Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors." Memorandum from Secretary of State McNamara to President Johnson, March 16, 1964, as quoted in *ibid.*, June 13, 1971, p. 35.

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dissension within this country generated by the war will make intervention more difficult if needed elsewhere. This, plus the physical cost in lives and money, leads to the conclusion that, on balance, our effort probably exceeded our interest. Although the principles on which the intervention was based were sound, it would have been more efficient to defer our full-scale engagement at least until the following "domino" was in jeopardy.

Whether our action in 1965 violated the second rule — that there be a reasonable prospect of success — depends on how one chooses to define the end. The action staved off defeat but failed to bring peace. Our involvement definitely went against the third rule. Although we had some degree of commitment to the South Vietnamese before we sent in our combat troops, with that step we conclusively bound ourselves to the fortunes of the noncommunist government in Saigon, increasing the difficulty of disengaging by several orders of magnitude.

The fourth test was met. The operation was not so successful as to lead the other side to change the basic context or level of the conflict. The bombing of North Viet Nam could have raised some risk in this respect, but the other side never did escalate in response to these raids.

The fifth question, of morality, is difficult to assess. In early 1965 the majority of the South Vietnamese did not favor an all-out struggle against the communists (they were not necessarily pro-communist, just pro-survival).[9] If the noncommunist forces had capitulated that year, fewer people would probably have been killed in the South at the hands of the communists than have died in the war since then. Did the loss of these people prevent greater tragedy elsewhere? A single nuclear exchange can be many times worse than the sacrifices in Viet Nam. But the demonstration of American will made in Viet Nam could probably have been made elsewhere thereafter, under more favorable circumstances, and we still could have avoided nuclear holocaust and other forms of all-out war.

Cambodia

The 1970 incursion into Cambodia was undertaken primarily to shore up our military posture in Viet Nam. We had a secondary purpose in keeping the communists away from Thailand. We also

[9]A cablegram from Ambassador Lodge to the State Department, September 19, 1963, as quoted in *ibid.*, July 1, 1971, p. 10, read: "General Big Minh's opinion expressed very privately yesterday that the Viet Cong are steadily gaining in strength; have more of the population on their side than has the GVN. . . ."

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had a third interest: the vote of confidence the Cambodians placed in us at the height of the conflict in South Viet Nam may well convince other countries as to which side represents the wave of the future. The operation cost about 300 American lives and a relatively small amount of money. Probably more than 300 of our troops operating thereafter in South Viet Nam are alive today because of the incursion. The interest clearly outweighed the effort.[10]

The operation was successful both in improving the allied military position in the adjoining part of South Viet Nam and in preventing the imminent collapse of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Test two was also satisfied.

We did not thereby commit ourselves to assuring the continued survival of the Lon Nol regime. The operation was limited in time and space. Even if Lon Nol had been overthrown in 1970, the incursion would not have tied us to him because it was entirely justifiable in regard to its effect on South Viet Nam. The firebreak is now even wider since the President is publicly committed not to send U.S. troops back into Cambodia and the Congress has passed legislation to the same effect. The military equipment and air support we have furnished to the Cambodians since the incursion have followed the pattern previously established in Laos: minor continued public attention, little basis for entanglement.

Test four, the avoidance of too much success, was probably met, since Cambodia is neither a Laos nor a North Viet Nam in the calculation of foreign interests. The escalation which mainly concerns us in Southeast Asia is overt Chinese intervention, and that seems unlikely as a result of activity as far south as Cambodia.

The moral issue is also probably resolvable in favor of intervention. The Cambodians seem sincerely committed to trying to recover their country from their traditional enemies, the Vietnamese. Furthermore, many people, Americans and Vietnamese, are alive today in South Viet Nam as a result of the campaign into Cambodia.

Korea

Next, let us hypothesize a resumption of the Korean War, without overt Communist Chinese intervention at the stage we are considering. Our interests would be (1) to preserve for its own

[10]The opposing political arguments heard at the time have not held up. The Paris peace negotiations, at zero before the incursion, did not suffer, and détente with the Soviet Union and Communist China has increased since then.

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sake the Republic of Korea which we once before saved at enormous cost to ourselves and which now stands as a stable pro-American nation in Asia, and (2) to keep the communists away from Japan.

This scenario calls for the initial American effort to consist of massive air support and the commitment of whatever ground combat units we may have at the time in Korea. The interests outlined above probably justify this level of effort.

The South Koreans have a larger army and manpower pool than the North Koreans, but the North has a much larger air force. Because of the numerical superiority of the South on the ground, and the cover of substantial American air support, the prospect of defeating the North Koreans is quite good.

The hardest question is whether such American participation would tie us into greater effort and much higher casualties if it should fail to stem the North Korean surge. This situation would involve a direct challenge to us through our treaty alliance with South Korea and a highly visible response by the United States. We might be able to avoid sending large numbers of ground troops by providing enormous air power and logistical support. This might prove to be all that is needed. If this assistance was not enough, and it was evident that only tremendous numbers of American ground forces would turn the tide, we might be able to take the position that it would be unreasonable to expect us to pay that price — this time. This would be consistent with the literal words of our treaty with South Korea, which only obligate us "to act to meet the common danger."

There is no denying that the situation would be a difficult one, but perhaps it is not made appreciably more difficult by the air and logistics support we would be providing. Because of the existing treaty and the history of American military presence in Korea, the commitment level is already high before the assistance is provided.

The U.S. Seventh Division stationed near the DMZ presents a special problem. It would have to be committed to battle and is likely to suffer a higher rate of casualties than our other forces. Thus it, more than the other units, contains the dynamics of greater commitment. The question whether to withdraw the U.S. infantry division presents the deterrence-disengagement dilemma referred to above. The visible American presence deters the North Koreans from attacking because they know they will probably engage massive American power. But if war should come

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nevertheless, this same process makes it difficult for the United States to avoid making the sacrifices that go with such an engagement. The dilemma is not irresolvable, however. Under the proper circumstances, i.e., during a relatively quiescent period, the United States can withdraw its ground forces and still retain sufficient deterrence to preclude an attack. Deterrence is an attitude in the mind of the enemy. If America's power is otherwise credible, the North Koreans will not gamble on our not intervening simply because we withdraw our ground forces.

Returning to our series of five questions as applied to Korea, questions four and five are fairly easily answered. The events of 1950-1951 teach us that pressing on to the Yalu would be exceedingly dangerous, but American involvement south of the 38th Parallel, and even some bombing in the North, would seem unlikely to lead to Chinese intervention. On the moral issue, the South Koreans have given strong indications of their willingness to fight and die to keep their country out of the hands of the communists.

The Middle East

For the Middle East, an appropriate scenario on which to focus is an Egyptian canal-crossing, with substantial Soviet air support, to retake the Sinai. The American interest is the preservation of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Such an interest is no doubt worth as much as we would be prepared to expend to preserve South Korea. This would at least mean heavy air and logistics support — perhaps also ground forces.

It is hard to judge how successful American intervention would be. One would have to know much more about the magnitude of the Soviet role before reaching a conclusion. Nevertheless, because we know that the Israelis can handle the Arab challenge, the U.S. worldwide tactical aircraft inventory is greater than the Soviets' and superior in other ways, and the United States still has overall superiority in the Mediterranean, there is high promise of success.

The great risk is escalation. Once engaged, both superpowers would be committing enormous prestige to the outcome. The implications of this for Europe and elsewhere are unforeseeable. We must be sure we have done all we possibly can to avoid such a deadly confrontation.

Room for political-strategic maneuvering would unfortunately be narrow, measured visibly by the 150-mile width of the Sinai Peninsula. In such a delicate situation, the dichotomy between

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deterrence and actual defense becomes crucial. In the pre-crisis period the United States must maintain the appearance that it would most likely commit its forces in the event of an attack across the canal by the Egyptians and the Soviets. If a canal-crossing should occur nevertheless, then perhaps the United States should respond not by an immediate engagement of its forces but instead by the dispatch of American-manned tactical aircraft assigned to an air defense role over Israel. This would avoid a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation while signaling American determination to preserve Israel in the rather unlikely event that Egypt and the Soviet Union decided to press their attack into Israel itself.

To avoid Soviet escalation that might follow from an overabundance of success on our part, we should not launch any major ground offensive west of the canal. The moral issue is unambiguous. The Israelis will welcome any support we choose to give them. Though the Arabs have some legitimate grievances, these do not justify destroying Israel.

IV

In conclusion, it may be said that the basic explanation for our military role abroad is none of the following: our commitments to others, the directness or indirectness of the particular challenge, the ideology of democracy, a belief that communism is evil, the aggrandizement of businessmen, or even pressures arising from American domestic politics. (Although some of these items are aspects of that fundamental explanation, others can be dismissed as irrelevant.) Instead, what most determines when and where we will use our military force is the gradient of American interest in a rather small and interrelated world — in most cases interest in our own security, in a few cases some popular nonsecurity interest — traditionally tempered by a sense of morality and justice. The fact that in many places such interests are often more psychological than strategic, in the classic sense, makes them no less authentic.

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A PROPOSAL FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Amnon E. Rafael

MUCH has been said and written about the prospects for peace in the Middle East and the methods of its achievement. To the best of my knowledge, none of the various suggested formulas has been incorporated into a document bearing the indicia of a legal instrument. Neither the parties to the dispute nor those who have attempted to abet the pacification of the Middle East have come forward with a comprehensive written offer embodying the terms of a proposed settlement. Unfortunately, such phrases as "a real peace" or "justice to the peoples of the Middle East" or "liberation of territories" turn out to be quite meaningless as an attempt to solve the Middle Eastern crisis.

This, therefore, is an attempt to draft a Peace Treaty between the warring factions. Not all of the solutions set out in this draft are entirely original. Some of the formulas used have been assimilated from other treaties or documents of international significance. As in any such preliminary proposal, it has flaws. However, my hope is that this proposal will stimulate a more fruitful discussion than we have had in the past and will afford those interested in finding a solution to the Middle Eastern crisis an opportunity to explore not only the meaning and substance of peace but the method of its implementation. To this hope I add one further personal wish: that this proposal, which I am of course prepared to amend, may not remain an intellectual exercise in futility.

PEACE TREATY

PREAMBLE

ARTICLE

I. Renunciation of the Threat and Use of Force

II. Pacific Settlement of Disputes

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III. Special Status of Military Forces

IV. Transfer of Civil Administration

V. The Status of the Region

VI. The Status of the City of Jerusalem

VII. Refugees

VIII. Rights of Citizens of One Party to this Treaty in the Territory of Another Party to this Treaty

IX. Prisoners of War

X. Waterways and Ports

XI. Disarmament

XII. Economic Cooperation

XIII. Cultural and Educational Cooperation

XIV. Diplomatic Relations

XV. Special Remedies of the Parties to this Treaty

XVI. Ratification

Preamble

The Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Israel, Lebanon, the Arab Republic of Syria, and the United Arab Republic,

Determined to bring about an end to all acts of war, belligerency, hostility and aggression in the Middle East;

Resolved to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the principles affirmed in the United Nations Charter and in accordance with the general guidelines of Resolution No. 242 adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on November 22, 1967;

Recognizing the inalienable rights of all peoples to self-determination by virtue of which they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development;[1]

[1]See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by Resolution 2200 (XI) of the General Assembly, December 16, 1966, General Assembly Official Reports (GAOR), XXI, Supp. 16 (A/63/6), pp. 49-52.

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RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of the peoples of the Middle East and to improve their living and working conditions;[2]

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

RENUNCIATION OF THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE[3]

(1) Each party to this Treaty hereby solemnly undertakes not to resort to the threat or the use of force against another party to this Treaty and to refrain from committing any one of the following acts:

(A) To declare war against another party to this Treaty.

(B) To invade by armed forces, even in the absence of a formal declaration of war, the territory of another party to this Treaty.

(C) To bombard by its land, sea or air forces the territory of another party to this Treaty, or to carry out or assist in any manner the carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter.

For purposes of this Article the term "ships" shall include naval and civilian vessels flying the flag of a party to this Treaty as well as civilian vessels owned or chartered by a shipper whose seat of management is located in a country which is a party to this Treaty, irrespective of the flag under which such vessel sails.

(D) To land or lead its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of the territory of another party to this Treaty without the express permission of the Government of the latter, or to violate the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the length of stay of the abovementioned forces or the extent of the area in which they may stay.

(E) To cause or to assist in any way or manner the naval or air blockade of the coasts, ports or skies of another party to this Treaty.

(F) To organize, support, harbor, abet, assist or tolerate armed bands, groups or organizations in its territory which invade the territory of another party to this Treaty, or announce their intention of invasion or the commission of acts of terrorism or diversionary acts in the territory of another party to this Treaty; or to refuse, upon receiving a formal notice from a party to this

[2]See Preamble to the *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.*

[3]See Soviet Union, Draft Resolution, October 18, 1954, A/C.6/L.332/Rev. 1; GAOR, Annexes (IX) 51, pp. 6-7.

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Treaty, to take any action within its power to deny such bands, groups or organizations any support, aid, protection, encouragement or refuge.

(G) To encourage subversive activity against another party to this Treaty.

(H) To promote the fomenting of civil war within the territory of another party to this Treaty.

(I) To promote an internal upheaval in the territory of another party to this Treaty.

(J) To take against another party to this Treaty measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of its economic life, including *inter alia* the organization of an economic boycott on traders with another party to this Treaty.

(K) To take against another party to this Treaty measures preventing it from exploiting its own natural riches.

Article II
Pacific Settlement of Disputes

(1) The parties to this Treaty hereby solemnly undertake to solve, by means of negotiation, any dispute the continuance and duration of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of peaceful and stable relations as provided for in this Treaty.

(2) (A) It is hereby further agreed that in the event recourse to negotiation shall fail to bring about a solution acceptable to the parties to this Treaty who are party to a dispute of the nature described above, such dispute shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties to such dispute.

(B) It is hereby further agreed that in the event consensus as to recourse to arbitration fails to be reached, those parties to this Treaty who are party to a dispute of the nature described above shall bring their dispute before an impartial arbitrator, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice in consultation with the parties to such dispute.

(C) The decision of the abovementioned arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute.

(3) (A) It is hereby expressly provided that where one party to this Treaty shall formally announce in writing to the President of the International Court of Justice that in its view another party has violated this Treaty in a manner which is likely to

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endanger the maintenance of peaceful and stable relations as provided for in this Treaty, and that recourse to negotiation has proved in its view unfruitful, and consensus as to recourse to arbitration has failed, such notice shall be deemed to announce the existence of a dispute the continuance and duration of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of peaceful and stable relations as provided for in this Treaty, and shall consequently empower the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an impartial arbitrator as provided for in paragraph (2).

(B) No notice to the President of the International Court of Justice shall be deemed to comply with the provisions of sub-paragraph (3) (A) unless the notifying party has suggested to the other party to the dispute a list of three arbitrators, and the said arbitrators were rejected by the other party to the dispute or no reply whatsoever was given to such suggestion within 72 (seventy-two) hours of its having been formally presented in writing.

Article III

Special Status of Military Forces

The parties to this Treaty, affirming the principle that territorial gains shall not reflect the weight of conquest, affirming further that all parties to this Treaty are entitled to recognized and secure boundaries, affirming further the need to determine permanently the boundaries of each and every one of the parties to this Treaty, and affirming further that the principle of sovereignty does not preclude the conclusion of agreements granting special privileges to the armed forces of another party to this Treaty, hereby agree as follows:

(1) (A) The final boundaries of the State of Israel shall be as indicated on Map I attached to this Treaty and signed by the representatives of the signatories to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as Map I).

(B) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (A), the State of Israel shall be entitled to station and maintain its military forces (hereinafter the "Israeli Defense Forces"), in a manner and a quantity to be decided upon by the Government of the State of Israel, during the following periods at the following points marked on Map I, and to patrol the routes marked (by a broken line) on Map I during the period in which it shall be entitled to station and maintain the Israeli Defense Forces at any one of the points reached by such routes:

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

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(i) During the period commencing with the execution of this Treaty and terminating exactly one year thereafter, at all points marked by the symbols ○, △, ●, ▲ on Map I.

(ii) During the period commencing with the termination of the period referred to in clause (i) and terminating exactly one year thereafter, at all points marked by the symbols △, ●, ▲ on Map I.

(iii) During the period commencing with the termination of the period referred to in clause (ii) and terminating exactly three years thereafter, at all points marked by the symbols ● and ▲ on Map I.

(iv) During the period commencing with the termination of the period referred to in clause (iii) and terminating exactly twenty-one years thereafter, at all points marked by the symbol ▲ on Map I.

(v) Nothing in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) shall preclude the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces at any point within the area demarcated on Map I as the State of Israel, during the periods referred to in the abovementioned clauses or during any period indefinitely thereafter.

(2) (A) Notwithstanding clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-paragraph (1) (B), the sovereignty over the areas in which the State of Israel has been granted the right to station and maintain the Israeli Defense Forces shall be exercised by the parties to this Treaty as indicated on Map I.

(B) The Israeli Defense Forces stationed and maintained by the State of Israel outside the State of Israel, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy the following rights, privileges and immunities:

(i) The establishment of short-wave sending and receiving radio broadcasting facilities for radio-telegraph, radio-teletype, radio-telephone, radio-telephoto, television and similar services at any one of the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

(ii) The establishment of a telephone network linking all points at which the Israeli Defense Forces may, by virtue of this Treaty, be stationed or maintained by the State of Israel, and the establishment of links between such network and the area coming under the sovereignty of the State of Israel in accordance with the terms of this Treaty, including *inter alia* the erection of tele-

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phone poles, the establishment of relay stations and the laying of underground and overhead cables within and throughout any of the areas lying between the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces may be stationed or maintained and the area coming under the sovereignty of the State of Israel in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

(iii) The establishment of radar installations or any other detecting installations or devices at any one of the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces may, by virtue of this Treaty, be stationed or maintained by the State of Israel.

(iv) The establishment of air bases, naval ports, military bases, camps, fortifications, buildings, warehouses and any other installation at any one of the points at which, by virtue of this Treaty, the Israeli Defense Forces may be stationed or maintained by the State of Israel.

(v) The establishment of a network of pipelines connected to water sources situated in the areas surrounding the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces may be stationed or maintained by the State of Israel, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, with an aim of serving and supplying the said Israeli Defense Forces with the proper quantity of water as determined by the Government of the State of Israel.

(vi) The establishment of facilities at the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained by the State of Israel, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, for purposes of supplying electricity to the said Israeli Defense Forces.

(vii) The paving of roads and routes between any of the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces may be stationed or maintained, from time to time by the State of Israel, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and between such points and the area demarcated on Map I as the State of Israel.

(C) (i) It is hereby expressly agreed that the State of Israel shall have the right at all times during which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained at the points marked by the symbol ▲ on Map I, to patrol the skies and overfly the areas presently encompassed in the lines known as the cease-fire lines, and to that end to send its aircraft over the said areas at such time and in such manner as it may deem necessary.

(ii) The parties to this Treaty, accorded by virtue of the provisions of this Treaty the sovereignty over any area over which the State of Israel is accorded the right to carry out air patrols and overflights, hereby solemnly undertake not to interfere in any

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manner with said flights and to render adequate assistance to crews of overflying and patrolling aircraft in case of emergency.

(D) (i) All points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained shall be under the control and authority of the State of Israel.

(ii) The Government of Israel is hereby granted the authority and power to make regulations operative within the points at which it shall from time to time station and maintain the Israeli Defense Forces outside the State of Israel, as demarcated on Map I and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, for purposes of establishing therein conditions in all respects necessary for the full execution of their powers.

(iii) The laws of the State of Israel, and those laws alone, shall apply to soldiers and members of the Israeli Defense Forces serving outside the area demarcated on Map I as the State of Israel.

(iv) The State of Israel hereby undertakes to fully and strictly apply the provisions of the present Israeli Military Penal Code, subject to changes resulting from the execution of this Treaty, to all soldiers serving with the Israeli Defense Forces outside the area demarcated on Map I as the State of Israel.

Article IV

Transfer of Civil Administration

(1) During the period commencing with the execution of this Treaty and terminating exactly two years thereafter, the State of Israel shall transfer the civil administration of the territories over which parties other than itself have been accorded sovereignty in accordance with the terms of this Treaty.

(2) In order to facilitate the said transfer of civil administration, the following bodies to be encharged with the civil administration transferred by the State of Israel shall be established and organized:

(A) *The Civil Administration of the Peninsula of Sinai* (the Peninsula of Sinai being hereinafter referred to as "the administered area"). The said body shall be comprised of a Governor, appointed by the President of the United Arab Republic, and a duly elected Committee of no less than five but no more than twelve members, inhabitants of the administered area, whose function shall be that of assisting the Governor in carrying out

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his duties and obligations as the Civil Administrator over the administered area.

(i) The Governor shall establish the administrative rule of the United Arab Republic over the area coming under the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic and demarcated on Map I, and shall *inter alia* be responsible for the safety of its inhabitants, the economic and social welfare of its inhabitants, the administration of justice, transportation, posts and telecommunications, medical services, commerce and industry, and the levying of taxes, fees and other compulsory payments necessary for the proper function of the said Civil Administration in the administered area.

(ii) The Civil Administration of the administered area shall refrain from imposing any impediments to transit to or from the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained in accordance with the terms of this Treaty.

(iii) The Governor shall be the Liaison Officer between the Israeli Defense Forces stationed and maintained in the administered area and the Government of the United Arab Republic.

(iv) In order to facilitate the execution of the terms of this Treaty with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces by the State of Israel in the administered area, the Governor and the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces so stationed and maintained shall meet and consult bimonthly, such meetings to be held in rotation first at the headquarters of the Governor and second at the headquarters of the said Commander.

(v) (a) It is hereby specifically agreed that, save as provided for in Article III (1) (B) above, no military forces whatsoever and of whatever nature of the United Arab Republic or of any other Government, whether or not a party to this Treaty, shall ever be allowed into the administered area. Save as provided for in Article III (1) (B) above, the entire administered area shall be forever and indefinitely demilitarized of all military forces of the United Arab Republic or of those of any other Government, whether or not a party to this Treaty.

(v) (b) The United Arab Republic shall be entitled to maintain within the administered area a police force, such force to be armed with light defensive weapons only, and under no circumstances to be equipped with armed personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, rockets, vessels, planes or any other offensive weapons of whatever nature. The size and armaments of the said police force shall be determined mutually by the State of Israel and the

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United Arab Republic in accordance with the specific requirements and needs of the administered area and shall be annually reviewed. In the absence of mutual agreement with respect to the size and armaments of the said police force, the parties shall submit their respective suggestions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall appoint an impartial umpire to decide the matter. The decision of the said umpire shall be binding upon the State of Israel and the United Arab Republic, subject to the annual review referred to above.

(B) *The Civil Administration of the Heights* (the Heights being hereinafter referred to as "the administered territory"). The said body shall be comprised of a Governor, appointed by the President of the Arab Republic of Syria, and a duly elected Committee of no less than three and no more than six members, inhabitants of the administered territory, whose function shall be that of assisting the Governor in carrying out his duties and obligations as the Civil Administrator over the administered territory.

(i) The Governor shall establish the administrative rule of the Arab Republic of Syria over the area coming under the sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Syria and demarcated on Map I, and shall *inter alia* be responsible for the safety of its inhabitants, the economic and social welfare of its inhabitants, the administration of justice, transportation, posts and telecommunications, medical services, commerce and industry, and the levying of taxes, fees and other compulsory payments necessary for the proper function of the said Civil Administration in the administered territory.

(ii) The Civil Administration of the administered territory shall refrain from imposing any impediments to transit to or from the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained in accordance with the terms of this Treaty.

(iii) The Governor shall be the Liaison Officer between the Israeli Defense Forces stationed and maintained in the administered territory and the Government of the Arab Republic of Syria.

(iv) In order to facilitate the execution of the terms of this Treaty with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces by the State of Israel in the administered territory, the Governor and the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces so stationed and maintained shall meet and consult bimonthly, such meetings to be held in rotation first at the head-

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quarters of the Governor and second at the headquarters of the said Commander.

(v) (a) It is hereby specifically agreed that, save as provided for in Article III (1) (B) above, no military forces whatsoever and of whatever nature of the Arab Republic of Syria or of any other Government, whether or not a party to this Treaty, shall ever be allowed into the administered territory. Save as provided for in Article III (1) (B) above, the entire administered territory shall be forever and indefinitely demilitarized of all military forces of the Arab Republic of Syria or of those of any other Government, whether or not a party to this Treaty.

(v) (b) The Arab Republic of Syria shall be entitled to maintain within the administered territory a police force, such force to be armed with light defensive weapons only, and under no circumstances to be equipped with armed personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, rockets, vessels, planes or any other offensive weapons of whatever nature. The size and armaments of the said police force shall be determined mutually by the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Syria in accordance with the specific requirements and needs of the administered territory and shall be annually reviewed. In the absence of mutual agreement with respect to the size and armaments of the said police force, the parties shall submit their respective suggestions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall appoint an impartial umpire to decide the matter. The decision of the said umpire shall be binding upon the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Syria, subject to the annual review referred to above.

(C) *The Civil Administration of the Region.*

ALTERNATIVE NO. 1. In the event that as a result of the Plebiscite, the governing provisions for which are spelled out in Article V of this Treaty, the peoples of the Region shall be governed by a Province which in turn shall be part of a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the following provisions shall apply with respect to the Region as demarcated on Map I.

(i) The Civil Administration over the Region shall be vested in the Provincial Government of the Region, which shall act in accordance with the powers delegated upon it by the Constitution of the Confederation of Jordan and shall in all cases be responsible for the safety of the inhabitants of the Region, the economic and social welfare of the inhabitants of the Region, the administration of justice, transportation, posts and telecommuni-

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cations, medical services, commerce and industry, and the levying of provincial and confederate taxes, fees and other compulsory confederate or provincial payments.

(ii) The Confederation of Jordan and the Provincial Government of the Region shall refrain from imposing any impediments to transit to or from the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained in accordance with the terms of this Treaty.

(iii) The Provincial Government shall appoint a Liaison Officer between the Israeli Defense Forces stationed and maintained in the Region and the Government of the Confederation of Jordan.

(iv) In order to facilitate the execution of the terms of this Treaty with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces by the State of Israel in the Region, the Liaison Officer appointed by the Provincial Government and the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces so stationed and maintained shall meet and consult bi-monthly, such meetings to be held in rotation first at the headquarters of the Liaison Officer and second at the headquarters of the said Commander.

(v) (a) The Provincial Government shall not be entitled to establish a military armed force, nor shall it be entitled to invite the armed forces of any other country into the territory of the Province.

(b) The armed forces of the Confederation of Jordan shall not be entitled to enter the Region.

(c) The Provincial Government shall be entitled to establish a police force, such force to be armed with light weapons only, and under no circumstances to be equipped with armed personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, rockets, vessels, planes or any other offensive weapons of whatever nature. The size and armaments of the said police force shall be determined mutually by the State of Israel and the Confederation of Jordan in accordance with the specific requirements and needs of the Region and shall be annually reviewed. In the absence of mutual agreement with respect to the size and armaments of the said police force, the parties shall submit their respective suggestions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall appoint an impartial umpire to decide the matter. The decision of the said umpire shall be binding upon the State of Israel and the Confederation of Jordan, subject to the annual review referred to above.

ALTERNATIVE NO. 2. In the event that as a result of the

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Plebiscite, the governing provisions for which are spelled out in Article V of this Treaty, the peoples of the Region shall become citizens of an independent State, the Civil Administration over the Region shall be vested in the Government of such independent State.

(i) The Civil Administration over the Region shall be transferred to the independent State, by the State of Israel, within one year of the approval of the Constitution of such State by all parties to this Treaty as provided for in Article V of this Treaty, provided that prior thereto the said independent State shall have entered into a Treaty with the signatories of this Treaty. The Treaty shall be drafted in accordance with the principles of this Treaty with a view to according the independent State the rights and obligations of the parties to this Treaty, and especially with a view to further ensuring the compliance of the independent State with the provisions regulating the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Region.

(ii) The said State shall refrain from imposing any impediments to transit to or from the points at which the Israeli Defense Forces shall be stationed or maintained in accordance with the terms of this Treaty.

(iii) The said independent State shall appoint a Liaison Officer between the Israeli Defense Forces stationed and maintained in its territory and the Government of the said State.

(iv) In order to facilitate the execution of the terms of this Treaty with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces by the State of Israel in the territory of the independent State, the Liaison Officer appointed by the said independent State and the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces so stationed and maintained shall meet and consult bi-monthly, such meetings to be held in rotation first at the headquarters of the Liaison Officer and second at the headquarters of the said Commander.

(v) (a) During the period in which the Israeli Defense Forces shall have the right to be located at any one of the points marked by the symbol ▲ on Map I, the said State shall not be entitled to establish a military armed force, nor shall it be entitled to invite the armed forces of any other country into its territory.

(b) Prior to the evacuation of the points marked by the symbol ▲ on Map I by the Israeli Defense Forces, the independent State and the parties to this Treaty shall enter into a separate Treaty with respect to the formation of a military force

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by the independent State. Notwithstanding any provision of this Treaty to the contrary, in the absence of agreement between all parties to this Treaty and the independent State with respect to the subject matter of the abovementioned Treaty, the State of Israel is hereby accorded the right to maintain the Israeli Defense Forces in the Region until final unanimous agreement between the parties concerned is reached.

(c) The said State shall be entitled to establish a police force and a national guard, such forces to be armed with light weapons only, and under no circumstances to be equipped with armed personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, rockets, vessels, planes or any other offensive weapons of whatever nature. The size and armaments of the said forces shall be determined mutually by the State of Israel and the independent State in accordance with the specific requirements and needs of the said independent State and shall be annually reviewed. In the absence of mutual agreement with respect to the size and armaments of the said forces, the parties shall submit their respective suggestions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall appoint an impartial umpire to decide the matter. The decision of the said umpire shall be binding upon the State of Israel and the independent State, subject to the annual review referred to above.

Article V

The Status of the Region

(1) (A) The parties to this Treaty hereby appoint and constitute the Plebiscite Commission for the Determination of the Status of the Region (hereinafter referred to as the "Plebiscite Commission"). The borders of the Region shall be as demarcated on Map I.

(B) The Plebiscite Commission shall be comprised of the following members:

(i) A Supreme Court Justice of the State of Israel, to be appointed by the Government of Israel.

(ii) A Supreme Court Justice of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, to be appointed by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

(iii) A Supreme Court Justice of the United Arab Republic to be appointed by the Government of the United Arab Republic.

(iv) A Supreme Court Justice of the Arab Republic of

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Syria, to be appointed by the Government of the Arab Republic of Syria.

(v) A Supreme Court Justice of Lebanon, to be appointed by the Government of Lebanon.

(vi) Six Judges of the International Court of Justice, to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The senior of the said six Judges shall be the President of the Plebiscite Commission.

(C) The appointments to be made in accordance with subparagraph (B) shall be made within 60 (sixty) calendar days of the execution of this Treaty by means of an appropriate notice in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(D) (i) The Plebiscite Commission shall conduct and execute a Plebiscite to determine the status of the Region.

(ii) The persons entitled to vote in the said Plebiscite shall be all persons having reached the age of 18 (eighteen) years on the date of the execution of this Treaty, who are not citizens of the State of Israel, and who either:

(a) Are presently permanent residents of the Region.

(b) Were permanently resident for a period of two consecutive years between November 29, 1945 and July 1, 1949, in the area over which the State of Israel exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction on June 4, 1967; who did not absent themselves except temporarily from the said area during the two consecutive years referred to above; who left the said area for a country contiguous to the State of Israel between November 29, 1947 and July 1, 1949, not resettling thereafter in the said area; and who are presently ordinarily resident in such contiguous country or in any other country contiguous to the State of Israel, as demarcated on Map I.

(c) Are the spouse or children of persons designated in sub-clause (b) and are presently ordinarily resident in a country contiguous to the State of Israel, as demarcated on Map I.

(iii) For purposes of this Article a person shall be considered permanently resident in the Region if he has been resident in the Region for a period of 285 (two hundred eighty-five) days during the calendar year preceding the calendar year of the execution of this Treaty.

(iv) For purposes of this Article a person shall be considered ordinarily resident in a country contiguous to the State of

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Israel, as demarcated on Map I, if he has been resident in such country or countries for a period of two calendar years out of the period of three calendar years preceding the execution of this Treaty.

(2) (A) A person entitled to participate in the Plebiscite shall have only one vote.

(B) Any vote which does not mark one of the two alternatives suggested to the voters, as provided for in sub-paragraph (4) (B) below, shall be disqualified.

(C) Any vote which in any way or manner modifies the questions posed to the voters, as provided for in sub-paragraph (4) (B) below, and respectively answers such modified question, shall be disqualified.

(3) (A) The Plebiscite Commission shall compile and approve an exact list of the persons entitled to vote in the Plebiscite and shall cause such list to be published in a fitting manner at least three months before the date of the Plebiscite.

(B) The Plebiscite Commission shall send to each person entitled to participate in the Plebiscite written notice to such effect. The said notices shall be sent in such manner that they reach their addressees at least three months prior to the date of the Plebiscite. The said notice shall serve as a voting card and shall entitle its lawful holder to the right to vote in the Plebiscite.

(C) Any person who shall not have been included in the abovementioned list or shall not have received the abovementioned notice shall have the right to appeal to the Plebiscite Commission during a period of one month commencing with the publication of the said list. The verdict of the Plebiscite Commission shall be final and no appeal shall lie therefrom.

(D) The Plebiscite Commission shall establish voting booths throughout the Region and in the countries contiguous to the State of Israel in such a manner as it shall deem proper, but in no case shall the number of voting booths in the Region fall below the number necessitated so that a person entitled to vote shall not be required to travel from his place of permanent residence or from his place of ordinary residence, as the case may be, a distance greater than 10 (ten) kilometers as measured in a direct line on Map I.

(4) (A) The Plebiscite shall be held during one whole day on a date to be determined by the Plebiscite Commission, but not later than one calendar year from the date of the execution of this Treaty.

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(B) The questions posed to the persons entitled to participate in the Plebiscite shall be as follows:

(i) Do you favor the creation of an independent State in the area demarcated as the Region on the Treaty signed and executed by the Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Israel, Lebanon, the Arab Republic of Syria and the United Arab Republic, such State to be governed by the permanent inhabitants of the said Region in accordance with their right to self-determination but to allow the stationing of the Israeli Defense Forces, in accordance with the said Treaty, on its territory, and to be substantially limited in its right to create an armed military force?

Or

(ii) Do you favor the creation of a Confederation of Jordan in which the area demarcated as the Region in the Treaty signed and executed by the Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Israel, Lebanon, the Arab Republic of Syria and the United Arab Republic shall be an autonomous Province of such Confederation, entitled to self-government within the said Confederation with respect to the civil administration of the Region, to a parliament of its own and to representation in a Confederate Parliament; however, not entitled to the creation of an armed military force of its own or to the stationing of any armed forces, whether of the Confederation or of any other country, in its territory, save those of the Israeli Defense Forces, as provided for in the abovementioned Treaty?

(5) (A) The alternative receiving the larger amount of votes shall be the binding result of the Plebiscite.

(B) The Plebiscite Commission shall tabulate the votes and announce within seven days of the day of the Plebiscite the official results of the Plebiscite. The announcement of the Plebiscite Commission with respect to the result of the Plebiscite shall be final, and shall not be subject to appeal.

(6) (A) The Plebiscite Commission shall draw up suitable rules of procedure and promulgate regulations governing, *inter alia,* the conduct of propaganda in order to carry out the Plebiscite effectively.

(B) All resolutions of the Plebiscite Commission shall require a two-thirds majority of the entire Plebiscite Commission.

(C) The Plebiscite Commission shall hire personnel as it

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deems fit and proper, to carry out and best fulfill its mission and purpose in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid authority, the Plebiscite Commission shall hire only citizens of Austria, the Helvetic Republic, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Rumania, except where the hiring of personnel is required for the purpose of translating, clerical work, and the performance of services totally incidental to the work of the Plebiscite Commission.

(7) (A) The Governments of the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall contribute in equal parts to the budget of the Plebiscite Commission, which shall be prepared by the Plebiscite Commission and submitted to the aforesaid respective Governments not later than three months after the appointment of the members of the Plebiscite Commission.

(B) The parties to this Treaty hereby undertake to facilitate the work of the Plebiscite Commission and to extend their assistance to the Plebiscite Commission so as to allow it to fulfill its purpose and mission as provided for in this Treaty. Without derogating from the abovementioned obligations undertaken by the parties to this Treaty, the said parties shall especially assist the Commission in its endeavor to compile the list of persons entitled to participate in the Plebiscite.

(8) (A) In the event that as a result of the Plebiscite the first alternative offered to the participants in the Plebiscite shall be binding, the Plebiscite Commission shall draw up a Constitution for the new State and shall conduct democratic elections in the said State for the purpose of electing its proper Government.

The said Constitution shall incorporate all the pertinent provisions of this Treaty, especially those with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Region, and those pertaining to the interdiction of creating an armed military force; shall commit the independent State to honor the obligations undertaken by the parties to this Treaty toward each other, except where inconsistent with the creation of the independent State; and shall provide that the said clauses shall not be subject to any amendment save with the express agreement of all parties to this Treaty.

The said Constitution shall be regarded as coming into force upon receiving the approval of all parties to this Treaty, such approval to be addressed to the President of the Plebiscite Commission.

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(B) In the event that as a result of the Plebiscite the second alternative offered to the participants in the Plebiscite shall be binding, the Plebiscite Commission shall, in consultation with the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, draw up the following documents:

(i) A Constitution for the Confederation of Jordan.

(ii) A Constitution for the autonomous Province to be established in the Region.

(iii) A Constitution for the other sole autonomous Province to be established outside the Region but within the boundaries of the Confederation.

The said Constitutions shall incorporate the pertinent provisions of this Treaty with respect to the stationing and maintaining of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Region, shall provide that no armed military forces of the Confederation or of any other country save those of the State of Israel shall be stationed in the Region, shall provide that the obligations assumed in this Treaty by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall be those of the Confederation of Jordan except where inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall provide that the said incorporation shall not be subject to any amendment, save with the express agreement of all parties to this Treaty.

The said Constitutions shall be regarded as coming into effect upon receiving the approval of all parties to this Treaty, such approval to be addressed to the President of the Plebiscite Commission, and upon the Confederation of Jordan's addressing a formal written notice to all parties to this Treaty to the effect that it shall honor all the obligations assumed by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in this Treaty, except where they shall prove inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty.

Article VI

The Status of the City of Jerusalem

(1) The territorial limits of the City of Jerusalem shall be as demarcated on Map II, attached to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as Map II).

(2) The City of Jerusalem shall be the capital of the State of Israel.

(3) The City of Jerusalem shall be the capital of the independent State to be created in the Region or of the Province to be created in the Region, as the results of the Plebiscite shall determine.

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

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(4) (A) Sovereignty over the City of Jerusalem shall be divided between the State of Israel and the independent State to be created in the Region or between the State of Israel and the Confederation of Jordan, as the results of the Plebiscite shall determine, in accordance with the general demarcation line of Map I, but more specifically in accordance with the demarcation line of Map II.

(B) Notwithstanding the division of sovereignty over the City of Jerusalem, agreed to by the parties to this Treaty, no fences, border posts or obstacles of whatsoever nature, save for customs check posts along the demarcation line, shall be erected within the City of Jerusalem.

(C) (i) Notwithstanding the division of sovereignty over the City of Jerusalem, agreed to by the parties to this Treaty, the City of Jerusalem shall have only one Municipality which shall be elected by all the permanent residents of the city, such Municipality to have the powers conferred by the laws of the State of Israel on municipalities within the State of Israel.

(ii) (a) The first elections to the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall be conducted, not later than one year after the execution of this Treaty, by the present Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem in the manner prescribed for the election of municipalities in the laws of the State of Israel as presently in force, subject to the right of participation in said elections as set out in clause (i) above.

(b) Elections other than those referred to in subclause (a) shall be conducted every four years in accordance with the laws of the State of Israel, applicable to the elections of municipalities and subject to the right of participation in said elections as set out in clause (i) above.

(iii) The budget of the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall be raised from taxes, fees, levies and other compulsory payments which the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall decide upon, and which shall be ratified by both the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Province established in the Region or, in the event that an independent State be created in the Region, by the Government of such independent State.

In addition to the said taxes, fees, levies and other compulsory payments, the Government of the State of Israel shall annually, during a period of 10 (ten) years from the execution of this Treaty, donate to the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem a

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sum equivalent to 30 (thirty) per cent of the amount of taxes, fees, levies and other compulsory payments which the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall have collected during such year. Half of the said sum shall be paid in advance on the basis of reasonably accurate estimates and the remainder shall be payable annually in accordance with the actual collections of the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem.

In addition to the said taxes, fees, levies and other compulsory payments, the Government of the Province to be established in the Region, or the Government of the independent State to be created in the Region, as the case may be in accordance with the results of the Plebiscite, shall annually, during a period of 10 (ten) years from the execution of this Treaty, donate to the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem a sum equivalent to 20 (twenty) per cent of the amount of taxes, fees, levies and other compulsory payments which the Municipality shall have collected during such year. One-quarter of the said sum shall be paid in advance on the basis of reasonably accurate estimates and the remainder shall be payable semi-annually in accordance with the actual collections of the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem.

After the expiration of the ten-year period referred to in this clause, the Government of the State of Israel, and the Government of the Province established in the Region or the Government of the independent State to be created in the Region, in accordance with the results of the Plebiscite, shall mutually decide upon their respective contributions, if any, to the budget of the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem.

(5) (A) The Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall be responsible for the maintenance of the guarantee of freedom of access, to all persons permanently resident or visiting in the City of Jerusalem, to all holy, historic and religious sites within the limits of the City of Jerusalem, and shall take the necessary measures to ensure to all permanent residents and visitors the freedom of worship, cult, religion or beliefs.

(B) The measures referred to in sub-paragraph (A) above shall include the establishment of a special force to protect and safeguard the sites referred to in the said sub-paragraph.

(6) All claims against the Municipality of the City of Jerusalem shall be brought before a special Court to be comprised of seven judges to be appointed as follows:

(A) Four judges, qualified under the laws of the State of

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Israel for the post of District Court Judge, by the Government of Israel.

(B) Three judges, qualified under the laws of the Confederation of Jordan for the post of District Court Judge, by the Government of the Province to be created in the Region or, in the event that an independent State shall be created in the Region, by the Government of such independent State.

The substantive law applied by the Municipal Court shall be the laws of the State of Israel. The rules of procedure, including the determination of the composition of the Court, applicable in the Municipal Court, shall be those applied by the District Courts of the State of Israel. Appeals against any judgment rendered by the Municipal Court shall lie to the Supreme Court of Israel in its capacity as High Court of Justice.

(7) (A) The residents of the City of Jerusalem are hereby accorded the right to maintain their abode or travel throughout the entire City of Jerusalem.

(B) Visitors to the City of Jerusalem are hereby accorded the right to travel freely throughout the entire City of Jerusalem.

Article VII
Refugees

(1) The Government of Israel, deeply moved by the inhumane sufferings of the Palestinian refugees, determined to use its best efforts, skills and a substantial amount of its financial resources to relieve this suffering, hereby solemnly undertakes as follows:

(A) To compensate any Palestinian refugee for any property in the area of the State of Israel acquired by such refugee prior to May 15, 1948 and lost by such refugee as a consequence of the war which raged in the Middle East during the years 1948 and 1949.

(B) (i) To establish a special committee, headed by a Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, to deal with all claims arising out of its obligation under sub-paragraph (A) and to authorize the payment of any sum due as compensation under sub-paragraph (A) above.

(ii) To establish a just and equitable procedure regarding proof of the right to compensation, in consultation with the other parties to this Treaty and prominent and eminent jurists of international renown.

(C) To allow during the period of five years extending from the execution of this Treaty the following number of refugees

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to settle in the State of Israel, provided such refugees enter the State of Israel within the framework of the "unification of families" as defined below, and provided further that such refugees are willing to assume all obligations and duties of Israeli citizens, do not constitute a health hazard to the population of the State of Israel, and have not been engaged in criminal activities of a nature which might endanger the safety of the population of the State of Israel.

(i) During the period commencing with the execution of this Treaty and terminating exactly one year thereafter, 13 (thirteen) per cent of the total number of Jewish immigrants to the State of Israel entering the State of Israel during such period.

(ii) During the period commencing with the termination of the period mentioned in clause (i) and terminating exactly two years thereafter, 10 (ten) per cent of the total amount of Jewish immigrants to the State of Israel entering the State of Israel during such period.

(iii) During the period commencing with the termination of the period mentioned in clause (ii) and terminating exactly two years thereafter, 8 (eight) per cent of the total amount of Jewish immigrants to the State of Israel entering the State of Israel during such period.

(D) To assist, by financial means and by providing vocational training, in settling on a permanent basis the refugees who shall not settle in the State of Israel, provided such refugees settle either in the countries in which they presently reside, a country party to this Treaty, or the Region, whatever status it assumes as a result of the Plebiscite.

(2) (A) Every refugee shall have the right to settle in the Region and to assume, by so settling, automatically and without delay, the citizenship of the Confederation of Jordan in the event that a Province of the said Confederation shall be established in the Region as a result of the Plebiscite, or the citizenship of the independent State established in the Region if so warranted as a result of the Plebiscite.

(B) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (A) above, the right to settle in the Region and the right to citizenship may be denied by the appropriate and competent authorities in the event that the refugee desirous of such right is deemed to constitute a security hazard to the population of the Region.

(3) (A) In order to facilitate the execution of the provisions of

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this Article, the parties hereby establish the Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees.

(B) The said Commission shall be comprised of the following members:

(i) One member appointed by each of the parties to this Treaty.

(ii) Five members to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, provided such members be citizens of a country mentioned in Article V (6) (C) above.

(C) (i) The Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall deal with all matters pertaining to the settlement of the refugees in the Region and, in consultation with the Government of the Region and the Governments of the parties to this Treaty, shall decide upon the methods of resettlement, the location of the resettlement, and the economic, social, educational and cultural programs required to effectuate such resettlement. The decisions of the Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall be binding directly upon the Government of the Region and the said Commission shall supervise their implementation.

(ii) The said Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall not deal with any matters pertaining to the unification of families.

(iii) The Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall not deal with any matters pertaining to the compensation of refugees by the State of Israel.

(D) The budget required for the proper function of the Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall be borne equally by the parties to this Treaty.

(E) The Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall create a Fund to be named the Fund for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees (hereinafter referred to as "the Fund"), and shall solicit monies for the Fund.

The Commission for the Rehabilitation and Settlement of the Palestinian Refugees shall allocate to the Government of the Region and the Governments of the parties to this Treaty the amounts necessary and required in its discretion for the implementation of its decisions.

In implementing its obligation under sub-paragraph (1) (D) of this Article, the State of Israel hereby undertakes to contribute

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to the Fund the sum of 250 (two hundred fifty) million United States dollars, such sum being payable in equal installments over a period of five years.

The Arab Republic of Syria hereby undertakes to contribute to the Fund the sum of 40 (forty) million United States dollars, such sum being payable in equal installments over a period of three years.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan hereby undertakes to contribute to the Fund the sum of 60 (sixty) million United States dollars, such sum being payable within one year of the execution of this Treaty.

The United Arab Republic hereby undertakes to contribute to the Fund the sum of 100 (one hundred) million United States dollars, such sum being payable in equal installments over a period of four years.

Lebanon hereby undertakes to contribute to the Fund the sum of 50 (fifty) million United States dollars, such sum being payable in equal installments over a period of three years.

(F) For purposes of this Article the following terms shall carry the following meaning:

"Refugee"—(i) a person of citizenship other than that of the State of Israel, or of no citizenship whatsoever, who permanently resided for a period of two consecutive years between November 29, 1945 and July 1, 1949, in the area over which the State of Israel exercised its sovereignty and jurisdiction on June 4, 1967; who did not absent himself except temporarily from the said area during the two consecutive years referred to above; and who left the said area for a country contiguous to the State of Israel between November 29, 1947 and July 1, 1949, not resettling thereafter in the said area.

(ii) the present spouse of a person referred to in clause (i).

(iii) the natural children of a person referred to in clause (i), born not later than three years after the execution of this Treaty.

(iv) the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of a person referred to in clause (i), born not later than three years after the execution of this Treaty.

"Jewish immigrant"—any person defined as Jewish in accordance with the Law of Return, as in force in the State of Israel, entering Israel equipped with an immigrant visa or with the visa of a temporary resident.

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"Unification of families"—the union of a citizen of the State of Israel with any one of the following: his spouse, his parents, his children, his grandchildren if accompanied by either one of their parents, his brothers, his sisters, his sisters-in-law, his brothers-in-law, his nephews and nieces if accompanied by either one of their parents.

Article VIII

Rights of Citizens of One Party to this Treaty in the Territory of Another Party to this Treaty[4]

(1) Each party to this Treaty hereby undertakes to assure full protection of the rights and liberties of citizens of the other parties to this Treaty present in its territory. Without prejudice to the generality of the aforesaid guarantee of full protection of rights and liberties, each party to this Treaty hereby undertakes especially to guarantee the following rights:

(A) The right of free access to any holy site situated within its territory.

(B) The right to exercise freely any religion or belief and to enjoy complete freedom of worship.

(C) The right to fair and equitable treatment in the matter of property, enterprises and interests situated within its territory.

(D) The right to a fair and just trial in their respective Courts of Justice.

(2) (A) Citizens of any party to this Treaty shall, subject to the laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, be permitted to enter the territories of any other party to this Treaty, to travel therein freely, and to take up temporary residence for the purpose of such travel or sojourn at places of their choice, ordinarily used in the accommodation of visitors.

(B) Citizens of any party to this Treaty shall be permitted within the territories of any other party to this Treaty to gather information material for dissemination to the public, and shall enjoy freedom of transmission of such material to be used abroad for publication by the press, radio, television, motion pictures and other means; and they shall be permitted to communicate freely with other persons inside and outside such territories by mail, telegraph and other means open to general public use.

(C) The provisions of the above enumerated sub-paragraphs

[4]See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1840; T.I.AS. 3593.

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(A) and (B) shall be subject to the right of any party to this Treaty to apply measures that are necessary to maintain public order and protect the public health, morals and safety.

(3) (A) The parties to this Treaty hereby undertake to abolish on the date of the execution of this Treaty all laws in force in their respective territory which were specifically promulgated to restrict the entrance of citizens of one party into the territory of another party, trade between the citizens of one party and the citizens of another party (including *inter alia* the import and export of goods to and from such party), and laws incompatible with the interparty relations established by the provisions of this Treaty.

(B) The provisions of sub-paragraph (A) above shall not be interpreted as requiring the abolition of any laws differentiating between residents and nonresidents or citizens and noncitizens, as long as such laws are not purposely discriminating against residents or citizens of any particular party to this Treaty, other than the party enforcing such laws.

(4) The parties to this Treaty hereby undertake to refrain from punishing or from bringing to trial any person solely because such person, during the period in which the State of Israel controlled any area outside the area demarcated on Map I as the State of Israel, collaborated or complied with the instructions issued by the Israeli authorities in said area.

Article IX
Prisoners of War

(1) (A) The parties to this Treaty shall within five days of the signing of this Treaty exchange all prisoners of war, including members of military forces, such exchange to be conducted under the auspices of the International Red Cross.

(B) For purposes of this Article the term "prisoners of war" shall include members of regular armed military forces, persons of the citizenship of a party to this Treaty convicted of espionage for another party to this Treaty or convicted exclusively of membership in a subversive paramilitary hostile organization.

Article X
Waterways and Ports

(1) The United Arab Republic hereby solemnly undertakes to allow, without discrimination, the vessels and ships of all nations

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the right of passage in the Suez Canal. This undertaking of the United Arab Republic shall, with respect to its relations with any country, party to this Treaty, supersede any other undertaking or obligation which the United Arab Republic may have previously assumed.

(2) The parties to this Treaty hereby solemnly declare that the Gulf of Aqaba, including the Straits of Tiran, is an international waterway and that the vessels and ships of all nations are allowed, without discrimination, the right of passage through such international waterway. The parties to this Treaty hereby undertake to take the necessary measures to guarantee freedom of passage to the vessels and ships of all nations through the said international waterway.

(3) The State of Israel hereby undertakes to allow the Confederation of Jordan and/or the independent State established in the Region, as the case may be in accordance with the results of the Plebiscite, free access over the route marked by two parallel lines on Map I to the port of Gaza.

Article XI

Disarmament[5]

(1) (A) The parties to this Treaty, recognizing that the maintenance of a just and lasting peace between the parties to this Treaty requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, and further consistent with the geographical situation and circumstances of each of the parties to this Treaty, hereby undertake to adopt and implement plans for such reduction.

(B) (i) The plans referred to in sub-paragraph (A) shall be prepared by a special Commission, which shall convene regularly and shall be comprised of two representatives of each of the parties to this Treaty, and a representative of the Confederation of Jordan or the independent State to be created in the Region, as the results of the Plebiscite shall require.

(ii) Plans adopted unanimously by all members of the Commission referred to above shall be submitted to the Governments of the parties to this Treaty, who shall thereupon enter into consultation for the purpose of their implementation, by means of special agreements to that effect.

[5]See Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 8.

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(C) The parties to this Treaty undertake to encourage the interchange of full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air capabilities, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

ARTICLE XII

ECONOMIC COOPERATION[6]

(1) The parties to this Treaty,

RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action designed to remove trade barriers existing between them;

RECOGNIZING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition;

ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development;

HEREBY AGREE to enter into a separate agreement, not later than five years after the execution of this Treaty, whose basic objectives shall be as follows:

(A) The reduction or the elimination, as between the parties to the said agreement, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect.

(B) The establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy toward third countries.

(C) The abolition, as between the parties to the said agreement, of the obstacles to the free movement of services and capital.

(D) The inauguration of a common agricultural policy.

(E) The inauguration of a common transport policy.

(F) The establishment of a legal system ensuring that competition among economic enterprises situated in the countries party to said agreement shall not be distorted.

(G) The application of procedures permitting the coordination of the economic policies of the parties to the said agreement and the correction of disequilibria in their balances of payment.

(H) The elimination of significant disparities between the parties to the said agreement in the conditions of supply of raw materials produced within the total area of the parties to the said agreement.

[6]See note 2 above.

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(I) The establishment of a Middle Eastern Investment and Industrial Bank intended to facilitate the economic expansion of the countries party to such agreement, through the creation of new resources.

(2) (A) The parties to this Treaty hereby establish the Economic Commission for the Middle East, which shall draw up a recommendation for the agreement referred to above, in the form of a draft agreement. The said Commission shall be comprised of the representatives of the Governments party to this Treaty and the representative of the Government of the State established in the Region, if so established, or in the event that a Confederation of Jordan shall be established, in all cases in accordance with the result of the Plebiscite, the representative of the Government of the Confederation of Jordan in lieu of the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the representative of the Government of the Province to be established in the Region.

(B) The Economic Commission for the Middle East shall submit the recommendations referred to above not later than four years after the execution of this Treaty.

Article XIII

Cultural and Educational Cooperation[7]

(1) The parties to this Treaty, desirous of promoting the fullest possible understanding among them in the intellectual, artistic and scientific fields, as well as their acquaintance with the social life of the peoples of the parties to this Treaty, undertake to encourage, support and facilitate friendly cooperation and cultural exchange among them, and have agreed that the means and ventures aimed at these objectives should be as follows:

(A) Exchanges in the spheres of culture, science and literature and in particular the exchange of books, periodicals, films and records of an educational character, in the original or in translation, as well as the exchange of copies of works and objects of an artistic character.

(B) The cooperation and exchange of scientists, research workers, lecturers and students.

(C) The taking of measures calculated to facilitate journeys of the citizens of the parties to this Treaty when made with the intention of participating in conferences, cultural or scientific

[7]See Cultural Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Uganda, K.A. 744, Vol. 21, p. 711.

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gatherings, or contests of sports and games, or attending exhibitions of a cultural or a scientific nature.

(D) The development of tourism between the parties to this Treaty with a view to promoting mutual acquaintance, understanding and economic benefit among the peoples of the parties to this Treaty.

Article XIV

Diplomatic Relations

(1) All parties to this Treaty who do not presently maintain diplomatic relations with each other, hereby establish diplomatic relations with such other party, and undertake to appoint not later than three months following the execution of this Treaty, in accordance with international custom and procedure, a diplomatic representative with ambassadorial rank.

(2) (A) In the event that as a result of the Plebiscite referred to in Article V of this Treaty, the Confederation of Jordan shall be established, the diplomatic representation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall be annulled and in its stead there shall be established diplomatic relations between the Confederation of Jordan and each of the other parties to this Treaty.

(B) In the event that as a result of the Plebiscite referred to in Article V of this Treaty, an independent State shall be established in the Region, each of the parties to this Treaty and the said independent State shall establish diplomatic relations with each other. The abovementioned diplomatic relations shall be established in accordance with international custom and practice and shall be of the same rank as those established among the parties to this Treaty.

Article XV

Special Remedies of the Parties to this Treaty

(1) It is expressly provided that notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Treaty to the contrary, in the event that the State of Israel shall commit a fundamental breach of this Treaty, the other parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to rescind this Treaty and to take such measures as they deem necessary in the circumstances to defend any threat to their security ensuing from such breach.

(2) It is expressly provided that notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Treaty to the contrary, in the event that any

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other of the parties to this Treaty, save the State of Israel, and in the event that a Confederation of Jordan shall be established or an independent State established in the Region, then the said Confederation or independent State, shall commit a fundamental breach of this Treaty or of the obligations imposed upon it by this Treaty, then the State of Israel shall be entitled to rescind this Treaty and to take such measures as it shall deem necessary in the circumstances to defend against any threat to its security ensuing from the said breach.

(3) For purposes of this Article the term "fundamental breach" shall carry the following meaning:

(A) The placing, or the allowing or tolerating of the placing by the party in breach, of any military forces and/or equipment and/or weapons in any area which, according to the terms of this Treaty, is to be demilitarized at the time of the said breach; or

(B) A breach of the provisions of Article I of this Treaty.

(4) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to deny a party to this Treaty, against which a fundamental breach has been committed, the right to the recourse to negotiations and arbitration as more fully spelled out in Article II of this Treaty.

Article XVI
Ratification

(1) The present Treaty shall be ratified by each of the parties to this Treaty, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the City of Jerusalem not later than thirty days after the signing of this Treaty.

(2) For purposes of this Treaty the term "execution of this Treaty" shall refer to the date on which the ratifications of this Treaty shall be exchanged as provided for in paragraph 1 above.

(3) (A) The binding language of this Treaty shall be the English language.

(B) The original copy of this Treaty shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall be open to the inspection of the parties in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations or any other official of the United Nations appointed by him.

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ADAPTIVE POLITIES IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD*

by James N. Rosenau

AMID swift and profound technological and social change, we tend to forget that our time is also marked by continuity. Deep-seated habits still shape the actions of men and nations, and long-standing conventions still guide their interactions. Yet the changes are so great that we stress, perhaps even exaggerate, the presence of crisis. The world is seen as in perpetual crisis, so that a rhetoric of crisis has become an accepted part of our daily life. While this rhetoric forces us to confront many of the important changes that are occurring, it too often also leads us to ignore the continuities, with the result that simplistic, either-or conceptions of the scope and meaning of the changes abound: either we find immediate solutions to ecological problems or the world will starve and suffocate; either the nuclear stockpiles are dismantled or nuclear holocaust will follow; either societies invent new forms of government suited to an interdependent world or they will turn on each other in a futile effort to preserve their independence; either man develops a new morality to replace the norms of a scientific age or he will be overwhelmed by a surfeit of unmanageable technology.

It is the central thesis of this article that such polarizations are inaccurate and dangerous. We shall argue that what lies ahead is a world of ungainly asymmetries and not tidy symmetries — a world marked by change *and* continuity, starvation *and* sufficiency, nuclear weapons *and* peaceful accommodations, interdependence *and* independence, old norms *and* new values. Some of the asymmetries may even be highly desirable. Continuity can facilitate as well as constrain change, independence can supplement as well as undermine interdependence, old norms can clarify as well as obscure new values. The greatest danger arises out of the tendency

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to define the present as racked by either-or crises from which there is no escape. Such a tendency leads to the conviction that we are pawns and not masters of the rapid and profound changes we only dimly perceive. This sense of powerlessness, in turn, leads to the abandonment of rationality. Once this happens, once the application of intelligence no longer seems useful, the world will have truly entered a crisis that is beyond exaggeration. Thus the emotional and intellectual wherewithal for man to find creative and humane responses to his changing world lies in the continuity of some deeply rooted and well-tested modes of thought and behavior — those that comprise the scientific approach and are based on reason and the pursuit of understanding.

This is not to venerate habit and exalt the status quo. To regard certain habitual modes of thought and long-standing conventions as sources of emotional and intellectual strength is not to contend that change should be resisted or radical solutions avoided. Rather it is to say that the opportunities inherent in the established patterns of modern life need to be appreciated and utilized if its crisis-ridden excesses are to be surmounted. Habits, like changes, can be either oppressive or liberating, and those that are liberating should be included among the tools used to overcome those that are oppressive. The habits of communities that have culminated in the pollution of their environment need to be understood if they are to be reversed. The habits of the nation-state system that have generated the nuclear arms race need to be probed if they are to be contained. The best way to understand such oppressive habits is by using the liberating habit of scientific inquiry, which offers man perhaps the only route to the kind of understanding of his dilemma necessary for the development of radical and effective solutions. Unless account is taken of the persistence of habitual forms of organization and traditional modes of interaction, desired change cannot be effectively promoted and undesired change resisted.

It is not difficult to map out alternatives to present conditions if one ignores the customs and traditions that created and sustained them and that must be overcome for change to occur. But unless these established ways are identified and comprehended in all their depth and complexity, no solution, however compellingly it may be propounded, can be made a reality.

I

Our main goal here is to probe the asymmetries that charac-

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terize politics in our interdependent world and to do so in the context of scientific inquiry. Ironically, to propose reliance on the application of science to human affairs today is to be profoundly radical. In the current milieu the notion of using human intelligence to solve human problems has given way to impatience, to respect for impulse and emotion, to calls for a new morality that will rescue the individual and the nation from the oppressive excesses of modern life. Those who believe in analyzing what is, as well as what ought to be, and proceed by conforming to strict rules of evidence and cautious modes of interpretation, are viewed as obsolete and as threats to progress. Their attempts to observe and quantify the central patterns in the behavior of people in general are seen as failing to depict, and even worsening, the qualitative predicament of the individual. Scientific inquiry has thus come into disrepute. Both the Establishment and the advocates of radical change reject the premises of social science. Only recently, for example, the President dismissed, abruptly and unqualifiedly, the results of a serious effort to employ the methods of science to trace and explain the consequences of pornography. His reasons for doing so are no different from those of many radicals who, when confronted with the results of scientific efforts to analyze international politics, in effect say "I will not accept facts that are contrary to what I believe."

Social science, in short, has come to be associated with the old norms that produced nuclear weapons and a polluted environment. What was once commonplace — that one should proceed as rationally as possible and seek to understand one's environment before attempting to alter it — has become suspect or abandoned. Even the most thoughtful of observers who are dedicated to democratic institutions have been led by the rhetoric of crisis to posit new policy goals and new strategies designed to realize them, without also calling for efforts to comprehend why present goals persist or how they may be altered. But if we believe that human problems can be solved through the application of intelligence, we must confront their complexity and be ready to pay the price such a confrontation entails. To do so is to tailor moral imperatives to empirical realities, to enlighten aspiration with reason, and to allocate resources for pure research in the social sciences — adjustments which in today's crisis-ridden climate constitute true radicality.

The widespread loss of respect for the uses of reason and the consequent erosion of confidence in the capacity of the social

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sciences to contribute to the solution of national and international problems cannot be exaggerated. From the President of the United States to the local newspaper editor, from the halls of Congress to the ivory tower of academe, from the seats of power to the centers of revolution, from whomever or wherever thoughts about the future originate, the call is for a reordering of priorities and rededication to old values or commitment to new ones. Conspicuously missing is a concurrent call to reason and a readiness to pay the costs of its application, as if the urgency and seriousness of the normative problems have rendered the use of reason a luxury that can no longer be afforded. Many people would doubtless argue that too many important problems must be addressed for scarce resources to be allocated on the basis of a hope that the painfully slow processes of science will unravel the mysteries of international life. One can only respond that the cost of not making such an investment is greater — much greater — than the small amounts it would require. For, to repeat our central concern in still another way, research and knowledge are as necessary to clearing our environment of conflict as they are to clearing it of pollution.

II

The need for careful inquiry is plainly evident in the problem of assessing the symmetries and asymmetries that may accompany the trend toward interdependence in a world of independent sovereign nations. The argument for new priorities and aspirations can be readily posed. As technology shrinks social and geographical distances, more and more groups are developing interdependencies that transcend national boundaries. Increasingly, therefore, "internal" events and trends are sustained by "external" events and trends, so that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy has become increasingly blurred. Accordingly, the world can be said to be moving into a "postnational order" in which the habitual methods of formulating foreign policy and conducting international affairs seem less and less appropriate. Diplomacy is seen as increasingly incompatible with democracy, as widening the gap between rulers and the ruled. In order to cope with the publics and issues that have been sired by growing interdependence, new policymaking procedures must emerge at the national level and new organizational arrangements must be developed at the global level. The problem is: will they? Will the profound forces at work in the world culminate, as many who

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argue for new priorities anticipate, in the emergence of supranational polities and the slow disappearance of national ones?

One can hardly quarrel with the conclusion that technology is shrinking distance and making the world increasingly interdependent. Both direct experience and reliable data sustain it. Experientially one knows that the safety of air travel has become related to foreign political conflicts, that the air itself is now subject to growing contamination by industrial activities beyond as well as within national boundaries, that the groups to which one belongs are developing wider contacts with counterparts in other countries, that the goods one buys and the prices one pays for them are in part a consequence of economic developments abroad. Moreover, it takes only a cursory reading of the daily paper to know that one's own experience is widely shared. We learn that American students recently concluded a "treaty of peace" with their counterparts in North Viet Nam, that a crippling strike in one country can have similar effects in another, that foreign conflicts can underlie domestic assassinations and kidnapings, that the multinational corporation is gaining prominence as an international actor[1]— that, indeed, the variety of persons and groups at the subnational and supranational levels who contribute to the functioning of the international system and can properly be viewed as international actors is undergoing exponential growth.[2] The systematic data gathered on the extent of interdependence amply confirm one's impressions. Many of these have been brought together and cogently analyzed by Robert C. Angell.[3] Among his numerous findings relative to the postwar world is clear evidence of increasing study and research abroad, of growing penetration of other societies by businessmen, and of a steady annual growth in the number of new international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).[4]

Similarly valid is the conclusion that the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is becoming increasingly blurred and

[1]For an interesting analysis of this trend, see Jack N. Behrman, *National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise: Tensions Among the North Atlantic Countries* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

[2]For a thorough discussion of the variety of new actors emerging on the world scene, see J. David Singer, "The Global System and Its Subsystems: A Developmental View," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

[3]*Peace on the March: Transnational Participation* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969).

[4]Angell estimates that roughly 300 new NGO's are founded every five years. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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that linkages between national and international politics are increasingly pervasive. It requires no great powers of observation to realize that the nonpolitical trends toward interdependence noted above give rise to political parallels. Even superficial examination of the conduct of local campaigns and electoral outcomes will uncover traces of the conflict in Viet Nam. Or one need only reflect on the tendency for *coups d'état* to come in waves, and protest movements to resemble each other in timing and tactics, to appreciate the extent to which the political processes of countries are linked to each other. Recognition of the prevalence of linkage politics is also evident in a number of concrete ways. Within the same year, for example, the Council on Foreign Relations, an organization long devoted to an exclusive concern with international affairs, found it necessary to organize a study group on the Domestic Bases of U.S. Foreign Policy, while the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, an organization long committed to improving the institutions and practices of intranational politics, found it appropriate to organize a conference on the conduct of international relations.

As for systematic data depicting the nature and extent of linkage politics, these are abundantly available, albeit they have not yet been gathered together in a single volume. The scope of linkage politics is so vast and the relevant data so voluminous that all attempts to bring coherence to the subject have proved less than successful.[5] Nevertheless, the central thrust of all the data affirms the emergence of a transnational politics.

Clearly the domesticization of foreign policy and the swift development of previously unrecognized forms of interdependence have fostered pressures toward regional or subregional polities, if not broad supranational ones. The prime findings of Angell's inquiry not only point to the presence of an "intersocietal web" but, even more importantly, amount to good evidence that there is "a broadening stream of influence on national policy-makers toward accommodation among nations resulting from transnational participation."[6] Likewise, Ernst Haas has compiled systematic data that depict an increasing readiness on the part of the members of one international organization (the International Labor Organization — ILO) to accept its con-

[5]Cf. two efforts at synthesis organized by the present writer: James N. Rosenau, editor, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), and *Linkage Politics, op. cit.*

[6]Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

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ventions,[7] particularly in the area of human rights.[8] Systematic evidence that, in certain issue areas, similar tendencies are at work in the United Nations and the European Economic Community has also been uncovered.[9] To innumerable quantitative findings such as these can be added the recent pattern whereby international organizations are serving as the arena for attempts to come to grips with the new issues of the postnational order, especially the problems of protecting the ocean floor, policing outer space, minimizing air hijackings and thwarting political kidnapings.

III

The fact that the world is increasingly aware of its interdependence, however, is no assurance that national polities will prove to be obsolete and that new political arrangements will emerge to replace them. The presumption that the ascendancy of regional or global polities will lead to a corresponding decline in the authority of national polities allows one to preserve a sense of symmetry, but it may also be profoundly inaccurate. Just because the interdependence of the late Middle Ages led to the evolution of the nation-state system does not mean that the nation-state system will inevitably dissolve and a new type of system will evolve to cope with the expanded interdependence of the nuclear age. Just because the instrument of diplomacy developed to facilitate interaction among nation-states does not mean that it will necessarily fall into disuse as the bases of interaction change. No omniscient hand guides history from epoch to epoch, always insuring that the institutions, processes and values of each epoch are different from its predecessor's. Overlap is possible, with aspects of one epoch persisting even as a new one emerges and takes hold.

This is not simply academic caution. There is considerable evidence that the nation-state is maintaining its independence and authority even as global interdependence mounts and supranational entities acquire added authority. For each of the trends

[7]Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

[8]Ernst B. Haas, *Human Rights and International Action: The Case of Freedom of Association* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).

[9]For example, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Supranationalism in the United Nations," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, revised edition, 1969), pp. 697-710; Chadwick F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly," in J. David Singer, editor, *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 51-84; and Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

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depicted above contrary ones can be noted and supported with comparably reliable data. Much of the research which identifies the emergence of supranational tendencies also provides evidence of the persistence of national ones. Angell's work is a case in point. In order to follow up his finding that increasing transnational participation is subjecting national policymakers to pressures toward accommodation with other nations, he used five varied measures to construct an "Index of National Receptivity to World Responsibilities" and ranked ninety-one nations on it.[10] In terms of face validity, the index appears to be measuring what its title suggests (the countries ranked first, second and third were, respectively, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and the ninetieth and ninety-first were South Africa and Albania); but it must also be noted that the scores of the ninety-one societies varied widely and showed no signs of the convergence necessary to justify a conclusion that the world's policymakers are responding similarly to the pressures to accommodate to each other.

Haas doubts whether his data showing a growing national readiness to accept the ILO's conventions amount to anything more than "internal posturing" and concludes that the overall thrust of his findings offers little basis for optimism: "the authority of the international machinery is not improving; the overall record of national compliance is very poor and shows no signs of improvement; compliance is concentrated among countries least in need of international prodding, whereas those most in need remain uniformly unresponsive."[11] In like manner the researchers who demonstrated substantial progress on the part of the EEC also found that the growth has been uneven, "that individual sectors or issue areas [in which the EEC operates] seem to tend toward equilibrium, and that as integration proceeds, more and more sectors are likely to follow suit and the whole [EEC] system may become more resistant to growth." They felt obliged to conclude from their data that "Even if the French government becomes more European, and even if Great Britain gains entry, our long term projection [for the EEC] is still for an overall equilibrium situation."[12]

Still another set of findings raising doubts about the trend toward a world polity was that developed by K. J. Holsti, who sought to ascertain, through a content analysis of 972 statements

[10]Robert C. Angell, "An Index of National Receptivity to World Responsibilities" (mimeo., 1970), pp. 1-14.
[11]Haas, *Human Rights and International Action, op. cit.*, pp. 115, 118.
[12]Lindberg and Scheingold, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

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by the leaders of seventy-one governments during a recent three-year period, what roles statesmen perceive their societies to play in the international system. Holsti found that national policymakers primarily perceive their society's role in its own immediate region and that perceptions of a role in the global system are minuscule by comparison.[13] As he puts it,

> The world may be appropriately characterized as polar in terms of the distribution of military capabilities and some selected issue areas, but from the point of view of many governments, international regional issues and roles are most salient. Though many become involved in some multilateral and global issues through the United Nations, their chief concerns are much closer to home.[14]

To a vast array of quantitative findings such as these can be added a never-ending stream of current events affirming the continued viability of the nation-state. When the United States withdraws its support from the Asian Bank and withholds it from the ILO, when the members of the EEC fail to agree on a common currency before the deadline, when the Soviet government compels one of its citizens to avoid acceptance of an international honor, such actions demonstrate that nation-states still possess ultimate authority and a readiness to use it.

IV

It must be emphasized that the problem posed by these contradictory trends is not one of assessing which of the two sets of data supporting them is the more reliable and valid. Both can be presumed to be reliable and there are also substantive reasons to have confidence in their validity. As will be seen, the conclusion that the world is presently marked by tendencies toward both centralization and decentralization need not be either surprising or confounding. Viewed from this perspective, the problem is to assess whether the contradictions indicate but a stage in the gradual deterioration of the nation-state system or a permanent condition. Do the assertions of national independence merely reflect old habits that are bound to disappear in the face of mounting interdependence? Or are the old habits likely to persist even as new ones develop to cope with the new issues created by in-

[13]K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, September 1970, pp. 233-309; in particular, see Table 2 on pp. 274-276.

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 291. For other systematic inquiries into regional orientations of national polities, see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, editors, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), and Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, *International Community: A Regional and Global Study* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

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terdependence? Are we witnessing the emergence of a global polity or a pluralistic one, part global, part regional and part national?

In the absence of a crystal ball, one's answer depends on his theory of world political processes. There are two contradictory lines of theory to which the analyst might well subscribe. One offers a basis for explaining the present scene as a transitional stage in a historic progression toward a global polity; the other provides grounds for interpreting current conditions as likely to persist indefinitely. The former, elaborately developed by a variety of scholars and claiming many distinguished adherents, is known as the functionalist model. The latter, still inchoate and supported by only a handful of somewhat apologetic researchers, has yet to win a widely accepted title. Some refer to it as the pluralist model, but here we will call it the adaptive model in order to emphasize its central concepts.

The functionalist approach anticipates the emergence of a global polity through a slow, indirect process whereby specialized international organizations perform functions not performed by the nation-state and, in so doing, satisfy human needs in the area of their specialty. Satisfaction in one area is then conceived to spill over into other areas, gradually fostering an ever-expanding community of interests and values that will weaken the authority of the nation-state and progressively narrow the range of its legitimacy. In its simplest form, functionalism posits the spill-over process as eventually creating such widespread and deep loyalties to supranational institutions that the habitual orientations toward the nation-state will erode and even the most traditional functions performed by the national polity will be taken over by "higher" authorities.

More cautious neofunctionalists recognize that the boundaries between functional areas may be high and that integrative lessons learned in one area may circuitously "dribble out" rather than spill over to others, but they still presume that the boundaries between issue areas are permeable and could disappear.[15] They thus inferentially accept the possibility of supranational polities and, if pressed for an interpretation, would doubtless consider the recent tendency toward international efforts to cope with the new issues of the postnational era as evidence of movement in that direction. Most neofunctionalists, for example, would probably

[15]For thorough presentations of the functionalist and neofunctionalist positions, see David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); James P. Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State, op. cit.*

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view the International Civil Aviation Organization conference that led fifty nations to sign a convention outlawing the hijacking of civilian aircraft[16] as one more incremental step in the world's transition to a supranational polity. From the perspective of functionalist theory, the present asymmetry is a logical and necessary prelude to the demise of the nation-state system.

The outlines of the adaptive model are not nearly as clear-cut as those drawn by the functionalists. A number of researchers have questioned the premises of functionalism and suggested that the world of the future may be marked by pluralistic political forms. Nevertheless, a succinct effort to trace the theoretical bases for anticipating continued pluralism is difficult to find. What follows is thus a somewhat rough and inconsistent attempt to specify the main components of an alternative model which anticipates an interdependent world of independent nation-states.

A central assumption of this alternative model is that the adaptive capacities of the modern nation-state are considerable. While there is much about the aspirations of national polities and their policymaking organizations that seems outmoded, their ability to keep the fluctuations of their essential structures within acceptable limits (my definition of national adaptation[17]) is not as fragile as the functionalist's model assumes. Most national polities are still able to reallocate their resources and revise their orientations,[18] and they manage to do so in such a way that their essential structures are not overwhelmed by the rapid and numerous internal and external changes with which they must presently cope. Equally important, the motivation to maintain rather than abandon the national polity as the instrument of adaptation to greater interdependence continues to derive considerable strength from established habits. Although the habits of exercising and obeying the authority of national polities may be inappropriate to the new types of issues now emerging, there remain many of the old issues — military security, internal order, selection of rulers, regulation of the mass media of communication, provision of welfare — for which the habits were designed and on which the advent of greater interdependence has had no noticeable impact.

Like any other human entity, the national polity can be con-

[16]*New York Times,* December 17, 1970.

[17]James N. Rosenau, *The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behavior and Transformation* (New York: McCaleb-Seiler, 1970), pp. 2-3.

[18]For a cogent analysis of the continued viability of the nation-state as a form of political organization, see John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy, op. cit.,* pp. 76-89.

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ceived as pursuing one of four basic and mutually exclusive adaptive orientations if it is to maintain its essential structures and survive. It can seek to adjust its present self to its present environment; it can try to shape its present environment to its present self; it can attempt to create a new equilibrium between its present self and its present environment; or it can accept the existing equilibrium between its present self and its present environment. In order to simplify discussion, these four alternative sets of orientations have been designated as giving rise to, respectively, the politics of acquiescent adaptation, the politics of intransigent adaptation, the politics of promotive adaptation, and the politics of preservative adaptation.[19]

Each of the four sets of orientations is conceived to be the basic posture from which all policy decisions spring, and as stable and enduring as long as the relative strength of the demands emanating from within the polity and those arising in its present environment do not change. If such changes do take place, the national polity is seen as either undergoing a transformation to one of the other adaptive orientations or failing to survive. While there are instances of national polities being conquered or voluntarily absorbed into a larger entity, modern history records that they usually survive and that adaptive transformation rather than extinction is their typical response to profound social and technological change. The model posits an electoral or violent ouster of political leaderships as normally necessary to the occurrence of any of the twelve possible transformations, and for some of them (especially the transformation from either intransigent or acquiescent to preservative adaptation), a major societal upheaval would appear to be a prerequisite.[20]

In our model, then, the cost of rapid change and mounting interdependence is more likely to affect individual officials, whole regimes, and even entire elite strata than the basic political forms through which societies conduct their affairs. Rather than being replaced by more comprehensive polities, national polities will cope with the quickening pace of interdependence and the new kinds of issues it creates through transformations of their basic orientations toward their environments. More specifically, the model posits a long-term trend in which all national polities undergo transformations in the direction of preservative adap-

[19]Present-day Czechoslovakia, South Africa, China and Great Britain are, respectively, illustrative of the four types. For a full analysis of each type, see my *The Adaptation of National Societies, op. cit.*, pp. 3-16.

[20]*Ibid.*, pp. 16-20.

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tation.[21] In an era of more coherent, sizeable, and demanding attentive publics at home and greater dependence on resources and support from abroad, none of the other types of adaptation seems viable.

Attentive publics at home will not tolerate prolonged acquiescence to external dictation (albeit recent developments in Czechoslovakia suggest that the durability of the politics of acquiescent adaptation can be underestimated) and the changing world scene will not permit intransigent insistence on the perpetuation of domestic institutions deemed by most nations to be noxious (albeit South Africa has demonstrated that the fragility of the politics of intransigent adaptation can be exaggerated). Eventually, therefore, polities will be compelled to seek an equilibrium between themselves and their environments and, given the scarcity of resources necessary to sustain growing populations in an industrial order, will increasingly have to forgo aspirations to promote desired equilibria and accept those that are built into their geographic, historic and cultural situations. Even the United States, possessed of vast resources and an outward-looking value system, found the politics of promotive adaptation no longer possible and underwent a transformation to preservative adaptation (perhaps beginning, at least symbolically, with the showing of Senator Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary).[22]

V

As developed to this point, our model falls short of a persuasive answer to functionalism. To conclude that most or all nations will eventually pursue the politics of preservative adaptation is to indicate how they may be able to sustain their traditional functions in the face of mounting interdependence. This conclusion does not account, however, for the impact of the new issues and functions to which interdependence and a rapidly changing technology have given rise. The functionalist can still argue that current trends are only transitional phenomena, that preservative adaptation is merely a stage in the long process of spill-over, that even the preservatively adaptive polity will be unable to perform the functions required by the new issues, and that, consequently, the ultimate transformation will be the replacement of preservatively oriented national polities by supranational ones. This argument is

[21] See *ibid.*, p. 20, for the bases of this expectation.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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countered by the very nature of preservative adaptation, especially the capacity which polities so oriented develop for distinguishing and maintaining rigid boundaries among issue areas.

Let me elaborate this further. In our model of an asymmetrical world, the preservatively oriented polity accepts the emergence of new issues, either at home or abroad, which have transnational ramifications, and it does so with the recognition that such issues cannot be handled in conventional ways. Consequently, by the very nature of its basic orientation, the preservatively adaptive national polity will not seek to redefine the new issues in terms of the traditional functions it performs but will choose instead to allow supranational institutions to develop the capacity to cope with them.

There are several reasons underlying this expectation that the politics of preservative adaptation will not lead to the classic nation-state pattern of treating emergent problems as subsumed by the traditional functions. First, the issues of the postnational order are more thoroughly transnational than has ever been the case in the past. National decision-makers will find it more and more difficult to view the problems created by mounting interdependence as matters of strict national concern or as challenges which they have the authority to resolve. Increasingly they will be forced to recognize that many desired solutions require compliance by groups and publics over whom they have no authority. The interdependent nature of the issues, in other words, will be so glaring that the preservative orientations of national officials will lead them to accept the help of "higher authorities" in coping with the issues, even while reserving the right to participate in their resolution in a supranational arena.

Second, the new issues of the postnational order are sure to be much more technical than the conventional issues of earlier eras, with the result that national decision-making agencies are unlikely to have developed the personnel and organizational competence to deal with them. Such problems as controlling pollution and developing the ocean floor require reliance on an expertise, made up of specialized personnel and of organizational skills, that most foreign offices cannot acquire. Supranational agencies, on the other hand, are in a position to develop the wherewithal to confront the new issues. Able to draw on a much larger pool of manpower and less encumbered by long-established procedures, they can recruit the personnel and develop the organizational skills a successful confrontation requires. These capabilities are added incentives for national decision-makers to let their supranational

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counterparts cope with transnational problems. One of James Reston's main conclusions after a recent visit to the Soviet Union bears out this idea that national decision-makers do not readily develop the same sense of competence toward newer issues that they have with respect to established ones:

> The odd paradox and ambiguity here [in Moscow] is that officials seem very confident about their ability to handle the conflicts of a divided world but not at all confident about reaching out with the United States to create a new and more dependable world order. They clearly don't want war with the United States and are prepared to talk about an accommodation on arms control and a political settlement in the Middle East, but they have nothing to say about the coming age, no wider vision of a more unified world community.[23]

Third, the rewards for flexibility on the part of national decision-makers will be heightened by the paradoxical fact that the new issues of the postnational order are highly visible and intimate as well as extremely technical. Unlike most of the conventional issues of the nation-state system, they impinge directly on individuals. Whether the air one breathes is polluted or the jet one travels on is hijacked matters more to the average person than the issues involved in maintaining the balance of power or collaborating in a foreign assistance program. The individual may not comprehend the scientific, economic and legal technicalities of the new issues, but he knows full well that their outcome affects him. As a result, postnational issues will be the focus of vigorous and sustained activity on the part of attentive publics, and since attentive publics are becoming larger and more articulate,[24] their activities will seem capable of threatening the continued tenure of national decision-makers. The latter will be glad to "pass the buck" to supranational authorities, or, at least, will not try to maintain full control over the issues when it means contesting the preservative orientations of their publics.

This is not to say that preservatively oriented officials will accede to all or even most demands that problems be handled at supranational levels. Their readiness to proceed in this manner will obtain only with respect to problems of interdependence that have not been previously experienced. On issues for which there is precedent and which can be resolved within the jurisdiction of the polity, the long-established habits of decision-making are likely to

[23]James Reston, "Nixon and Brezhnev," *New York Times*, December 20, 1970, p. E-11.

[24]For elaborate data depicting this trend, see James N. Rosenau, *The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 31, 1969), pp. 22-48.

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prevail and national officials can be expected to cling stubbornly to their authority. The stubborn retention of authority in regard to conventional issues and the accommodative transference of it in attempting to deal with new ones is neither an attitudinal nor a behavioral contradiction for those with a preservative orientation. It is in the nature of this form of national adaptation for the boundaries between issue areas to be firmly maintained and for officials and publics alike to view the essential structures of their societies as more susceptible to fluctuation in one area and less so in another. Only in this way can the flow of domestic and foreign demands be kept in equilibrium. Only in this way can the requirements of mounting interdependence be met without violating those past arrangements that are still viable.

At the same time, an asymmetrical world of national and supranational polities will not want for attempts to bargain across issue areas. The stronger the feelings of officials or publics of national polities about issue X, the more inclined they will be to offer concessions on issue Y in exchange for compliance with their position on X. The processes of bargaining issues off against each other are by definition a more central feature of a preservative orientation than of the other three forms of national adaptation. Without such a process, the inherent balance between internal and external demands cannot be established and maintained. This readiness to bargain across issue areas, however, is not inconsistent with the aforenoted readiness to maintain firm boundaries between the new postnational issue areas and the old ones. The adaptation model posits different attitudes toward bargaining within each type of area on the one hand and between the two types on the other. Officials are conceived to view the bargaining process within the old and new types of areas as necessary and desirable, but bargaining between them as unnecessary and undesirable.

To be sure, the temptation to trade new issues off against old ones will almost certainly arise. There will doubtless be occasions when a demand on an old issue seems so threatening to some essential structure that officials will consider withholding accommodation on a new issue as a price for withdrawal of the demand. Some officials may even temporarily succumb to this temptation, but not for long, as our model posits them or their publics as being quick to realize that such a posture constitutes an even greater threat to their essential structures. Furthermore, since habitual attachments have yet to surround the values at stake in the new issues, they are unlikely to emerge as comparable to —

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and thus subject to trade-offs for – the values that sustain the old issues. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that even in an acute crisis over Berlin, threats by one party to withhold participation in global attacks on atmospheric pollution would succeed in evoking concessions from the other party. Conversely, it seems equally implausible that retaliation with respect to Berlin would ever be used to gain advantage in a dispute stemming from an ecological crisis.

In sum, the adaptation model acknowledges the growing interdependence of world affairs, allows for the emergence of new, supranational political entities to process the problems created by interdependence, and at the same time assumes that the nation-state system, with all its accompanying conflicts and procedures, will persist undiminished. If the model is valid, the new world politics of the future will supplement, but not replace, the world politics that has prevailed for centuries.

VI

We must ask as tough empirical questions about the asymmetrical image of world politics as we have about the symmetrical image. Most notably, we must ask whether in fact the boundaries between the two basic types of issue areas will remain high and relatively impermeable. There is little systematic evidence applicable to the question. Issue-area phenomena have been investigated at the level of local and national polities, and at these levels the data indicate that individual citizens, political organizations and governmental agencies are capable of differentiating both attitudinally and behaviorally among issue areas.[25] At the international level, on the other hand, with one possible exception there have been no systematic inquiries into the capacity of national polities and international organizations to separate and insulate their activities in one area from those in another. Voting behavior in the United Nations has been subjected to intense issue analysis,[26] but the relationships among issues have not been deeply probed and the consequences of these relationships for more conventional diplomatic situations have been ignored.

[25]In particular see Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, March 1963, pp. 45-56. For more conceptual inquiries into the problem, see Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, July 1964, pp. 677-715, and my "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," in Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, op. cit.*, pp. 11-50.

[26]See, for example, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

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The one exception in this regard is the study by Lindberg and Scheingold of the development of the European Community. These two researchers created a "scale of the locus of decision-making" that ranged from a low score of 1 ascribed to issue areas in which "all policy decisions [are made] by national processes" to a high score of 5 for areas in which "all policy decisions [are made] by joint Community processes." They then relied on their knowledge of the European scene

> to score the scope of European Community decision-making [in twenty-two issue areas] for four separate key dates: 1950, before the launching of the European Coal and Steel Community; 1957, just before the EEC and Euratom treaties came into effect; 1968, the time of writing; and 1970, the year when, according to the EEC and Euratom treaties, the Common Market is to be completed.[27]

These rankings are reproduced in Table I. Assuming that their scoring is valid, their data indicate clearly that supranational polities can and do widen the scope of their authority in some areas even as national polities firmly retain their authority in others. Table I supports the central hypothesis of the adaptive model, that the capacity to differentiate and insulate issues is an integral part of the evolution of asymmetrical political structures. A cautious and elaborate analysis of the data presented in Table I led Lindberg and Scheingold to the interpretation that "the nation-state remains the clearly dominant final decision-making locus, although its almost total monopoly has been clearly broken and the trend is in the direction of more joint activity."[28] Nevertheless, they also predict that this trend will end and that the asymmetry depicted in Table I will persist into the foreseeable future.[29]

In addition to these few systematic data, one's own reading of the world scene provides considerable reason to have confidence in the capacity of national polities to maintain high issue-area boundaries when interacting with each other. The recent history of Soviet-American relations reveals a pattern in which negotiations progress in one area even as severe conflict marks another. The disarmament negotiations between the two countries are conspicuous in this respect. While their pace is painstakingly slow, progress does occur, and it is clear that it results precisely because the negotiations have somehow been insulated against the many other conflicts that mar Soviet-American relations. The

[27]Lindberg and Scheingold, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 75.
[29]See p. 160 above.

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TABLE I

THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SYSTEM: 1950 to 1970*

	1950	*1957*	*1968*	*1970*
EXTERNAL RELATIONS FUNCTIONS				
1. Military security	1	1	1	1
2. Diplomatic influence and participation in world affairs	1	1	2	2
3. Economic and military aid to other polities	1	1	2	2
4. Commercial relations with other polities	1	1	3	4
POLITICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS				
5. Public health and safety and maintenance of order	1	1	2	2
6. Political participation	1	1	1	1
7. Access to legal-normative system (civic authority)	1	2	3	3
SOCIAL-CULTURAL FUNCTIONS				
8. Cultural and recreational affairs	1	1	1	1
9. Education and research	1	1	3	3
10. Social welfare policies	1	2	2	3
ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS				
11. Counter-cyclical policy	1	1	2	3
12. Regulation of economic competition and other government controls on prices and investments	1	2	3	3
13. Agricultural protection	1	1	4	4
14. Economic development and planning	1	2	2	3
15. Exploitation and protection of natural resources	1	2	2	2
16. Regulation and support of transportation	1	2	2	3
17. Regulation and support of mass media of communication	1	1	1	1
18. Labor-management relations	1	1	1	1
19. Fiscal policy	1	1	3	3
20. Balance of payments stability	1	1	3	4
21. Domestic monetary policy	1	1	2	2
22. Movement of goods, services, and other factors of production within the customs union	1	2	4	4

Score:

1 = All policy decisions by national processes.
2 = Only the beginnings of Community decision processes.
3 = Policy decisions in both but national activity predominates.
4 = Policy decisions in both but Community activity predominates.
5 = All policy decisions by joint Community processes.

*Adapted from a combination of Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 in Lindberg and Scheingold, *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 71.

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simultaneity of conflict and cooperation between the two superpowers is a major characteristic of present-day world politics. Exceedingly graphic evidence of the pattern occurred on December 12, 1970, when the front page of the *New York Times* carried two adjacent stories, one headlined "Moscow Cancels U.S. Visit by Bolshoi Ballet, Opera" and the other, "U.S.-Soviet Pact on Fishing Signed."

Nor is the Soviet-American pattern unique. Once one becomes sensitive to high issue-area boundaries in relationships, one begins to realize they are pervasive phenomena evident in widely varied circumstances. U.S.-Algerian relations, for example, broke down in 1967 when Algeria severed diplomatic ties with the United States during the Arab-Israeli war. These ties remain severed four years later, but business and commercial relations between the two countries have flourished nonetheless. Although there is no American embassy or aid mission in Algiers, the number of American businessmen and technicians in the country has tripled since 1967 and U.S. exports to Algeria increased by 21 per cent in 1969 over 1968.[30] Examination of a number of other conflictual international relationships would almost certainly yield similar findings.

It is hardly surprising that people, individually and collectively, can maintain high boundaries between issue areas. Modern relationships are generally so complex — be they formal or informal, intense or superficial, composed of two persons or of many — that functional differentiation is almost essential within them. This means that the tasks that have to be performed to sustain a relationship will require different sets of attitudes and behavior in different functional areas. Since the requirements of one area will often be in conflict with those of another area, contradictory attitudes and contradictory patterns of behavior will be required as the focus of the relationship shifts from one area to another. In order to preserve the valued aspects of the relationship, moreover, none of the parties to it is likely to allow the attitudes and behavior appropriate to the conflictual areas to contaminate the others. Anyone who has ever shouldered responsibilities in one branch of a large organization will affirm that it is possible to wrangle bitterly with counterparts in other branches over one matter in the morning and agree enthusiastically about another matter in the afternoon. Likewise, anyone who has ever enjoyed a dynamic marriage will aver that anger over the performance of one task can shift easily to affectionate cooperation when attention

[30] *New York Times*, December 15, 1970, p. 16.

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turns to another. In short, modern man is adept at varying the performance of his roles in response to the many different demands of complex relationships to which he is a party.

VII

The foregoing formulation contains an important normative implication, namely, that it is not only possible but highly desirable to maintain firm boundaries between issue areas in complex relationships. For sensitivity to issue-area boundaries leads also to the realization that it is characteristic of stable and/or desirable relationships to have strong boundaries and characteristic of unstable and/or undesirable relationships to have weak ones. More accurately, systems of interaction that one tends to value are not dominated by any one issue or issue area, whereas systems that one tends to loath are usually marked by one predominant issue area. The Cold War, for example, was a single-issue-dominant period of postwar history, whereas the fact that Soviet-American animosity no longer determines the outcome of all problems at the international level is perhaps the surest sign that world politics has moved into a new, multi-issue era. Similarly, the Middle East is presently dominated by a single issue, and few outsiders would deny that the Arab-Israeli dispute operates to the detriment of all the polities in the region. In like manner, unrewarding marriages, uncreative organizations and authoritarian societies tend to be single-issue-dominant systems in which the conflicts of one area undermine interaction in all areas.

The dedicated functionalist should not be too dismayed by the adaptive model outlined here. The notion that national polities will persist as authoritative in traditional issue areas and that supranational polities will emerge as authoritative in new areas, with spill-over kept to a minimum, contains the possibility of both a stable and a creative world order. Anything else might well be retrogressive. For if the boundaries between the issues of the traditional nation-state system and those of the postnational order do not hold, the habits that have sustained the former would probably overwhelm the needs that have fostered the latter, thus returning world politics to the uncreative and counterproductive procedures which have characterized it for so long. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes important that the emerging pluralistic patterns continue to grow. Odd as it may seem, there is good reason to aspire to and work for an asymmetrical future of independent national polities in an interdependent world.

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INDONESIA, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE "REPUBLIC OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS"*

by Justus M. van der Kroef

IN the early morning hours of August 31, 1970, on the eve of Indonesian President Suharto's state visit to the Netherlands, thirty-three Ambonese youths forcibly entered and occupied the residence of the Indonesian Ambassador in Wassenaar, north of The Hague. A Dutch policeman, on guard before the residence, was shot and killed by one of the Ambonese. The ambassador, Taswin Natadiningrat, was able to escape and, clad only in pajamas, sought refuge in a nearby hotel. His wife and two children, however, as well as members of the embassy staff, were kept hostage by the invaders, who in military fashion placed themselves in a defensive ring around the residence garden and hoisted the four-colored flag of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" (*Republik Maluku Selatan* — RMS).[1]

The Ambonese issued an ultimatum demanding that Suharto agree to discussions with RMS President J. A. Manusama under supervision of a United Nations representative, and threatened to kill one of the embassy hostages unless their demand was met. Feverish mediation efforts, involving Dutch Premier P. J. de Jong, Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, Manusama, and the Reverend S. Metiary, chairman of the South Moluccan organization, *Badan Persatuan,* in the Netherlands, ultimately persuaded them to surrender to surrounding Dutch police after having held the embassy for about eleven hours. Apparently the Ambonese youths also abandoned their demand for a Suharto-Manusama

*The author gratefully acknowledges specialized data on the RMS struggle made available by Dr. J. P. Nikijuluw, formerly General Representative (*Wakil Umum*) of the RMS in The Hague, and A. Th. C. Schiebergen of the Stichting door de Eeuwen Trouw (Faithful through the Centuries Foundation, a principal Dutch support group of the RMS) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.

[1]Cf. photographs of the incident in "Dramatisch Beleg," *De Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), September 1, 1970. For a report on it from Indonesia, see *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, September 2, 1970, pp. i-ii. The term "Ambonese" has come to be applied generically to all South Moluccans in the Netherlands, and in the following pages it will be so used. Though relatively the most developed, Ambon is but one island in the South Moluccan archipelago, and less than half of the original 12,500 South Moluccan migrant group that arrived in Holland in 1951 came from Ambon.

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discussion — something the Indonesian government has, in any case, consistently refused.

Subsequently brought to trial on charges ranging from manslaughter to "commission of an act of force against persons and property," the Ambonese were convicted on January 19, 1971, and received prison sentences varying from four months to three years. Addressing the defendants, the presiding judge declared that in determining the sentences he had considered the fact "that there is perhaps reason for reflection upon the question as to whether the Dutch government, the Dutch parliament and Dutch society during the past twenty years have always been sufficiently aware of Dutch obligations as regards the people of the South Moluccas."[2]

On September 3, two days after the surrender of the Ambonese, and well before this call to "reflection," President and Madame Suharto had set foot on Dutch soil. Their visit was limited to twenty-four hours, however, and was characterized by extremely tight security measures. ("Never in the history of state visits made by heads of state to the Netherlands were such heavy and extensive police forces mobilized before," the Indonesian government news agency Antara reported from The Hague on September 4.) A mass demonstration planned by South Moluccans in The Hague during Suharto's reception by Queen Juliana was canceled on orders of Manusama at the last moment, although smaller groups did hold protest gatherings. It was evident, however, that the Dutch government, in keeping Suharto's movements as secret as possible, had also been concerned about possible demonstrations by some elements of the Dutch Left, among whom Sukarno's fall and Suharto's rise to power have never been popular.

Although Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared as early as September 3 that "The incident at Wassenaar will not deteriorate [*sic*] the relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, because 'RMS' followers are outlawed elements who have nothing to do with the Dutch government,"[3] Indonesian press reaction to the incident, and to the resurgent Ambonese problem generally, was a good deal more critical. It ranged from warnings that "those Ambonese babies or small boys who grew up in the Netherlands with endless grudges and hate for the Indonesian

[2]*Rechtsoverwegingen, vonnis der Zuid-Molukkers, betrokken in de actie in Wassenaar, 31 Augustus, 1970* (mimeo.), p. 6. I am indebted to the administrator (*griffier*) of the circuit court (*Arrondisementsrechtbank*) in The Hague for a copy of the judgment in the Wassenaar case.

[3]Antara dispatch, Djakarta, September 3, 1970.

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Republic have now metamorphosed into deranged individuals" who could endanger the "very amicable relations at present" between Indonesia and Holland,[4] to demands that the Dutch government make clear to the South Moluccans in Holland that they must either "become loyal citizens" of the Netherlands or "return to Indonesia as Indonesian citizens" with Dutch compensation, since "The dream of a Republic of the South Moluccas has long since vanished."[5]

Prominent attention was given in Indonesia to Antara reports that the Dutch queen had personally appealed to Suharto to keep his visit, and that the Dutch government had assured him it would ban all demonstrations "as well as the posting of bills containing anti-Suharto slogans"[6] in the country during his stay. This probably mollified the Indonesians, for they were aware that the Netherlands had played a pivotal role among the principal creditor nations in the so-called Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia, and in Indonesia's financial rehabilitation generally, since Suharto had assumed power.[7]

In Holland, however, the Wassenaar incident was perceived as marking a new high in the accelerating militancy and ever sharper articulation of political frustrations and ambitions of the nearly 30,000 Ambonese expatriates. The security measures taken by the authorities during and even after Suharto's visit suggested to one leading Dutch daily an atmosphere of an attempted coup d'état by Dutch colonels.[8] During his visit small groups of Ambonese clashed with police in several cities, and in one instance police were compelled to fire warning shots. Elsewhere the movements of dark-skinned people were suspect.

Well after Suharto's visit Ambonese restiveness persisted, especially among adolescents. A *Badan Persatuan* demonstration of about 3,000 in the resort town of Scheveningen at the close of September, for example, erupted into a pitched battle with police when a group of young Ambonese "radicals" attempted to storm the prison confining the South Moluccans arrested at Wassenaar.

[4]*Pedoman* (Djakarta), September 2, 1970.
[5]*Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), October 31, 1970.
[6]Antara dispatch (Djakarta), September 4, 1970.
[7]See Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971), Chapter 7.
[8]*Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, September 4, 1970, and *Report of a Protest, An Open Appeal to World Opinion to Condemn the Immoral Policy of the Dutch Government towards the People of the South Moluccas* (*s.a.e.l.*, 1970?), p. 10. The latter brochure is a publication of *Badan Persatuan*, the principal South Moluccan interest group in Holland.

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Earlier there had been disquieting reports that youthful Ambonese were planning to kidnap prominent Dutch officials in order to force the government to discharge the prisoners. On October 15 a South Moluccan housing community called Ijsseloord, located near Rotterdam, was surrounded by more than a thousand police and more than a dozen armored cars, as army helicopters hovered overhead. The objective was the arrest of two inhabitants of the community suspected of having participated in planning the Wassenaar incident. Even some pro-government political circles regarded these police actions as excessive and unduly provocative.[9] Meanwhile, on October 7 Premier de Jong had informed Manusama that his government did not intend to raise the question of RMS independence either with Indonesia or in the United Nations.

II

The new aggressiveness of the Ambonese in Holland has thrown into sharp relief the controversial history of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" and its legal and political claims, and the plight of a growing Asian refugee community. The origins of the RMS have been discussed in detail elsewhere.[10] Suffice it to note here that the Ambonese minority group in the Netherlands had its beginning with the arrival early in 1951 of some 12,500 natives from the islands of Ambon (Amboina), Ceram (Seran), Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, Buru, and the Kei, Aru and Tanimbar island groups in the Southern Moluccas region of Eastern Indonesia. The reason for their migration lies in the constitutional history of the Indonesian Republic as it was formalized at the close of 1949 after a four-year independence struggle against the Dutch. The new republic was conceived as a federal state of sixteen components, of which the state of East Indonesia was one. The East Indonesian state had come into existence earlier, in December 1946, largely as a result of Dutch policy, and a subsidiary part of it, in turn, was the regional administrative unit or *daerah* of the South Moluccas, with its own regional council. According to RMS leaders today, the South Moluccan *daerah* council only agreed to join the state of East Indonesia provisionally, reserving the right (in which the East Indonesian state government is said to have

[9]*De Volkskrant*, September 4, 16, 28, 1970, and *Report of a Protest . . . , loc. cit.*

[10]See, e.g., Günter Decker, *Republik Maluku Selatan. Der Selbstbestimmungskampf der Ambonesen* (Göttingen: Otto Schwartz Verlag, 1957), and J. C. Bouman, *et al., The South Moluccas. Rebellious Province or Occupied State?* (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1960).

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concurred), to define its own future constitutional relationship with the Dutch Crown.[11]

The planned federal structure by implication lent legal substance to the South Moluccan regional council's decision, and, perhaps more important, when the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty over their East Indian possessions to the federal Indonesian Republic at the end of 1949, explicit provision was made for the right of self-determination by distinctive population groups and areas.[12] There was a question whether this provision applied to the South Moluccan region. Within weeks after the republic had acquired its independence, however, the central government in Djakarta began a campaign in the constituent states to dissolve the federal structure and its underpinnings of regional autonomy and substitute a unitary state. Though the procedure used by Djakarta was of doubtful legality in terms of then prevailing constitutional provisions, it is probably true that considerable popular support for such a centralization process existed in Sumatra and Western Indonesia. (In a few years, however, much of Sumatra was to rise up in rebellion against an allegedly overdominating central government.) [13]

But in Eastern Indonesia — particularly in the Christianized regions of the Minehassa, in Northern Sulawesi (Celebes) and in the Southern Moluccas — there was strong opposition. During the generations of Dutch colonial control the Ambonese and other South Moluccan islanders had forged strong bonds of loyalty to the Dutch Crown. The male inhabitants of these islands had achieved renown as mercenaries in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (*Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Leger* — KNIL) and the population as a whole took pride in having the region referred to as "Holland's Twelfth Province." Conversely, Ambonese

[11]J. A. Manusama, *On Recht en Vrijheid. De Strijd om de Onafhankelijkheid der Zuid-Molukken* (Utrecht: Libertas, N. V., *s.a.,* 1952?), p. 16. See also, for the RMS view of its origins and struggle, the brochures of the South Moluccan Bureau (*Bureau Zuid Molukken*) in the Netherlands: *Erkenning van Ambon* (The Hague, 1950), *De Stem der Ambonnezen* (The Hague, 1950), and *Ambon Beroept Zich op Recht en Trouw* (The Hague, 1950). This bureau, established in 1950 in The Hague, acted as an informal RMS "embassy" and as information and policy implementation center for the cause in Holland as well as abroad.

[12]Cf. *Resultaten van de Ronde Tafel Conferentie zoals aanvaard tijdens de Tweede Algemene Vergadering welke op 2 November, 1949 werd gehouden in de Ridderzaal te 's-Gravenhage* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1949), p. 44.

[13]On these developments generally see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The South Moluccan Insurrection in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis," *The Journal of East Asiatic Studies* (University of Manila), July 1952, pp. 1-20, and the literature there cited. On the dubious legality of the establishment of the unitary Indonesian Republic see, e.g., F. R. Böhtlingk, "De Nieuwe Eenheidstaat," *Indonesië* (The Hague), September 1950, pp. 112-113.

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leaders have accentuated their distinctiveness within the ethnic diversity of the Indonesian population. As one RMS cabinet official put it, "there is a greater difference between a Javanese and an Ambonese than between an Italian and a Norwegian."[14]

On April 5, 1950 a short-lived uprising was staged in Makassar, South Sulawesi, by a number of Indonesian KNIL personnel (including Ambonese) who were alarmed about the abolition of the federal structure and their own demobilization and/or incorporation into the armed forces of the new unitary central government.[15] Through diplomacy, various ruses, and the connivance of East Indonesian state officials, the rebellion soon ended. But Ambonese rebels who were able to escape from Makassar made their way to Ambon and other South Moluccan islands, where the stories of their experiences accelerated a rapidly developing anti-Djakarta movement. In the night of April 24, after a series of mass meetings on Ambon and Seran, the RMS was formally proclaimed. A mission sent by Djakarta to negotiate with RMS leaders failed. Although both Dutch officials and representatives of the United Nations Commission on Indonesia (UNCI) attempted to lend their good offices behind the scenes,[16] the Indonesian government shortly mounted an effective military campaign which by early October 1950 had reduced RMS resistance to spasmodic and small-scale guerrilla activity.

In the early months of 1951, about 4,000 other KNIL Ambonese who insisted, with the backing of Dutch courts, that for their own protection they be demobilized in Holland rather than in Indonesian territory, succeeded in making their way to the Netherlands. There, along with more than 8,000 members of their families, they formed the refugee remnant of a self-proclaimed government and became a nation-in-exile. Though lower Dutch courts and the Netherlands Association for International Law substantiated the legal position of the RMS as a political entity,

[14]P. W. Lokollo, *Amboyna's Struggle Against the Lies of Djocja* (The Hague: South Moluccan Bureau, 1950), p. 10. Lokollo served as Minister of Supply of the RMS.

[15]On the Makassar revolt see C. Soumokil, *Rondom de Affaire Kapitein Andi Abdul Azis* (The Hague: South Moluccan Bureau, 1950). Soumokil, formerly State Attorney General of East Indonesia and later RMS President, was eventually captured and executed by the Indonesian government in April 1966. See also Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 67-68.

[16]For the UNCI role see Alastair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), pp. 414-415, and N. J. C. M. Kappeyne van de Coppello, "Relation to the United Nations," in Bouman, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 87-104.

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neither the Dutch government, which was anxious to normalize relations with Indonesia after four years of revolutionary fighting, nor the United Nations Security Council, which had been made aware of the RMS insurrection through the UNCI, was willing to do so. On October 3 and 4, 1950, Premier Willem Drees' government had made a few overtures to Djakarta and to the UNCI to solve the dispute peaceably, but these were ineffectual, largely because of pressure in the Dutch States General. Repeated appeals and offers of good offices by the UNCI to Djakarta (on August 4, September 25 and October 6, 1950) were also rejected on the grounds that the RMS problem was a matter involving Indonesian domestic jurisdiction and that, in any case, the Ambonese were mere rebels and mutineers.[17]

Thus there began for the South Moluccans in Holland twenty years of political frustration, social isolation, stagnation and eventual disorganization. Their experience has few parallels among exiled minorities in the contemporary world (perhaps an apt comparison would be with the Palestinian Arab refugees in Jordan). Housed initially in some fifty camps, barracks and temporary living quarters, the Ambonese group from the start suffered a ghettoized and communally "limboized" existence. Even though integration into the host society was eventually encouraged by the Dutch authorities and no formal impediments to freedom of movement or settlement prevailed, isolated camp life probably had enduring social-psychological effects.

Maintenance care of the Ambonese, which at first was provided entirely at Dutch expense, was organized through various government departments and ministries under supervision of the Head of Ambonese Living Facilities in the Netherlands (*Hoofd van de Ambonezen-Woonoorden in Nederland*). In 1952 a new agency, the Commission of Ambonese Care (*Commissariaat van Ambonnezenzorg* — CAZ) began a generally supervisory function. Food was provided through communal kitchens in the camps,

[17]On the Indonesian government's view of the RMS, see generally J. Leimena, *The Ambon Question, Facts and Appeal* (*s.a.e.l.*, Djakarta?, 1953?). An Ambonese, Leimena held a cabinet post of one kind or another during most of the Sukarno era. To the author's best knowledge the Indonesian government has never published a "white paper" or complete official account of the RMS affair. Even nonofficial Indonesian studies are few. For various views, see, e.g., Jusuf Abdullah Fuar, *Peristiwa Republik Maluku Selatan* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1956?); Agus Anwar, *Soumokil dan Hantjurnja RMS. Sebuah tugu kegagalan bagi usaha pemetjah — belah kesatuan bangsa Indonesia* (Medan: Pudja Sakti, 1964). See also I. O. Nanulaitta, *Tibulnja Militerisme Ambon sebagai suatu persoalan politik, sosial-ekonomis* (Djakarta: Bhratara, 1966).

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clothing through the issuance of annual coupons. Adults received three guilders (about $0.75) weekly pocket money, children two guilders. Free medical care was also available in the larger camps. Camp schools, mostly run by the South Moluccans themselves, or nearby private Protestant schools were favored; secular public education, particularly when the government was suspected of compelling the Ambonese to study *bahasa Indonesia* (the national Indonesian language) through special courses in the public schools, at first had little appeal.[18]

Attempts to persuade the adult Ambonese males to prepare for a new vocation in civilian life were at first unsuccessful; most still regarded themselves as professional soldiers and hoped for an eventual return to military life either in Ambon or, somehow, in Holland. Only gradually, when it became apparent to the majority that a return to Indonesia or New Guinea (let alone to an independent South Moluccas) was an increasingly unlikely or unwelcome prospect, did they begin to seek employment, first as seasonal workers in agriculture, later also in industry. This, however, had only a minimal effect on the integration process during the first decade of Ambonese exile. Though they were technically considered Indonesian citizens under the terms of the Dutch-Indonesian sovereignty transfer agreements, few Ambonese were willing to acknowledge such citizenship. In their continuing social isolation they tended to sink into a rootless, *de facto* stateless condition.

Initially, Dutch public reaction had seemed quite sympathetic to the Ambonese, particularly in political circles (e.g., the confessional Protestant parties) which had never been reconciled to Holland's loss of her East Indian empire. As one daily put it, with the arrival in the Netherlands of the Ambonese — victims of "the tragedy of a loyalty which was rewarded with disloyalty" — Dutchmen would get the chance to express their appreciation for South Moluccan fidelity; the more so inasmuch as many Netherlanders had already given unequivocal evidence "that they do not wish to have a part in the writing of one of the least attractive pages in the postwar history of their country."[19] Yet, by April 1951 the Dutch press was commenting on the relatively small segment of the Dutch population inclined to express real concern for the South Moluccans, and the Ambonese themselves,

[18]This description of Ambonese camp life is drawn from Bung Penonton, *Wat Er Gebeurde Na 1950* (Groningen: Madjalah Bulanan "Toma," 1970), p. 17.
[19]*Haagsche Post*, April 21, 1951.

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living in various makeshift camps, were speculating about the possibility of going to Dutch-held West New Guinea.[20]

This idea proved unrealistic. West New Guinea had been the one part of their East Indies possessions retained by the Dutch when they ceded sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic. Discussions between Djakarta and The Hague to settle the future of the territory soon broke down. Although during most of the 1950's the Dutch government showed considerable determination in maintaining control over the disputed area despite mounting Indonesian diplomatic pressures, at no time was the possibility of a South Moluccan resettlement to West New Guinea officially considered. By 1962 the question had been decided by the Dutch agreement to surrender the territory to Indonesia. But the fact that many Ambonese were dreaming of West New Guinea as early as 1951 suggests that from the start of their stay in Holland they felt themselves to be in an unwelcome limbo.

III

In subsequent months and years — as reports of guerrilla attacks and "commando raids" by RMS bands on Indonesian government installations in the South Moluccas filtered through the Ambonese camps in the Netherlands, as the Dutch appeared to follow a contradictory course with respect to the RMS, now declaring that the Ambonese had been unjustly treated by Indonesia and again saying (as Foreign Minister Luns did in November 1953) that the RMS proclamation had been a "juridically unlawful deed," and as vain attempts were made by RMS leaders to get the UN General Assembly and the dormant UNCI to consider the South Moluccan question — the community seemed to be buffeted perpetually between old hopes and new disappointments.[21] In May 1956 there were strikes and eruptions of discontent in the Ambonese camps as the Dutch government began to implement the "self care" regulation (*Zelfzorgregeling*), designed to compel South Moluccan integration into the production process and society of the Netherlands. The regulation called for a phased reduction in free food services and other welfare provisions made available to the camps; only those wholly without income or earning capacities would continue to get free maintenance benefits. Whatever the wisdom of this measure as an official means of combating the

[20] *Nieuwe Provinciale Groninger Courant*, April 24, 1951.
[21] See the "Chronology of the South Moluccas" in Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

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festering isolation, frustration and dependence of Ambonese ghetto life, most of the Ambonese regarded it as a punishment. To them the "self care" regulation seemed to be an act of retribution for their failure to respond to a Dutch government campaign, begun in November 1955, to induce them to return to Indonesia.

This campaign was not unconnected with a decision of the Indonesian government to permit fifty South Moluccans per month to "repatriate," on condition that they sign a declaration expressing regret for their affiliation with the RMS. A special Indonesian mission was sent to the Netherlands for this purpose, but neither the mission nor official Dutch entreaties had much success. In the end only about 200 Ambonese were persuaded to return.

Another reason for the introduction of the "self care" regulation was the pressure of Dutch labor unions. Those Ambonese who did find employment outside the camps, and who at the same time continued to benefit from the government's free food and welfare services, acquired a more favorable position than the average Dutch worker. By June 1954 it was deemed necessary to require working Ambonese to pay back about 60 per cent of their wages to the government in compensation for their maintenance expenses.[22] These partial repayment measures, however, satisfied neither the labor organizations nor Dutch officials who urged complete and accelerated integration of the Ambonese. The subsequent "self care" program deepened the sense of betrayal in the Ambonese community. In several camp and living areas resentments found expression in arson, looting and pitched battles with police.

The government, alarmed over growing Ambonese restiveness, also had to consider that steadily worsening Dutch-Indonesian relations resulting from Dutch retention of West New Guinea had made the South Moluccans' return to their homeland a more remote possibility than ever. In September 1957, therefore, it established a special commission of advice and inquiry into the policy problems posed by the Ambonese. This body has usually been called the Verwey-Jonker Commission, after its woman chairman. In its report published in April 1959, it recommended an extension of the "self-care" concept, along with a possible relocation of Ambonese in special "open" urban quarters so as to

[22]Data drawn from M. H. Mariën, "De Zuid Molukkers in Nederland. Migranten tegen Wil en Dank in de Minderheidssituatie" (unpublished, December 1968; available from Stichting door de Eeuwen Trouw, Eindhoven), p. 28, and Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

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retain the group's sense of communal identity. The report cautioned against erosion of Ambonese group life, and at the same time warned against any government pressures to keep the better educated South Moluccans in communal quarters. It also stressed that "The problems of the younger generation deserve the greatest possible attention" and urged that special care be taken to provide the Dutch people with accurate information about the Ambonese problem.[23]

Perhaps the most useful parts of the report were the analytical data. Among other things, these revealed that the original group of about 12,500 Ambonese had grown by January 1, 1959 to more than 18,500, and that, given its present birth rate, the community would number about 39,000 by January 1, 1976. Available camp quarters were described as overcrowded, difficult to keep clean and orderly, and frequently isolated from all but the most basic services. Although some 75 per cent of Ambonese sixteen years of age or older had found some kind of employment, significant groups remained which refused employment altogether ("in two of the residence areas there is practically not a single worker"). The commission expressed particular concern over the high rate of unemployment among youths not attending school; of those aged between sixteen and twenty-one, more than 36 per cent of the boys and 53.5 per cent of the girls were reported unemployed. Yet it also noted that practically all Ambonese children who had grown up in the Netherlands had had some kind of post-primary schooling, including vocational training, and that by virtue of this schooling their command of the Dutch language could be considered superior to that of their parents. (The latter conclusion is true enough, but Ambonese children have nevertheless tended to lag behind Dutch children in knowledge and effective use of Dutch, and this has hampered them in qualifying for further training.)

The high youth unemployment rate to which the Verwey-Jonker report refers is due to various factors, ranging from embarrassment and fear when applying for a position, aggravated by instances of anti-Ambonese discrimination in the Dutch community, to traditional patterns of family assistance on which unemployed Ambonese know they can count.[24] Even so, the com-

[23] *Ambonezen in Nederland. Rapport van de Commissie, ingesteld bij Besluit van de Minister van Maatschappelijk Werk, dd. 24 September 1957, Nr. U 2598* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), p. 107.

[24] The Verwey-Jonker report specifically warns that the inability to "guide" the "young Ambonese educated in Holland" into the "Dutch production ethos" and

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mission, noting the readiness with which some adults had sought and usually found varying and improved employment (often having started as unskilled workers), permitted itself to be moderately optimistic about Ambonese integration into the Dutch socio-economy and its modern industrial ethos. Its report, while primarily concerned with the frustration and maladjustment of the Ambonese living outside the camps and communities, also mentioned the "growing group of Ambonese who have been able to utilize personal opportunities and who apparently do not feel themselves unhappy by any means."

Other analyses around this time suggested a constellation of factors favoring as well as impeding integration. Among the integrative factors were Dutch schooling of Ambonese children, identification with the Reformed Church and other religious life, and successful intermarriages (131 such marriages had occurred by 1959, 116 of them between Dutch girls and Ambonese males). The impediments were Ambonese nationalism and political factionalism, and the isolation of the residence communities.[25] Time was to show, however, that the integrative dynamics of school attendance and church affiliation were insufficient to break through prevailing patterns of isolation. With respect to the religious factor, the majority of South Moluccans have preferred to keep their own separate church identity.

IV

Complex political patterns in the Ambonese community, deriving from frequent reorientations of sentiment, have also served to impede integration. The reorientation began shortly after the arrival in the Netherlands, when, in consequence of official Dutch ambivalence if not hostility regarding the RMS, a rapid erosion of traditional loyalty to the Dutch nation began to set in — even as Ambonese realization grew that the period of exile in Holland might last much longer than anticipated. "After 1951," according to one study, "the Dutch colors were no longer displayed, the national anthem no longer played, and photographs of the Dutch royal family no longer exhibited in Ambonese homes."[26] The first

Dutch working patterns could result in a large number of this group continuing to have "adjustment problems." *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[25]Tamme Wittermans and Noel P. Gist, "Urbanization and Integration of the Ambonese in the Netherlands," *The Sociological Quarterly*, April 1961, pp. 119-133.

[26]Tamme Wittermans and Noel P. Gist, "The Ambonese Nationalist Movement in the Netherlands: A Study in Status Deprivation," *Social Forces,* May 1962, p. 315.

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of various Ambonese interest groups, the Commission on the Legal Status of Ambonese Soldiers and Sailors (*Commissie Rechtspositie Ambonese Militairen en Schepelingen* — CRAMS), had been formed almost immediately, in March 1951, and continuing inter-ethnic and personality clashes and disappointments over Dutch policy eventually led to the establishment of the Organization of the Moluccan People (*Kopintingan Rajat Maluku* — KRM) and the National South Moluccan Party (*Partai Nasional Maluku Selatah* — PNMS) in 1954.

An effort at unity as early as February 1952, through the formation of a single Representative Organization of the South Moluccan People (*Badan Perwakilan Rajat Maluku Selatan* — BPRMS) failed, to be followed in 1954 by yet another splinter organization, the Association of Repatriating Military (*Militer-Militer dalam perdjalanan pulang kenegerinja*). Meanwhile South Moluccans from the most southeasterly islands retained their own organization (established in December 1951), and in 1956 some of the more pro-Indonesian Ambonese organized a Movement for the Return to Indonesia (*Aliran Pulang ke Indonesia* — Apkindo). The last-named organization subsequently found support from other small dissident groups such as the Ceramese Movement of the Mother Island (*Gerakan Nusa Ina* — GNI), most of whose members by 1961 had departed for Indonesia.[27]

An analysis of the broad spectrum of Ambonese political groupings during the past two decades reveals sentiments ranging from active support for, to virtual neutrality toward, the RMS, along with either adhesion, indifference or opposition to the Indonesian Republic and/or a return thereto, and variances to the same degree regarding the South Moluccan policies of successive Dutch cabinets. The vast majority — i.e., about 20,000 of the nearly 27,000 Ambonese in 1968, according to M. H. Mariën's authoritative estimate — remain pro-RMS. Pro-Indonesian sentiments are held by approximately 1,300 (not counting the 1,800 South Moluccans who returned to Indonesia between 1952 and 1970), and the remainder might be considered "neutral" or apathetic.

By the end of 1962 the Dutch government's surrender of West New Guinea to Indonesian control, as well as an increased awareness that divisions among the Ambonese were in part responsible for the Dutch decision to solve the Ambonese problem

[27]The discussion of Ambonese interest and political groups is based on Mariën, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-81, and the Verwey-Jonker report, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

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by progressive integration, led to renewed efforts at unity.[28] At a congress held in December, and thanks to the work of a widely respected "activist" Ambonese minister, the Reverend S. Metiary, most of the political and interest groupings, including the largest (the BPRMS) decided to form a relatively loosely organized entity, the Federated Organization (*Badan Persekutuan*). Subsequently, in July 1966, this federation representing some 22,000 Ambonese was transformed into a more centralized Unity Front of the South Moluccan People (*Badan Persatuan Rajat Maluku Selatan*), usually referred to as *Badan Persatuan* or BP.

Different BP sections assumed the leadership and coordination of social, political and youth affairs and other special interests in the Ambonese community, while the Front's general program emphasized the "self determination of peoples" and defense of "the rights and interests of the people of the South Moluccas in the widest sense of the word." The latter are said to comprise (1) a struggle for the recognition of the RMS, (2) recognition of the rights of former KNIL soldiers, (3) improvement of the social position of the Moluccan people in the Netherlands, and (4) preservation of the cultural identity.[29]

There is little question that the formation of the *Badan Persekutuan* and the *Badan Persatuan* reflected a new sense of determination generally, and a new sense of militancy among the young. The execution of RMS President Christian Soumokil in Indonesia in April 1966, combined with continuing reports of Ambonese guerrilla resistance, and the evident attempt of the Dutch government to hasten integration in the wake of the Verwey-Jonker Commission's recommendations contributed to this. Increasingly, after 1959, Ambonese in their camps and residence communities were made to pay the cost of rent, utilities and other services. Meanwhile, Dutch social work officials intensified assistance to those who wished to move to newly designated quarters in various urban areas or into Dutch society at large.

To the surprise of Dutch authorities and the older RMS leaders, however, the slowly growing economic independence of the Ambonese community, resulting from increasing employment in the Dutch economy, appeared in many respects to accentuate rather

[28]On Ambonese interest in West New Guinea see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Republic of the South Moluccas after Seven Years: A Review," *World Justice*, December 1961, pp. 194-195.

[29]Mariën, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79, and Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

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than diminish its nationalist self-consciousness and even aggressiveness. Increased interaction with the Dutch socio-economy augmented alleged instances of racial discrimination and unfair treatment by officials and police, which in turn tended to foster the new militancy. Among the Ambonese young the effects of the worldwide "hippie style" youth culture with its revolutionary overtones were also being felt. When a group of young South Moluccans set fire to the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague, on July 26, 1966, the problem of the RMS and the South Moluccan community in Holland clearly had entered a new and more radical phase.

V

Before considering some of the dimensions of this heightened militancy, it is necessary to take note of the political considerations and ideological crosscurrents that have stirred the South Moluccan group over the years as revealed in its own publications. RMS leaders, elaborating on the legitimacy of the RMS independence proclamation, have never failed to stress that Indonesia's ethnic diversity makes a united Indonesian state impossible. As Soumokil's successor to the RMS presidency, a Rotterdam mathematics teacher, J. A. Manusama, has put it: "Among the Minangkabu, the Achehnese, the Sundanese, the Menadonese, etc., the realisation grows that 'one Indonesian nation' is a completely empty concept."[30]

Indonesian diversity is said to point up the failure of the United Nations to deal justly with the right of various peoples to self-determination. It has been an easy matter for the UN, Manusama has charged, to defend the principle of self-determination when it involves a Western or white-skinned colonial power subjugating a colored race. But the world is increasingly forced to recognize that "the subjugation of one colored race by another colored race, in consequence of imperialistic tendencies, must be condemned just like the old type of colonial subjugation."[31] As for fears that a consistent and universal application of the self-determination principle might lead to a "Balkanization process" and a weakening of security in various parts of the world, Manusama contends that in

[30]J. A. Manusama, "Het Federalisme in Indonesië," *Tot Vrijheid Geroepen* (Utrecht), January 1961, p. 4.

[31]J. A. Manusama, "Politieke Aspecten van het Zuidmolukse Recht van Zelfbeschikking," *De Stem van Ambon* (Eindhoven), April 1970, p. 4. *De Stem van Ambon* is a publication of the Stichting door de Eeuwen Trouw, an organization of Dutch political conservatives, some allied with the major Dutch Protestant confessional parties, who support the RMS cause.

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the absence of common interests among diverse peoples any artificially created political entity is itself an invitation to international tensions. That other ethnic Indonesian dissidents were opposed to an "Indonesia Djawa" ("Javanese Indonesia") was shown in the course of the 1950's when anti-Javanese and anti-Djakarta sentiments erupted into provincial rebellions, for example in Sumatra and the Celebes.[32]

In the growing controversy over the future of West New Guinea, RMS publications struck a similar note: "As long as the Indonesian leaders . . . consider the Ambonese to be Indonesians, either in accordance with or against their own will, these leaders will also force the aborigines of New Guinea to accept the Indonesian nationality."[33] Another RMS release, expressing the Ambonese feeling that Dutch policies had betrayed them, warned that "at the decisive moment" the Dutch would "hand over" West New Guinea's Papuans to Indonesia.[34] Not unexpectedly, after Indonesia's formal takeover of West New Guinea in 1963, RMS-oriented media in the Netherlands began to pay increasing attention to anti-Indonesian resistance among the Papuans.

Moreover, RMS leaders think a small South Moluccan state in a "Balkanized" Indonesia could be economically viable. They point out that even before the colonial era the South Moluccans had an "export" economy based on the production of spices. Although foreign domination has stunted economic growth, a considerable diversity of agricultural production — not just of spices but including such crops as tobacco, copra, sugar, cotton, and a modern, mechanized production of rice — is believed possible. The island of Ceram has petroleum resources and the presence of other minerals such as gold and coal "is not excluded."[35] More important from this point of view, the Moluccan population's relatively high level of educational development is seen as a guarantee that industrial modernization and the introduction of

[32]Cf. *Toma Hasa* (Eindhoven: Badan Persekutuan, 1966), pp. 4-5, and J. A. Manusama, "Het Indonesisch Nationalisme," *De Stem van Ambon,* March 1963, p. 5.

[33]"The South Moluccan Attitude Towards the Future Status of West New Guinea," *News in Extract from the Republic of the South Moluccas* (Rotterdam), November 25, 1960, p. 5. (This publication, an official release of the RMS Information Service, will henceforth be cited as *NERSM.*)

[34]"Gegoochel met het Zelfbeschikkingsrecht," *Nieuws in het Kort over de Republiek Zuid Molukken* (Rotterdam), January 25, 1962, p. 1. (A Dutch-language release of the RMS Information Service, this publication will henceforth be cited as *NKRZM.*)

[35]*De R.M.S. Haar Politieke, Economische en Sociale Aspekten* (Assen: Lete Mena, 1970), pp. 10-12, and "The Economic Prospects of an Independent and Sovereign Republik Maluku Selatan," *NERSM,* December 25, 1967, pp. 1-4.

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new agricultural techniques would meet with success. The new economic stabilization efforts of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, based largely on foreign capital inputs, are viewed as having little development value for the South Moluccan region. Presumably only South Moluccan independence can bring meaningful economic growth.[36]

The passing of years and the frustration of exile have inevitably injected an occasional admission of futility into RMS-oriented literature, with which immediate reaffirmations of the significance of the RMS struggle are closely correlated. "Is there any point to it all? Is there any sense in going on for Ambon and New Guinea?," one lead article in *De Stem van Ambon* (*The Voice of Ambon*) asked; another echoed a similar comment frequently flung at RMS supporters: "You are tilting at windmills."[37] To still such doubts three "realities" are underscored: (1) the injustice done to the Ambonese by Holland, the UN and Indonesia, (2) the fact that the RMS cause is "a test case for the establishment of an international legal order," and (3) the continuing *de facto* existence of the RMS despite "occupation, oppression, and betrayal."[38] The last point is substantiated by another principal theme in RMS literature, namely, the anti-Indonesian guerrilla resistance allegedly enduring in the home islands, particularly in the interior of Ceram. Notwithstanding the capture of Soumokil, it is asserted,

> RMS armed forces on Ceram, led by men such as Colonel Sopamena, Colonel Sopacua, Lieutenant-Colonel Salakory, Captain Souisa and many others, and aided by the loyal Ceramese population, continue their determined stand against an overpowering Indonesian force, and they will continue to do so until a free and sovereign RMS shall have been recognized by the international community.[39]

The collapse of anti-Djakarta regional resistance movements in Sumatra and the Celebes in the early 1960's led to an official declaration issued by the RMS' general representative, P. J. Nikijuluw, and Manusama, who was then head of the RMS "political mission" in the Netherlands. Warning against "defeatist sentiments," the declaration pointed out that the demise of other pro-

[36]Earlier publications sponsored by RMS agencies tended to give a more balanced picture of South Moluccan economic assets and liabilities. Compare, for example, a monograph distributed by the South Moluccan Bureau in the early 1950's: G. L. Tichelman, *De Zuid-Molukken. Overzicht van Een Eilandenrijk* (Eindhoven: Stichting door de Eeuwen Trouw, 1952?), especially pp. 46-50.

[37]*De Stem van Ambon*, January-February 1963, p. 1; March 1965, p. 1.

[38]*Ibid.*, April 1965, p. 1.

[39]"De Strijd Op Ceram Gaat Onverminderd Door," *NKRZM*, July 25, 1964, p. 2.

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vincial rebellions "is not a collapse of our resistance in Ceram," and called attention to Indonesian army communiqués admitting that the fighting in Ceram "after eleven years" was still continuing.[40] Some three years later the RMS Information Service cited a report by the Indonesian press agency, Antara, to the effect that "remnants" of Ambonese rebel forces no longer constituted a threat to security as, in fact, being evidence that elements of the RMS resistance had still been operating in the Moluccas.[41]

On occasion, as the alleged unrest on Ceram continued to bolster the morale of Ambonese exiles, RMS leaders seemed quite flexible in their tactics toward Indonesia, though the principle of an independent South Moluccan Republic was never abandoned. In September 1963, for example, with West New Guinea in the Indonesian domain and the United States and the Netherlands vying for a better understanding with Djakarta, Manusama declared that the RMS was not only interested in fighting "with weapons in hand" for its independence, but was also willing to meet Indonesia at the conference table in order to come to a "definitive solution" of the Ambonese problem, perhaps via a plebiscite in the South Moluccas.[42] The Dutch government, he suggested, could tender its good offices to mediate such a conference. Whether Djakarta or The Hague ever officially reacted to Manusama's proposal is not known. In any case, within months Indonesia's increasingly anti-American and anti-Dutch policy pronouncements, in the context of her confrontation campaign to destroy Malaysia and her growing friendship with People's China, seemed to render a conciliatory tactic useless.

Indonesia's threats to Malaysia, including invasions by small armed bands of terrorists, and the concern about this development shown by the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and other powers led the RMS to explore and publicize new tactical approaches:

As we see it, there is only one way which the United States can follow to stop Sukarno's confrontation policy against Malaysia, namely to conduct a positive policy towards the Republic of the South Moluccas by giving it moral support. We, South Moluccans, are not asking for military help at all, because we know that mere moral support to the

[40]"Zuid Molukse Politieke Verklaring Betreffende Ineenstorting RPI Verset," *ibid.*, September 1961, pp. 2-3.

[41]"Resistance actions of the South Moluccans against Indonesia in Various Parts of the South Moluccan Archipelago," *NERSM*, March 25, 1964, pp. 1-2. See also "Onrust op Ceram," *De Stem van Ambon*, April 1968, p. 3.

[42]"Zuid-Molukkers tot Onderhandelen Bereid," *NKRZM*, October 25, 1963, pp. 2-4.

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righteous cause we are fighting for would already have a tremendous effect on the further political development in Indonesia itself. A simple official statement in which the Government of the United States expressed its opinion that the South Moluccans have exercised their right of self-determination in a legal way, and that therefore the United Nations should take up and discuss this matter in due time, will certainly encourage the various peoples in the Indonesian Archipelago to resist the Sukarno regime.[43]

According to a British press report at about this time, relayed without denial by the RMS media, West New Guinea and South Moluccan leaders went so far as to propose to the Malaysian government that it provide arms to anti-Sukarno Papuan and Ambonese guerrillas in the field.[44] The British account said that Ambonese rebels — despite "acute shortages of ammunition," but aided by "aboriginal Alfur tribesmen armed with poisoned arrows" — were tying down as many as twenty Indonesian battalions. It also made the point that smoldering regional resistance elsewhere in Indonesia could and should be encouraged to draw the sting from Djakarta's anti-Malaysian campaign.

Neither Washington nor Kuala Lumpur reacted to such suggestions, however. They no doubt considered that whatever the vitality of various provincial dissident movements in Indonesia, many of them — as RMS leaders themselves were well aware — were anti-Sukarno rather than opposed to a unitary state per se. Were these groups to come to power they would hardly accommodate a demand for an independent South Moluccan state.[45]

The abortive coup in Indonesia on September 30, 1965, in

[43]"How to Stop Sukarno's Confrontation Policy Against Malaysia . . . ," *NERSM,* May 25, 1965, p. 3.

[44]*The Sunday Telegraph* (London), February 21, 1965; "Sap Indonesia from Within," *NERSM,* March 25, 1965, pp. 3-4. During 1965, as British concern over Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia grew, RMS media optimistically spoke of the "Constantly Growing Perception in Great Britain Towards [*sic*] the Republic of the South Moluccas." *NERSM,* October 25, 1965, pp. 1-2.

[45]An exception was the short-lived *Permesta* movement of anti-Sukarno dissidents in East Indonesia, which in April 1958 briefly occupied portions of the Northern Moluccas. On January 22, 1960 RMS leaders issued a manifesto of collaboration with the *Permesta* rebels, but by this time the East Indonesia movement had all but disintegrated. In contrast, although in 1959 a small group of Ambonese in Holland proclaimed their support of the Sumatra-based anti-Sukarno rebels who eventually formed the Unitary Indonesian Republic (*Republik Persatuan Indonesia* — RPI), the RMS on April 25, 1960 formally rejected collaboration with the RPI. RPI leaders in Sumatra had proved much less sympathetic to RMS claims than the *Permesta.* For an official Indonesian view of the *Permesta* rebellion, see the publication of the government's Information Department, *Peristiwa Sulawesi Utara* (*Permesta*) (Djakarta: Departemèn Penerangan, Direktorat Dokumentasi dan Research, 1963).

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which communists were heavily involved, and which led to the collapse of the Sukarno regime, had little effect on RMS policy. "One faction or another may gain control of the wheel, but the Indonesian ship of state will continue to be steered on the same totalitarian, disruptive course," the RMS Information Service declared in November. "Though General Nasution and the Army may wish to control Indonesia rather than the Communists, the aims of the new regime are the same as those of the old."[46]

The RMS' inflexible position toward the new Suharto government, however, tended to sharpen antagonisms with the Dutch. This was so because The Hague, along with a consortium of major Western powers, soon began to develop a new diplomatic warmth for the Suharto regime. Extensive new credits for and investments in Indonesia were accompanied by new arrangements regulating the repayment of Indonesia's huge debts.[47] The Dutch-Indonesian rapprochement also included efforts to solve the problem of the exiled Ambonese, and at the close of October 1967, during a visit of Foreign Minister Malik to the Netherlands, agreement was apparently reached on attempts to step up repatriation. It was decided that beginning on January 1, 1968, Dutch authorities were to assist in a planned monthly repatriation program of 100 Ambonese. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Luns was said to have assured Malik, care would be taken that the Ambonese undesirous of returning home would not endanger the good relations now prevailing between Holland and Indonesia.[48]

Repatriation did jump significantly, from fourteen in 1967 to more than 600 in 1968. But the projected exodus did not materialize, not least because RMS spokesmen continued to stress the untrustworthiness of Indonesian intentions. On January 31, 1968, for example, Manusama revealed a supposedly secret report sent on April 3, 1967 by the First Secretary of the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague to Djakarta. In it the RMS struggle was seen as heavily dependent on the support of the Faithful through the Centuries Foundation in the Netherlands, and the Foundation was charged with maintaining a veritable reign of "terror and intimidation" among Ambonese to prevent them from "going to the Indonesian Embassy" in The Hague. The report also allegedly

[46]"Once again, the Republic of the South Moluccas and the Recent Political Developments in Various Parts of the Indonesian Archipelago," *NERSM*, November 25, 1965, p. 4.
[47]Van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno, op. cit.*, especially Chapters 7 and 8.
[48]*De Stem van Ambon*, February 1968, p. 1.

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counseled "playing off the South Moluccans against each other and arousing them against the Foundation."[49] Such charges, widely believed and never fully denied by Djakarta, kept the RMS-Djakarta breach as wide as ever.

Over the years anti-Dutch grievances among the Ambonese, as reflected in RMS literature, have had different emphases. An initial and already noted stress on the Dutch government's failure to acknowledge and press RMS claims in the councils of the world increasingly gave way to indignation over Dutch efforts to compel adjustment to the exile environment, e.g., through the "self care" regulation. One common RMS argument is that the Ambonese, as a military force, had little or no choice in coming to the Netherlands. They had been ordered to do so, and because they acted in compliance with that order the Dutch government is obliged to stand by them and provide for them.[50] The government has also been charged with unseemly pressure and haste in moving Ambonese to new and more "integrated" urban quarters, and with permitting severe friction to develop between small groups of pro-Indonesian Ambonese and the RMS-oriented majority in their own communities.[51]

From these and many other, often petty, accusations and criticisms, one gets an impression of long-festering grievances and misunderstandings, encapsulated in rumor, myth, and the impenetrable bitterness of enduring exile. It appears that a dialogue has become virtually impossible and that any attempt to break through the frozen relationship between Dutch officialdom and Ambonese leaders is likely to meet with corrosive suspicion and skepticism. Especially in the past several years, as the end of the Sukarno regime has done little to encourage a return to Indonesia, and as tendencies toward radicalization among the younger Ambonese have grown stronger, the exile literature has become more insistent that the civil and political rights of the Ambonese are deliberately being curtailed or denied by the Dutch government. Allegations of the denial of freedom of speech to President Manusama, the barring of other RMS leaders from Ambonese camps, unwarranted police searches of Ambonese homes in the aftermath of the arson of the Indonesian Embassy in July 1966, and complaints that government policy is "consciously aimed at

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[50] "Wat Heeft de Nederlandse Regeering in Werkelijkheid voor met de Ambonezen?," *NKRZM*, June 25, 1961, p. 2.
[51] Cf. "Ambonezenzorg," *ibid.*, October 25, 1961, pp. 1-8, and "De Situatie in Ijsseloord," *ibid.*, March 25, 1964, pp. 1-2.

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the destruction of our ideal, our identity," have been representative of this theme.[52]

When two young RMS supporters wanted to demonstrate in front of the royal palace at Soestdijk in June 1964 in an expression of sympathy for President Soumokil, then being tried in Djakarta, police quickly intervened on the basis of an ordinance prohibiting such demonstrations near the royal residence. *De Stem van Ambon,* however, headlined the incident "Our Right to Demonstrate in Front of the Soestdijk Palace," and went on to comment on "the natural right of the people" to turn to their sovereign for a redress of grievances.[53] Inevitably, as militant confrontations have become more frequent, police reaction has come to seem more severe and indiscriminate, directed even against occasional well-meaning foreign observers who have, for example, begun to speak of the "brutal Gestapo methods" of the Dutch authorities.[54]

It remains to mention the continuing appeals to the United Nations and other international agencies prominently featured in RMS literature, though some of the international overtures made by RMS leaders over the years could not have done their cause much good. In November 1955, for example, the RMS made contact with the Polish government-in-exile in London, and in March 1957 Manusama visited the Republic of China on Taiwan. Neither venture had any practical result. On April 9, 1960 the RMS formally offered "military assistance" to the Katanga Republic in the Congo, a gesture virtually without substance (even if the transport of Ambonese military to Africa could have been arranged) and scarcely likely to win many friends in the United Nations. From time to time representatives of the autonomous Moluccan Evangelical Church (*Geredja Indjili Maluku*) in the Netherlands have had contact with the International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC), and in August 1958 an ICCC congress in Rio de Janeiro called on its members to support the South Moluccan people. The ICCC has, however, but a fraction of the influence and resources of the World Council of Churches (which has been notably silent on the RMS case).

Efforts to bring the case before the United Nations have been in

[52]*Salawaku R.M.S. De Zuidmolukse Jongeren. Hun Eisen* (Uitgave Vrije Zuidmolukse Jongeren, *s.a.e.l.*), p. 6.
[53]*De Stem van Ambon,* June-July 1964, pp. 1-2.
[54]Cf. Friends of Indonesia Fellowship, *Indonesia's Millions* (*s.l.*, 1961), p. 4. This is a publication of the Fundamental Evangelical Pioneer Faith Fellowship, operating from Indonesia House in Upland, California.

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vain. In spite of previous refusals by the Secretary-General to have it placed on the agenda, Manusama on November 24, 1961 once more appealed to the General Assembly to consider "our view with respect to the right of self-determination of peoples." Calling attention to an Antara report from Djakarta on November 9, which described the arrival of Indonesian army reinforcements to combat RMS insurgents on Amboina, he stressed the unitary Indonesian Republic's disregard of the right of self-determination of all peoples in the Indonesian archipelago. RMS media referred also to what was called the "changing interpretation in the international world [*sic*] of the right of self-determination."[55] No official UN reaction to this and similar appeals was made public by RMS sources.

When the Twenty-second Session of the General Assembly opened in New York on September 19, 1967 a group of South Moluccans staged a demonstration in front of the UN buildings. A letter they handed to an official of the UN Secretariat asked for consideration of the ongoing conflict between Indonesia and the RMS within the context of a special five-power draft resolution which the previous year had called on UN members and agencies to strengthen the means of settling international disputes.[56] During Secretary-General U Thant's visit to the Netherlands from April 6 to 8, 1968, Manusama sent him a written request for an audience on behalf of the Ambonese who "are sufferers from an intolerable neglect of their right of self-determination." According to the RMS Information Service, "No answer was received. . . ."[57] Since then there have been no further RMS appeals to the UN from the majority Ambonese group led by Manusama.

VI

The seeming indifference of the world, and the mounting pressure exerted by the Dutch government on the South Moluccans either to integrate or repatriate, inevitably produced demands among them for radically new tactics. The initial impulses came from the often unemployed Ambonese youth, some of whom in "life style" and outward appearance were mimicking the "hippies" of the revolutionary subculture sweeping the globe. As has been noted, in July 1966 the Indonesian Embassy in The

[55]"South Moluccan Appeal to the United Nations General Assembly," *NERSM*, December 25, 1961, pp. 2-5.

[56]"South Moluccan Demonstration at the United Nations. . . ," *ibid.*, September 25, 1967, pp. 1-2.

[57]"South Moluccan Appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations at his Visit to the Netherlands," *ibid.*, April 25, 1968, pp. 3-4.

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Hague was set on fire by Ambonese youths. But almost simultaneously there were signs of significant disaffection among older Ambonese with the RMS "establishment" in such organizations as the BPRMS. During the June 1966 "unity" conference of Ambonese interest groups which established the *Badan Persatuan* (BP), a "government in exile" or *Pemerintah Darurat* of the RMS also was formed, in which veteran spokesmen like Manusama, Nikijuluw and P. W. Lokollo assumed principal executive positions. The *Pemerintah Darurat* declared that it would continue the main policies of the independence struggle as laid down by the recently executed President Soumokil.[58]

But more radical elements were not content. Dissatisfaction over the BP's lack of militancy, both in standing up to the Dutch and in the international arena, and criticism of the Ambonese "establishment's" dependence on the Faithful through the Centuries Foundation, eventually led to the formation of a counter-government. Opposition to the Manusama leadership finally crystallized around the "Tamaela group," which in 1968 seceded from the BP and then on May 17, 1969, at a conference of various splinter groups in Nimwegen (Nijmegen), established a new, rival government in exile with headquarters in Nijverdal, Holland. Named acting President and Foreign Minister of the rival government was fifty-four-year-old Isaac J. Tamaela, a KNIL veteran who claims to have been appointed Vice-Commander in Chief of RMS forces in 1950. He subsequently fled to Dutch-held West New Guinea and thence to the Netherlands, where he held a civil administrative post with the Dutch government.[59] There is little doubt that the Tamaela group, whose formal and informal supporters are said to number at least 3,000 South Moluccans, has captured much of the new spirit of restiveness and militancy among the youth, and thus probably constitutes the most serious threat to the old-line RMS leadership since the migration to the Netherlands.

As early as December 1968, Tamaela had gone to New York to address a vain appeal to U Thant, asking his "able assistance in freeing my people from the bondage in which they now exist. . . ."[60] In September 1969 he was again in New York. This time he secured a local public relations firm to publicize his effort to get the United Nations to take up the South Moluccan case, and in a

[58]Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[59]See the release on Tamaela's background issued by his "Office of Republic of South Moluccas," operating from a hotel in New York City, in September 1969.

[60]*The Australian* (Sydney), December 13, 1968.

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press conference he charged that "The Dutch want us to sit, hope and wait. They say ours is — how do you say — a lost cause."[61] But the second appeal to the UN was no more successful than the first. The continuing factionalism within the Ambonese community in Holland, and the fact that he represented but a minority of that community soon undermined his efforts.

In the Netherlands Manusama eventually was to charge the Tamaela group with fostering the growing unrest among the Ambonese youths. Tamaela, he noted, had asserted that several of the thirty-odd youths who had occupied the Indonesian Ambassador's residence on August 31, 1970, in the "Wassenaar incident," belonged to his following.[62] Although Manusama said he was unable to substantiate this claim, the older RMS "establishment" and its Dutch supporters have been at pains to minimize Tamaela's influence and have recognized the necessity of adopting bolder and more radical tactics.

By the end of 1970 Lokollo, a long-time RMS cabinet figure and a member of the *Pemerintah Darurat,* was reported to have made yet another effort to arouse interest for the South Moluccan cause at the United Nations. The *Pemerintah Darurat* was also said to have agreed that an "internationalization" of the RMS problem — presumably an arousing of international concern, as opposed to Indonesia-RMS or Indonesia-RMS-Holland discussions — might help to change Djakarta's mind. To this end Lokollo had approached an unnamed West African country, as well as smaller countries "in the vicinity of Australia."[63] It may be doubted, however, that the older RMS leadership, many of whose members hold or have held positions of some significance in the Dutch society and economy, were prepared to emulate the militant confrontation approach of the younger Ambonese and Tamaela.

VII

In the middle of 1970 the Faithful through the Centuries Foundation announced cessation of its twenty-year-old publication *De Stem van Ambon,* and the inauguration of a new journal *Zelfbeschikking (Self-Determination)* which would reflect the West Papuan as well as the South Moluccan struggle for independence and explain the necessity of a "changed tactic."[64] In successive issues the new journal has struck a somewhat more mili-

[61] *New York Times,* September 29, 1969.
[62] *De Volkskrant,* October 6, 1970.
[63] *Ibid.,* January 13, 1971.
[64] *De Stem van Ambon,* July-August 1970, p. 1.

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tant tone, but not to a pitch that would satisfy Tamaela or many radicalized Ambonese youths. While condemning the killing of the police officer during the Wassenaar incident, and reiterating that it "has never wanted violence as a method of struggle," the Foundation's executive placed the blame for the incident squarely on the Dutch government for inviting Indonesia's President Suharto, the individual "who is responsible for the continuing injustice done to the South Moluccan people, as well as for the cowardly murder of the great South Moluccan hero of freedom, Dr. Christian Soumokil, LIM."[65] In *Zelfbeschikking's* pages treatment of the Wassenaar incident and the radicalization noted in the Ambonese community has been generally sympathetic. Yet, by its continued insistence on constitutionality and peaceful methods, and its principled confidence in an eventual triumph of the RMS-West Papua cause through changes in Dutch public opinion and in the workings of the Dutch party system and parliament, the Foundation merely widens the distance between itself and younger Ambonese who evince admiration for a Black Power mentality.[66]

By October 1970 RMS leaders were acutely aware of three currents of opinion and action among their constituency.[67] The main group, the only one under their control and comprising about "80% of the South Moluccan community," is represented by the BP, which disavows the use of violence. But the youth groups allied to the BP are now said to be prepared to go a "little farther" (i.e., to countenance some violence) in order to realize the "liberation" of the South Moluccas.

Representative of the second movement is the Federation of Moluccan Christian Youths (*Persekutuan Pemuda Kristen Maluku* — PPKM), originally founded in 1952. Its membership of about 4,000 throughout Holland ranges from sixteen to thirty-five years of age, and is active in both church and vocational training programs. Since the execution of Soumokil, however, and especially since the Wassenaar incident, the moderation of the PPKM has been steadily eroded by the appeal of smaller, more radical organizations.

The latter form the third current in Ambonese opinion and are usually referred to as the People's Youth (*Pemuda Masjarakat* — PM). PM is not so much an organization as a loose conglomera-

[65]"Op de Grens van Twee Jaren," *Zelfbeschikking*, December 1970, p. 3.
[66]On this interest in Black Power see, e.g., Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
[67]The following analysis is derived largely from "Balans van Wassenaar," *Zelfbeschikking*, October 1970, p. 7.

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tion of various smaller "action clubs" scattered through the Ambonese camps and urban quarters.[68] The clubs have such names as "Pattimura" (the name of an early nineteenth-century Ambonese freedom fighter) and "Sou '66" (from Soumokil and 1966, the year of the RMS President's execution). The PM groups are sharply critical of the Dutch government, the *Pemerintah Darurat* and the Faithful through the Centuries Foundation.

In June 1966, in the midst of the growing restiveness following the news of Soumokil's death, the then newly formed BP began efforts to unite the splintering youth movement. A year later, on July 1, 1967, a central governing organization (the *Susunan Pusat Pemuda RMS*), was established. Besides the PPKM a dozen or so smaller youth groups affiliated themselves with this center, but soon there were desertions to freewheeling PM clubs, and the tactical as well as generation gap (age in the center's leadership ranged as high as thirty-seven) seemed to grow steadily.

Although nominally the great majority of Ambonese youths remain affiliated with the "establishment" PPKM organization, it is evident that *Pemerintah Darurat* leaders have little or no control over the steady radicalization of the young — or, indeed, over the growing militancy affecting the older generation. For example, within the time span of a few days around the turn of 1970-1971 such developments as these occurred: (1) a hunger strike of four young South Moluccans near the Parliament building in The Hague, designed to call attention to the cause of an independent RMS; (2) a demonstration by more than a hundred Ambonese youths before the courthouse in the town of Assen, demanding freedom for those "compatriots" involved in the Wassenaar incident; (3) a group presentation of petitions to the Dutch upper house, urging freedom for the "Wassenaar 33" and a return to a "sovereign fatherland"; (4) a Dutch television report that Tamaela's associates were covertly undergoing military training and appeared to be obtaining and using arms; (5) demonstrations by youths carrying banners reading "We want neither assimilation nor integration" and protesting various policies in the South Moluccan residence community at Huizen; (6) the arrest of a South Moluccan in Zaandam for failure to carry the identity card required of all "stateless" persons in the Netherlands, and subsequent public protests that the arrest concerned unresolved "political issues"; and (7) the issuance and distribution of a new

[68]The description of the PM and other youth groups is drawn from Mariën, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

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"call for unity" by the incarcerated "Wassenaar 33," advocating "one state-one government-one flag-one struggle-only one ideal, the RMS which we all love."[69]

Worried older RMS leaders and young militants alike believe the momentum being achieved is likely to create a pattern of future confrontation with Dutch authority, on the order of the civil rights struggle in the United States or the student demonstrations in various parts of the world. Preventing or at least blunting this aggressive upsurge has focused redoubled attention on possible solutions of the RMS problem.

VIII

One proposed solution, of course, is a return to Indonesia. As previously indicated, only 1,800 or so South Moluccans have gone back to Indonesia since 1952, notwithstanding the not inconsiderable (if often covert and informal) efforts of Indonesian diplomatic personnel in Holland, particularly in the last four years, to arouse greater interest in a return through the medium of pro-Indonesians in the camps and living quarters. The Dutch government certainly cannot be faulted for not providing assistance to would-be repatriates. It is ready to make available the cost of passage, expenses while in transit and a gratuity sufficient to maintain a family for at least five months after arrival.[70] The Indonesian government, in turn, has become more flexible in the issuance of entry permits. Initially permits were extended only to those whose political bona fides were not in question (i.e., the South Moluccan repatriate, in effect, had to indicate that he had abandoned all RMS aspirations), and who could show that they had some means of livelihood or someone who could assume responsibility for their care. Recently, however, willingness to return has come to weigh more heavily in official Indonesian considerations. There are three reasons for this: the generous Dutch repatriation provisions, improved reception facilities in Indonesia, and the Moluccan tradition of mutual assistance within the family and between those standing in a *pela* relationship to each other, which has occasionally proved effective in integrating returnees.[71]

[69]*Zelfbeschikking*, January-February 1971, pp. 4, 12, 13.

[70]Mariën, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[71]*Pela* is the term for an anciently established pattern of reciprocal assistance and service between members of a village and one or more different village groups in Moluccan society. *Pela* traditions have remained alive among the exiles in the Netherlands. Cf. T. Wittermans, "Functional Aspects of Pela among Ambonese Refugees," *Indonesië*, June 1955, pp. 214-230.

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According to an Antara dispatch from Ambon on January 23, 1971, Governor Sumitro of the Moluccas Province said that a total of 248 South Moluccans had repatriated from the Netherlands since 1968, that they were being brought by ship to their home villages at the expense of the Dutch government, and that a special organization, "Trinefo," had been established in Indonesia to aid in this effort. Sumitro noted also that most of the Moluccan repatriates had originated from the southeastern islands (i.e., the Kei and Tanimbar archipelagoes).

Repatriation may be facilitated, at least in theory, by several other short- and long-term factors. First, whatever the degree of the South Moluccans' social and economic adjustment in the Netherlands, they are likely to remain in limbo politically so long as they stay in Holland. The Dutch government, which initially considered them to be Indonesian citizens on the basis of the transfer of sovereignty provisions of 1949, now tends to view them (with some complicated exceptions) as essentially stateless. The Indonesian nationality law of July 1958 required that all Indonesians residing abroad must report within five years to the Indonesian embassy in the country of their residence. But by the middle of 1963 the overwhelming majority of South Moluccans in the Netherlands had not done so, thus, in principle, losing their formal citizenship from the point of view of The Hague as well as Djakarta. The international legal aspect is a different matter. When it comes to the position of the group as a whole, The Hague continues to deal with Djakarta.[72] A number of Ambonese have formally applied for and acquired Dutch citizenship, although pro-RMS sentiments linger among them. Not a few have married Dutch spouses.

The efforts of the Suharto regime to stabilize and improve the Indonesian economy may be another inducement toward repatriation. On March 2, 1971, Governor Sumitro of the Province of the Moluccas announced that a 30 per cent budgetary increase had been authorized for the province's development during the 1971-1972 fiscal year, as compared with the preceding two years' total expenditures. The new allotment would be used for projects ranging from hygiene to sea transportation, as part of the current national five-year development plan. He added that expanding domestic and foreign capital investments in the Moluccas (the latter in the lumber industry) would greatly increase job opportunities. At present there was a lack of middle-level, skilled

[72]See on this citizenship question Mariën, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

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labor in the province, and a relative surfeit of academically trained persons.[73]

Toward the close of 1970 it was rumored that Djakarta had plans to send a special emissary to the Netherlands to facilitate Ambonese repatriation. He would be none other than J. H. Manuhutu, a former RMS President who had been captured in January 1952 during the Indonesian military operation in Ceram and sentenced to three years in prison; after his release he had made his peace with the authorities. But on December 17 the embassy in The Hague denied that anyone was coming to talk to the Ambonese. According to the next day's *De Volkskrant*, the Indonesian government had been warned that the presence of such an emissary would only accelerate Ambonese radicalism, and that the lives of the mission's members might be endangered.

On their part, Indonesian officials fail to realize that the now urbanized and modernized Ambonese are unlikely to be attracted by available opportunities in their region of origin. The chairman of the Indonesian government's commission on Ambonese repatriates, General Wijono, recently declared after visiting the Moluccan region to study the possibilities of resettlement, that there were at least 5,000 hectares of cleared land on the island of Ceram now available for agriculture.[74] But few South Moluccans in the Netherlands — and particularly the youths who have never seen Ceram or any part of Indonesia — would want to become peasant colonists on virgin soil. Despite their adjustment problems they have grown accustomed to a modern economy's amenities and services.

A second alternative — migration to a country other than Indonesia — appears to be impracticable. For the better part of the 1950's the Ambonese had an idea of migrating to West New Guinea, but to the author's knowledge no RMS spokesman ever formally broached the matter to the Dutch government. In any case, the Dutch were anxious not to aggravate tensions over that disputed territory by introducing an incalculable factor such as a mass Ambonese migration. Moreover, RMS endorsement of a third-country migration, even to West New Guinea, would almost certainly have undercut its case for return to a "sovereign" South Moluccan state. The biggest difficulty today, however, is that there are few areas in the world where economic development is not running a close race with rapid indigenous population growth,

[73] *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, March 2, 1971, p. 3.
[74] *Zelfbeschikking*, November 1970, p. 15.

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under conditions that most urbanized Ambonese would consider to be unattractive. Those areas that are available, e.g., Australia, have immigration restrictions of varying degrees of severity. The number of Ambonese who have left Holland on their own — including a handful settled in California — is minimal.

When considering the third possibility, permanent settlement in the Netherlands, it is first necessary to note the change and diversity of Dutch opinion on the RMS case and the problems posed by the South Moluccans' presence. Most of the Dutch Left had no concern for the RMS so long as Sukarno was in power. Today, however, at least one Left faction which includes some noted academic specialists on Indonesia is projecting its strong opposition to the Suharto regime through a new interest in the Ambonese struggle for independence. One opinion heard in these quarters is that a solution lies in the creation of "a Socialist Federation of Indonesia, in which the South Moluccas would enjoy a healthy measure of autonomy."[75] In the Dutch Labor Party (*Partij van den Arbeid*) there is some distaste for Suharto's Indonesia without active opposition, but certainly no interest in jeopardizing greatly improved Dutch-Indonesian relations through sponsorship of the RMS cause.

In influential Protestant confessional political circles zealous support of the RMS was at one time *de rigueur*. One former prime minister of the confessional Anti-Revolutionary Party declared in 1956 that his associates had better realize that abandonment of the "right of Ambon" was tantamount to abandonment of the party's entire program, and that the South Moluccan problem generally was a "test case" of his party's desire to pursue a "truly Christian policy."[76] Such unequivocal expressions of adhesion are not altogether gone from the Protestant confessional camp, but a vigorous, sustained championing of the RMS cause, in or out of the Dutch Parliament, can no longer be expected from this quarter. Prominent Dutch Protestant missionary spokesmen have declared the RMS to be "a dream that is gone."[77]

There is even less enthusiasm in the powerful Catholic People's

[75]F. Tichelman, "Het Zuid-Molukse Vraagstuk," *Vietnam Bulletin/Indonesië Informatie*, January 16, 1971, p. 5. This publication, not formally affiliated with any party, contains the views of a predominantly leftist, anti-Suharto government group of Netherlanders, among them Professor W. F. Wertheim and other prominent academic specialists on Indonesia.

[76]P. S. Gerbrandy, *Ambon en de A. R. Partij* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, N. V., 1956), p. 35. See also *Ambon en het Geweten der Kerk. Documentatie inzake het Adres van het Comité dr. H. Bout* (no publisher, *s.l.*, 1960).

[77]*Zelfbeschikking*, January-February 1971, p. 2.

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Party (*Katholieke Volkspartij*) and the smaller, classically liberal and big-business-oriented People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*). In their view Dutch support for an unpopular cause like that of the RMS can only harm Holland's profitable new investment and commercial relationships with post-Sukarno Indonesia. The present government of Premier Barend Biesheuvel is unlikely to initiate a different policy.

After the Wassenaar incident South Moluccan leaders conferred with officials of the Dutch Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, and were told that in light of the recent disturbances the government had reflected upon its policy of seeking to integrate the South Moluccans within Dutch society on the basis of "retention of their own identity." Its conclusion was that there was no "reasonable alternative" to the existing integration policy. The unrest among South Moluccan youths was considered to be a kind of "transition sickness"; a "following generation" would be surer of its community position in society, and with the aid of the Dutch language would be able to make easier contact with Dutch contemporaries than was the case now among the "marginal" Ambonese youths.[78]

Half a year prior to this pronouncement the Minister of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, Dr. M. A. Klompé, had been asked by *De Stem van Ambon* editors if the preservation of South Moluccan group cohesiveness, as recommended in 1959 by the Verwey-Jonker Commission, was still official policy. The answer was yes. But the Minister also emphasized the importance of eliminating the obstacles preventing the Ambonese "from participating fully" in the society, even as a group, and of stimulating Ambonese contacts with "Dutch organizations and associations." Asked whether the evidences of radicalization among Ambonese youths were not indications that government expectations about progressive integration, beginning with the younger generation, were being challenged, Dr. Klompé admitted that the process was likely to increase tensions. Though she said the government was ready to support new initiatives to deal with the problem, she did not disclose what some of these new initiatives might be.[79]

[78] *De Volkskrant*, January 19, 1971.

[79] *De Stem van Ambon*, May-June 1970, pp. 1-3. At the end of March 1971, Minister Klompé declared that in the fall legislation would be introduced into the

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Clearly the Dutch government is confident that it can control the heightened tensions within the Moluccan community without deviating from its main policy of letting RMS political aspirations atrophy as "integration without assimilation" proceeds. Whatever the wisdom of this policy, the effects of the Wassenaar incident continue to make themselves felt. An analysis by the Sociological Institute in Amsterdam concluded that the South Moluccans viewed the publicity given this event as a relative success for their cause, and that as a result the incident had probably encouraged further radicalization.[80] Throughout the pattern of Ambonese-Dutch interaction today there seems to be a new degree of sensitivity, caution and implicit violence, especially in youth relationships. The "growing mutual aggression and discrimination between South Moluccan and Dutch youths in all of the Netherlands" reported in a recent survey of the situation has implications for its policies perhaps not fully realized by the government.[81]

Holland is generally considered free from serious racial hostilities. But as far as the South Moluccans are concerned the discrimination against them is pervasive for all its subtlety, and is expressed in many ways, ranging from verbal slurs about the *zwartjes* (literally "little blacks"), to attempts by segments of the urban white population to bar Ambonese from settling in their part of town, as in Sittard in May 1967.[82] As the Ambonese population grows and becomes "more visible," and as the militancy and ethnic self-awareness of the young Ambonese persists and is fed by each successful "confrontation," new patterns of conflict are likely to emerge, similar to those existing between American blacks and whites in the context of the civil rights struggle.

No official Dutch institution or agency, no RMS arm, and no mechanism of Ambonese organizational life can be said to have been successful in integrating the South Moluccan minority into Dutch society, though some — such as the Dutch supervisory offices for the Ambonese — are committed to that objective. A few examples must suffice. From 1952 to 1970 the principal supervis-

Dutch lower house, granting Ambonese the same legal rights as Dutch citizens but without the right to vote or the obligation to perform military service. The Minister also noted that about 20 per cent of the total group of 30,000 Ambonese had already acquired Dutch citizenship or had applied for it. From five to six thousand Ambonese wanted to go to Indonesia. (*De Volkskrant*, March 30, 1971.) Ambonese leaders have disputed the accuracy of these figures.

[80]*Het Parool* (Amsterdam), December 11, 1970.

[81]Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[82]Mariën, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

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ing agency was the previously mentioned Commission of Ambonese Care (*Commissariaat van Ambonnezenzorg* — CAZ), eventually functioning under the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work. The Commission's high degree of autonomy, and its extensive involvement in every aspect of Ambonese life, came to be resented by most Ambonese. Equally resented was the alleged insensitivity or ignorance of CAZ officials. Many who were formerly in Dutch colonial service were criticized for applying a "colonial mentality" to their tasks, and more recent CAZ appointees had little or no knowledge of the Ambonese dialect or customs. A frequent complaint, particularly in the early years, was that little effort was made to absorb the Ambonese themselves into the CAZ decision-making structure.[83] Given the initial isolation and dependency of the Moluccan community, the Commission was almost inevitably perceived in a paternalistic-authoritarian role. As a regulating agency over which the stateless, voiceless Ambonese had no control, it determined their housing, their food, and even their simplest amenities with what was often considered to be officiousness and fiat. "The CAZ," as one analysis expressed it, "has become in the Ambonese thoughtworld a threatening chimera, which, moreover, seemed to be continuously concerned to make the Ambonese lose his own identity."[84]

With growing Ambonese resistance, and militancy later on, CAZ also seemed to carry out its policies more repressively and punitively, and as an arm of the government it became a symbol against which the South Moluccan camp or urban colony dweller found it easy to direct his frustrations.

In the course of 1970 a new Ambonese Bureau (*Bureau Ambonezen* — BA), also in the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, began replacing CAZ in some functions. Meanwhile, in the endeavor to promote "self-care" and integration, Ambonese welfare is increasingly to become the concern of private organizations, trade unions, general government social services and — above all — individual and family responsibility among the Ambonese. But after two decades of a custodial type of policy,

[83]On CAZ policies and Ambonese reaction see especially Bung Penonton, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 21-22. Elected Ambonese camp councils, and later Ambonese "camp elders" in the new urban settlements, participated only minimally in CAZ decision-making; their primary task seemed to be to make policy decisions acceptable among their fellows. When small groups of pro-Djakarta South Moluccans were increasingly subjected to intimidation and terror by their pro-RMS neighbors, an internal security organization was established in 1964 in a number of camps.

[84]*Zelfbeschikking*, December 1970, p. 9.

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operating under circumstances of persistent Ambonese self-ghettoization, resentment and frustration, the social distance between the Ambonese group and its host environment seems as great as ever, if not greater.

Another instance of the failure of integration is the stand on religion. Some 80 per cent of the original Moluccan immigrants were members of the Protestant Moluccan Church in Indonesia. But in Holland they soon evinced a marked aversion to joining Dutch churches. The reason most often heard was that the Dutch Reformed religious establishment had shown itself to be apathetic to the RMS cause. The author has the impression, however, that language and cultural differences, plus an unwelcoming "stiffness" on the part of Dutch church leaders, were more responsible for the formation in 1952 of an independent Moluccan Evangelical Church (*Geredja Indjili Maluku* — GIM), of which some 22,000 or more than 75 per cent of the total Ambonese group now are members. Various small factions soon split off from the GIM, but contact with the Dutch Protestant churches has remained minimal. In contrast, the 2,000 or so Roman Catholic South Moluccans (mostly from the Kei and Tanimbar islands) almost immediately came under the effective care of the Dutch Catholic hierarchy. Some 400 remaining Moluccan Muslims are soon likely to return to Indonesia, as their religious adjustment in the Dutch environment has been especially difficult.[85]

What strikes one on the whole about Ambonese Protestantism after all these years is its self-contained, even involuted, character. In all vital elements of religious service, ritual or church community life the South Moluccan distinctiveness is preserved and the outreach to Dutch society is limited and often awkward. It appears that Dutch Protestant leaders want it no other way. In June 1971 a delegation of the Indonesian Council of Churches and one from the Roman Catholic bishops in Indonesia conferred about the Ambonese problem with their Dutch counterparts in Holland. The conference's recommendations — assistance to Moluccan youth in facilitating integration; for others, inexpensive travel opportunities to Indonesia to explore possible settlement in their region — would seem to have scant appeal to the more dedicated RMS supporters.

IX

To an American observer, familiar with the minority

[85]On Ambonese religious life, see especially *Ambonezen in Nederland* (cited, note 23), pp. 65-82, and Mariën, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-63.

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movements in the United States, the dynamics within the Ambonese group appear to be leading toward violence and a collision with the Dutch government. By April 1971 Manusama revealed that small groups of young South Moluccans were preparing themselves in various wooded areas of Holland for guerrilla war. At about the same time nine Ambonese were convicted for illegal possession of weapons. A leading Dutch criminologist has concluded that criminality among Ambonese youths is significantly higher, and rising faster, than among Dutch youths. Incidents between widely roving groups of Ambonese and the Dutch population confirm other analyses of the emergence of an aggressive, gang-oriented life style among younger South Moluccans. Community leaders, like the Reverend S. Metiary of the *Badan Persatuan*, deny the increase in criminality, although they admit that the young people are "more fanatic" than their parents — some because of resentment that the parents allowed themselves to be "misled" by the Dutch government for so long. In the opinion of H. Wagenveld, head of the Moluccan section in the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, on the other hand, South Moluccan avowals of the independence of their RMS state often serve merely as a peg on which to hang deeper feelings of frustration and inner disquiet.[86]

From August 26 to September 5, 1971, Queen Juliana, Prince Bernhard and Dutch Foreign Minister Norbert Schmelzer visited Indonesia. The Ambonese problem was discussed between Schmelzer and his Indonesian opposite number, Adam Malik. Subsequently Malik repeated that no special constitutional or legal place would be made for the Ambonese community in Indonesia, and both men agreed that there was no need for a conference between the two countries on the Ambonese question; existing agencies were deemed adequate to handle those seeking repatriation. On his return to Holland, Schmelzer did indicate that his government was considering making a contribution to development programs in Indonesia of particular benefit to those Ambonese who had gone or planned to go back.[87] An Ambonese delegation from the Netherlands to Indonesia also painted a bright picture of Indonesian economic and social development.[88] On November 4, 1971 Antara reported from Djakarta that Suharto had issued an executive decree placing South Moluccan

[86] *Zelfbeschikking,* April 1971; *De Volkskrant,* April 1, 15, July 2, 31, and August 3, 6, 10, 13, 1971.
[87] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* October 16-23, 1971, p. 24883.
[88] *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* August 11, 1971, p i.

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return to Indonesia in the hands of a special commission in the Home Affairs Ministry. Programs of transportation, settlement and retraining would be implemented through this new commission.

But RMS leaders have remained adamant in demanding recognition of their state's independence and there is no indication that interest in repatriation has quickened among the Dutch Ambonese. On the contrary, disappointment with the policies of Premier Barend Biesheuvel's cabinet, which began functioning in July 1971, has sharpened their intransigence. Opposition to integration and assimilation in the Dutch society, to "unilateral" Dutch decisions affecting the future of the South Moluccan community, and to "divide and conquer" policies were voiced at a *Badan Persatuan* congress barely one month after the Biesheuvel cabinet had assumed office.[89] Reports that a thousand or so RMS troops are still active in the interior of Ceram island; a May 1971 resolution adopted by the congress of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, calling on its Indonesian affiliate to create a favorable climate for RMS-Indonesian negotiations looking toward the exercise of "the right of self-determination" by the South Moluccan people; the rising militancy of the Tamaela faction, whose leaders assure the Ambonese community that "we are fighting for a viable cause" — all such developments inspire further South Moluccan resistance.[90]

[89] *De Volkskrant*, August 2, 1971.
[90] *Ibid.*, November 1, 1971; *Zelfbeschikking*, November-December 1971, pp. 3, 12.

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THE SINO-BURMESE RIFT: A FAILURE FOR CHINA

by Robert A. Holmes

MOST scholars who have written about the Sino-Burmese dispute of 1967 have argued that Peking's attempt to export the Cultural Revolution, even to nations with which China had previously had cordial relations, was its major cause.[1] The split occurred ostensibly over anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon — in response, be it remembered, to Maoist demonstrations by overseas Chinese students encouraged by the Chinese Embassy. In reality it was the final incident in a long series of failures to extend Chinese influence into Burma and induce this neutralist state to identify with and support Chinese foreign policy. Within Burma, China had found that its presence was being restricted and its influence reduced to a minimum. In denouncing Burma's "persecution" of the Chinese and declaring its hostility toward the Burmese government, Peking was revealing that it had failed to attain its goals.

It is this writer's belief that China's frustration over the lack of success of its policy vis-à-vis Burma led to the actions precipitating the Sino-Burmese rift. Since 1954 Burma had been a major target of China's "Bandung strategy," which was designed to eliminate other competitive influences and replace them with its own. Through a carefully orchestrated use of a variety of instruments and tactics — a mixture of "attraction, intimidation and subversion" — Peking sought to transform Burma's cherished posture of neutralism into one agreeing with Chinese foreign policy objectives. Among the many devices available were propaganda spread by the local Chinese-language newspapers, radio broadcasts, schools and government missions, economic aid-and-trade benefits, diplomacy (including "people's diplomacy"), and subversion via the local communist movement and the overseas Chinese community.

But despite huge China's contiguity, General Ne Win was not deterred from undertaking systematic efforts to control or repress

[1]Among the many excellent articles dealing with the 1967 incident are those by Peter Boog, "The China-Burma Rift: An Analysis," *Current Scene*, October 17, 1967, pp. 5-11, and Frank N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," ORBIS, Winter 1968, pp. 1034-1054.

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the instruments of Chinese influence within Burma's boundaries. His "Burmanization" program involved curbing the propaganda activities of China's diplomatic missions, banning the publication of privately owned Chinese-language newspapers, nationalizing Chinese government-owned banks and Chinese-run schools and businesses, and taking repressive measures against the local pro-Chinese "White Flag" communists, whose insurgent activities had won Peking's support.[2]

Burma's resistance to Chinese influence and refusal to become closely identified with the Chinese position goes far to explain why Peking allowed its relations with Rangoon to deteriorate to the point where they were "suspended," in contrast with the quick move to apologize to Cambodia for Cultural Revolution "incidents" in an effort to maintain friendly relations with that country.

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how China's strategy went amiss by comparing and analyzing Chinese and Burmese views and policies on major international issues of the 1960's. To that end, we will examine the two governments' policies toward the United States, the Viet Nam war, the Soviet Union, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the United Nations and the seating of China, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Laotian crisis and the formation of Malaysia.

China, Burma and the United States

The state of Sino-American relations from 1949 to February 1972 has been too well documented elsewhere to require detailed treatment here. Professor Donald Zagoria has listed a number of factors explaining China's hostility toward the United States: (1) America supports a rival regime on Taiwan, (2) U.S. power has prevented the expansion of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia, (3) America supports China's major Asian rivals, India and Japan, (4) it had succeeded — until 1971 — in blocking Communist China's admission to the United Nations and diplomatic recognition by some states, and (5) U.S. military bases encircle China.[3]

To China the United States has been a major and formidable enemy. Looked upon as the leader of the world's "aggressive," "imperialist," "neo-colonialist," "reactionary," and "counter-revolutionary" forces, it has been called the enemy of all Asian

[2]For an extended treatment of these actions see my "Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization," *Asian Survey*, March 1967, pp. 188-197.

[3]Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York: Pegasus Press, 1967), pp. 24-25.

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and African "peace-loving" peoples, and has been accused of using every means at its disposal to carry out brutal intervention around the globe in order to suppress national liberation struggles. According to Peking, the United States has prevented the peaceful reunification of Korea, Germany and Viet Nam, violated the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, and established a series of military alliances, allegedly to create tension, threaten world peace and launch aggression. The monopolistic capitalistic clique, which reportedly controls the U.S. government, has been accused of pursuing a global strategy to establish a "Pax Americana" through wars of aggression.

An article by "Observer" in *People's Daily*, entitled "Old Tune, New Conspiracy," presents a good summary of the Chinese view:

> . . . *United States imperialism has consistently followed a policy of hostility toward China and it has never stopped its aggression and threats against this country.* It has been occupying China's territory of Taiwan by force. . . .
>
> It has imposed an embargo against this country and built a string of military bases around it. It has increasingly sent secret agents to carry out subversive activity and sabotage against China. Its warships have violated China's territorial waters and its aircraft have intruded into China's airspace on countless occasions for military provocation. *What U.S. imperialism has done clearly shows it is the sworn enemy of the Chinese people.*
>
> It is common knowledge that in addition to whipping up a campaign against China in all parts of the world, the United States is redoubling its efforts to form an anti-Chinese front in Asia with the Soviet revisionists, Japanese militarists, and Indian reactionaries as its core.
>
> The source of all tension springs from the extremely hostile policy that the U.S. government persistently pursues toward China, and primarily because the United States is occupying by force China's province of Taiwan. So long as the U.S. government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question. . . .[4]

The article concludes that American hostility will continue because China will always oppose U.S. imperialism's "counter-revolutionary global strategy for the domination of the world."

The basic aim of China's Afro-Asian strategy is to detach the Third World from U.S. influence as a prelude to extending Chinese influence into these nations. As another *People's Daily* article stated:

[4] *People's Daily*, March 29, 1966, in New China News Agency (hereafter referred to as NCNA), March 29, 1966. (Emphasis added.)

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The Chinese people will resolutely adhere to the general line laid down by Chairman Mao: unite with all the oppressed people and nations of the world, form the broadest possible united front against U.S. imperialism, and frustrate all its aggressive and war plans.[5]

From Peking's point of view a model Burma should take this "correct line" on all major issues and thus pursue an "active anti-imperialist" foreign policy. One of the first steps would be to condemn American policy in Southeast Asia, particularly in Viet Nam. The Burmese government has, however, continued on friendly terms with the United States. The KMT (Kuomintang) troops issue, which strained American-Burmese relations in the 1950's and early 1960's, could easily have led to a diplomatic break between the two countries. Many of the American weapons supplied to Chiang Kai-shek were later smuggled into Burma and ended up in the hands of KMT troops who were conducting raids, not only against China but in Burma as well. Burma appealed to the United Nations Security Council and the American Ambassador. It also urged the Burmese public (and warned the pro-Peking National United Front and radical nationalists) to "keep . . . indignation under control and refrain from lawless actions." No anti-American demonstrations were permitted.

In 1961 the U.S. State Department expressed its concern over the matter of American-manufactured arms falling into KMT hands and promised to take immediate action if it discovered that Chiang was supplying arms to the KMT.[6] Less than three weeks after this announcement, the semi-official Taiwan newspaper, *Chung Yang Jih-Pao* (*The Central Daily*), stated that the Nationalist Chinese government would assist in the repatriation of "anticommunist, patriotic persons from the borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos."[7] By 1962 the United States had helped to evacuate practically all of the KMT troops from Burma, via Bangkok. Despite the strain over this issue, therefore, the Burmese government refrained from following an "anti-imperialist" policy.

Since 1962 Burmese-American relations have on the whole been

[5]*Ibid.*, October 16, 1967, in NCNA, October 16, 1967. In recent months both nations have become interested in reducing the level of hostility, at least to the point of opening a dialogue. This desire was reflected in Premier Chou En-lai's invitation to President Nixon to visit China. The American President went to China from February 21 to February 28, 1972 and had talks with Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung and other high-ranking Chinese officials. However, the communiqué issued at the end of his trip indicated that none of the fundamental issues of conflict between the two powers had been resolved.

[6]Burmese Home Service (Radio), February 16 and 18, 1961.

[7]*The Central Daily*, March 7, 1961.

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cordial.[8] At first the State Department was concerned over General Ne Win's "Burmanization" program, but by 1966 Washington came to realize that these measures were designed mainly to eliminate Indian and Chinese control over the economy. When Ne Win visited Washington in 1966,[9] President Johnson praised Burma as a model Asian state with an independent foreign policy. In their joint communiqué the two heads of state expressed a desire to see a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, supported a non-proliferation treaty, and favored an extension of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty to cover underground tests.[10] Ne Win has always been well-disposed toward the United States and counts among his personal friends Professor Frank Trager, former Director of USAID in Burma and a frequent visitor as guest of the Rangoon government, and Senator Mike Mansfield, who has also visited Burma on several occasions. There is nothing to indicate that the present friendly state of Burmese-American relations will change in the near future.

The Viet Nam War

The Chinese view of the Viet Nam war is that the United States has intervened, in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954, to aid successive "puppet" governments and troops in waging a barbarous and brutal war of persecution against the patriotic masses of Viet Nam. China has pledged to stand behind the Vietnamese people in their struggle against American aggression. It charges that the intervention is part of a global U.S. effort to put down liberation movements, but predicts that righteous patriotic people's struggles will prevail. *People's Daily* has said the victories of the Vietnamese people have universal significance because they have set an example for all oppressed people to follow in their struggles against the "American imperialists."[11] Peking has called

[8]It is worth noting that in March 1971 Secretary of State Rogers said the United States "respects Burma's policy of nonalignment and has no plans to introduce new [aid] projects there." In June 1971 the fourteen-year-old U.S. economic ($28 million since 1957) and military assistance ($88 million since 1958) programs came to an end; Burma apparently considered continued American aid undesirable.

[9]Much speculation surrounded this visit. One report stated that Ne Win had come to ask for sophisticated weaponry and was turned down by American officials because it was too expensive. Another version is that the United States made the offer of weapons and the Burmese leader rejected it. (Author's interview with Professor Frank N. Trager, New York University, October 16, 1968.)

[10]For the text of the communiqué see *Forward*, October 1, 1966, p. 3. *Forward* is an official Burmese government journal; it began publication after the 1962 coup that brought Ne Win to power.

[11]See *People's Daily*, April 12, 1961, in NCNA, April 12, 1961; also NCNA, March 4, May 18 and July 19, 1964.

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on the United States to withdraw and allow the people of Viet Nam to solve their own problems, meanwhile warning against a negotiated settlement of the war. It has, however, refused to make any specific commitments concerning how it intends to aid the Vietnamese "patriots."

Since 1965 China's policy pronouncements have alternated between threats of intervention and exhortations for Vietnamese self-reliance. In a *People's Daily* editorial entitled "People of the World, Rise to Aid the South Vietnamese People to Defeat the U.S. Aggressors," for example, China pledged to send

> all necessary and material aid, including arms and all other war materials, to the heroic South Vietnamese people who are battling fearlessly. At the same time, we are ready to send our men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the South Vietnamese people to annihilate U.S. aggressors. The people of the socialist countries and all the peaceloving people of the world have the unshirkable duty to extend all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people in their historic struggle.
>
> All negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are utterly useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and all kinds of war materials and means of [their own and] of their satellite countries. . . .[12]

The *People's Daily* "Observer" warned the United States that its military actions in Viet Nam posed a threat to China's security; therefore, China was entitled "to take any actions necessary" to protect itself. However, the New China News Agency reported on May 28, 1965 that Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi had told K. S. Karol of the *Nouvel Observateur* that the Vietnamese people were capable of relying on their own forces to drive the American aggressor from Viet Nam.

Peking's apparent fluctuation between belligerent threats to intervene and calls for self-reliance on the part of the Vietnamese can perhaps be attributed to a split in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy over the American involvement and the possible consequences of escalation for China.[13] According to one interpretation an "interventionist" faction headed by General Lo Jui-Ch'ing, P'eng-chen, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Shao-ch'i expected the escalation of the Viet Nam war to involve China and espoused unconditional assistance to Viet Nam in close cooperation with the Soviet Union. The "noninterventionist" faction led

[12] *People's Daily*, March 25, 1965, in NCNA, March 25, 1965.

[13] On this point see Ishwar C. Ojaha, "China's Cautious American Policy," *Current History*, September 1967, pp. 135-140, and Zagoria, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3, "Peking's Hawks, Doves and Dawks."

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by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi and Mao Tse-tung saw little chance of the war spreading to China and emphasized Vietnamese self-reliance. The latter group won out. Its most significant pronouncements were Lin Piao's famous speech, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," and Ch'en Yi's speech appropriately titled "Rely on Your Own Efforts, and Your Position is Invincible." According to Ch'en:

> To make revolution one must rely mainly on one's own efforts. The people should and can rely on themselves to make revolution and wage people's war in their own country . . . no outside aid can replace their struggle. To make and win revolution, the people must unswervingly rely on themselves and be prepared to carry on the struggle by themselves should all material aid from the outside be cut off.[14]

China's position on Viet Nam can thus be summarized as follows: it opposes all peace talks and favors unilateral American withdrawal; it desires the unification of Viet Nam under communist auspices; and it wants the NLF and North Viet Nam to continue fighting until final victory is won. But while the Chinese favor these outcomes, they are reluctant to commit any manpower to achieve them.

Burma has remained neutral on the war in Viet Nam. The Burmese government has followed the principle of nonrecognition of divided countries[15] and recognizes neither the North nor the South, although it has sent "good will missions" to both governments on many occasions. There have been no Burmese statements condemning or supporting one side or the other. The many references to Viet Nam that have appeared in joint communiqués signed by Burma with China, the Soviet Union, the United States and India have all called for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, to be reached at a Geneva-type conference. One statement issued by the governing Revolutionary Council said:

> Burma calls on the countries and organizations concerned to avoid all means of settling the Vietnam question militarily, for they could never bring about a lasting and correct solution, but to exert all means for a political solution on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.[16]

As early as October 1964, the Burmese government offered

[14] *People's Daily*, July 10, 1966, in NCNA, July 10, 1966.

[15] In the case of Germany this principle was not applied. In 1956 Burma recognized the Federal Republic of Germany, probably because West Germany was a possible source of much economic and military assistance which it has, in fact, provided.

[16] Rangoon Domestic Service (Radio), July 2, 1966.

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Rangoon as a neutral site for talks between Hanoi and Washington. Reports have it that Secretary-General U Thant gave this message to UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who in turn conveyed it to the White House. It is believed that White House advisers convinced President Johnson to wait until after the Presidential election before replying. In the meantime Hanoi rejected all efforts to arrange peace talks. Two years later, at the Peasants' Seminar, General Ne Win said Burma wanted to see peace in Viet Nam and referred to the 1964 initiative which ended in controversy between U Thant and the United States. According to the General: "They asked for permission to hold talks in Rangoon and we agreed since the talks were for peace." He also noted that American and North Vietnamese representatives had met in Rangoon in 1966 and that the Burmese government had given all possible help to both but did not side with either of the belligerents.[17] The official government newspaper, *Working People's Daily*, reported in its March 2, 1966 edition that two U.S. and two DRV (North Viet Nam) envoys had met, but what they discussed was not made public. It said Burma was only helping in a small way to achieve peace in Viet Nam by being host for these representatives. Subsequently, in March 1967, Secretary-General Thant visited Burma and reportedly met with Colonel Hon Van Lau, Hanoi's chief delegate to the International Control Commission. At a press conference, Thant said the time was ripe for private diplomacy to try to solve the Viet Nam problem. Needless to say, Rangoon supports the Paris peace talks now in progress.[18]

Burma has tried to maintain a policy of nonalignment on the Viet Nam war in order to protect itself from entanglement in the Cold War between China and the United States. Thus, it has resisted Chinese efforts to obtain its support of China's position. During his second visit to Burma in 1966 Liu Shao-ch'i urged Ne Win to show more anti-imperialist zeal, saying that the anti-imperialist struggles must be intensified. According to Liu: "We Afro-Asian countries must heighten our vigilance, unite even more closely and persevere in the struggle."[19] His many speeches were a clear exhortation to the Burmese to exhibit anti-imperialist zeal by attacking American policy in Viet Nam. But Burma refused to be drawn into a denunciation of American policy and the

[17] *Ibid.*, March 1, 1966.
[18] See *Working People's Daily*, March 1-4 and 6, 1967.
[19] NCNA, April 17, 1966, in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (hereafter referred to as *SCMP*), April 22, 1966, pp. 25-26; *Peking Review*, April 22, 1966, p. 6.

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joint communiqué which followed the two days of talks between Liu and Ne Win avoided the question of Viet Nam.

The Chinese were obviously not happy about the Burmese posture, but they refrained from criticizing it (at least publicly) until after the Sino-Burmese rift in 1967. Then, at the height of the anti-Burmese fervor in China (July-August 1967), *People's Daily* printed the following accusation: "How can Ne Win, who is receiving U.S. loans, follow a neutral policy? Is not his real stand on the Vietnam question precisely that of the United States?"[20] If by this the Chinese meant that Ne Win was desirous of seeing the Viet Nam conflict transferred from the battlefield to the conference table, their charge was undoubtedly true. One American observer has described Burma's position on the Viet Nam war as follows:

> In Vietnam, they don't want to see the U.S. lose, but they don't want to see us win either. If the U.S. quits in South Vietnam, Burma realizes that Chinese domination is inevitable. If the U.S. wins, however, they see similar outbreaks (of guerrilla warfare) flaring nonetheless across Southeast Asia. Above all Burma fears divisions along the lines of Vietnam and Laos — a fear eminently justified in view of the endemic minority unrest.[21]

Burma's hope appears to be for a negotiated settlement decreeing that neither communist nor Western influence will be dominant in Viet Nam but, rather, will be kept in balance as is the situation in Burma itself.[22]

China, Burma and the USSR

In the 1950's Peking was concerned with detaching Afro-Asian nations from dependence on the United States, but since the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute it has also attempted to lead them away from the Soviet Union. It has sought to encourage opposition to "revisionism" as well as "imperialism" in the Third World. It has tried to weaken Moscow's appeal to the new nations by charging collusion with the United States to defeat their aspirations toward development. It has called the détente in Europe part of a plot to allow Washington to shift more troops to Viet Nam and accused the "incorrigible renegade revisionists," Brezhnev and Kosygin, of promoting the American "peace talks swindle" to sell out the Vietnamese people.[23] Its exhortations for self-reliance

[20] *People's Daily*, August 14, 1967, in NCNA, August 14, 1967.
[21] Robert Karr McCabe, "Ne Win's Secret Burma: When China Spits, We Swim," *New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1966, p. 66.
[22] On this point see Holmes, "Burmese Domestic Policy. . . ," *op. cit.*
[23] See NCNA, September 29, November 8 and 13, 1966.

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in national economic development are directly related to its efforts to show collaboration between the Soviets and Americans. Peking contends that neither can be trusted and it is therefore dangerous to accept assistance from either: they both want to turn Asian and African nations into satellites.[24]

Chinese leaders have made an effort to identify with the nationalist leaderships of Afro-Asia in the struggle against revisionism, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. They have tried to show that China and the new nations have a common background and that both were victims of Western (including Soviet) imperialism.

In contrast to the *Sturm und Drang* of Sino-Soviet relations, Burma has maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union. Many high-level state visits and cultural delegations have been exchanged between the two countries, including Khrushchev's visit and Anastas Mikoyan's two trips to Burma, Ne Win's visit to Moscow, the visits of three Soviet cosmonauts and a Burmese broadcasting delegation, and President Podgorny's trip to Rangoon. Moscow has praised Burma's economic policy, its "correct line" of friendship with all socialist countries, and its policy of positive neutralism. Burma has made it clear, however, that it will not discard its policy of neutralism in international affairs. For example, when Marshal Malinovsky stated, at a reception in Rangoon in 1963, that the Soviet Union was a fighter for peace in a united front with Burma and that Burma was a reliable ally in this struggle, General Ne Win replied by asserting Burma's neutrality: "Some countries are trying to impose their will on others. My fault is that I do not go their way. We go our own way. I know who our friends and enemies are."[25]

The one strain in the generally cordial Soviet-Burmese relationship was the Kovtunenko affair of 1960-1961. Yevgeny Kovtunenko, a TASS correspondent, accused U Law Yone, editor of the *Nation*, of receiving $35,000 from the United States. U Law Yone instituted a libel suit against Kovtunenko, but Prime Minister U Nu intervened, removed the case from the jurisdiction of the courts and allowed Kovtunenko to leave Burma on "humanitarian" grounds. He stated that the verdict of the Burmese people was clearly in favor of U Law Yone and that the

[24]See Harold M. Vinacke, "Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1965, pp. 116-122.

[25]Rangoon Domestic Service, April 11, 1963. See also *Forward*, April 22, 1963, p. 24.

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government withdrew the case from the court's jurisdiction in order to preserve the good relations between Burma and the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister added a note of warning against future libelous statements by foreign correspondents. According to one press agency report, he said: "In Burma there is freedom to attack capitalism or communism, provided no attacks are made below the belt." He cautioned the USSR, China and Western countries to take note.[26]

Burma and the Soviet Union signed their first trade-and-aid agreement in 1955. Under its terms Burma exported rice in exchange for Soviet machines, tools, technical equipment and some consumer goods. The Soviets have also built some projects in Burma, among the most important of which are the Burmese Technical Institute, a 200-bed hospital, a hotel and an irrigation system. The agreement was originally for five years and since 1960 has been extended on a yearly basis.

Burmese students, scientists and technicians who were formerly sent to Britain and the United States are now being sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to be educated. In many areas, therefore, Soviet-Burmese relations may be regarded as close and cordial. Burma remained impartial in the Sino-Soviet dispute and failed to follow the "anti-revisionist" policy urged by Peking.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The issue of the limitation of nuclear weapons development provides a further indication of the failure of Chinese strategy toward Burma. Burma took the same position as the vast majority of Asian nations and signed the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The Burmese government stated that the treaty was a significant step toward the goal of banning nuclear tests in all environments and a great contribution to world peace. In a speech at the United Nations Foreign Minister U Thi Han called it "a breakthrough in the Cold War."[27]

China issued a statement condemning the treaty and advocating a conference of all nations to discuss the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.[28] Premier Chou En-lai sent notes to various African and Asian governments asking support for this proposal. In reply, Ne Win said he supported the idea of abolishing all nuclear weapons, but added that since only limited gains were

[26]Reuters (Singapore), December 20, 1960 and March 20, 1961.
[27]Rangoon Domestic Service, July 29 and August 11, 1963. *Forward*, August 7, 1963, p. 5, contains the Revolutionary Council's statement.
[28]For the text of this statement see *Peking Review*, August 2, 1963, pp. 7-8.

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possible at the present time, agreements such as the Test Ban Treaty were steps in the right direction. The tone of his reply is reminiscent of a political science professor lecturing a naive freshman student on the realities of international politics and the difference between achieving the desirable and the possible:

> While I, therefore, welcome all initiatives toward disarmament, such as the important proposals Your Excellency has made, it seems to me that the history of various efforts for achieving disarmament among nations indicates that only the method of seeking gradual and phased agreements between the major armed powers insures any hope of success, and of reaching the ultimate objective of complete and general disarmament. It is in that understanding of developments in the field of disarmament . . . that we have become a party to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. . . .
>
> It is that understanding also which prompts me to suggest, in all sincerity, that the only practical formula for effecting general disarmament, including a total ban on nuclear weapons, would appear to be for all the major armed powers, assisted and facilitated to the extent practicable by non-armed nations, to seek phased limited agreements, and to proceed by an aggregation of limited gains to totality of achievement.[29]

At the Nonaligned Nation Conference in Cairo in 1964, Foreign Minister Thi Han said: ". . . I believe it is our duty . . . to appeal again to all nations to subscribe to those measures such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of Moscow, which are intended to lead the way to general and complete disarmament."[30]

The Chinese, however, found no merit in the Test Ban Treaty. They insisted that it was aimed at obstructing China from developing the atomic bomb and thus benefited American imperialism. According to Peking, the United States, the USSR and Great Britain were trying to consolidate their nuclear monopoly; the treaty was a fraud because it strengthened the ability of the nuclear powers to indulge in nuclear blackmail and also increased the danger of an imperialist nuclear war. The Chinese also accused the Soviets of selling out the interests of the socialist camp and all peace-loving people. In short, they viewed the treaty as a capitulation to imperialism.[31]

Thus, again, Burma took an independent course and refused to identify with China's position.

The United Nations

With respect to the United Nations, Burma has praised the

[29]NCNA, September 7, 1963, in *SCMP*, September 12, 1963, pp. 39-40.
[30]*Forward*, October 15, 1964, p. 5.
[31]See NCNA, July 30, 1963.

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organization for its constructive role in world affairs, especially its economic and social activities. On the twenty-second anniversary of the UN, Ne Win sent Secretary-General Thant a message which said, in part: "It is evident that the UN organization is a plain necessity of our age for the conduct of international relations in both political and technical affairs."[32]

The Revolutionary Council has reaffirmed its wholehearted support for and complete faith in the world organization on many occasions. Each year a massive celebration is held in Rangoon at which high Burmese officials make speeches praising the United Nations as an instrument serving mankind and maintaining peace in various areas of the world. They pledge continued support for it and express the hope that it will be strengthened in the future.

Another theme in Burma's UN policy has been consistent support of China's membership. Former Premier U Nu said the illegal exclusion of China was a grave injustice to the Chinese people and also harmful to the UN itself. General Ne Win did not deviate from this view; during Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Rangoon in 1964, he declared:

> . . . We have consistently supported the seating of People's China in the UN. We believe that the participation of People's China in the deliberations at the UN would facilitate the finding of solutions to many issues now outstanding in the world. We will therefore continue to support and press for the seating of People's China in the UN.[33]

Foreign Minister Thi Han told the General Assembly that the absence of China was a major weakness of the UN and that without China it could not be described truly as a world organization. In his words:

> An organization which refuses to face the facts of international life, to the extent of ignoring the existence of a government which has so clearly established effective control over the entire mainland of China, imposes a severe handicap on itself. We believe that this ostrich-like behavior of burying its head in the sand can only harm the cause of the UN, and that the development of this world body will remain severely retarded until this glaring anomaly has been removed.[34]

On another occasion Thi Han said that achieving universality was a *sine qua non* for strengthening the world body, and added:

> I should like to reiterate the long-held views of the Government of the Union of Burma that the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of

[32]For the full text of the message see *Forward*, November 1, 1967, p. 4.
[33]NCNA, February 15, 1964.
[34]*Forward*, October 7, 1963, pp. 6-7.

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China in the UN and all its organs should be restored without further delay. We believe that the absence from our Organization of the legitimate representatives of a quarter of the human race [has been] and will continue to be a major source of weakness.[35]

In short, Burma views the UN as an essential organization deserving of support from all nations. Its leaders believe the world body has made an important contribution to economic development and peace, and they have consistently maintained that it would be strengthened by the admission of China. On October 25, 1971 Burma voted for the Albanian resolution which seated China in the UN and excluded Taiwan.

On the other hand, prior to its admission China attacked the world body as a tool used by the United States in its global strategy of aggression to suppress liberation struggles, frequently referring to a "mechanical majority," "manipulated majorities" and a "voting machine" in describing how Washington managed to have its way on issues before the UN. The Peking regime accused the United States of manipulating the General Assembly to arbitrarily prevent China's assumption of its rightful seat in the organization. It asserted that it would have nothing to do with the United Nations before the simultaneous "restoration" of China's seat and the expulsion of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" from all UN organs. Until 1964 it said China's presence in the UN depended on the organization throwing out representatives of the "Chiang gang" and the United States ceasing its occupation of Taiwan and withdrawing the Seventh Fleet. Then it added a new condition: that the UN be reorganized and correct its past mistakes, particularly by rescinding the resolution condemning China as an aggressor in the Korean War. According to Peking: "It is obvious that the only way out for the UN is to get rid of U.S. domination, correct its mistakes and get itself thoroughly reorganized. Otherwise, the only thing to do is set up a revolutionary UN."[36]

In 1967 there was another shift in China's attitude toward admission. "Commentator" wrote in *People's Daily* that China was no longer interested in being seated:

The UN has long been discredited as a result of the treachery of U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism. *Frankly speaking, the Chinese people are not at all interested in joining the UN*, a body manipulated by the United States, a place for playing power politics, a stock exchange

[35] *Ibid.*, November 1, 1965, p. 5.
[36] NCNA, September 22, 1967.

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for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to strike political bargains, and an organ to serve U.S. policies of aggression and war.

The UN can never become an international organization worthy of its name unless it rids itself of the U.S. imperialist control, rectifies all the errors it has committed in the past and puts into effect the principle of equality among nations, big and small.

If these just demands of the people of the world cannot be met, then all those nations which uphold justice have the right to set up a new and revolutionary United Nations.[37]

C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* reported on November 8, 1970 that Peking had once again changed its position on UN membership: "It can now be stated with 100 per cent certainty," he wrote, "that Communist China wants to join and no longer abides by its previously snooty stand-off attitude." The accuracy of this report was evident in China's reaction to "its victory in the UN" (the 76-to-35 vote of admission) in October 1971. Peking was jubilant. It quickly named a "high powered" delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Ambassador Huang Hua to attend the United Nations' Twenty-sixth Session, then in progress.

The above data demonstrate that throughout the 1960's there were great differences between China's and Burma's attitudes toward the world organization.

The Sino-Indian Border Dispute[38]

On October 20, 1962 Chinese troops launched a massive counteroffensive against the Indian army in the Northeast Frontier Agency Area and Ladakh. The border dispute had simmered for eight years before erupting into full-scale warfare. Then on October 12, 1962 Nehru had ordered that Chinese forces be driven from "Indian soil."[39] On October 20 the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that "Chinese frontier guards fighting in self-defense no longer need restrain themselves to the bounds of the illegal McMahon line." This was the signal for the Chinese troops to begin their offensive. They attacked on two widely separated sectors of the border, overran numerous Indian army outposts, and pushed southward into India. Four days later Chou En-lai sent Nehru a cease-fire proposal calling for each side to withdraw 12.5 miles from the line up to which it exercised control, set up

[37] *People's Daily,* November 30, 1967, in NCNA, November 30, 1967. (Emphasis added.) See also "Blueprint for a House Divided: Peking's Design for a Revolutionary UN," *Current Scene,* September 17, 1965, pp. 1-14.

[38] For an excellent study of the dispute see Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[39] *New York Times,* October 13, 1962.

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check points along the border, and settle the dispute through negotiations. Nehru rejected the proposal, declaring that Chinese troops would have to be withdrawn from Indian soil before any negotiations could be considered.

On November 20 the Chinese counteroffensive stopped as suddenly as it had begun. Chou sent another note to Nehru in which he said China would unilaterally implement its October 24 proposal. The note warned that if India failed to reciprocate by withdrawing its troops or attempted to interfere with the Chinese withdrawal, China reserved the right to strike back in self-defense. Although Nehru avoided acknowledging it, the Indian troops observed the cease-fire and withdrew 12.5 miles. India acquiesced in the Chinese proposal because it was unable to change its vulnerable condition by diplomatic or military means.[40]

It appears that China's behavior was designed to make India a less effective rival for leadership and influence in Afro-Asia. According to George Patterson, Nehru assumed that Asia would play a major role in international affairs as a result of the cooperative initiatives of the two great Asian peoples — the Chinese and Indians. He envisioned a "two-great-powers-in-Asia" policy, but the Chinese apparently had another concept in mind. There is an old Chinese saying that "there cannot be two suns in one sky. . . ."[41] K. M. Panikkar, India's first Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, has remarked, "It was understood that China as the Great Power in the East . . . expected India to know her place."[42] India was put in its place, and its humiliation lessened its prestige and in general made it a less formidable competitor. After proving the Indian army to be a "paper tiger," China was able to call for negotiations, and Afro-Asians did not fail to note that it was Nehru, the leading apostle of negotiations and the foremost advocate of conciliation, who declined to negotiate. India received neither moral nor diplomatic support from its neutralist brethren. Instead, most Afro-Asian countries pointed out that the border had been established by the British and urged India to accept China's offer of direct negotiations to settle the border question, as China and Burma had done in 1960.[43]

Perhaps even more damaging in Afro-Asian eyes was India's

[40]NCNA, October 23 and November 20, 1962; "India's Stand on China's Three Point Proposal," *United Asia*, December 1962, pp. 703-708.

[41]George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi* (London: Farber and Farber, 1962), pp. 16-17.

[42]Quoted by Wayne Wilcox, *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China* (New York: Walker and Company, 1964), p. 47.

[43]For Afro-Asian sentiment on this issue see *United Asia*, November 1963.

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reversal of policy in accepting American military assistance. To some Nehru appeared to have abandoned his nonalignment.[44] India's prestige declined noticeably in world affairs, and in Afro-Asia Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Tito challenged Nehru for the role of chief spokesman of the nonaligned bloc.[45]

As soon as the Sino-Indian dispute escalated into large-scale warfare, the Burmese Revolutionary Council appealed to all Indian and Chinese nationals in Burma to refrain from acts that might lead to disturbances over the fighting on the Sino-Indian border. Ne Win sent messages to Nehru and Chou En-lai and also attended a special meeting in Rangoon on the conflict.[46] Chinese Ambassador Li I-mang and Indian Ambassador R. S. Moui called on Ne Win to give him their governments' "views" on the crisis. China's Vice Foreign Minister, Huang Chen, and Deputy Director of the First Asian Affairs Division of the Foreign Ministry, Chang Tun, and India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Madame Lakshmi Menon, also came to Rangoon for talks with Foreign Minister Thi Han and Ne Win.[47]

In November Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon proposed a meeting of the six Colombo Powers to help China and India solve their problem. Ne Win accepted the invitation to participate. Since Burma had a common border with both disputants, the hostilities were of direct and deep concern as well as a source of distress to the Burmese leader. Yet he viewed the proposed conference as a mixed blessing: while it would accord Burma international distinction, China and India were not invited to attend, and the meeting might take action offensive to Peking.

In his major speech at the Colombo Conference in December 1962, Ne Win stated what he conceived to be the task before it:

> . . . The working out of a definite settlement . . . rests mainly with India and China, and third parties such as ourselves should not and could not interfere in respect of substantive issues. But there is a need

[44]Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike observed: "If nonalignment is to remain a living force in world politics, India I am sure realizes there is an urgent need for India herself to take the lead. . . . *Entanglement with power blocs is contrary to the cardinal principles of nonalignment.*" A statement by the Colombo Powers (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) said "Neutralist nations hold that nonalignment is still a viable force and that more Asians, Africans and Latin Americans may see the attractions and add to their collective strength. *India's present entanglement is regarded as an active danger to their aspirations.*" Quoted in Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 130. (Emphasis added.)

[45]*New York Times,* November 25, 1962.

[46]See *Forward,* November 7, 1962, p. 23.

[47]*Ibid.,* November 22, 1962, p. 23.

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—a pressing need—for the two sides to return to the conference table, and *it is in regard to the promoting of direct bilateral talks that friendly third parties can, circumstances permitting, play a useful role.*[48]

Seeking a compromise between the Chinese and Indian positions on cease-fire arrangements as a precondition for negotiations, he exhorted the conference to make flexible proposals acceptable to both sides. That his advice was followed is indicated by the six-point proposal adopted by the conference:

(1) The conference considers the present de facto cease-fire period as a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict.

(2) (a) With regard to the Western sector, the conference appeals to the Chinese Government to carry out the withdrawal of their military posts by 20 kilometers as has been proposed in the letters of Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Nehru dated November 21 and 28, 1962.
(b) The conference appeals to the Government of India to keep their existing military positions.
(c) Pending final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides, to be agreed upon without prejudice to the rights of the presence of both India and China in that area.

(3) With regard to the Eastern sector, the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both Governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions. The remaining areas in this sector can be settled by future discussions.

(4) With regard to the problems of the middle sector, the conference suggests that they be solved by peaceful means without resort to force.

(5) The conference believes that these proposals which could help in consolidating the cease-fire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving the problems entailed in the cease-fire positions.

(6) The conference would like to make it clear that a positive response to the appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two governments as regards its conception of the final alignment.[49]

Nevertheless, Ne Win was pessimistic about the prospect that China would accept the Colombo proposal. His fear was confirmed by the Chinese reaction.

Peking praised the Colombo Conference for supporting its cease-fire overture and promoting direct negotiations between the

[48] *Ibid.*, December 22, 1962, pp. 1-3. (Emphasis added.)

[49] "Six Point Neutral Plan for Border Settlement," *United Asia*, January 1963, p. 5. The conference also decided that Prime Minister Bandaranaike should visit Peking and Delhi in January 1963 to find out China's and India's reactions to these proposals.

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two disputants, but a *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) editorial expressed disappointment at some aspects of the proposal which it said were biased in favor of India. The proposal contained "ambiguities and inconsistencies" and was not "equitable" to both sides. Singled out for particular criticism was Point 2, which asked India to maintain its military position in the western sector while China was asked to create a demilitarized zone. *Jen-min Jih-pao* said the principle of mutual disengagement applied in the eastern sector should be applied to all sectors of the border.[50]

The Chinese felt that since the proposal did not appeal for the withdrawal of Indian troops in the western sector, China should maintain its military positions in the middle and eastern sectors. Premier Chou En-lai told Prime Minister Bandaranaike in January 1963 that if China withdrew 12.5 miles along the western border, India should not be allowed to keep its existing military position as stipulated in the proposal and should send only civilians into the area. He said China's position followed the "principle of equal application," thus implying that the Colombo proposal did not.

Despite the constant wooing by India and China between 1963 and 1967, Burma remained neutral on their dispute and called on both sides to enter into negotiations based on the Colombo guidelines. In the matter of its own borders, in 1967 Burma signed an agreement with India that recognized parts of disputed territory as belonging to India.[51]

In summary, Burma's attitude toward the Sino-Indian border dispute can be described as neutral, but sympathetic to India — its "spiritual fatherland." Ne Win undoubtedly anticipated the Chinese reaction to the Colombo proposal, and in voting for Point 2 he may have believed China would be willing to accept this "biased" provision, if only to show its peaceful intentions and willingness to go to any lengths to settle the boundary question. China's suggestion was that the proposal serve as the basis for negotiations, during which both parties could work out their different interpretations of the "Six Point Plan."

The Laotian Crisis

Laos has been in constant crisis since 1958 and the civil war is still in progress. Our focus here is on China's and Burma's policies toward Laos in the period from 1960 through the 1962 Geneva

[50] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, January 28, 1963, in *Peking Review*, February 1, 1963, p. 12.
[51] John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead," *Asian Survey*, November 1967, p. 756.

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Conference. China supported the participation of the North Vietnamese-controlled Pathet Lao (Neo Lao Hak Xat Party) in a coalition government after Laos became an independent nation. But in 1958 an anti-communist coalition was formed which excluded the NLHX and asked the already suspended International (Supervisory) Control Commission (ISCC) to cease operations in Laos. Peking accused the new pro-Western Premier, Phoui Sananikone, of violating the Geneva Accords by preventing the ISCC from returning to Laos and of being an agent of the United States. When Laotian government forces attacked two Pathet Lao battalions, Peking said Sananikone was trying to provoke a civil war and was allowing Laos to be used as a base by KMT troops and the United States for attacks against China.

In December 1959 the Sananikone cabinet was ousted and replaced by a more "rightist" government which rigged the following election (on April 24) to prevent NLHX candidates from winning any seats in the National Assembly. This government, too, looked to the United States for assistance.

Then in August 1960 pro-neutralist Captain Kong Le staged a coup and requested former Premier Souvanna Phouma to lead a government. He also sought a reconciliation with the Pathet Lao and the nationalist forces led by General Phoumi Nosovan, but the General refused to cooperate and established a rival government in southern Laos at Savannakhet. When the United States supported Phoumi Nosovan, Souvanna Phouma sought to ally with the Pathet Lao and began receiving assistance from the Soviet Union. After the Nosovan forces retook Vientiane, Souvanna Phouma established even closer ties with the communists and called for an international conference to guarantee the neutralization of Laos. When the Pathet Lao gained control of the strategic Plain of Jars and began to counterattack the Phoumi forces successfully, there were threats of SEATO intervention to which China said it would "not remain idle" if its assistance were requested by the Souvanna Phouma government.[52]

In Cambodia Prince Sihanouk, like the Chinese, had approved of Souvanna Phouma's original policy of neutrality and of the participation of the Pathet Lao in the government. Throughout 1960 he called for the formation of a "troika government of national unity" headed by Souvanna Phouma, and the formalization

[52]This review of early developments in Laos is based on A. M. Halpern and H. B. Fredman, *Communist Strategy in Laos* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R.M. 2561, 1960), and Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), Chapters 9 and 13.

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of Laotian neutrality via an international conference which would prevent partition and restore peace in the country. The Prince recommended that the participants in the 1954 Geneva Agreements, members of the ISCC, states having common frontiers with Laos, and the United States should attend the conference.[53] Early in 1961 he sent a letter to this effect to nations he believed to be directly concerned about the future of Laos, inviting them to meet at a neutral Asian site to discuss the crisis. China, which had consistently supported Sihanouk's proposal, replied in the affirmative and suggested Phnom Penh as the meeting place. By the spring of 1961 all fourteen concerned nations had agreed to hold a conference at Geneva. When the Geneva Conference convened, China's Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi maintained that there was a need to reorganize the ISCC and that it should reach its decisions by "unanimity through consultations." He pressed for the withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from Laos, with the ISCC to oversee their removal. It took fourteen months (May 1961-July 1962) for the conference to hammer out a settlement acceptable to all parties.

China was apparently satisfied with the agreement and affixed its signature to the accords. The agreement called for a "troika" government headed by Souvanna Phouma, the re-establishment of Laos' neutral status, and the reactivation of the ISCC in Laos. *People's Daily* hailed the Laotian settlement as a setback for the United States' aggressive policies of intervention and concluded that the "Conference showed peaceful negotiation is an important form of struggle against imperialism."

Harold Hinton believes that China's goals were met in the provisions for a minimum of international supervision, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the formation of a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma, and that Peking thought this situation would pave the way for the NLHX to achieve success through subversion.[54]

Burma had also consistently recommended reconvening the Geneva Conference to discuss the deteriorating situation in Laos, even while realizing that an internationally-arrived-at settlement could impose only an "artificial" neutrality. Burma undoubtedly feared that the issue would be determined on the battlefield and was certain in that case of a Pathet Lao victory. After the Kong Le

[53]I.e., France, Britain, China, the Soviet Union, North Viet Nam, Canada, Poland, India, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, South Viet Nam and the United States — together with Laos a total of fourteen nations.

[54]Hinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-349.

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coup, Premier U Nu called on the Laotian people to settle their problems in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords and appealed to all powers to abide by the agreements. He also suggested that the UN appoint a neutral commission to try to solve the Laotian conflict.[55]

At Geneva Burma's two chief delegates, Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio and James Barrington, said the aim of the conference should be to help the Laotians attain a united, independent and neutral nation, not to impose a solution from outside on them. They believed the ISCC should work in close cooperation with the Laotian government to help it maintain neutrality and disagreed with the Moscow-Peking proposal to give the government sole responsibility in supervising the ban on imported armaments other than those required for national defense. The Burmese delegates suggested that the ISCC also be charged with carrying out investigations on instructions of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference; it should be enlarged and instructed to station teams at fixed points to check on infiltration as well as withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from Laos. Furthermore, they rejected the Soviet-Chinese idea of requiring unanimous decisions in the ISCC.[56] Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio concluded that "the ISCC should not only be retained, but conditions should be provided under which it can operate efficiently and effectively."[57] On July 26, 1962 (after the coup in Burma that brought Ne Win to power) the new Burmese Foreign Minister, U Thi Han, signed the agreement on Laos and expressed the hope that outside interference would not keep it from serving as an example for the settlement of difficult world problems.[58]

The post-conference tripartite coalition government was short-lived. In 1963 Prince Souphanouvong (the Pathet Lao leader) withdrew from the government and attacked Kong Le's neutralist forces. Shortly thereafter, a cabal of generals staged another coup. China supported the reconvening of the fourteen-power conference to deal with the situation, saying "otherwise the flames of war in Indochina may spread," but this veiled threat did not lead to another session. After 1964 China continued to accuse the United States of seeking to use the ISCC as a tool of interference in Laos. Peking seems also to have become disenchanted with

[55]NCNA, September 23, 1961.
[56]*Ibid.*, June 19 and 28, 1961.
[57]*Ibid.*, May 23, 1961.
[58]Rangoon Domestic Service, July 26, 1962.

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Souvanna Phouma and now backs the Pathet Lao's "people's war." On the eighteenth anniversary of the Laotian People's Liberation Army, *People's Daily* stated: "The Laotian people are a people daring to struggle and daring to win. They have grasped the most effective magic weapon to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. This weapon is Chairman Mao's thought on people's war."[59] Since 1967 China has pledged its support to Souphanouvong until final victory is achieved.

On the complex Laotian situation, Burma and China seem to have taken positions reflective of their independent concerns. They supported the Geneva Conference of 1961-1962 for different reasons: Peking, because it saw an opportunity to influence a settlement whereby the danger of U.S. intervention might be eliminated; Burma, because it feared the spread of war and a Pathet Lao victory and desired peace and stability in Laos as a guard against the extension of the East-West conflict in Asia. Burma's position on the Laotian crisis was thus taken in consideration of the national interest; whether it met with Chinese approval was beside the point.

The Formation of Malaysia

China looked upon the formation of Malaysia as an American imperialist and British colonialist plot: The Kennedy Administration had called the Federation an "anti-communist bulwark" and an American offer of economic aid was part of an American-British "conspiracy" to safeguard their economic interests, "plunder the rich resources, bring the region under U.S. control and make it a U.S. base for aggression in Southeast Asia."[60] In *People's Daily* "Commentator" said: "What sort of stuff is Malaysia? It is a product of neocolonialism manufactured singlehandedly by U.S. and British imperialism and is a tool for suppressing the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and for subverting Indonesia."[61]

The Chinese also viewed the Federation as an effort to link the "aggressive military blocs" in Asia — ANZUS and SEATO. As proof of America's aggressive intentions in this connection, they cited the growth in size of the Malaysian armed forces and the plan to increase the defense budget from 15 per cent of the total budget in 1962 to 25 per cent by 1965.

As a countermove, Peking sought to win Indonesia's friendship

[59] *People's Daily*, January 21, 1967, in NCNA, January 21, 1967.
[60] NCNA, September 29, 1963.
[61] *People's Daily*, August 17, 1966, in NCNA, August 17, 1966.

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by stressing that Malaysia was designed to "encircle" Indonesia. During Sukarno's reign, it gave wholehearted backing to his "confrontation" policy vis-à-vis Malaysia, saying:

> The aim of the imperialists in creating Malaysia is to oppose China as well as Indonesia. At the time of the formation of Malaysia, the U.S. propagandists stressed the need to build it into an "anti-communist bulwark" and use the combined military strength of the U.S. and Britain to deal with the so-called aggression from Indonesia, People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
>
> The Chinese people will not look on with folded arms in the face of this sinister scheme of the imperialists. Should U.S. imperialism dare to launch aggression against Indonesia, the Chinese people will back the Indonesian people with all their might.[62]

China has continued to be hostile toward Malaysia and gives at least moral support to a small guerrilla force (the Malayan National Liberation League) "in its struggle against imperialism to achieve national salvation."

On the other hand, Burma's relations with Malaysia have always been amiable. Foreign Minister Thi Han sent a message of congratulations to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on the inauguration of the Federation. The note wished him peace and prosperity, and expressed Burma's desire for friendly relations with his government.[63] Diplomatic relations between the two nations were immediately established and the Malaysian Ambassador, Inche Bladum Ben Haji Hassan, arrived in Rangoon in February 1964. When General Ne Win visited Malaysia in 1968 he spoke of the growing awareness of common interests between the two nations and voiced the hope that they will "help create in Southeast Asia a community of nations in which every nation would be free to develop its own way of life and would be able to contribute to the orderly development of security of the region."[64]

Conclusion

Burma is an excellent example of a small Southeast Asian nation seeking to maintain a policy of strict neutrality. The record shows that during the 1960's it jealously safeguarded its nonaligned posture against Chinese influences with respect to the major issues in international affairs. Burma's rigid neutrality led it to take positions contrary to China's on some issues (the Test Ban Treaty, policy toward the United States and the United Nations,

[62]NCNA, September 9, 1964.
[63]Rangoon Domestic Service, September 16, 1963.
[64]*Forward*, May 15, 1968, pp. 3-4.

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and the formation of Malaysia), and to remain neutral and thus refuse to become closely identified with Chinese policy on others (the Viet Nam war, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Sino-Indian and Laotian crises). We must conclude, therefore, that China's strategy to gain Burma's support of its interests in world affairs was a failure.

At the same time, because of their assertion of an independent posture vis-à-vis China in the international arena, Burmese leaders were able to exert little restraint on Chinese policy toward Burma. The contrast in Peking's reaction to anti-Chinese demonstrations that took place in Burma and Cambodia was striking — "militancy" toward one, an apology to the other.[65] Since Peking was apparently dissatisfied with the existing relationship with Rangoon, there seemed little reason to refrain from venting its displeasure, hence the verbal assault on the Ne Win government and the exhortation to the "White Flag" insurgents to overthrow the regime.

China had followed a policy of "friendship" toward Burma until the June 1967 incident, but then its attitude changed suddenly and drastically. Burma's reaction to this development was accurately predicted by a former Vice President of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, U Kyaw Nyein, who said in a 1960 speech: "We don't want to do anything that will provoke China, but if she does invade, I am confident that the national spirit of our people will stand firm against her."[66] The vituperation to which Burma was subjected not only stiffened Ne Win's determination to resist China; it also led to greater unity in support of the Revolutionary Council regime.

The government newspaper, *The Guardian,* was moved on October 29, 1967 to editorialize on Burmese relations with China:

> The position of small nations, especially those dedicated to peace and committed to strict neutrality in foreign affairs, in the present world of political and economic tensions is not unlike that of a ship trying to make a safe passage between the legendary Scylla and Charybdis. Yet the perils faced by these small nations are infinitely greater today if they happen to be situated on the perimeter of China. Peking has not only tried to export Maoism to Burma, but has also, in utter dereliction of its part under the Friendship Treaty, given open and brazen help

[65]Instead of reacting violently to anti-Chinese demonstrations and Prince Sihanouk's attacks on Chinese interference in Cambodian affairs, China apologized and pledged to stop all subversive propaganda in Cambodia. Peking's conciliatory approach was undoubtedly due, in part, to Cambodia's close identification with China on all the major international issues.

[66]Quoted by Frank N. Trager, "Burma and China," *Journal of Southeast Asian History,* March 1964, pp. 29-30.

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to the Burmese Communist rebels. Not that their stooges can shake the stability of the Revolutionary Council regime, but the unscrupulousness with which it has abandoned the norms of international conduct must eventually effect the course of international relations adversely to Peking's regret.

For more than two years after the 1967 incident Sino-Burmese relations were "cool" as Peking continued to express hostility toward the Rangoon government. Not until late 1969 and early 1970 were negotiations held to discuss the resumption of an ambassadorial exchange. The culmination of these efforts was the arrival of Ambassador U Thein Maung in Peking in November 1970, raising Burma's representation in China to the ambassadorial level for the first time since 1967. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon had also been without an Ambassador for more than three years before the arrival of Chen Chao-yuan in March 1971. Then in August General Ne Win paid a friendly visit to China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai.

These developments did not portend a shift in Burma's policy of rigid neutralism between East and West. While moving toward a détente with China, Burma also sought to maintain friendly relations with such nations as Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Australia, Yugoslavia, Malaysia and the United States. During the intensive fighting along the Burma-China border in the spring of 1968, Ne Win said: "We will never give up our neutralist policy despite all these happenings. . . ." As long as the present regime, which has been described as a "Cromwellian dictatorship, puritanical, parochial, and intensely patriotic," remains in power, there seems little likelihood of any revolutionary change in Burmese foreign policy.

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INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN MODERN CHINA

by Robert E. Bedeski

FOR more than two decades, Sino-American hostility has been one of the few constant features of the international environment. From the Korean War through the conflict in Viet Nam, U.S. policy in Asia has been premised on the perceived need to contain Chinese communist expansionism. The People's Republic of China (PRC), judging America's Asian presence and alliance system to be inimical to China's national interests, has responded with its own antagonism toward the United States. Within the past year these certainties have been upset and new arrangements are being explored which will have far-reaching consequences for East Asian politics.

This essay will examine some general aspects of the relationship between domestic politics in China and the external environment. In particular the following thesis will be explored: The Sino-Soviet dispute and a number of other external crises have undermined the credibility of Chinese communist ideology. This in turn has weakened the Chinese Communist Party's dominance of the state. The partial decay of party power has allowed the military to assume greater authority in state affairs in order to prevent chaos and to defend the country from external enemies should China's position further deteriorate. The army's ascendancy could be offset to a considerable extent, however, if Chou En-lai's current diplomatic offensive is successful and brings about a more peaceful setting for China.

The Emergence of the Army in Politics

The turbulent events of the Cultural Revolution ended with the rulers in Peking attempting to reconstruct the shattered political order. Within the party, the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 ratified the expulsion of Liu Shao-ch'i and the ideological leadership of Mao Tse-tung. A new, shorter party constitution was adopted; and Lin Piao, Minister of Defense, was designated as Mao's comrade-in-arms and probable successor, only to drop from public view in September 1971. During the summer

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of 1970 there were hints that the National People's Congress would be convened to ratify changes in the government and possibly promulgate a new national constitution to replace the 1954 document, but this has not yet occurred.

These developments can be understood best as the latest chapter in the evolution of power relations in China. For students of Chinese political history, a notable feature has been the occasional emergence of the army as a crucial force in the affairs of the state. In pre-communist regimes military dominance was often a symptom of deep domestic malfunctioning. The presence of generals at the center of political power indicated that, at the least, the army was being consulted extensively on the wisdom of governmental decisions. Politicization of the army was a sign that the leadership was suffering a loss of confidence in its abilities to control the country's destiny.

In twentieth-century China, the army has never been too far from the corridors of state power. During the final years of the Manchu empire, General Yuan Shih-k'ai dictated state policy. After 1911 a republic was established with Yuan as president, but he preferred to be emperor and restored a short-lived monarchy. This was followed by a period of republican facades.[1] Political reality, however, resided in militarist domination of the instruments of power.

When the Kuomintang (KMT) revolution brought an end to the military dictatorship at Peking in 1928, the newly-established Nanking government inherited many of the problems of the republic it had superseded. Within a few years after coming to power the Nationalists found their own rule marked by intense factionalism, civil wars, militarist mutinies, other domestic revolts and foreign intervention.[2] Even under the best of conditions, the unification and economic reconstruction of China would have been formidable. But the KMT could scarcely control its own organization due to internal dissension, and its control over China was tenuous or nominal in many areas. The early 1930's added external factors discouraging to the civilian leaders of the KMT: world economic depression, the growth of anti-democratic movements in Europe, and the Japanese intervention in Man-

[1]For an examination of the central government from a formal institutional perspective, see Franklin W. Houn, *The Central Government of China 1912-1928* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959).

[2]Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China, 1912-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1950), provides a highly readable account of this complex period.

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churia. It was therefore not surprising that the army, specifically Chiang Kai-shek and his group, came to exercise primary political power. At a minimum, the army could prevent the extinction of the state that had been established in 1928. The government at Nanking was at the mercy of domestic and external enemies and only the army was able to preserve some degree of political order.[3]

Under the KMT the government of China was formally a party dictatorship. Party domination was scheduled to be replaced by constitutional government in 1936, but this had to be postponed because of the exigencies of internal conflict — especially the growing communist threat — and Japanese pressures in the north. After the major cities of east China fell to Japan in 1938, the government retreated into the interior and established the wartime capital at Chungking. The militarization of the state was completed, since strategic priorities dictated by the war overshadowed all other considerations. Chiang Kai-shek has been harshly criticized as being inept and narrow-visioned during the war.[4] Yet it must be recognized that his goals were really a continuation of prewar politics: national unification and survival of the KMT revolution. By the end of the war the viability of the Nationalist movement had been destroyed. It was drained of energy and belief in its own mission. Mao's revolution succeeded in part through the KMT's internal collapse. By 1949 Nationalist armies had been defeated and the People's Republic was established.

As the means of seizing and maintaining power the communist military arm, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), despite rhetoric to the contrary, was a primary vehicle for revolutionary success.[5] Without military victories the moral commitment and

[3]The central army fought a number of battles that were decisive in establishing and preserving Nanking's rule. The KMT was brought to power by the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to eliminate warlord regimes in central and north China. The allies of the KMT, however, proved at least as recalcitrant as the defeated opposition. Chiang directed campaigns against Li Tsung-jen, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and other ostensibly "Nationalist" generals after 1927.

[4]A critical evaluation of Chiang and his supporters is found in Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder out of China* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946).

[5]Mao Tse-tung, on June 30, 1949, stated that the "well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism. . . ; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes, and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party" were the "three main weapons" that led to the defeat of the enemy. ("On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* [Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961], Volume 4, p. 422.) Kao Kang, a communist leader who was purged in the early 1950's, reportedly had embraced the heresy that the party was a creation of the army. *New York Times,* April 6, 1955.

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political organization of the CPC would have been insufficient to establish the communist government in Peking. After the communist movement came to power, the army remained in the background to serve the new state in a purely functional role — national defense and the pacification of areas such as Taiwan, where KMT forces had not been defeated. The Korean War hastened its depoliticization. A nonpolitical, professional, modern army, on the Soviet model, became the objective. In a 1951 speech commemorating the twenty-fourth anniversary of the founding of the PLA, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh indicated the projected development:

> The Chinese People's Liberation Army must build up its various arms, strengthen itself in modern technical equipment, strengthen its combat training and its fighting power so as to undertake the historical task of defending the motherland and opposing imperialist aggression. . . . Our troops must be active in studying techniques and raising their technical level, and commanders at all levels must learn to master new equipment and new arms . . . absorbing the highly advanced experience of the Soviet Union.[6]

Demands for modernization also broached the need for conscription to maintain a large reserve force, but the law providing for this was not promulgated until early 1955.[7] In the same year, military ranks and honors were introduced, adding another dimension of professionality in common with military forces abroad. By the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, the PLA seemed well on the way to becoming a modern state-serving organization, in contrast to the armed forces which had been a political instrument of power in previous Chinese regimes of this century. Chu Teh reiterated the primacy of civilian leadership, but at the same time warned against an exclusively military viewpoint within the army: the army was not and could not be separate from politics. As long as the party was in command, the army was to cultivate a proper political consciousness among the masses and participate in the tasks of economic development designated by the party leadership.[8]

It was also during the late 1950's, however, that events transpired to test the PLA's acquiescence to party leadership in three vital areas: foreign affairs, the management of domestic af-

[6]NCNA (New China News Agency), July 31, 1951, in *Current Background*, No. 208, September 10, 1951.

[7]For details on the Conscription Law of 1955, see *Current Background*, No. 314, February 18, 1955.

[8]Three major tasks of the army were identified: fighting, production, and maintaining close contact with the masses. "People's Army, People's War," NCNA, July 31, 1958.

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fairs, and army interests. In the realm of diplomacy, the civilians seemed to be charting a course toward collision with the Soviet Union. The strains in the Soviet-Chinese alliance became apparent during the Taiwan Straits incidents in 1958, when Moscow sought to curb Peking's belligerence. Army dissatisfaction came to the surface during the next year, culminating in the dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai and his replacement by Lin Piao.[9] Captured documents from the PLA on the Indian border revealed widespread unhappiness within the ranks over party treatment of the army.

The movement calling for officers to serve as privates for one month every year further alienated the military leadership. Extensive use of the army for nondefense purposes, such as water conservation projects or industrial production, reduced time spent on military training and maneuvers. The apparent abandonment of the Soviet model of army modernization, along with the loss of Soviet aid, and the involvement of the army in economic production created a new set of priorities and values within the PLA. Necessity was also a part of this reorientation: the army was a well-organized pool of available manpower that the party leadership could not overlook in its intense utilization of human resources during the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The mobilization of the militia during this period of economic frenzy diluted the professional capacity of the army by diverting resources from programs of military modernization.[10]

As the role of the army broadened into nonmilitary sectors of society, it reacquired a variety of functions that it had exercised in the Yenan days. By 1960 it was becoming a primary organization for political, social and economic development, rivaling the party itself as a model for actions and attitudes among the masses. The PLA became a mass organization which was held up as a pattern for the remainder of the population to follow and which could mobilize its membership for participation in political campaigns. Public campaigns to emulate the "proletarian spirit" of the army were conducted.[11] Model soldiers were presented as heroic types in

[9]David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1961, pp. 68-76.

[10]The regime's goals for its "Everyone a Soldier" movement of 1958 are described in Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Hold Aloft the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking and Strengthen Militia-Building," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*JMJP*); translated in *Current Background*, No. 624, June 30, 1960.

[11]"The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army," *JMJP* editorial, February 1, 1964; translated in *Current Background*, No. 732, May 12, 1964.

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propaganda drives. The warrior, struggling with himself and the natural elements, began to rival the party cadre as the prototype of the new man in new China.

This shift in exemplar models, as registered by the mass media, could be interpreted as a symptom of vital changes underway. During the 1950's the party activist had been the forerunner of the new communist man or woman. By judicious use of the mass line, the party cadre was given the personal responsibility of integrating party policy and the interests of the masses. He became the exponent of what Franz Schurmann refers to as "practical ideology."[12] The type of heroism he represented idealized the moral example in the tradition of the Confucian official/literatus. As the possessor of knowledge and wisdom, he was expected to have the ability to solve specific problems and to intervene in situations where unlettered or "un-Red" men were helpless. Whether Confucian or communist, this application of general principles to concrete social relations has been a crucial criterion of social leadership in China.

The emergence of proletarian heroes in the army was a novel development. From one perspective, some of the propaganda seemed to be promoting a type of existentialist hero, in the sense that action and struggle were valued for their own sake with no promise of ultimate release or salvation. The Chinese proletarian hero has Sisyphean dimensions: though consciousness cannot conquer existence, the objective circumstances of existence do not submerge the individual in despondency or desperation. Descriptions and biographies of these model men give the "Thought of Chairman Mao" a central place in providing the political and existential consciousness for individuals who have never wrestled with the full metaphysical dimensions of dialectical materialism or other aspects of Marxist doctrine.[13] In the phenomenon of the proletarian hero, Maoism became the universal referent for action. But in the process, doctrine has been drained of its utopian destination.

The changing image and mission of the army were reflected in realignments of the leadership. Lin Piao emerged as the chief spokesman for the new mission which placed greater emphasis on paramilitary activities. Men such as Chu Teh, who represented the military professionals, were eclipsed. Lin Piao's speech, "Long

[12]Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), Chapter 1.

[13]One example is "Wang Chih-tung —'Hard-Boned' Member of the Working Class," *Peking Review*, October 23, 1970.

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Live the People's War," in September 1965, emphasized the importance of guerrilla warfare and at the same time underlined the necessity for revolutionary movements abroad to rely on their own resources.[14] The beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 created opportunities for the army to transform its latent political power into visible action.

The inauguration of the Red Guards took place under PLA supervision and training. This organization of revolutionary, and occasionally anarchistically-oriented, youth was the vanguard of Mao's attack against Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters. Indirectly, the army became an instrument in the party struggle. The Red Guards intervened not only in party and administrative affairs but also in the factories and farms, and their activities often adversely affected the political and economic system. The political purge, which took place under the euphemism of "continuing revolution," had the effect of spreading disorder while generating its own backlash as the workers and peasants clashed with the Red Guards. Finally, local military commanders intervened and a statement from Peking in September 1967 declared that enforcement of central orders henceforth rested with provincial and local commanders.[15] Whether this delegation of some measure of central authority represents a further step toward decentralization may depend on the degree of threat the Chinese leadership perceives in the domestic and external setting. The restoration of domestic order averted an accelerated devolution of central authority; however, it is doubtful whether the Communist Party will be restored in the foreseeable future to its former political eminence.

The result of the political crises of the past decade has been the cumulative erosion of party unity. In the purges undertaken during the Cultural Revolution nearly one-half of the members of the Central Committee were removed. The Ninth Party Congress ended with a predominance of military members sitting in the central organs of the party. The attempt to reconstitute the party by creating Revolutionary Committees was notable in that army representatives tended to dominate the provincial governments and party apparatuses.[16]

Nor has the PLA been immune to the effects of political crisis.

[14]Lin Piao's speech is reprinted in A. Doak Barnett's *China After Mao* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[15]J. Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," *Asian Survey*, May 1968, pp. 359-360.

[16]The increasing role of the PLA at the subnational level of government is noted in "The Revolutionary Committee and the Party in the Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," *Current Scene*, April 15, 1970.

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A number of high-ranking officers have been purged as anti-party elements and further disputes within the ranks are more than likely.[17] Such occurrences could conceivably lead to conflict between center and regions, but the leadership in Peking is aware of this danger and can be expected to take steps to mitigate disputes.

Theoretical Perspectives

From the above it can be seen that the political role of the PLA antedates 1966, and that its recent eminence is merely another stage in the evolving relationship between the CPC and the army. In this section, this development will be placed in a theoretical framework taking account of the course of external affairs. The dramatic eclipse of the party by the army appears to have come about because of a series of crises that weakened the party's ideological credibility. The result has been a challenge to the legitimacy of party rule which may be irreversible.

We can examine general institutional dynamics in modern China as a function of foreign affairs and the way in which communist ideology has responded to domestic and external change. Several writers have described the high degree of integration between ideology and organization within the CPC. Franz Schurmann's analysis of the Chinese political system identifies ideology as a mode of communication within the party structure.[18]

To the communications function of ideology we can add another: prediction. Claiming to understand historical forces, the Maoist version of communism has made a number of predictions concerning future situations in policymaking. The prophetic element has been an integral part of Mao's charismatic authority[19] and has contributed to the mobilization of support at crucial points in the past twenty years. Nevertheless, in the vital area of foreign affairs, particularly regarding the firm identification of friends and enemies, Mao's prophetic vision has been far from perfect. The failure of ideological assumptions to materialize in international affairs, in turn, seems to have affected the credibility of party authority. For example, the loss of Soviet friendship during the CPC's stewardship may have led to a crisis of confidence

[17]See L. LaDany, "China: Period of Suspense," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1970, p. 707.

[18]Schurmann, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[19]Irwin J. Schulman describes this aspect of Mao's role in "Mao as Prophet," *Current Scene,* July 7, 1970. Schulman's concept of prophecy is tied to a "message" having appeal to interests in the party or among the masses. This is a more restricted notion than what I identify as a claim to envision and create an ideological imagery of currents or tendencies beyond the present societal situation.

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within the civilian leadership, since that friendship was both useful in a diplomatic sense and reinforced the belief that China was riding the wave of the future. The high level of performance and the intense commitment demanded in the party were undoubtedly facilitated by the conviction that China was on the side of history's dominant forces.

If the events of the Cultural Revolution can be interpreted as symptoms of widening disunity within the party, one might conclude that the PLA has intervened to save party and national unity by assuming control of the state apparatus. However, historical precedents indicate that the army, once it becomes the locus of political leadership, may not be the most effective or reliable agent in revivifying the party. In order to examine the tensions inherent in the shifting of power arrangements in China, one must consider the nature of the authority and some special characteristics of its legitimation.

A distinction should be made between authority as a function of organization and as a function of institution. The organizational authority of the party refers to its capacity to mobilize its own membership and carry out specified programs and policies. In this sense there has been considerable continuity between the pre-1949 and post-1949 party. Purges have occurred, organizational changes have been made, and policies radically altered, but the basic organizational principles of democratic centralism and the revolutionary mission have been maintained. On the other hand, the institutional dimensions of party authority — the relationship between the party and the state — have undergone fundamental change. The pre-1949 party provided the structural framework for the governmental apparatus, but until the establishment of the People's Republic the CPC was not in control of the Chinese state. A new institutional dimension was added to party authority when it became responsible for the foreign affairs of the state.

Since 1949 the institutional dimension has been more crucial than the organizational one. The external environment has been the apparent source of many of China's problems since independence — indeed, for over a century. From the Opium Wars through the decades of economic, military and political intervention from abroad, Chinese leaders considered themselves only partially in charge of guiding their country's destiny. Confucian officials in the late Manchu period remonstrated against the introduction of Western ideas and values, fearing that they would undermine traditional culture. The Nationalists during their

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hegemony blamed the great powers and the Unequal Treaties for China's inability to democratize and industrialize. The communists saw the struggle against imperialism as half of the battle for national liberation and social progress.

Yet additional signs were needed to certify that the international environment was conducive to communist successes. The KMT in 1927 had also come to power on the wave of popular support, but within a few years the plans and expectations of the Nationalists collapsed when confronted by the realities of economic depression and a hostile international system. As elsewhere, the authority of ruling groups in China has never been unconditional or effective for an unlimited duration. Institutional arrangements of authority have been valid only as long as they proved appropriate or effective.[20] In the case of the CPC, its mandate to rule has been challenged by setbacks in the international arena.

Concepts of authority within the Western tradition of political theory make it difficult for us to accommodate phenomena of the Chinese system. Two types of political legitimacy can be identified: immanent and transcendent. Immanent legitimacy is familiar in Western thought. It is based on the Hobbesian/Lockeian vision of legitimate government which derives its authority from the members of the state.[21] Government is authorized to act and to maintain a monopoly of violence within society so as to facilitate the orderly functioning and survival of society and its members. The continued performance of these functions in a satisfactory manner provides the government and the political order with the credibility required to command support and resources. Instrumental criteria are paramount in determining the immanent legitimacy of authority. It is immanent because the citizens of the state are the theoretical validators of political authority and acts of revolution or

[20]Seymour M. Lipset makes the distinction between "effectiveness" ("the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and . . . powerful groups . . . see them") and "legitimacy" (which "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society") in *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), p. 64. My own reading of Chinese political dynamics indicates a fusion of this distinction. That is, a regime that is effective is also legitimate in the sense that it is appropriate to society. Hence, both considerations come under what I term "immanent legitimacy."

[21]"The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will. . . ." Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 72.

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withdrawal can destroy a government. If it appears that the political regime is not meeting the demands and expectations of the people, then its legitimacy is questioned.

Transcendent legitimacy is not common in highly secularized political systems such as the Western democracies. It refers to traditional mandates to govern which have a religious character and is related to Weber's notion of traditional authority. In imperial China the emperor was the Son of Heaven (*t'ien tzu*) who exercised authority as the representative of cosmic rationality. He was authorized to rule because his office represented the harmonization of the interests of heaven and earth. His authority in this capacity derived from the Mandate of Heaven (*t'ien ming*).[22] The absence or presence of this mandate could theoretically be discovered by the flow of events within the empire.

The agreement between heaven and earth, that is, the legitimation of the rule by an emperor and his dynasty, was assured when political unity prevailed, rebellions were few, and prosperity was general. The loss of a mandate to rule was signified when events in the empire seemed to indicate that the political regime was out of favor with cosmic forces. Famines, invasions or other natural disasters might point to the illegitimacy or inappropriateness of government. Unfavorable trends could become self-confirming prophesies of a weakening mandate as administrators either deserted the imperial service or began to protect their own positions and family interests through self-aggrandizement. With the breakdown of central control and the weakening of communications between center and region, provincial elites had to rely on their own devices and resources, causing further withdrawal of support from the imperial court.[23] Such periods of crisis were also accompanied by rebellions and invasions and forced the ruler to depend on the military for defense, execution of policy, and the maintenance of political unity. The last stages of several dynasties were marked by this combination of domestic disunity, weakness of central government, and increased military involvement at all levels of the political system.

[22]"The theory of the Mandate of Heaven has been called the Chinese Constitution, the Right to Rebellion. . . ." C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Birth of Communist China* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 25.

[23]In the Confucian tradition, public service could be terminated honorably if the continuation of service threatened the ethical integrity of the individual. See Frederick W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period," in *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, Arthur F. Wright, editor (New York: Atheneum, 1964), pp. 252-290.

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The historical consciousness of the Confucian literati allowed them to make comparisons between one dynasty and another, or between different rulers within the same dynasty. The relative virtue of rulers and dynasties provided criteria of performance over time. Even if the concept of the Mandate of Heaven was a convenient summation of past experience, it did have the virtue of providing standards of governmental performance, justification for support, service and commitment, and a coherent rationale for the withdrawal of support from a dynasty of doubtful virtue. The political momentum that seemed to be generated by the possession or loss of the mandate suggested that a source of legitimacy other than popular support was at work in traditional China. This source has been identified as transcendent legitimacy.

Sensitivity to historical trends was also a major component in Kuomintang conceptions of legitimacy. Some comparisons can be made with the traditional system to elaborate on the KMT outlook. The doctrines of Sun Yat-sen provided the ideological link between perceptions of world trends in political arrangements and the specific conditions of Chinese society. His Three Principles of Nationalism, Democracy and Livelihood, for example, were programmatic ideals that derived their validity in large part from non-Chinese sources and precedents and promised the reordering of the Chinese polity along modern lines. In this formulation of Sun's thought, the distinction made by Schurmann between "pure" and "practical" ideology takes on an additional dimension. For the Nationalists, there was no organized body of doctrine which could meet the requirements of "pure" ideology, in the sense of being an internally consistent system of thought that summarized politics, history and society. Adoption of Marxism-Leninism was unfeasible since it stressed class conflict that would be destructive to the national unity the KMT was trying to build, and also because the specter of Chinese Bolshevism would increase the intransigence of the great powers in renegotiating the Unequal Treaties.

Instead of importing a foreign ideology into China, Sun Yat-sen sought to identify fundamental historic trends outside the country which might point to the direction the nation ought to take. The triad of the Three Principles fulfilled this requirement, and Sun's ideology made an effort to erase the flaws that he recognized in the non-Chinese versions of those principles. Democracy, for example, ought to be more responsive to the people, so Sun proposed a number of electoral reforms that would give the people more

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power over their government. Chinese nationalism should not be the narrow chauvinism of tribal or communal loyalties. In Sun's vision the KMT mission was to overcome the obstacles to national unity and identity, then to assist other nations in a situation similar to China's — poor, exploited and disunited.

When the Nationalists established their state at Nanking in 1928, Dr. Sun was dead and the movement was already weakened by serious cleavages and rivalries. Still, there was confidence in the initial premises of KMT ideology. At the Third Party Congress during March 1929, the leadership tried to put its house in order. The government was threatened by revolts from regional militarists, dissident political figures and remnants of communist forces. By the criterion of immanent legitimacy, the authority of the new regime was not great: Nanking's control was limited to only three provinces around the lower basin of the Yangtze River. Yet, some degree of ideological unity in the country was possible since there was widespread acceptance of Sun's main concepts within intellectual, business and military circles. KMT ideology provided a symbolic summary of Chinese national ideals that could be agreed upon by a divergent population and could provide a common identity and focus of allegiance. In this sense, KMT ideology provided the pre-constitutional framework for China's political development. Despite violent disputes over the implementation of those ideas, they were accepted as guiding ideals for China, since the Three Principles epitomized the key elements of modernity responsible for progress in Europe and Japan prior to the dark years of the 1930's.

The difficulties encountered by the Nanking government in negotiations over the Unequal Treaty system confirmed earlier perceptions of the foreign states' behavior. Many supporters of the Nationalists, impatient with the slow pace of negotiations, warned that without the military manifestations of state power China could not expect diplomatic success. The diplomatic impasse showed the need for achieving full territorial sovereignty and greater national control over China's vital economic interests. The international depression, although not seriously affecting China until 1932, dramatically demonstrated the dangers of excessive dependence on integration in an international market dominated by the major industrial powers. As the industrial nations sought protection and self-sufficiency behind tariff walls, Japan's ambitions on the Asian mainland posed new threats to Nationalist hegemony.

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The international setting of the 1920's had seemed hospitable to China's national aspirations; the next decade was transformed into one of hostility and upheaval. Democracy as the ideal for new governments was losing its earlier appeal. The demise of the Weimar Republic, the rise of fascism and rampant militarism were among the anti-democratic currents that China's leaders recognized as new dominant forces.

The hostile international and domestic setting of China's political development during the Nanking period emphasized the need for national defense. The disunity of the country and the unpreparedness of Chinese armies in the face of Japanese incursions (Manchuria in 1931 and Shanghai in 1932) demonstrated that unless military development was given priority in the resources of the state, China as a sovereign entity was threatened with extinction. Military priorities began to dictate state policies, whether in diplomacy or in the allocation of scarce resources. Previous anti-Russian sentiments of the government were muted in favor of regularizing relations with Moscow. It was during this period that Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the leading figure in the nation, party and government. By 1936 his nearest rivals, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, were by comparison of little national consequence. Although Chiang is often held up as the scapegoat for the KMT's corruption and disintegration, the conspiratorial elements of Chinese politics and the degenerate international climate of the prewar period must be considered in evaluating events and personalities. Given the climate of the time, the shift from civilian to military dominance of the state was understandable. The army was the organizational apparatus best suited to maintain domestic order and defend national sovereignty; it inherited state leadership from the demoralized party apparatus.

Although the KMT state never formally abandoned its adherence to the ideology and programs of Sun Yat-sen, their content and emphasis changed considerably under Chiang. In the inimical circumstances of the 1930's the apotheosis of Sun's thought as state orthodoxy and the Confucian principles reintroduced during the New Life Movement (1933) proved to be an irrelevant credo. The result was a crisis of confidence within the party as it became apparent that earlier expectations of world developments had been in error, leaving Chinese Nationalism with obsolete ideals. The notion of political tutelage, once a theory of transitional government during a period when the people were to be prepared for constitutional self-rule, became transmuted into a rationale for

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military dictatorship behind the facade of party rule. The forms of institutional development were adhered to as closely as possible. A provisional constitution was introduced in 1931, and preparations were made for a full constitution at a later date. But belief in the efficacy of constitutional government had been weakened by the occurrence of historical aberrations. In this way, the modern equivalent of transcendent legitimacy was denied to the Nationalist regime.

Transcendent Legitimacy and External Affairs in the PRC

The completely new system that has emerged in China since 1949 can be examined as the latest stage in Chinese political development or as a variant of other systems in the contemporary world. Taking the first view and briefly comparing the present Peking regime with its Nanking predecessor, some similarities between the Nationalist and communist revolutions can be identified:

(1) An initial sense of accomplishment and confidence that provided the new regime with a mandate for sweeping changes. In the case of the KMT, the fiscal and industrial systems were the chief objects of attention, and policy was directed at developing industry and creating an environment conducive to modern economic programs. For the communists, land reform and rehabilitation of prewar communications preceded stress on industrial development. Broad changes were made in most sectors of society.[24]

(2) Justification of successful revolution according to criteria derived from broad historical trends. The KMT, as described above, sought to adapt key features of modern society for China. The communists saw their hegemony as part of a larger upsurge of world socialism under the leadership of the Soviet Union.[25]

(3) An elitist organization recruited heavily from among the intellectuals, and having a monopoly over the interpretation and implementation of ideology.

(4) The reassertion of Chinese sovereignty over historically defined territory and the reclaiming of lost prerogatives. The Nationalists sought the abrogation of the Unequal Treaties and the retrocession of the treaty ports before coming to power. Their failure in this regard and their inability to establish central authority over the whole of China may have been instrumental in their loss of popularity. Nevertheless, considerable

[24]See T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[25]See Mao's speech at the Moscow Airport, November 2, 1957; extracts translated in Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 435-436).

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attention was given to minority peoples and overseas Chinese in order to affirm the principle that the government was the guardian of their welfare. Nationalist ideology was also addressed to the situation of states and colonies on China's periphery, such as Annam, Korea and India. The communists have also been deeply concerned about spreading revolution in Asia and gaining support among the overseas Chinese communities.

(5) A series of crises, resulting in the apotheosis of a single figure. Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung became objects of intense public adulation within a state-sponsored cult. Sun's successor, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao's former heir apparent, Lin Piao, were military figures who were legitimated as wielders of authority because of their close contact with the chief ideologues of revolution.

(6) Factional struggles among the central leadership. This was more intense and self-destructive among the Nationalists, since party disunity was exacerbated by continuing regional fragmentation. Dissident politicians could always find support from one or several regional militarists. Frequent alliances between political figures out of power and autonomous generals were formed to oppose the central government and weakened its credibility as the ruling authority. Communist unity was easier to accomplish since regional militarism had been largely eliminated during the war. By 1960, however, internal cleavages within the party had been publicized. The purges during the Cultural Revolution demonstrated that the CPC has not been immune to the disunity that eroded the KMT at an earlier period. It remains to be seen whether the army can maintain its own organizational unity, or at least remain politically neutral to the extent that dissident party leaders can find no sympathetic supporters within the PLA's regional commands.

These analogies are inconclusive, of course, in predicting the future of Chinese politics, but they point to some continuing features of the problems facing any regime that seeks to govern the country. The remainder of this essay will be concerned with the concept of transcendent legitimacy and its usefulness in understanding contemporary politics in China.

When the PRC was established, it was amid assurances that this was an event fulfilling the prophetic vision of Marxism-Leninism and was one more nail in the coffin of capitalist imperialism.[26] The CPC acted as the organizational vehicle for transforming China into a sub-unit of the new socialist world order. The Soviet Union was expected to provide fraternal assistance to the new regime, but Peking underestimated Stalin's parsimony. Nevertheless, the friendship of the USSR became an ideological cornerstone of the new political system.[27] Whatever hesitation or

[26]See Mao's report to the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, June 6, 1950; translated in *Current Background*, No. 1, June 13, 1950.

[27]"The People's Republic of China resolutely sides with the world camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and has established the closest fraternal

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doubts the Chinese leadership had about its own role in East Asia were subordinated when Peking decided to launch an attack in late 1950 against UN forces approaching the Yalu River through North Korea. If at the end of 1949 the PRC found its diplomatic situation regarding friends and enemies ambiguous, there seems to be little doubt that by 1953 the issue had been settled. The Sino-Soviet alliance was indispensable to China's survival, and Sino-American hostility fitted neatly into the ideological framework of Cold War alignments.[28] The soft areas of the Third World were still neutral, but with some prompting and persuasive argument they might be shifted into the socialist camp. The Bandung Conference and the era of the Five Principles exemplified this post-Korea operational matrix of Chinese diplomacy. The termination of colonial regimes in Africa and Asia, either voluntarily or through military defeat (as the French suffered in North Viet Nam), indicated the general retreat of imperialism.

Either through hubris or miscalculation, the Chinese overestimated the speed with which the new order could be brought about. The Soviets were considerably more aware of the dangers of nuclear warfare, because they were highly sensitive to the destruction that could befall their industrial society. Nuclear blackmail was not to be undertaken lightly. The Soviets also had grave reservations about sharing nuclear devices and technology with the Chinese, whom they regarded as impetuous and adventurous after the abortive Great Leap Forward. During the Taiwan Straits hostilities in 1958, there were intimations of an undercurrent of mutual distrust between the fraternal countries.

Domestically, the Peking leadership launched a propaganda barrage against the United States and synchronized it with the mobilization programs of the Great Leap. Renewed emphasis was placed on the people's militia, for both defensive and productive purposes. The United States was denounced as an unrelenting aggressor that was preventing the complete unification of China by supporting the anti-communist regime on Taiwan. The external posture of the government was described in a more subdued fashion. A joint communiqué signed by Khrushchev and Mao stressed moderation and coexistence in dealing with capitalist

relations with the Soviet Union." Chou En-lai speech, September 30, 1950; translated in *Current Background*, No. 12, October 5, 1950.

[28]In a Peking article, "How to Understand the United States," America was described as the deadly enemy of the Chinese people, the headquarters of reactionary degeneracy in the entire world, and a paper tiger. *Shih Shih Shou-ts'e* (*Current Affairs Journal*), November 5, 1950; translated in *Current Background*, No. 32, November 28, 1950.

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countries,[29] and also called for the reduction of nuclear tensions in the world. But in Mao's view, by failing to support the Great Leap in economic development and the military posturing at the Straits, the Soviets had demonstrated undue caution. After this period tensions between the two communist giants became clearer and resulted in Peking's more autonomous role in world politics.

As China vied not only for partnership status equal to that of the USSR in the socialist camp, but actually appeared as a competitor for leadership, the nations of the Third World became a competitive arena for diplomatic thrusts. At a reception for foreign delegations at the National Day celebrations in 1958, Chou En-lai stressed China's friendship for the exploited nations of the world. He cited the "achievements" of the Great Leap as an example of how an underdeveloped society could transform itself by utilizing to the fullest extent its own human resources. Moreover, competition with the imperialist countries would be peaceful, despite their proclivity toward aggressive behavior. In this and other statements, government leaders in the PRC emphasized the community of interest between China and other developing nations, with only brief reference to the Soviet Union.[30]

The frustrations of the disastrous Great Leap and subsequent disputes with the USSR gradually undermined Maoist pretensions of omnipotence and were reflected in mounting intraparty strife. The purge of P'eng Teh-huai and some of his supporters in 1959 was evidence of growing dissatisfaction within the army and party concerning the direction of state policy. The hopes China may have had for leading the nonaligned nations as a bloc were considerably diminished in 1962 when hostilities erupted on the Indian border. Peking blamed the clashes on Nehru and his policies, but it may have suspected a growing loss of credibility among the nonaligned nations of Asia. According to *People's Daily,* Nehru was betraying the interests of the Indian people and represented only a small group of men who had compromised with imperialism.[31] The Chinese leaders were obviously annoyed at Soviet diplomatic gains in India and the increasing alienation between New Delhi and Peking. But they depicted the border war as an isolated event — an aberration that could be explained away as a

[29]See NCNA, August 3, 1958.

[30]See especially Chou En-lai's statement at the National Day reception. NCNA, September 30, 1958, in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press,* (*SCMP*), No. 1870, October 8, 1958.

[31]*JMJP* (*People's Daily*) editorial, October 10, 1962; translated in *SCMP,* No. 2839, October 16, 1962.

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vestige of capitalist mentality afflicting India's formal leadership which had produced adventurism and miscalculation. At the same time it was crucial to maintain the appearance of Sino-Indian friendship, not only to preserve the image of the PRC as a peace-loving nation, but also to assure the Chinese people that their country was not drifting in a sea of hostility abroad. Thus it was necessary to separate the "Nehru ruling clique" from the "Indian people" in policy statements and communiqués.

Large-scale American intervention in Viet Nam in 1964 was the next major setback for Chinese ideological projections. Mao's doctrine of national liberation through people's wars was not invalidated, but the demonstration that warfare of this type could be blunted by massive air and ground power undercut the notion of the invincibility of guerrilla insurgency. The destruction wreaked by the widespread guerrilla fighting and massive fire power may also have lessened the chances that "wars of liberation" could be staged in other countries. The United States' actions proved that it was not merely a paper tiger with unusable nuclear teeth. Vast resources and new tactics enabled American forces to operate below the threshold of nuclear war and still contain Maoist warfare. Hence, cheap victories through low-level conflict were ruled out and the Chinese communist vision of the coming world order was blurred again. Lin Piao's speech on "people's wars" in 1965 emphasized the necessity for each national liberation movement to fight its wars with its own resources and not to depend on outside support for victory. The vulnerability of long communications lines could not have been absent from Chinese strategic thinking at the time.

The abortive coup by the Indonesian Communist Party in October 1965, followed by the reduction of Sukarno's power and the rise to power of a military junta under General Suharto, further undermined Peking's hopes for pro-Chinese regimes in East Asia. By the end of 1965, Mao, Lin and Chou faced an array of counter-revolutionary states in Asia whose regimes could count on American or even Soviet support in the event of a Chinese threat. China was not only isolated diplomatically from the major states that had been actual or potential sources of past support, but it was estranged from history as evidenced by the series of setbacks since 1958. During their first years of power, Chinese communist leaders had invested external affairs with heavy ideological significance; as a consequence, they may have found it impossible to explain away the later failures in the 1960's without raising questions about the effectiveness of their policies.

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Since the end of the Cultural Revolution China has made substantial revisions in its diplomatic posture. The new pragmatism culminating in UN membership and a Security Council seat and, later, a visit by the President of the United States, is based on a more cautious approach that takes China's weakness into account. The Japanese potential for remilitarization and Soviet agreements with West Germany and India have increased Peking's anxieties, and perhaps serve as reminders that the Yang (revolutionary) forces of history have ebbed and the Yin (counterrevolutionary) element is ascendant. Because the global environment seems hostile to Chinese aspirations for world revolution, greater caution in foreign affairs and concentration on domestic problems and resources is the order of the day.

Institutionally, the ramifications of the failures of policy and ideological predictions have been felt chiefly within the party. The initial role of the CPC as interpreter and oracle of Marxism-Leninism has been damaged — perhaps permanently. The Thoughts of Chairman Mao, which permeate all levels of society, are unlike Marxism-Leninism in that they stress action at the individual level and are tinged with political romanticism. Additionally, the party has been bypassed in the simplification of Mao's thought and its promulgation among the people, thus diminishing its organizational role. Patterns of hierarchy have been disturbed and experiments in various combinations of organization have been attempted, resulting in a loss of the continuity and momentum that previously sustained the party.

Conclusion

The Communist Party of China may never be restored to its former role of state dominance. Its ideological credibility as a historical force has been eroded by events, and purges within the party have undermined its morale. These trends may have prompted the army to assert itself as the only alternative organization capable of maintaining order within the country and defending China from external predators. We may expect further transformation of the party, and it will probably continue to exercise important formal and managerial functions within the political and economic system. However, its past eminence may be permanently eclipsed. Individuals within the party, similar to KMT members nearly four decades ago, may have discovered that the world outside China does not submit to the Middle Kingdom's ideological vision.

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"GAP" PREDICTION AND AMERICA'S DEFENSE: ARMS RACE BEHAVIOR IN THE EISENHOWER YEARS

by Colin S. Gray

THIS article examines two examples from postwar American defense policy that illustrate the dilemmas attending the conduct of an interstate weapons competition in a period of rapid technological change. References to the bomber and missile gaps abound in the literature of defense policy and strategic theory, but there has been little systematic investigation of these two phenomena.[1]

In all weapons competitions the participants may expect to confront situations fraught with a great degree of uncertainty. If knowledge of the arms race strategy of an opponent (and its hardware referents) is unobtainable, the defense community of the other nation will feel bound, professionally, to assume "the worst plausible case." Should such a prognosis prove to be incorrect, the worst that could happen — barring the risk that an anxiety neurosis might lead to a preventive strike — would be the unnecessary stimulation of the race. However, should the prognosis turn out to be correct, intensive qualitative and quantitative hardware improvements might deny an opponent the fruits of success in the competition.

Gap prediction is endemic in the arms race calculus and has appeared with particular force in the following periods of the current superpower competition: 1955-1956, 1957-1961 and 1969-1971. In the course of any arms race certain individuals and organizations will warn of a gap opening up for a period of years between the military capabilities of the arms-racing states. The incumbent administration cannot deny the possibility of this happening; it can only promise to watch the adversary carefully, take a number of precautionary measures, and deny the need for a "crash program" in the form of an "anticipatory reaction."

Acceptance of gap claims could have unfortunate consequences — both for the course of the arms race and for the political pros-

[1] A notable recent exception is Edgar M. Bottome, *The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy* (Cranbury, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971).

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pects of the incumbent administration. First, it might set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy — the opponent might react to the original anticipatory reaction. Second, the administration would be admitting, in effect, that "we were grossly in error yesterday." On such a politically sensitive matter as national security, threat must always have been foreseen. Third, there is the possibility that irresponsible threat manipulators could not be appeased. The reaction of the adversary to gap-countering moves could serve as a basis for further gap claims — in short, a positive feedback in the arms race.

It is the contention of this study that the perception of gaps is an inherent feature of arms competitions. Those advocating crash programs in order to close a projected gap are not necessarily motivated solely by a desire to serve their own political or service interests. In an arms race it is always possible that one party might attain a qualitative lead sufficient to neutralize the quantity of the adversary's armaments. The reasonable fears regarding the survivability of manned bombers in the missile age is a case in point. Furthermore, faulty prediction or lax intelligence gathering, analysis or dissemination might result in a considerable quantitative imbalance.

At the heart of the missile gap controversy in the United States were such questions as: "How rapidly is the Soviet Union going to deploy a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)?" and "What accuracies and yields are to be expected from weapons to be deployed four or five years hence?" In the years 1969-1971, the Nixon Administration had to answer the same questions with respect to Soviet SS-9 ICBM's and sea-launched ballistic missiles on the new Y-class submarines, for in some scenarios these qualitative additions to the Soviet arsenal could render two out of the three components of America's strategic forces vulnerable to a surprise counterforce blow after 1975. Calculations concerning counterforce success are also complicated in the 1970's by the need to assess penetration capabilities in the face of active missile defenses.

The Bomber Gap

How much strategic airpower the United States should buy in order to deter the Soviet Union was a question that was to plague the Eisenhower Administration until revised intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber production were available in August 1956 (from the first flights of the U-2 in June of that year).[2] The

[2]On aerial and satellite reconnaissance see Philip J. Klass, *Secret Sentries in Space* (New York: Random House, 1971).

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stark Air Force view was expressed by Harold Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force, on June 15, 1954: "In the present air-atomic age, it is imperative that we maintain at all times quantitative superiority."[3] But by late 1954 and early 1955 the official view that an age of mutual deterrence was dawning caused some rethinking of the nature of deterrence. It began to be clear that the Soviet Union, with a small and vulnerable force, was exercising a considerable deterrent effect upon the United States. Therefore, perhaps numerical superiority was not as important as the manifest determination to use the force on hand. It was also argued that the technical superiority of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) could substitute for any inferiority of numbers. In a statement challenging to the Air Force and to its lobby in Congress, President Eisenhower remarked on March 2, 1955: "There comes a time, possibly, when a lead is not significant in the defensive arrangements of a country. If you get enough of a particular type of weapon, I doubt that it is particularly important to have a lot more of it."[4] Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, testifying before the House Appropriations Committee in early 1955, followed the new official line by arguing that "the quality of our retaliatory force is now becoming increasingly more important than its size."[5] This appeal to the traditional American pride in technical accomplishment was to prove an embarrassment after the Soviet technical "first" with Sputnik in 1957.

Estimates of reasonable accuracy can be made regarding an adversary's current capabilities and current production facilities. The difficulty lies in determining the assumptions behind his military programs. Unfortunately, in order to counter possible military buildups in various categories of weapons, action has to be taken before these estimates can be verified by events. This initiative, generally referred to as an anticipatory reaction, risks giving stimulus to the arms race activities of the rival and producing the critical situation it was meant to forestall. The interpretation of intelligence estimates and the evaluation of their impact on the future strategic balance are thus far more difficult than their collection.

[3]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Two Additional Secretaries for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,* 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, June 15, 1954 (Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 31.

[4]President Eisenhower's News Conference of March 2, 1955, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1955* (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 303. (Hereafter cited as *PPP, 1955.*)

[5]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, Hearings,* 84th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 9.

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The unveiling by the Soviet Union of its M-4 Bison, TU-20 Bear and TU-16 Badger in 1954 and 1955 produced serious concern that the United States might be facing a bomber gap. The particular cause for alarm was the appearance of these aircraft in unexpectedly large numbers at the May Day and Aviation Day parades in 1955.[6] As Allen Dulles recalled the U.S. evaluation of this development:

> There was hard evidence of Soviet capability to produce bombers at a certain rate if they so desired. At the time of the estimate, the available evidence indicated that they did so desire, and intended to translate this capability into an actual program. All this led to speculation in this country as to a bomber gap.[7]

The growing Soviet strategic delivery capability evoked an increasing stress, in the speeches of Administration spokesmen, upon the horrors of nuclear war, mutual deterrence and the approaching balance of terror. Although they did not admit the existence of an adverse balance of strategic military power, they did concede — until reliable evidence of the rate of buildup of the Soviet long-range air force was provided in August 1956 — that by the late 1950's the USSR could outnumber the United States in strategic bombers. In face of this possibility, the Administration took a sophisticated view of the strategic balance, asserting that the United States needed an adequate or a sufficient deterrent rather than one that was quantitatively superior.[8]

The evidence of deficiencies in SAC presented in 1956 to the Air Force Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee[9] and contemporary National Intelligence projections of

[6]In Moscow on May Day 1954 one prototype M-4 Bison was demonstrated, while a year later first ten and then eighteen flew past the reviewing stands. This aircraft had a 3,000-4,000-mile radius and a top speed of 625 mph. The TU-16 Badger also made its appearance on May Day 1954, and on Aviation Day 1955 fifty-four were seen. The Badger had a performance close to that of the B-47; if operational in large numbers, it could render SAC's advance overseas bases vulnerable to a devastating first strike. The TU-20 Bear, seven of which joined the Soviet air force in July 1955, was notable for its unusual range, a radius of over 4,000 miles. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956, Additional Hearings,* 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1956), testimony of General Twining, p. 31; Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 38-39; Lloyd Norman, *Chicago Daily Tribune,* May 22, 1955; *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1955-1956* (London: Sampson Low, 1955), pp. 195-196.

[7]Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Signet edition, 1965), p. 151.

[8]President Eisenhower's News Conference of March 2, 1955, *PPP, 1955,* p. 303.

[9]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on the Air Force, *Airpower Report, Senate Document No. 29,* February 20, 1957, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 95-97.

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Soviet airpower for the late 1950's painted a sobering picture of the future. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Nathan Twining, warned: "To sum up, they either have overtaken us or can overtake us in all categories of warplanes, except that of the medium jet-bomber."[10] His statement indicated that the issue in 1955-1956 was not the technical proficiency of the Soviets, but whether the Soviet Union would mass-produce the long-range Bison and Bear and what impact a Soviet numerical lead in heavy bombers would have on U.S. security. Until August 1956, intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber production showed that the Bison and Bear were being produced in greater numbers than the B-52,[11] and that by June 1959 the USSR could have 600 to 700 of these planes compared with 400 B-52's.[12]

In the category of medium bombers, projections to 1959 showed that the U.S. B-47, numbering approximately 1,600 on July 19, 1956, would continue to outnumber the TU-16 Badger, but by a sharply diminished margin.[13] Future trends in the number of ballistic missiles on each side were uncertain, but it seemed likely that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in the development and production of these weapons also.

In the period 1955-1957 the United States was engaged in building elaborate continental air defenses in anticipation of a Soviet challenge in manned bombers. But when the USSR eschewed quantitative competition in bombers, the continental air defense programs became, in good part, a redundant anticipatory reaction. In fact, the major force posture decision taken by Soviet leaders in the mid-1950's was to deploy a significant force of intermediate- and medium-range missiles as a continuation of their traditional continental strategy.

Based on information derived from Soviet fly-pasts in 1954 and the July 1955 Aviation Day parade, where Bisons, Bears and Badgers were observed in large numbers, Washington assumed

[10]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Hearings,* 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 759.

[11]*Ibid.,* p. 758.

[12]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Forces, Subcommittee on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower, Hearings,* 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1956), General Irvine (Deputy Chief of Staff, Material, USAF), p. 437. (Hereafter cited as *Study of Airpower.*)

[13]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, Hearings,* 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), General McConnell, p. 174, General Twining, pp. 1810-1811. (Hereafter cited as Senate, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960.*)

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that the Soviets were following the U.S. path of weapons system development, i.e., they were building a large, long-range air force before turning major resources to the uncertain development of ballistic missiles, and were striving to attain a strategic superiority of numbers.[14] Neither of these assumptions was certain, but they were at least plausible.

During FY 1955 the B-52 had undergone intensive service testing and it was first delivered as an operational weapon system to the 93rd Bombardment Wing of SAC in June 1955. The United States reacted to pessimistic projections of Soviet bomber production by accelerating its monthly rate of production of the B-52 on three occasions: in the spring of 1955 to twelve per month; in May 1956 to seventeen and then to twenty per month. At the time, alternator trouble meant that these production totals were just paper targets, as General Curtis LeMay testified before the Study of Airpower Subcommittee in May 1956. The number of completed B-52's by January 1, 1956 was 57, although only 41 of these had been accepted by SAC. In January, 4 out of 4 were accepted; in February, 2 out of 6; in March, 0 out of 6, and in April, 0 out of 5.[15] Meanwhile it was estimated in *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1956-1957* that the Soviet Union was probably producing the M-4 Bison at the rate of fifteen per month.[16]

U.S. reaction to projections of Soviet bomber production was not limited to increasing production rates. The construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was accelerated, SAC adopted a dispersal principle, and the Department of Defense supplemental appropriations request of April 9, 1956 raised the overall order for B-52's to a figure of 598 and that of its aerial refueler, the KC-135, to 400. The heavy bomber wing was also expanded to include forty-five B-52's instead of thirty of the B-36, the aircraft that had up to then constituted the overwhelming bulk of the SAC long-range force.[17]

Following the first flights of the Lockheed U-2 in the summer of 1956, the National Intelligence Estimates were reassessed in August, and by early 1957 it was clear that the United States was in fact outproducing the Soviet Union in heavy bombers. In April 1957 the monthly rate of B-52 production was reduced from twenty to fifteen.

[14]Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.
[15]*Study of Airpower*, General LeMay, p. 112.
[16]*Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1956-1957* (London: Sampson Low, 1956), p. 204.
[17]U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Report, 1st January-30th June, 1956* (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 257.

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Until the U-2 flights and the subsequent reassessment of Soviet bomber production, the Administration could not deny that a numerical gap between the rival long-range air forces might exist during the period 1958-1960. What it did deny was that this gap would lead to a weakening of the American strategic deterrent. The alarms sounded by Air Force partisans regarding the gap, culminating in the Study of Airpower Hearings, spurred the Administration to develop the concept of the sufficient deterrent, which set forth the persuasive argument that critics ignored the diversity of America's striking forces, particularly the Navy and Tactical Air Command (TAC), and that insufficient attention was being paid to weapons system effectiveness. There was, also, the question of mission: the United States had fewer targets to strike than did the Soviet Union. Finally, the fact of geography should not be ignored: the Soviet Union was more vulnerable to long-range bomber strikes than was the United States.

The input of strategic intelligence into the defense debate in 1955-1957 was extremely damaging to the Administration. The National Intelligence Estimates in 1955 and 1956 provided a range of possible production curves, the choice among them being largely a matter of institutional commitment and interest. The only way to still a debate fed by uncertain estimates was to acquire reliable intelligence. President Eisenhower illustrated this point:

> During the four years of its operations, the U-2 program produced intelligence of critical importance to the United States. Perhaps as important as the positive information — what the Soviets did have — was the negative information it produced — what the Soviets did not have. Intelligence gained from this source provided proof that the horrors of the alleged bomber gap and the later missile gap were nothing more than imaginative creations of irresponsibility.[18]

Interesting comment on the fate of the bomber gap was contained in an article written by Senator Stuart Symington in 1962. He provided the following details: taking August 1956 as the baseline for estimates of Soviet heavy bomber deployment by mid-1961, in November 1957 the estimates were reduced to 62.5 per cent of the August 1956 figure, in December 1958 to 25 per cent, and in February 1960 to 19 per cent. The estimates remained at 19 per cent until August 1961.[19]

At the time of Sputnik the strategic balance was favorable to the

[18]Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 547, footnote 1.

[19]Stuart Symington, "Where the Missile Gap Went," *The Reporter*, February 15, 1962, pp. 21-23.

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United States. The 137-wing New Look force goal was reached by mid-1957 and the last B-36 was due to be phased out of SAC in late 1958. Meanwhile, fears regarding Soviet bomber production had thrice caused an acceleration of B-52 production before the lower and more accurate rate was uncovered by the U-2 flights in mid-1956. Throughout the late 1950's it was clear to the Eisenhower Administration that the Soviet Union had no intention of matching SAC but rather hoped to render SAC obsolete by a prodigious effort in ICBM's.[20] The early Soviet success with an ICBM in August 1957 and the orbiting of Sputniks I and II provided conclusive evidence that great industrial activity was under way on the ICBM and explained the slack rate of Soviet heavy bomber production in the period 1955-1957. The 1957 estimates regarding the lagging Soviet bomber production proved accurate, for in 1959 Senator Symington credited the USSR with having only 100-125 long-range bombers,[21] while in late 1960 it was widely accepted that the Soviet air force had only 100-120 Bisons, 60-70 Bears and 1,000-plus Badgers.[22]

The concept of sufficiency, of the adequate deterrent, crept into Administration declarations — along with the notion of mutual deterrence — and eventually emerged as the new official orthodoxy. The hardware referents of sufficiency are difficult to define; however, the term has been understood to stand in contrast to the idea of superiority. The theoretical basis of the concept is the principle of diminishing returns, the sharply reduced marginal utility of units of strategic deterrent power beyond the point of sufficiency. The strategy of deterrence requires forces neither so large as to pose the threat of a credible first strike or a second-strike counterforce blow, nor so small as to grant by default a credible first-strike capability to the Soviet Union.[23] Given the vulnerability of manned delivery systems, the danger lay in

[20]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, Part I, Policy Statements, Hearings,* 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), information supplied by Department of Defense, p. 55. (Hereafter cited as House, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960, Part I.*)

[21]Senate, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960,* Senator Symington, p. 702.

[22]Colonel C. Donnelly, Library of Congress, the Legislative Reference Service, *United States Defense Policies in 1960, House Document No. 207,* 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 10; Robert Kilmarx, *A History of Soviet Air Power* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 258.

[23]In the airpower debate of 1955-1956, the term sufficiency was used by Administration spokesmen to justify the buying of fewer B-52's than the counterforce adherents believed necessary.

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possessing too little or too much. A reasonably stable mutual deterrence could be based on the maintenance by the two superpowers of force levels within the fairly broad range between the two extremes.

It is not easy from the public record to ascertain what degree of "assured destruction" was considered sufficient by the Eisenhower Administration. The B-52 program accelerations and eventual deceleration are explicable in terms of domestic politics and fiscal considerations, but they would appear, in one interpretation not shared by the author, to be nonrational in regard to the arms race. Since "zone of the interior" based aircraft would not engage in combat against like forces, it would have been more reasonable to gear B-52 program alterations to changes in Soviet air defenses. However, despite the alarmist cries of the critics in 1955 and 1956, the real danger to America's striking power lay in the increasing vulnerability of the overseas base structure. To compensate for this loss, improvements in the force based in the zone of the interior were not at all unreasonable.

The near-mystical sanctity of a specifically quantified degree of necessary assured destruction was a product of the McNamara Pentagon. This concept has recently, and belatedly, received the criticism it merits. However, regardless of the folly or otherwise of maintaining a capability to assure the destruction of fixed proportions of industry and population, such calculations have the great value of being explicit and offering an irrefutable argument to counter those who believe in "the more, the better."

The period of domestically "exploitable" alarm that has been termed the bomber gap endured for approximately eighteen months, from spring 1955 to fall 1956. The sources of this alarm may be located in a simplistic "mirror image" view of the strategic perspective of the arms race adversary, undue attention to the relative quantities of offensive weapons in the pre-attack inventories, and a temporarily irreducible uncertainty concerning current and future weapons production programs of the rival. Politically, the bomber gap supplied the Democratic Party with a much-needed defense issue in the 1956 elections, and the Democrats in turn found the Air Force willing to cooperate in the carefully staged Study of Airpower investigation.

The B-52 program accelerations and the augmentation of the heavy bomber wing may justly be viewed as the product of gap-thinking. However, these measures were sensible precautions to counter the increased weight of Soviet air defenses and the new

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vulnerability of the B-47's operating from overseas bases, while also serving as minimal expedient measures designed to appease domestic pressures. The real importance of the bomber gap, with the advantage of hindsight, is that it provided a dress rehearsal for the missile gap of the late 1950's. To the student of arms races in international politics, the bomber gap is generically related to the naval scares that punctuated the domestic politics of the great powers from the 1840's until 1914. To the student of Soviet-American strategic relations, the bomber gap was the first of a series of alleged gaps that have raised the temperature of defense debates in the United States during the past quarter-century.

The Missile Gap

The rapid development of the ICBM and IRBM from 1955 to 1957 threatened to create a situation, within a few years, in which the bulk of the strategic manned deterrent force would be vulnerable to a surprise missile attack. Sputniks I and II indicated that any stability based on the sufficient deterrent of dispersed SAC and naval aviation forces might be upset by a Soviet crash program for a large inventory of first-generation ICBM's, which would render obsolete much of America's vast investment in continental air defense. The growing evidence of a small Soviet intercontinental bomber program posed an additional worry.

As a phenomenon, the missile gap bore a remarkable resemblance to the bomber gap that preceded it, and in some measure its development may have been influenced by both sides' earlier experience.[24] The missile gap referred to a future strategic environment believed to be imminent, a period in which the USSR would be able to deploy reliable ICBM's with an acceptable circular error of probability (CEP) in larger numbers than the United States could.[25]

The missile gap prognosis stemmed from the success of the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1957 in persuading the United States that a bomber gap was imminent, the existence within the United States of groups eager to profit from predictions of future inferiority, and the USSR's breakthrough in achieving the first successful flight of an ICBM. Although rumors and limited evidence of Soviet missile progress had circulated for years prior to 1957,

[24]See Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 29-30.

[25]See the graphs demonstrating the decline in anticipated Soviet bomber and ICBM production in Symington, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

CEP refers to the expected degree of accuracy of a missile — the probability that 50 per cent of the weapons will strike within a circle of a specified radius.

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forecasting of Soviet missile development remained an inexact science, a fact well illustrated by Dr. Albert Wohlstetter's comments in 1969 on the predictive skill of the 1953 Millikan Committee: "In February (1953) an important scientific study group [the Millikan Committee] expected the Soviets would have no ICBM's before the late 1960's — a prediction plainly in error by the end of the year."[26]

The measure of anxiety felt by those in the inner defense community in 1954-1955 may be gauged by the tone and contents of the Killian Committee report (the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee to the Office of the Secretary of Defense) of February 14, 1955. Unlike the disclosure of the Gaither Committee report of November 7, 1957, the contents of the Killian report were not widely disseminated at the time and even now the report can be described only in general terms.[27] In short, it presented an alarming picture of Soviet ballistic missile capabilities, current and prospective, and called for increased U.S. technological efforts "across the board" to strengthen the strategic deterrent.[28]

The importance of the Killian Committee can hardly be exaggerated. In the short run (1955-1956), its report provided the vital thrust behind the parallel IRBM development programs of the military services that were to produce the Thor, Jupiter and Polaris missiles. The sense of urgency sounded was successfully communicated to the White House, where the prospective "quick fix" of the IRBM was deemed worth its cost. In the medium run, the Killian report may be viewed as the psychological preparation that lent credibility to the missile gap. Prognoses of strategic inferiority which became fashionable after Sputnik could refer, in a general way at least, to the highly respectable forecasts of the Killian Committee, made as early as February 1955.

In August 1956 predictions of a major Soviet missile effort were given added credibility through the downgrading of estimates of Soviet bomber production. In 1962 Senator Symington reviewed this period in the following way:

[26]Albert Wohlstetter, "Defence in the 1970's," *Survival*, August 1969, p. 244, footnote, reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, U.S. Senate, May 1, 1969.

[27]Interesting comment on this point is to be found in Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965 edition), p. 148, footnote 15.

[28]A recent study focusing on the missile program of the 1955-1957 period concludes that the primary concern of the Killian report was to warn the United States that it must not fall behind in the development of the long-range ballistic missile. Michael Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 51.

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Later that quantity of Soviet bombers was tremendously reduced as against what was previously estimated. And the justification for that was told this committee in no uncertain terms — the phrase "leap-frog," that the Soviets were cutting down heavily their long-range bomber production because they had leap-frogged into long-range missiles.[29]

The missile gap debate was launched properly in late 1957 following the ICBM firing in August, the flight of Sputnik I on October 4, and, above all, the leaked conclusions of the Gaither Committee report of November 7.[30] As President Eisenhower later wrote, one of the conclusions of that report was profoundly disturbing: "the Soviet Union could, by late 1959, possibly launch an attack against the United States with 100 ICBM's carrying megaton warheads."[31] The subsequent speculation over the "years of maximum danger" generally believed to lie ahead was reminiscent of the identical warnings voiced during the initial period of Korean War rearmament and during the bomber gap period.[32]

A familiar pattern began to emerge in 1958, as a result of reports of difficulties in the Soviet ICBM testing program. The agreed National Intelligence Estimates of ICBM production were downgraded early in the year.[33] Although by the spring of 1959 it was apparent that an initial operating capability (IOC) of ten ICBM's would not be ready until the end of that year, Secretaries of Defense Neil McElroy and Thomas Gates both conceded to the Soviet Union a probable ICBM numerical superiority during the first half of the 1960's.[34] This estimate was based on the capacity of Soviet industry to produce a large number of missiles and on the assumed desire of the USSR to compensate for its inferiority in manned strategic delivery vehicles. In a primarily qualitative arms competition, such as that between the United States and the Soviet Union, a great quantitative superiority for one side raises the premium on qualitative leadership for the other.

By February 1960 the intelligence-gathering activity of the U-2

[29]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963, Hearings,* 87th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1962), Senator Symington, p. 51. (Hereafter cited as Senate, *Hearings on Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963.*)

[30]Chalmers Roberts, *Washington Post,* December 20, 1957.

[31]Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

[32]For example, see Senator John F. Kennedy, "The Missile Gap," Address to the Senate, August 14, 1958, reprinted in John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 34. In 1969-1970 similar expressions of alarm were aired concerning the possible counterforce capability of Soviet SS-9's, with multiple, individually targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's), beginning in 1974-1975.

[33]Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," *Fortune,* April 1959, pp. 241-242.

[34]For example, Senate, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960,* McElroy, p. 9.

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had provided information of a more certain and less alarming nature regarding the rate of Soviet ICBM production.[35] In the spring of 1960, using evidence from over 200 U-2 flights, U.S. intelligence experts could detect only two operational ICBM launchers within Soviet territory.[36] At no point from late 1957 to early 1961 did the Administration credit the Soviet Union with an ICBM capability of any military significance. The decline and fall of the missile gap from February 1960 to September 1961 was described by its erstwhile high-priest, Senator Symington, on January 19, 1962.[37] Relying on the adjustments made in the National Intelligence Estimates regarding the number of Soviet ICBM's believed likely to be deployed by July 1, 1961, he noted that the figure of 100 established in late 1958 was first cut back in February 1960 by 66 per cent, then by a further 4 per cent in August, by 15 per cent in June 1961, and by 11.5 per cent in September 1961. Thus, between January 1960 and September 1961 the estimates were reduced by a total of 96.5 per cent.

Nevertheless, during 1958-1959 the danger that a missile gap might appear did influence U.S. policy. Until the Soviet first-generation ICBM development cycle was completed in late 1959, the White House had to assume, on grounds of prudence, that a considerable number of Soviet missiles would be on station from late 1960 onward. This, despite contrary evidence provided by the procurement history of the Soviet long-range bomber and the manifest performance shortcomings of the early ICBM.[38] The difficulty of securing reliable strategic intelligence forced the Administration to base its defense planning for 1958 and 1959 on assumptions about a future strategic environment that the White House believed were probably invalid but had to accept as the most accurate forecast obtainable at the time.

The Administration was not tricked into believing the Soviet ICBM production claims that began in November 1958 or the

[35]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and Committee on Astronautical and Space Sciences, *Missiles, Space and Other Major Defense Matters, Hearings*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1960), Admiral Burke (Chief of Naval Operations), p. 294; Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

[36]Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times*, May 6, 1960. The U-2 flights were made between June 1956 and May 1960. However, it is not certain how many of these flights were of a "strategic reconnaissance" nature.

[37]Senate, *Hearings on Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963*, Senator Symington, pp. 49-50. Also see Bottome, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 180-196.

[38]See House, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960, Part I*, information supplied by the Department of Defense, p. 55, McElroy, p. 58; Senate, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960*, McElroy, p. 10.

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capability claims that began in November 1959.[39] The U-2 demonstrated beyond question that a large ICBM force did not exist. However, the imminent vulnerability of SAC to a first strike without warning had to be treated as a serious matter in the period 1960-1964. Consequently, steps were taken to reduce vulnerability by increasing the warning time available and improving the reaction speed of SAC.

The estimates of a likely missile gap pointed to the need also for the acquisition of a secure second-strike capability, a force that could ride out a surprise attack. The disadvantages of the first-generation ICBM, particularly its slow reaction time and soft base configuration, ruled out the option of acquiring a large inventory of these weapons as rapidly as possible.[40] There was risk in taking this course, but it was accepted as the price of an orderly program.[41] Although this risk was greatly exaggerated by both self-serving military spokesmen and academic analysts, journalists hostile to the Administration were unrestrained in their criticism of the seeming lack of concern in high places about the growing Soviet edge in ICBM's.[42] The Gaither Committee had believed, in late 1957, that the Soviet Union would have ten operational ICBM's by early 1959 and 100 by the end of that year.[43]

The Administration decided to defer a large ICBM procurement decision until Polaris and Minuteman were available and evaluated. Although the intelligence-gathering agencies could not know until 1960, with any degree of certainty, whether the Soviet Union would also await the second-generation missiles before producing the ICBM in large numbers, there were some hopeful signs in 1958 and 1959. First, the Soviet ICBM was an older model than its American counterpart, and, therefore, the technical reasons for deferring its large-scale acquisition would probably be even more convincing than those which severely restricted the purchase of Atlas and Titan, America's first-generation ICBM's. Second, there was evidence that the Soviet ICBM test program was in trouble.

In his Message on the State of the Union of January 9, 1959, President Eisenhower set the tone of his Administration's reaction

[39]Horelick and Rush, *op. cit.*, pp. 50, 58.

[40]Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

[41]On the nature of the risk in choosing to await the second-generation ICBM see House, *Hearings on DOD Appropriations for 1960, Part I*, James Douglas, p. 845.

[42]See, for example, Joseph Alsop, "The Gap," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1958.

[43]Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 220. These estimates were based on the National Intelligence Estimates, which in early 1958 set a figure of 100 operational ICBM's for early 1960, and later in the year used the same figure for late 1960. Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

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to the forecast of a critical missile gap: "We must guard against feverish building of vast armaments to meet glibly predicted moments of so-called maximum peril."[44] His policy response to the coming of the ballistic missile was to decrease the vulnerability of the manned bomber force to the greatest degree possible and to deploy a limited number of Atlas and Titan missiles. Sound technical reasons permitted the Administration to state consistently and confidently that America's immense, diversified and dispersed weapons system mix would guarantee an adequate deterrent threat until the second-generation ICBM was ready to provide a capability for surviving a surprise attack. This weapons system mix was composed of SAC's long- and medium-range bombers, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), the IRBM, naval aviation, and the Atlas and Titan ICBM's. In March 1959, Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles explained the Administration's preference for the second-generation missile: "Based upon estimates of cost effectiveness, we believe that the Minuteman is the missile that should be put into quantitative production. The Minuteman is smaller and cheaper than the first generation missiles, easier to protect and capable of quicker reaction."[45]

Publicized decisions in 1959 and 1960 made it clear that a counterforce option was an aspiration, if not a vital requirement. These decisions were to acquire two additional wings of the B-52, to develop the Skybolt (standoff, air-to-ground ballistic missile), and to increase the planned deployment of Atlas and Titan. Unexpected progress in developing the Polaris and Minuteman missile systems held out the hope of a sizeable deployment of these strategic weapons by the early 1960's. Testifying before the House Committee on Appropriations in 1960, Secretary Gates stated that "we are adjusting to a counterforce theory; or a mixture of a counterforce theory plus attacks on industrial centers and things of that character."[46]

The Eisenhower Administration took a number of steps between October 1957 and January 1961 to reduce the vulnerability of existing strategic forces and to lay greater stress upon future weapons systems required by the new strategic en-

[44]*House Document No. 1*, January 9, 1959, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 3.

[45]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Military and Naval Construction, Hearings,* 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 1128.

[46]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961, Part I, Hearings,* 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1960), p. 26.

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vironment. Accelerated development was ordered for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), the MIDAS ICBM launch-detecting satellite, and the SAMOS ground-surveillance satellite. The air defense program underwent two major revisions in favor of systems concerned with ballistic missile warning and defense. One-third of all SAC planes were placed on fifteen-minute ground alert, and the number of dispersed bases was considerably expanded. In addition, funds for an "on the shelf" SAC airborne-alert capability were included in the request for FY 1961, and the base configuration of both Atlas and Titan was altered from 1958 to 1960 to ensure greater survivability. These were hardly the decisions of an Administration lacking in sophisticated strategic thought — in this case, regarding the need for invulnerable deterrent forces.

The missile gap, like the bomber gap before it, was a plausible illusion, and responsible leaders could not afford to ignore the "worst plausible case." On balance, the Eisenhower Administration pursued moderate and wise policies, exemplified by its decisions to avoid littering the landscape with vulnerable liquid-fueled, first-generation missiles and to provide a hedge against an unanticipated threat in the period before second-generation missiles could be deployed in large numbers.

Growing out of, and supported by, the bomber-gap phenomenon, the missile-gap claims reached a crescendo in the Presidential election campaign of 1960. The successful Democrats quietly interred the missile gap in 1961. In late 1961 the gap returned in a new guise — as an actual American superiority claim, on which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara based his counterforce or damage-limitation strategy.

Gap prediction is endemic in arms races, as we have said, but a comparison of the strategic policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations demonstrates the real, if often unacknowledged, freedom of choice available to participants. McNamara chose to explain the acceleration of the missile programs in 1961-1962 on the grounds of prudential arms race logic. Looking back from September 1967, he concluded that the United States engaged in an anticipatory overreaction.[47] However, there is ample evidence to suggest that domestic politics rather than strategic logic dominated the decision-making process which was eventually to produce an ICBM force of 1,054 (a total deploy-

[47]Remarks by Secretary McNamara before the United Press International editors and publishers, San Francisco, September 18, 1967.

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ment figure frozen on November 5, 1964).[48] President Eisenhower decided upon severe restraint in missile deployment, regardless of the domestic political cost;[49] the Kennedy Administration did not, although it did resist Air Force demands for a total Minuteman deployment figure of 3,000.

Eisenhower bequeathed a comfortable margin of strategic superiority to his successor. The McNamara Pentagon chose to make a virtue of the American lead, to exploit it as an explicit counterforce strategy, and also to increase it. The missile gap — the one that favored the USSR — was officially interred by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick on October 21, 1961. In a speech on that day, Gilpatrick made unambiguous claims for American nuclear superiority:

> The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great as — perhaps greater than — the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike.[50]

The price to be exacted for such claims to nuclear superiority included the risks of the Cuban missile crisis and the arms race acceleration of the late 1960's.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to investigate the distinct, but related, bomber and missile gaps. With the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to deride the unwarranted fears of military officers, politicians and journalists. However, the historians of defense policy will almost certainly be more favorable toward the arms race behavior of the Eisenhower Administration than toward the policy advice offered by its more vociferous critics. The Administration had to contend with strong domestic political forces demanding that the worst assumptions be made regarding the future capability of the arms race rival. It was to the credit of the Administration that only minimal gestures to appease domestic pressure groups were offered in 1955-1956 and from the advent of Sputnik (October 1957) until the election campaign of 1960. Attention has been drawn above to the folly of "mirror image"

[48]See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race, Hearings*, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1970), Dr. Jerome Wiesner, pp. 395-396, 408.

[49]No more than 200 ICBM's were programmed for deployment by the Eisenhower Administration.

[50]Roswell Gilpatrick, "Present Defense Policies and Programs," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, December 1, 1961, p. 99.

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assumptions in an arms race situation, by which America's military planners assumed that the Soviet Union would follow a strategic doctrine and a path of weapons system development and deployment similar to those of the United States. This error was compounded by the assumption that the Soviet Union was determined to gain a measure of strategic superiority that could be exploited militarily or, at the least, diplomatically.

In fairness, one should remember that military planners in the 1950's had seen, in previous years, example after example of an unexpectedly rapid Soviet mastery of modern weapons technology. Unlike in the 1960's, prudent military planners in the 1950's could not point to falsely prophesied gaps. Indeed, the first false alarm — the bomber gap — lent credibility to those anxious about the race for ballistic missile superiority. The foreign and military policy intentions of the Soviet Union in the late 1950's were largely unfathomable and aerial surveillance was far from perfect.

If it is recognized that the arms race itself is, on occasion, an instrument of policy, then concern over possible future gaps, voiced within or outside the Administration, is easy to comprehend. In light of the potential diplomatic utility of strategic superiority and considering the domestic use made of gap issues, the arms race record of the Eisenhower years is marked by an unusual degree of moderation, a policy fully justified by future events. However, the nonmaterialization of the bomber and missile gaps may have conditioned many defense commentators to disbelieve any and all future gap prognoses — an extremely dangerous possibility. We have no evidence yet as to how the Soviet Union would behave if it ever came to possess numerical, if not qualitative, superiority in strategic weaponry.

The Eisenhower Administration and its successors have been concerned not to secure "victory" in the arms race, but rather to deny it to the USSR. Both sides have believed that to be "ahead" in strategic weaponry meant to deny an undesirable measure of diplomatic leverage to the other side. Many critics of America's arms race behavior have neglected the fact that deterrence is psychological — if the Soviet Union were convinced that it was ahead, this could be as destabilizing for international order as if real military advantages had been gained.

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U.S.-JAPANESE POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS: A CONFERENCE REPORT

ON February 4-5, 1972, the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Japan Society co-sponsored a conference entitled "U.S.-Japanese Political and Security Relations: Implications for the 1970's." Addresses were delivered by the Hon. Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and Dr. Jerome B. Cohen, Chairman of the Japan Society Committee on Economic Policy Studies.

Discussion sessions were organized around three topical panels: The Political Setting, under the chairmanship of Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University; Cultural Aspects of U.S.-Japanese Relations, chaired by Francis B. Tenny, U.S. Department of State; and U.S.-Japanese Security Arrangements, chaired by Professor James Morley, Columbia University.

The conference benefited from the participation and assistance of three past or present United States Ambassadors to Japan. Professor Reischauer's address provided a useful framework for discussion, and his remarks during the conference were valuable. The then U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Hon. Armin H. Meyer, furnished helpful advice that aided in planning the conference, and the group was honored by the presence of the President's Ambassador-designate to Japan, the Hon. Robert S. Ingersoll.

The summary report which follows sets forth the major themes discussed and attempts to delineate the range of views expressed. Participants were given the opportunity to review a preliminary draft of the summary in order that this report might reflect the proceedings as faithfully as possible.

The Political Setting

Discussion of the political setting centered on an analysis of the extent to which Japan's international position could be considered isolated, insecure and ambiguous. While most participants were willing to consider these three categories, many added qualifications. With some exceptions, most speakers found Japan to be isolated either psychologically, spiritually or politically. It has only tenuous political links with the other two great Asian powers, the

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Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. By contrast, the Soviet Union has both an empire and a series of client states; China has a universal ideology and a new interlocutor in the United States; and the European states have each other. Japan's bilateral relationship with the United States, it was argued, had made the country psychologically dependent on America. One participant maintained that the "Nixon shocks" of last summer therefore exacerbated Japan's isolation and made imperative a multilateralization of its foreign relations in the future. Such multilateralism already exists in the economic sphere.

The development of U.S.-Japanese relations in the past year may be divided into four phases, according to a Japanese participant. The first period, from January to July 1971, was characterized by bitter feelings generated by the textile issue. The second phase, during July and August, was dominated by the "Nixon shocks" relating to the President's China initiative and unilateral action in the economic field. The third period, beginning in the fall, was marked by Prime Minister Sato's "bold" decision to go along with the United States rather than oppose U.S. policies. This cooperative attitude was instrumental in gaining Senate agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. The realignment in international currency values was also assisted by Japanese willingness to help the United States out of a difficult situation. The fourth phase was ushered in after the Nixon-Sato meeting in San Clemente. Its distinguishing features are still unclear, but one may note Sato's remarks that Japan's relations with the United States are more important than the relations Japan has with any other country.

Another Japanese participant observed that of the two "Nixon shocks," the more severe was the July announcement of the President's trip to Peking without prior consultation with the Japanese government. The August economic "shock" came as less of a surprise to the Japanese since "the handwriting had been on the wall" for some time, due to the textile issue. An American participant questioned whether the President's China announcement had not been "signaled" by ping-pong diplomacy. Moreover, he asked, was it not true that the U.S. initiative toward China was responsive to Japanese desires for a new, more flexible U.S. approach to the People's Republic? A Japanese participant stressed in reply the key role of the August economic "shock" in causing even those Japanese urging reliance on U.S. friendship to question whether this would be possible in the future. A U.S.

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participant added that the real "shock" came when the White House learned how shocked Japan had been by the American initiatives.

According to one trend of thinking, insecurity as well as isolation characterizes Japan's position in international politics. This insecurity was aggravated by the "Nixon shocks." It has a partly economic basis, since Japan is highly dependent on external markets and sources of energy. The flow of oil, for instance, is subject to interruption because of extended and exposed sea lanes, and the price of oil may skyrocket in the future as producer nations seek greater profits from consumer nations such as Japan.

Japan's sense of security, one participant observed, depends chiefly on the United States. Here the intangible problems of communication and style have a critical impact on the way the leadership of each country perceives its counterpart in the other country. Japanese feelings of insecurity have been heightened by the U.S. emphasis on secrecy, surprise and a willingness to be "rough" with the Japanese. The Japanese leadership bears its share of responsibility also. Prime Minister Sato's stress on the unchanging nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States leaves some observers with the suspicion that something is being left unsaid. "What are Japan's real purposes and plans?" is the question on many Americans' minds.

Other participants disputed the view that Japan suffers from any general feelings of insecurity. A Japanese speaker thought that while isolation and insecurity may have characterized Japan in the past, they are not presently a factor and will not be in the future except on specific issues. An American participant said the Japanese were not insecure in a military sense and did not themselves feel insecure. This, he stated, is partly because they see themselves outside the nuclear balance of power. Moreover, they see three of the four great power centers (the United States, the USSR, and Western Europe) as status quo-oriented and the fourth (China) as not adventurous. Rather, their past insecurity related to Japan's economic and political position. The implication of this for the United States is that nothing should be done to disrupt U.S.-Japanese relations on a massive scale, such as abrogating the Security Treaty. Nor should the United States give the Japanese the impression that it regards international relations as an exclusively "European game" from which Asian nations are excluded.

On the economic plane, it was argued that Japan was not really

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insecure and could live with the less liberal U.S. trade position. Japan was compared to a poor man who has made good: he possesses a great wealth but is not yet sure he is wealthy enough to spend it. It was noted that the United States and Japan had parallel interests in trying to break down European trade barriers. Because Europe has effectively kept Japanese products out, Japan has had to expand its markets in the United States. Another participant faulted the Japanese for the insecurity implicit in their seeking to have trade barriers to their exports lowered while they delayed lowering their own barriers against imports from the smaller states of Asia. In 1971, Japan began extending preferential tariffs to other states.

Some participants judged that Japan's position is ambiguous because the Japanese are unclear as to their role in the world. Their relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union lack goals and specific purpose. The as yet unanswered question facing Japan is whether it should seek to play an important role in the maintenance of peace and security in Asia. It was generally agreed that the answer to this question will depend in large measure on what the United States does. As long as the American nuclear deterrent remains credible, one American participant added, it is unlikely that any Japanese government in the near future would prefer going nuclear to continuing to rely on the U.S. security guarantee. Other participants noted that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the nuclearization of Japan, serves as an important obstacle to exercising the nuclear option.

One participant remarked that Japan's insecurity and ambiguity were reflections of the ambiguity of U.S. policy in Asia. Japanese feelings of uncertainty were also attributed to the unequal nature of the bilateral relationship, in which Japan plays follower to the U.S. leader. The only way for Japan to "equalize" its bilateral relations with the United States, in this view, is to develop new multilateral relations with other countries, particularly Australia, Indonesia and Canada.

Some participants took exception to the picture of Japan's position as potentially volatile because of its isolation, insecurity and ambiguity. In their judgment Japan's role in Asia in the last twenty years has been maturing at a healthy rate, and in its relations with Australia, particularly, it has suffered none of these feelings. Moreover, its economic policies and foreign policies are rather closely coordinated.

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Another participant denied any "uncertainty" in Japan's awareness that it would have to become a global power as its markets expanded and pointed out the stability present in Japanese political life. The same group of political conservatives has been running the country since the occupation. Japanese politics, far from being volatile, tend to move within rather narrow parameters. The key question is: What will these parameters be? According to this view, the future is likely to see a gradual loosening of the close U.S.-Japanese ties, rather than a rapid swing away from the United States. At the same time, Japan's relations with the Soviet Union are likely to improve somewhat as a countermove to the Sino-American rapprochement.

A Japanese participant argued that his country was not yet prepared to multilateralize its foreign relations. The impression of ambiguity in its position and policy derives from the fact that for the last twenty years Japan has worn a "small jacket" and now some people expect it to wear a "big jacket." Another Japanese foresaw his country's future role as that of a "major middle power," strengthened by closer relations with other Asian nations than is now the case.

Japanese speakers generally stressed the importance of bilateral U.S.-Japanese relations. One stated that Prime Minister Sato's statements were sometimes misinterpreted outside Japan. While Sato had emphasized in a recent speech that Japan's relations with the United States were more important than its relations with any other state, he had also said that Japan would expand its relations with other powers in order to balance its changing relationship with Washington. In this view, since the United States is not as dominant as it used to be, Japan cannot be as dependent on America as it has been in the past.

Differing views were expressed with respect to the existence and nature of a balance of power in Asia. Some participants maintained that the traditional kind of power balance associated with Europe in the nineteenth century cannot be expected in Asia today. In this trend of thinking, one subgroup considered that power itself is only a marginally useful concept in understanding the dynamics of Asian political reality; thus, the idea of a balance can be rejected except in terms of a strategic nuclear balance. A second subgroup held that the balance of power model does not correspond to the reality of the preponderant power position of the United States, which continues to occupy a singular role because of the size of its domestic economy, its impact on the

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world economy, and its unchallenged status as the primary power in the Free World. In this sense, the "balance" of power concept is inapplicable to Asia today. But "balance of power" in the sense of "power politics" is very much alive, it was said, so long as some states continue to believe in it.

The balance of power concept was seen as potentially dangerous by one Japanese participant who expressed skepticism about U.S. policy. For the United States to use China as a counter to the Soviet Union could be destabilizing, he thought, since in a four-power game the weakest player militarily (Japan) must align either with the strongest power (the United States) or with the second and third powers (the Soviet Union and China). This scenario was disputed by an American speaker, who felt that economic strength must also be considered. To say there are four great powers in Asia exaggerated China's role, he maintained, for China is the weakest of the four major Pacific powers economically. The delicacy of Sino-American contacts was underscored by one Japanese participant, who noted that the China issue is sufficiently "hot" in Japan to suggest that any mishandling of it by the United States could seriously damage U.S.-Japanese relations.

The tripolar U.S.-China-Japan power situation was analyzed in terms of the uncertainties it engenders. In the view of one American, U.S. eagerness to "play the three-power game" reflects a lack of goals on the American side. To exercise its leadership role responsibly, he added, the United States must abandon its tendency to take unilateral action. A Japanese noted that in no period in the twentieth century has a triangular relationship involving China, the United States and Japan worked out well. Another Japanese observed that U.S.-Chinese relations have been historically a source of Japanese insecurity.

The prevalence of the "China myth" has led many observers to believe that China is more vital to U.S. interests than Japan, an American speaker pointed out. But even as a trading partner, China's potential importance would be only a small fraction of Japan's current status.

Cultural Aspects of U.S.-Japanese Relations

The bearing of cultural and psychological traits on Japanese-American relations was conceded by participants to be an elusive but nonetheless important topic. Misperceptions and misun-

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derstandings between Americans and Japanese are sometimes caused or aggravated by cultural differences. Americans tend to speak bluntly, whereas the Japanese generally try to avoid disagreements. The result is that American decision-makers may seem more harsh than they are, and many Japanese leave Americans feeling that they do not know what the Japanese are really thinking. A Japanese participant added that more attention should be paid to differences in decision-making styles in the two countries. The process in Japan, to a greater extent than in the United States, tends to be slow and consensual, with a greater effort being made to achieve a broad level of agreement and support among the various factions before a decision is taken.

In the view of most speakers the cultural dialogue has long reflected serious disproportions. The Japanese government, businessmen and media pay far more attention to the United States than their U.S. counterparts pay to events in Japan. This "attention gap" could also be called an "effort gap." The Japanese spend a great deal of money trying to understand the United States, and the United States spends large sums to tell Japan about the United States, but what is missing is greater knowledge by Americans of Japan and the Japanese. The Japanese themselves have done little to carry their message to the United States, although due to the "Nixon shocks" this situation is changing rapidly, it was noted. Leaders of the U.S. textile workers and teamsters unions have been invited to Japan for visits, and a new, large-scale cultural exchange program is planned. The new budget of the Japanese government will attempt to make the "one-way" funding of cultural programs more of a shared burden, a Japanese participant added.

Over the years the U.S. State Department has spent $30 million to promote cultural exchanges with Japan, and the United States Information Agency has spent $40 million to inform the Japanese public about America, but despite considerable Japanese interest in American culture, areas of neglect were acknowledged. Although English is compulsory in all junior and senior high schools in Japan, it is not well taught and most Japanese are unable to use it effectively to communicate with Americans. Nor are American studies as widespread at the university level as some Japanese would like.

A number of professional groups have not been included in the cultural dialogue, a Japanese speaker noted. Important economic and political groups, including journalists, need to be brought in-

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to the two-way communication process. While foreign correspondents are usually well informed, the editors making up newspapers and writing the headlines often have not been abroad and lack understanding of U.S.-Japanese relations.

The popularization in the United States of simplistic views of Japan in this time of tension was particularly regrettable, an American participant said. Three distorted images have been given wide currency in recent months: (1) A newly published book purports to expose the endless deceit among the Emperor's advisers prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. (2) The "superstate" conception of Japan's economy as running wild and threatening world economic stability contributes to misunderstanding. (3) The "Japan, Inc." view held by many businessmen tends to give a misleading picture of Japan as a business-government juggernaut when, in fact, the government has a great deal of trouble in making up its mind.

Two participants took a more optimistic view of U.S.-Japanese cultural relations. They noted that in the 1930's the Japanese who came to the United States did so merely to justify Japanese military aggression. Few Americans were then specializing in Japanese studies. Today, visiting Japanese may have to defend themselves against charges of economic aggression, but such charges are considerably less serious than charges of military aggression.

Despite the language barrier, moreover, cultural differences are not as great as they may seem. Both countries, for instance, are achievement-oriented. Unfortunately, achievement-oriented people are often abrasive and not highly empathic. Nevertheless, expressions of optimism concerning cultural relations were supplemented by concern that the trend among American youth, away from interest in foreign affairs and toward urban and ethnic problems, may augur poorly for efforts to promote increased international understanding.

U.S.-Japanese Security Arrangements

The unifying theme of the discussion on security problems was the necessity to retain the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty as the formal commitment underlining the shared interests of the two countries. Japanese security policy remained quite stable from the early 1950's until the twin "Nixon shocks" of last summer. Since that time, the pronouncements of Prime Minister Sato, the Foreign Minister, and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States have consistently reaffirmed their support of Japanese-

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American ties. This relationship is more important to both countries than the construction of unilateral links to the Chinese People's Republic.

Disagreement emerged over the future U.S. security role in Asia and the course of Japanese security policy. Participants had some difficulty in defining the threats these security policies would be designed to meet. Nor did a consensus emerge on the importance of Taiwan and South Korea to either the United States or Japan.

Participants generally agreed that the credibility of the U.S. defense guarantee had been weakened by various factors, including the provision by which the Security Treaty may be abrogated on one year's notice, the denuclearization of Okinawa, the declining value to the United States of the 140 bases remaining in Japan, the Nixon Doctrine's call for re-examination of the U.S. commitments and the extension of an unspecified "shield" to allied nations, and the President's China initiative. One question raised was whether the Gaullist thesis might come to have relevance in Asia in the next decade. A *New York Times* report that the Japanese have forbidden official use of the term "the U.S. nuclear umbrella" suggests that the old confidence in the U.S. guarantee no longer exists. It was thought that the Japanese will face difficult decisions if their perception of the guarantee deteriorates further.

Several Americans suggested that future Japanese security policy hinges on attitudes and actions taken by the United States. Any American moves based on a balance of power model and on predictions of a rearmed Japan might become self-fulfilling prophecies and force the Japanese into a military buildup. In discussing Herman Kahn's 1969 prediction that Japan would undertake a major nuclear role by 1975, it was noted that Kahn recently had revised his estimate to 1980, and that his forecast was based more on economic considerations than on political and psychological factors which might be crucial. An American participant stated that he disagreed with Kahn more strongly two years ago when the original prediction was made than he does now. Another American postulated a direct link between the strength of the U.S.-Japanese relationship and a possible Japanese decision to undertake nuclear armament. The probabilities of Japan going nuclear are also heightened by China's increasing nuclear capability and the likelihood that Japan, as a big power, will decide to acquire the strategic accoutrements of a big power.

One American participant thought the problems of the U.S.-Japanese link had been created by the increasingly multilateral

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relations developed by both parties, as a result of which they are veering toward slightly divergent courses. The President of the United States chose to go to Peking; the Japanese wonder whether they should follow suit. The critical question is how a modest expansion of multilateral contacts can be achieved while the bilateral tie is preserved. Japan, in this view, will probably pursue a middle course with a gradually increasing international role and growing military power. Meanwhile, the United States will continue a slow withdrawal from its Asian commitments. The tempo of that withdrawal will be important. Any policy carried out by the United States should include full consultation with Japan and should avoid at all costs abrupt or sudden changes in direction.

Some Japanese at the conference were reluctant to speculate on the future of Japanese security policy or to admit the possibility that the Japanese military role might increase. One stated that his country had no plans for going nuclear. Another pointed out contrasting views on nuclear matters among different segments of Japanese society: "nuclear weapons" is a term the military is virtually forbidden to use; pacifist intellectuals and most neutralist intellectuals view nuclear weapons, whether defensive or offensive, as anathema; the business community is concerned with its competitive position in advanced technology and with the difficulties inspection requirements pose to the development of atomic generating capacity. He added that the small minority of militarists and nationalists, and the neutralists as well, were strengthened in the aftermath of President Nixon's China initiative.

The importance of power below the level of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance was questioned by one American participant. In his view, any minimal American deterrent would be sufficient to ensure the safety of the United States and its allies. Therefore, the Japanese would not be forced into a nuclear role. Several of the Americans challenged this and argued that neither the Japanese, the Chinese, nor the Soviets shared this view. So long as the Soviets continue their nuclear program, the military dangers are real rather than merely psychological. A similar opinion was that the United States should not seek to trade the clear Japanese-American predominance of power which existed until recently for a quadrilateral balance of power that might prove illusory. The Japanese should therefore wait for the United States to tire of its flirtation with China and return to the more important problem of maintaining ties with Japan.

The conferees had some difficulty in defining the threat to U.S.

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and Japanese interests. A Japanese participant stated that the initial reaction of the Japanese military is that Japan has no hypothetical enemies. If pressed, however, most will cite the Soviet Union. Communist China is seldom considered by Japanese as a potential military enemy, and it would be unpopular to suggest that China might have aggressive designs against Japan.

In the view of one American, Sino-Japanese relations will worsen as competition between China and Japan intensifies. Peking has been treating Japan rather roughly and has demanded that Sato be replaced before meaningful Sino-Japanese contacts can be made. Soviet efforts to woo Japan, most recently through the Gromyko visit, were also noted. There was general agreement that conflict with either the Soviet Union or China was most likely to occur in the peripheral areas of Asia — Taiwan, South Korea, or the Southeast Asian mainland.

American participants disagreed over the future military role of the United States in Asia, and Japanese participants expressed doubt that Japan would undertake a larger defense role in other Asian countries. Two Americans called for the removal of American bases from Taiwan and the eventual end of the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty, in the expectation that the status of the island will not be settled by war, but American participants generally were reluctant to speculate on future relations between Taiwan and the United States. The meaning of Prime Minister Sato's statements in 1969 and after the San Clemente meeting with President Nixon in January 1972, on the importance of Taiwan and South Korea to Japanese security, was also discussed. Some participants suggested that Japan, if consulted, would be willing to let the United States use Japanese facilities in the event of hostilities over Korea, and that Japan did not want the United States to abandon South Korea. There was no prevailing Japanese view expressed on the Taiwan question, which was recognized to be extremely delicate.

Several Americans voiced strong support for maintaining the U.S. commitment to South Korea. As one observed, the question is not how to avoid U.S. involvement in Korea but how to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, which can be accomplished only through U.S. involvement. Advocates of a "stand pat" policy noted that the official U.S. position is that enough forces will be maintained in Korea to deter attack for the foreseeable future. Another American favored "Koreanization" and a strengthening of the Koreans' own capabilities.

A further consideration was whether Taiwan or Korea might

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fall within an enlarged Japanese security perimeter designed to protect sea lanes and immediately adjacent areas. A Japanese participant stated that the only mission of the Self-Defense Forces is the protection of Japanese territory. Another Japanese viewed Taiwan as a problem out of Japan's purview, while recognizing that this contradicted the Sato statements mentioned previously. None of the participants was willing to admit the possibility of Japan assuming the current U.S. role in Korea over the next five to ten years.

The idea of a Pacific and Indian Ocean defense agreement incorporating Free World nations with interests in these regions, broached by an American speaker, was challenged by another American as being in neither the U.S. nor the Japanese interest.

Domestic politics, according to one American, is the key to present difficulties in U.S.-Japanese relations. In his view it is a serious mistake for the United States to try to push the Japanese into a hard and fast public position on security policy. This simply invites attacks from the press and the opposition parties, and eventually forces the government to weaken its position to the detriment of U.S. interests. Japan should have recognized the political significance in the United States of the textile issue and the China visit. The United States should have consulted more closely with the Japanese on major questions, especially the China initiative. The U.S. Administration should also comprehend, however, that failure to consult is only one-quarter of the problem. Perhaps 75 per cent of the present difficulty is that U.S. actions threaten permanently to disturb the stability of Japanese politics. Since leading political figures in both countries must be politicians as well as statesmen, their mutual efforts to stay in office must be appreciated by each side if the alliance relationship is to remain viable. Finally, the Japanese should not exaggerate the long-range importance of President Nixon's trip to Peking, for Japan will remain a major partner and ally of the United States in the more multipolar world of the 1970's.

Conference Participants

United States Participants

Rodney E. Armstrong
Executive Director
Japan Society, Inc.

C. Gordon Bare
Research Analyst
Foreign Policy Research Institute

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William J. Barnds
Senior Research Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

Tristan E. Beplat
Senior Vice President
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski
Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs
Columbia University

Professor Ardath W. Burks
Director of International Programs
Rutgers University

William Carpenter
Strategic Studies Center
Stanford Research Institute

Dr. Jerome B. Cohen
Chairman, Committee on Economic Policy Studies
Japan Society, Inc.

Professor Hilary Conroy
Department of History
University of Pennsylvania

Professor Gerald Curtis
East Asian Institute
Columbia University

Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Country Director for Japanese Affairs
Department of State

David Finkelstein
The Ford Foundation

John Habberton
Business Council for International Understanding

Najeeb E. Halaby
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Professor John W. Hall
Department of History
University of Chicago

Hon. Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Borg-Warner Corporation
U.S. Ambassador-designate to Japan

Professor Akira Iriye
Department of History
University of Chicago

Dr. William R. Kintner
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute

James A. Linen
Chairman, Executive Committee
Time Magazine

Roy Lockheimer
Associate Executive Director
Japan Society, Inc.

Professor James W. Morley
Director, East Asian Institute
Columbia University

Ronald P. Myers
Education Director
The Young President's Organization, Inc.

Professor Herbert Passin
East Asian Institute
Columbia University

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Hon. Edwin O. Reischauer
Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan
University Professor
Harvard University

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Isaac Shapiro
President
Japan Society, Inc.

Gaston J. Sigur
Representative, The Asia Foundation

Professor Chong Sik-Lee
Department of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

Francis B. Tenny
Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs
Department of State

Professor Frank N. Trager
Graduate School of Public Administration
New York University

Philip Trezise
The Brookings Institution

Philip Van Slyck
Philip Van Slyck, Inc.

Professor Martin Weinstein
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Nils H. Wessell
Research Fellow
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Dr. Robert Yarnall, Jr.
President
Yarway Corporation

Japanese Participants

Yasushi Akashi
UN Secretariat
United Nations

Motoyuki Ariizumi
Chief, New York Bureau
Fuji Broadcasting

Professor Chihiro Hosoya
The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, N.J.

Kazuo Murakamy
Deputy Consul-General
Japanese Consulate
New York, N.Y.

Professor Shumpei Okamoto
Department of History
Temple University

Hon. Yoshio Okawara
Minister of Embassy
Embassy of Japan
Washington, D.C.

Professor Seizaburo Sato
Associate Professor of Japanese Political History
Tokyo University
(currently visiting Harvard University)

Professor Yozo Yakota
Assistant Professor of International Law
International Christian University
(currently visiting Columbia University)

Kazuto Yoshida
Japan Broadcasting Corporation
New York, N.Y.

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Reviews

WHITHER GERMANY?*

by Walter F. Hahn

In 1923 a German philosopher named Max Scheler looked about him at the spectacle of his nation struggling from the defeat of World War I, blighted by economic problems, traversed by freebooting armies, and ripped by political warfare and regional separatism. He concluded sorrowfully that the Germans could never become a "unified brotherly people." The only solution was to merge the Protestant northeast of Germany with Moscow and the Catholic southwest with the Vatican.

Scheler had no way of knowing that his cynical jest would, some two and one half decades later, become an approximation of harsh geographical reality. The approximation is all the more striking when we remember that in the bitter postwar duel between Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democrats and Kurt Schumacher's Social Democrats over the fundamental direction of West Germany's future, the SPD saw in the processes of West European integration a plot by Catholic-ruled France, Italy and the Federal Republic to extend and render permanent their political domination of the western part of the continent, and denounced NATO as "conceived in the Vatican and born in Washington."

Beyond its inadvertent prophecy, Scheler's jest also reminds us that the "German problem" has endured over time, conflict and the convulsions of global power. Today as in 1923, when Gustav Stresemann grasped the reins of his confused country, the Germans are still searching for ethos and identity and debating whether the road of that search leads westward or eastward. And, at the time of this writing, amid political deadlock in Bonn, apprehensive Germans see the "ghosts of Weimar" once again stalking the corridors of the Bundestag.

What is the "German problem?" Writing on *Germany's Ostpolitik*, Lawrence Whetten defines it elaborately as "the proper geographical location for the German peoples in the established world order, the types of social institutions they should adopt, their relations with external powers, the dimensions of their international political aspirations, and the degree of influence they should exercise over the course

**The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II.* By Robert McGeehan. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972. 280 pp. $7.95.

Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Post War Years. By Alfred Grosser (translated from the French by Paul Stephenson). New York: Praeger, 1971. 370 pp. $12.50.

Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries. By Lawrence L. Whetten. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. 244 pp. $6.50.

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of European developments." (p. 1.) This definition, to the extent that it focuses on the aspirations of the Germans themselves, reflects the fundamental change in the "problem" over the past quarter-century —at least in the way it is perceived. Twenty-five years ago the wartime victors and later the Western allies debated the question: "What should be done with the Germans?" Today the questions more often posed—and posed with growing apprehension—are: "What are the Germans up to? Where are they going?"

Taken together, the three books under review (Robert McGeehan's *The German Rearmament Question,* Alfred Grosser's *Germany in Our Time* and Whetten's *Germany's Ostpolitik*) trace the story of the changed dimensions of the German problem. McGeehan looks back to the critical period in the postwar evolution of Europe, 1950-1955, which witnessed the transition of West Germany from fragment of a defeated nation into the linchpin of economic integration and a complex alliance system. Grosser, in probably the most comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon published to date in English, probes the evolution of the Federal Republic from occupation to statehood, analyzing in detail the institutions and personalities that have shaped the West German political experiment. Whetten examines searchingly the contemporary blossoming of West German *Ostpolitik* and its myriad implications.

McGeehan's study is certain to evoke nostalgia among those who, to borrow the late Secretary of State Dean Acheson's words, were "present at the creation" of the Atlantic Alliance. His scholarly narrative not only illuminates a period of relatively recent history that by now seems strangely remote (attesting to the sweep of events since 1955), but also bares the outlines of its legacies. The legacies are both negative and positive. On the negative side, the well-intentioned arrogance with which the United States plunged into the affairs of postwar Europe emerges starkly from his pages of detailed diplomatic history. The story of 1950-1955 is essentially the tale of how American missionary idealism, using persuasion but more often the bludgeon, imposed its predilections upon the European allies.

On the positive side, American caprice and highhandedness set in motion a process which, largely unintended and unforeseen in Washington, revamped the political landscape of Europe and led to an unprecedented experiment in international community—the process of West European integration. McGeehan's central thesis regarding the 1950-1955 evolution is that of the "expanding scenario." It began with the doctrinaire American conviction, under the impact of Korea, that viable Western defenses required German soldiers and German real estate. Even the highest-pressure American salesmanship of this conviction in Europe, however, could not breach the barriers of distrust amid the ruins of recent conflict. German rearmament could

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be sold only within a framework of enveloping safeguards and controls. Hence the alternation of schemes from the European Army concept to the Pleven Plan, from the abortive European Defense Community to the Western European Union. What began as the military imperative of added military manpower and territory ended as a grandiose blueprint of supranational defense authority, merged armies and the expanding circle of West European economic integration and political cooperation.

The victor of this five-year drama was the new leader in a country that barely ten years earlier had not only lost a war but had been consigned by the enraged conquerors to permanent impotence. Konrad Adenauer in many ways bears out the strange convergence of time and the man in the fashioning of greatness. *Der Alte,* whose granite face lingers as the symbol of West Germany's postwar recovery and return to international respectability and strength, continues to be the target of controversy within as well as outside his country. Nobody can detract from the reality of Adenauer's achievements. Yet, the argument runs, his real greatness can be measured only against the yardstick of a priority of objectives, which the taciturn old Chancellor managed to keep to himself. Was his aim simply and opportunistically to raise the stature and strength of West Germany? McGeehan seems to think so (p. 71 *et passim*) and gives him high marks. Was his main target the reunification of his country? Whetten tends toward this belief, suggesting that "the Federal Republic's integration into Western Europe was envisaged by Adenauer as a strategic move to strengthen his bargaining position on reunification" (p. 93); he implicitly gives him low marks on this score.

But, was Adenauer's overriding ideal that of a new Western community in which West Germany would play a vibrant role, sacrificing the larger German identity? Grosser is of this opinion, and he persuasively establishes in retrospect the nexus between Adenauer and the temper of his constituents: "It remains true . . . that the Federal Republic had made its decision once and for all against Communism, which explains why its claim to legitimacy never really suffered as a result of the division of Germany. In 1948, the great majority of West Germans made a choice that is very rare in the twentieth century, preferring the maintenance of a certain political and economic system to the achievement of national unity." (pp. 81-82.)

Yet if this was the true temper of Adenauer's Germany from 1948 to 1963—if the priorities of reconstruction and identification with the West overwhelmed the objectives of national unity and "Germanness"—what has changed in the meantime? Why *Ostpolitik*?

Most analysts of this phenomenon, Whetten included, attribute its rise to a chain of events, notably German frustrations in the Western political arena and the shock of the Berlin Wall upon lingering West

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German hopes of reunification. The explanation is plausible enough as far as it goes. There is no question that the *Adenauersche Konzeption* was battered in the 1960's by a series of debilitating blows, prominently the loosening of security ties between the Federal Republic and the United States and the dimming of West European integration as a result of de Gaulle's resurrection of national prerogatives. There is no question, moreover, that Ulbricht's Wall seemed to write *finis* for that part of the Adenauer prescription which held that magnetism of power and "negotiations from strength" would eventually solve the problem of German reunification.

However, this kind of analysis of *Ostpolitik,* which leans heavily on an assumed model of environmental opportunities and constraints and West German *Realpolitik,* misses the critical point at issue. That point has not so much to do with the likely successes and failures of *Ostpolitik,* importantly as these may bear on the future evolution of Europe. It does not even concern so much the short-range impact of *Ostpolitik* on the security interests of the United States in Europe or on the fortunes of West European integration. At major stake, rather, is the fragile experiment of West German political evolution.

We may understand the traumas, largely of our own doing, that have impelled the West Germans to seek an escape from their perceived *Sackgasse* (dead-end street) of postwar policy. We—or at least some among us—may applaud Chancellor Brandt for his efforts in undoing the legacies of the past and building bridges of understanding with Germany's former victims in the East. Confronted by our own national problems and weary of our global burdens, we may vest in Bonn's initiatives the hope that somehow the vanquished in the last war will solve the dilemmas of the victors.

The hope at this juncture of history, however, is not only fragile but dangerously placed. Willy Brandt may be perfectly sincere in his peace offensive and merit the Nobel Prize that has been bestowed upon him. In so doing, he may be reflecting the wistful hopes of broad stretches of West German opinion. But Brandt is also presiding over forces in his government and in his own party that seem addicted to notions only vaguely related to present-day realities. Prominent members of Brandt's policy entourage (like Egon Bahr, Herbert Wehner and Leo Bauer) see reconciliation with the East not only as an imperative of policy, but also as the prerequisite of a new social order (*Gesellschaftsordnung*) in Europe. Though vaguely expressed, these ideas within the governing SPD spell a theory of ideological convergence in Europe which would sweep aside the two opposing alliance systems and in which the Federal Republic would play a pivotal role.

West German defenders of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, while acknowledging the existence of these views, dismiss them as illusory and mitigated by the hard realities of

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power. But the hard realities of power include the Soviet Union. What has shaped Moscow's response to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*?

The standard explanations of the Soviet Union's shift toward Bonn list a catalogue of defensive motives: Moscow's preoccupation with the China problem, its obsessive need to sanctify Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, its thirst for Western trade and technology, and its desire to stabilize the "central relationship" with the United States. The explanations also defer to lingering Soviet offensive ambitions in Western Europe—such as the hastening of a withdrawal of American power and influence and the merits of a divisive strategy directed against the major West European countries. There is recognition, also, of the asymmetry in power which favors Moscow in its dealings with Bonn. As Whetten puts it somewhat euphemistically in his evaluation of the Bonn-Moscow treaty: "the long-term advantages [of the treaty] are more difficult to assess, but the Soviet Union stands to lose less than the West Germans." (p. 150.)

Without disparaging the possible mix of defensive and offensive motives that have conditioned the Soviet Union's *Westpolitik,* one element perhaps bears closer examination. Whatever the language and nuances of the new contractual obligations between Moscow and Bonn, the Soviets have gained in the process something they never possessed before: a direct leverage over the internal politics of the Federal Republic. To the extent that Brandt must wager his political fortunes on successes in *Ostpolitik,* to that extent he perforce becomes beholden to Soviet predilections.

Is it possible that the Soviets, in making a calculated political investment in the Brandt Government in Bonn, have really engaged in a low-risk gamble? At best, if everything goes well, they will have ready for use an important crowbar against NATO and Western Europe. At worst, if their political investment goes sour, its end result may be political polarization and paralysis in Bonn. The harbingers of the latter contingency are already all too conspicuous.

The main perils of *Ostpolitik* thus relate to the internal fabric of the Federal Republic. Alfred Grosser believes this fabric is reasonably strong: "More and more, the Federal Republic presents the appearance of a normal state and society, playing a sober and useful part in international life and especially in the building of Europe." (p. 330.) But Grosser penned this judgment before the bitter parliamentary battles and deadlocks in the Bundestag over *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik.* One recalls Henry Kissinger's prediction, in testimony before Congress some six years ago, that the issue of relations with "the other Germany" holds the potential of tearing the West Germans apart.

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Arthur Bliss Lane: Career Diplomat*

by Gaddis Smith

Good American diplomatic biographies and memoirs are rare. Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation* and George Kennan's *Memoirs, 1925-1950* stand alone in the first rank. The second rank is scarcely larger—Robert Murphy's *Diplomat among Warriors,* Waldo Heinrichs on Joseph C. Grew, Robert Dallek on William E. Dodd,[1] and now Vladimir Petrov's admirable portrait of Arthur Bliss Lane, entitled *A Study in Diplomacy.*

Lane graduated from Yale in 1916, became private secretary to Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page in Italy, officially entered the Foreign Service in 1917, served under Hugh Gibson in Poland, John W. Davis in Britain, Dwight Morrow in Mexico, and at the age of thirty-nine became the youngest chief of mission in the career service—in Nicaragua in 1933. Then to Riga, Belgrade, back to Latin America, and in 1945 to Poland as the first postwar Ambassador. Embittered by what he considered the ineffectiveness of his government's resistance to the expansion of Soviet influence, Lane resigned from the Foreign Service in 1947. Had he never entered the Foreign Service, American diplomacy would not have been different. He was a conscientious professional, not a profound thinker, sometimes acerbic, never a prime mover. And yet Petrov, who scrupulously avoids claiming more importance for his subject than the evidence warrants, manages in Lane's story to tell more about the inner strengths and weaknesses of American foreign policy than many a biographer focusing on a President, a Secretary of State or other magisterial figure.

For example, the essence of the Good Neighbor policy in Latin America was nonintervention, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull reiterated many times. But Arthur Bliss Lane in Managua knew that ritualistic affirmation of American nonintervention in Nicaraguan affairs was itself a form of intervention. Military power was in the hands of Anastasio Somoza, commander of the Guardia Nacional—a force organized, armed, trained and led by American Marines until 1932. President Juan Sacasa wanted to assert his legal authority over the Guardia and sought Minister Lane's public support. But for Lane to support Sacasa was considered intervention and thus forbidden by the Department of State. Somoza, unchecked, arranged the murder of former guerrilla leader

**A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane.* By Vladimir Petrov. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971. 302 pp. $12.00.

[1]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-50* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Robert D. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964); Waldo H. Heinrichs, *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Robert Dallek, *Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of William E. Dodd* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

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Sandino, now a Sacasa ally. The anti-American press then charged that Lane was responsible for Sandino's death because everyone knew that the Guardia was an instrument of American imperialism. Lane could do nothing but watch in helpless frustration as Somoza took over the country. Nonintervention had led to the reimposition of a grim military dictatorship.

After an uneventful tour in Riga, Lane was posted to Yugoslavia in 1937. He watched the outbreak of war in Europe and reported in meticulous detail the tortuous efforts of the Yugoslav government to keep out of war and keep the nation together. By 1941 Prince Paul, the regent, believed his country had to choose between invasion, the death of hundreds of thousands and slavery, on the one hand, and an accommodation with Hitler and slavery without death on the other. He made the accommodation early in 1941—and was promptly overthrown by a group of patriotic romantics supported by the British and the Americans. The consequences were inevitable—a ruthless German invasion, the extinction of the nation, and for Lane the ignominious end of his mission.

Petrov devotes two-thirds of his book to Lane's Nicaraguan and Yugoslav missions, neither of which holds a central place in American diplomatic history. Here is a portrait of a representative diplomat of his generation—wealthy, well born, good company at the poker table, jealous of his position as chief of mission, devoted to a code of professional diplomatic conduct, socially conservative, and yet withal profoundly influenced by the great figure of his youth, Woodrow Wilson. Lane was an idealist who believed with Wilson that it must be the basic purpose of the United States to help the world achieve self-determination. He was also a self-styled realist who believed that these ideals could not be achieved without the intervention of American political, economic and military power.

The interaction of Lane's idealism and realism became the theme of his final sad and famous mission to Poland. Lane was appointed ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile in London in 1944, but because of the hostility between that government and the Soviet Union he was not allowed to proceed to his post. After much bickering over the nature of the new Polish government envisioned by the ambiguous Yalta agreement, the Truman Administration in July 1945 extended diplomatic recognition to the Polish Provisional Government and Lane arrived in Warsaw.

The Ambassador hoped he would be able to witness and assist the creation of a democratic, independent Poland. Instead he saw the systematic suppression of all non-communist political elements by an unrepresentative Moscow-supported group. Dark visions of appeasement and the possible repetition of policies that had led to the Second World War crowded his mind. He developed an acute case of what George C. Marshall once called "localitis"—the belief that the fate of the world depends on

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the outcome of events in the spot where one happens to be assigned. Lane bombarded the Department with long cables and wondered, as so many ambassadors before and since have wondered, if anyone heeded the messages he sent. In the meanwhile the Polish government was negotiating in Washington for economic aid. Lane pleaded that aid be withheld pending political concessions by Poland. His advice was not followed. He resigned, wrote his bitter, best-selling *I Saw Poland Betrayed,* became a right-wing Republican politician, and ultimately a supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Lane's realism, narrowly centered on Poland, could not comprehend the larger context of American policy which made effective pressure on Poland impossible. His unfulfilled idealism turned to sour recriminations.

Petrov writes with affectionate detachment and objectivity. He admires Lane, but does not avoid discussing his faults. He prefers Lane's position on Poland to that held at the time in Washington, but he is fair in presenting the Washington point of view. The writing is clear, pleasantly seasoned with anecdotes, and judiciously documented with excerpts from Lane's own well-written letters and cables.

Cuba After Thirteen Years of Castroism*

by Willard Barber

Fidel Castro is now in his fourteenth year as maximum—and only—leader of Cuba. During that time approximately 800,000 Cubans have left their native land. While some escaped clandestinely, most were able to depart legally by registering their desire with Castro's officials. The fact that the act of registration means confiscation of home and personal property and loss of job, followed by a lengthy waiting period spent in forced labor, is indicative of the intense motivations of the emigrés. How many more wish to leave but remain in Cuba because of family connections or inability or unwillingness to go through the tortuous exit procedures is a matter of speculation.

But there are also many true believers in Castroism. No less than 2,500,000 are claimed as revolutionary vigilance committee members, operating at all levels down to hamlets and individual city blocks. In the judgment of Philip W. Bonsal, the last United States Ambassador to fill the post at Havana (February 16, 1959 to October 28, 1960), "As long as Castro keeps his health and his charisma, a successful internal movement against him, though certainly possible, seems unlikely."

To describe the Ambassador's recently published *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* as an objective narrative is scarcely possible, for he was observer, reporter, negotiator, peacemaker and target of Castro's unpredictable behavior at one time or another. While his account is naturally subjective, there is no neglect or coloring of the facts to fit an ideology or a dogma. Nor

**Cuba, Castro, and the United States.* By Philip W. Bonsal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. 318 pp. $9.95.

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does his graceful style admit of the shrill polemics characteristic of too many writings on Cuba. This is not to imply that Bonsal is a plastic man. He is not. His book reveals anger, frustration, sympathy, curiosity, embarrassment, compassion and humor, the very essence of human sensitivities responding to a fast-changing series of obstacles, opportunities and rebuffs. Some of the latter came from his own countrymen and from his own government, for all that he strove to serve their long-range interests.

Fluent in Spanish, experienced as the U.S. Ambassador at Bogota and later at La Paz, a veteran of the bureaucratic wars in Washington, Bonsal entered upon his assignment in Havana with every intention of seeking ways to improve relations between the United States and Cuba. His report of the Cuban transformation, realistic, candid, and based on a careful analysis of historical, political and economic factors, reveals how and why that improvement was not to be.

He recalls for us that during the period 1952-1958 the way for Castro was paved by Batista, and that once it was in power the new revolutionary government was given recognition. Castro visited Washington and returned to Cuba to introduce land reform to which former President Prio Socarras, titular leader of the Auténtico Party, gave warm assent. But simultaneous with this domestic reform, Castro embarked on a series of armed interventions against the governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti. These adventures were complete and bloody failures. They resulted in the convocation of the hemisphere's foreign ministers —which could not agree to take punitive action against him.

The story continues with chapters on the arrangements worked out by Anastas Mikoyan and Castro in 1960 for Soviet economic assistance to Cuba, the termination of sugar import quotas, and the U.S. decision to close the Embassy at Havana. Then follow sections on the spectacular events during the Kennedy Administration: the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile crisis. "The anti-American extremism personified by Castro with his hold on his people had stimulated a true fanaticism which Washington did not fully understand. The administration's imperfectly secret preparations for an invasion of Cuba by a force of exiles and refugees and the possibility that American armed forces might also participate in such an invasion were responsible for the increasing quantities of arms and military equipment sent by Russia." (p. 177.)

Bonsal's book offers a chronologically developed analysis of Castroism in Cuba followed by two special sections: a careful exposition of the sugar industry and a detailed record of Cuban-U.S. relationships from time of the infamous Platt Amendment of 1901. This felicitous arrangement carries the reader along easily and swiftly through twenty-two chapters; those who want additional details, statistics and verse-and-chapter documentation can refer to the two appendages. An annotated bibliography

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provides incisive opinions on the merits of the works cited.

Bonsal does not set himself the task of prophecy, but he has made clear how it is that we are where we are now with respect to Cuba. It is a far cry from the pre-Castro era of predominant U.S. influence over Cuban affairs. He shows how the Cubans waited for the United States to "do something" about Castro; the Cuban oligarchy and middle class proved themselves politically impotent and inept. Thus, Castro has imposed himself on Cuba, a power-hungry man who has followed classical patterns in eliminating rivals—individuals or institutions—one by one. He remains implacable in blaming all of Cuba's ills on the United States. This absurdity Bonsal rejects.

Should the State Department Make Policy?*

by Robert R. Sullivan

The argument of the late John Franklin Campbell's *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* is that the Washington foreign-policymaking process is characterized by bureaucratic gigantism and fragmentation, that the White House cannot make a good foreign policy, and that the way out of the sugary morass is to return the process to the Department of State, or rather to the diplomatic corps within the Department, or even more specifically to an elite within the diplomatic corps that would remain after a reduction in the size of the corps by about 50 per cent. In effect, Campbell's book presents the extreme case for delegating to a small group of janissaries within the State Department the double task of making and executing policy. He thus joins the likes of George Kennan, Charles Thayer and numerous other advocates of a return to the days when Dean Acheson presided over the diplomatic process.

For Campbell, the problem (Chapter 1) is that in the period of the Cold War the foreign policy process has become fragmented into several bureaucracies and the State Department has consequently become ineffectual. This bureaucratic fragmentation is reinforced if not actually caused by the divided philosophical underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy (Chapter 2). Pitted against the realist diplomatic tradition is the Woodrow Wilson-initiated idealist diplomatic tradition, which sees the world in ideological terms as a contest between good and evil. Some foreign policies of the Kennedy Administration (Chapter 3) and the Johnson Administration (Chapter 4) failed as a result of bureaucratic fragmentation and ideological confusion, and the response of both chief executives was to encourage the NSC staff to grow in size and stature. The State Department's decline (Chapter 5) from Senator Joseph McCarthy to the present is traced in painful detail. Such is the fudge factory in Campbell's eyes.

The author's prescriptions flow from his analysis. The intelligence

**The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory.* By John Franklin Campbell. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 292 pp. $6.95.

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(CIA) and propaganda (USIA) sections of the foreign policy community ought to be put under the control of the State Department and many of their functions should be curbed or eliminated (Chapter 6). The foreign aid program should be restructured and AID's staff reduced considerably (Chapter 7). The same chapter briefly considers the Department of Defense's role in the making and administration of foreign policy and argues that in all cases it must be diminished. Similar prescriptions are outlined for the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor and the Treasury—and an even wider cast of the net scoops up for cursory examination all other government agencies that have anything to do with foreign policy (Chapter 8). The final chapter addresses itself to the question "What is to be done?" and answers it with a program of State Department reform in the context of enlightened leadership from the White House.

Campbell's study reflects a lively and free-wheeling intelligence that greatly facilitates the reader's progress through often familiar material, and the fact that it is wedded comfortably to a large capacity for common sense makes many of the predictable prescriptions easy to take. He also carries the burden of statistics lightly, using them to reinforce his otherwise verbalized arguments.

But the book's weaknesses outweigh its many fine points. *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory's* main defects are its narrow scope and its descriptive rather than analytical nature. Without due regard to the complex international system that has borne on its development, or the domestic social, political and economic factors that could serve to explain why the bureaucracy is what it is, the study does no more than skim the surface, and this tends to make the prescriptions sterile.

First of all, there is good reason to be wary of any attempt to separate diplomacy from international politics, and Campbell does far too much of this. We are at present in a transitional phase, inclining away from the Cold War's tensions and toward what may be an era of negotiations, to use one of President Nixon's favorite terms. In these circumstances a reform of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus, while perhaps opportune today, may not have been in order at peaks in the Cold War in the late 1940's, the 1950's and the early 1960's. But the author's diplomatic critique, divorced from a parallel analysis of developments in international relations, leaves one with the feeling that perhaps the Cold War never really happened, or that if it did happen it was because the State Department's elite was not in charge of policymaking. Yet there was a Cold War, and the problems it created justified the existence of a large and influential defense establishment. In the tight and secretive global politics of the 1950's and early 1960's a strong intelligence community was also required. Failure to take account of the salient features of world politics over the past quarter-century

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cripples the author's bureaucratic analysis.

Likewise, the bearing of democratic decision-making on foreign policy is a problem raised but not dealt with by the book, perhaps because good diplomats do not tamper with domestic politics. But this is a serious defect, for foreign policy has domestic determinants as well as those which arise from the international system. How is one to square the author's demands for an elitist control of foreign policy with the President's position as a vulnerable democratic officeholder? This year's summit meetings in Peking and Moscow might be frowned upon by professional diplomats, but admittedly they represent potentially profitable election-year ploys. Gearing the SALT talks' outcome and the winding down of the Viet Nam war to an election year also points up the extent to which foreign and domestic policy are intertwined.

Furthermore, our overall sub-Saharan Africa policy is not so much the result of an enlightened, elitist conception of the national interest as it is a compromise between the pressures of American business and the countervailing pressures originating in our domestic race problem. Our Middle East policy is only partly comprehensible if viewed from the perspective of national interest. Originally it reflected the influence wielded by Jewish voters within the United States, and eventually Jewish pressure was countered somewhat by pressure from oilmen. Similarly, in our relations with Latin America and Canada business interests have often been decisive, and with respect to China a potent right wing in U.S. politics has until recently prevented a switch in U.S. China policy.

The point is that the foreign affairs bureaucracy is fragmented not only as a consequence of the Cold War but also because it is responsive to the influences of a plural society and democratic polity—and whereas the Cold War may be coming to an end, it is to be hoped that pluralism and democracy are not. Given the nature of our populist democracy, it is inconceivable that the President of the United States would consign any high-level policymaking process entirely to the purview of bureaucrats. Indeed, the President's problem as chief executive is not how to give up control of high-level policy processes but rather how to expand his influence to include lower-level policy processes.

For better or worse, the result of bureaucratic fragmentation is that the Presidency's policymaking powers in foreign affairs have grown and become institutionalized in the office of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy, Walt Rostow under Johnson, and Henry Kissinger under Nixon. The White House ideal of Washington's adumbrated division of labor is as follows: The President, his Special Assistant and the NSC Staff *make* foreign policy; the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, AID, USIA, and virtually anyone who inhabits a

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section of an American embassy overseas *administers* foreign policy. Increasingly the President's task is to see to it that this division of labor is sharply defined—i.e., that the President and his staff have the competence to make policy and that the bureaucratic agencies stick to the administration of policy and be allowed to "make" it only in the sense that they fight for the domestic interests they represent in Washington. In sum, the making of U.S. foreign policy can only be understood if one focuses on the White House while remembering that the bureaucratic fragmentation which has given impetus to Presidential decision-making is no more than a reflection of the pluralism of a democratic polity.

Another major defect of Campbell's book is that it makes superficial ideological judgments. He divides Washington's foreign policy community into a small group of realists in the State Department and a much larger group of starry-eyed or warmongering Wilsonian idealists located in AID, USIA, CIA or DOD. But any firsthand knowledge of Washington or American embassies over the past twenty years belies this kind of oversimplification. George Kennan and Dean Acheson tell us in their accounts of postwar events that they were realists, yet they stated U.S. foreign policy in the 1940's in the strongest ideological terms. John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk were in the forefront of "Cold Warriors," yet both were closely identified with the State Department's bureaucracy.

On the other hand, it is grossly unfair to pin the "Cold Warrior" label on all military officers simply because they are in the military. Many of them did not want to get involved in Korea, and once there MacArthur did not want to cross the 38th Parallel. But they fought and MacArthur crossed to the North because the White House, under Dean Acheson's influence, so directed. Similarly in Viet Nam, the military was reluctant to send large ground forces there; they did so because the civilian "hawks" in the Administration prevailed. McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were two professors always more at home in Foggy Bottom than in Arlington. Washington's good guys and bad guys cannot be divided up as easily as the author would like.

In spite of my criticisms, this reviewer is in fundamental agreement with the *spirit* of Campbell's book. A more or less closed foreign policy process in the hands of a small group of well-informed professionals would be a good step if it were feasible in our system of government; but, while the author prescribes the ends to be sought, he has virtually nothing to say about the practical means to attain them. How, the incredulous reader may ask, does one manage to put the State Department in control of the CIA or reduce the staff of the Secretary of Defense by 50 per cent? No doubt such changes are possible, but a bit of operational advice is in order and Campbell does not give it.

Although this book suffers from various shortcomings as an analysis

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of policymaking and bureaucratic functions, it has merits within its narrowly defined scope. It ranks as one of the most eloquent and persuasive pleas for a reinvigorated Department of State, with a stronger elite diplomatic corps and wider control over the policymaking process. But in the end, the narrow scope of the book's traditional bureaucratic analysis repeatedly condemns it to sterility, and thus *The Fudge Factory* provides a lesson on the desirability of examining bureaucracies in their relevant social, economic and political settings.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Education for National Development: Effects of U.S. Technical Training Programs. By Albert E. Gollin. New York: Praeger, 1969. 281 pp. $15.00. A study of the nature and consequences of the technical training provided each year in the United States to some 6,000 people, coming primarily from the less developed countries, and to additional thousands in U.S.-sponsored programs abroad. Dr. Gollin, Research Associate with the Bureau of Social Science Research of Washington, D.C., examines the selection process; describes and evaluates the training programs; discusses the aftermath of training, e.g., placement in jobs, career patterns, and occupational mobility; and draws some conclusions on the limits of technical training as a viable strategy for human resources development and an effective means of fostering technological change.

From Peasant to Farmer: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development. By Raanan Weitz. New York: Columbia University Press, for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1971. 292 pp. $10.00. Mr. Weitz, a member of the Settlement Study Center of the National and University Institute of Agriculture in Rehovot, Israel, believes that "Successful methods of development must take into account the feelings of the people and how they envision the world." The purpose of his book is "to change this vague, general principle into detailed, practical guidelines for implementing a policy of development at all levels, from national policymakers to the individual instructor on the farm." The first part outlines a program of institution-building for agriculture and the second deals with the planning methods and general organizational structures required for the program.

Human Rights, Federalism, and Minorities. Edited by Allan Gotlieb. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970. 268 pp. $6.00. In these essays, ten prominent Canadian statesmen and scholars, including Prime Minister Trudeau, examine the rights of the individual in the federal state, his place in international law, the issue of self-determination, the protection of minorities, the language rights of minority groups, and the impact of UN achievements on Canadian laws and practices. Two of the ten essays are in French.

A Hundred Years of International Relations. By F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve. New York: Praeger, 1971. 397 pp. $11.50. In an ambitious work, Professors Northedge and Grieve present a condensed yet comprehensive view of international politics over the past century, from 1871 to 1971. Memorable in this period have been the emergence of a worldwide state system, the profound shock of two cataclysmic wars, the rise of the United States and the USSR as global powers and the recent renaissance of non-Western states.

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New Orientations: Essays in International Relations. Edited by E. F. Penrose, Peter Lyon and Edith Penrose. New York: The Humanities Press, 1970. 136 pp. $7.50. The editors hope this will be the first of a series of volumes undertaking the publication of critical essays on world affairs, especially essays "devoted to new or revised interpretations in international history." Four papers are included in this book: "The Great Globe Itself: Continuity and Change," by Peter Lyon; "Britain's Place in the Changing Structure of International Relations," by E. F. Penrose; "Vietnam: The Real Issues," by Jacques Decornoy; and "International Economic Relations and the Large International Firm," by Edith Penrose.

Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook. Edited by Donald Eugene Smith. New York: The Free Press, 1971. 286 pp. $8.95. A collection of important excerpts from authoritative religious pronouncements, official state documents, political party manifestoes, election campaign statements, parliamentary debates, speeches, writings, government reports, constitutions, treaties, concordats and press commentaries from various Third World countries—all concerned with the role of Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism, Islam and Roman Catholicism in the development of modern nation-states. Dr. Smith, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, has provided an introductory note for each reading.

Revolutions: 1775 to 1830. Edited by Merryn Williams. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 611 pp. $3.25. The first part of this book is given over to basic documents from the American and French Revolutions as well as papers from the Industrial Revolution in Britain. The second part associates outstanding figures, by way of illustration, with significant trends in religion, philosophy, literature, art and science in America, France and Britain.

Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution. By P. A. Kropotkin; edited by Martin A. Miller. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970. 374 pp. $12.50 ($3.95, paper). This collection of political works by Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), who was, after the death of Bakunin in 1876, the most widely read and respected theorist of anarchism, contains letters and essays which have not been previously translated or have been out of print for some time. In them Kropotkin sets forth his views on the role of anarchism in modern history, his criticism of capitalism, his conception of revolution, and his ideas on the postrevolutionary society of the future.

Statement on Race. (Third edition.) By Ashley Montagu. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. 278 pp. $7.95 ($2.50, paper). Between 1950 and 1968, UNESCO issued four statements on race, written to clarify the whole concept of race and to show the speciousness of racist myths and theories. In this edition (the first two were published in 1951 and 1953), the four statements are reproduced, and prominent anthropologist Ashley Montagu provides extended commentary, annotating separately each paragraph of the first and fourth statements.

A World History. (Second edition.) By William H. McNeill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 550 pp. $15.00. This widely-acclaimed one-volume history of the world was originally published in 1967 and has been revised, expanded and brought up to date for this edition. Professor McNeill's organizing idea is simple: "in any given age the world balance among cultures was liable to disturbance emanating from one or more centers where men succeeded in creating an unusually attractive or powerful civilization. Neighbors . . . were then tempted or compelled to change their own traditional ways of life. . . . In successive ages the major centers of such disturbance to the world altered.

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It therefore becomes possible to survey the epochs of world history by studying first the center or centers of primary disturbance, and then considering how the other peoples of the earth reacted to or against what they knew . . . of the innovations that had occurred in the main centers. . . ."

II. United States and Canada

Afternoon on the Potomac?: A British View of America's Changing Position in the World. By Roy Jenkins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 59 pp. $3.95. In this series of three lectures delivered at Yale in 1971, a Labour Party leader, Roy Jenkins, traces America's rise to world leadership in the years 1917-1963, interprets Britain's changing perspective since the end of World War II, and reflects upon the recent problems faced by the United States as its dominant world position erodes. He suggests that while America will have to adjust to its waning economic, military and political power, the European Community, strengthened by British entry, will approach parity with its Atlantic partner.

Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives. By Dale C. Thomson and Roger F. Swanson. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1971. 170 pp. n.p. (paper). This is an important book for students of Canadian foreign policy. A survey of high analytical rigor treating of Canada's global relations, past and present, has been long overdue. American readers will appreciate the thoughtful chapter on the Canadian-United States relationship and will note, in the course of discussions on Europe, the developing world and communist states, that the Canadian view on world affairs has often diverged considerably from the American. A perceptive section on the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy suggests that Canada's distinctiveness on the international scene may increase as she seeks to establish cultural, economic and political independence of her southern neighbor.

Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender. By Raymond G. O'Conner. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 143 pp. $6.50. This brief work traces the evolution of the unconditional surrender doctrine in World War II, with particular regard to the impact of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The demand for unconditional surrender is defended and praised as one of President Roosevelt's most important policies.

The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. By Ross Gregory. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 162 pp. $6.95. A well-rounded interpretation of the reasons for prolonged U.S. neutrality from 1914 to 1917 and the pressures, both domestic and foreign, that finally brought about Wilson's decision to take the United States into the war against the Central Powers. Dr. Gregory is Associate Professor of History at Western Michigan University and winner of the Frederick Jackson Turner Prize in 1969 for his first book, *Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court of St. James.*

The Responsibles: How Five American Leaders Coped with Crisis. By William S. White. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 275 pp. $7.95. Mr. White, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *The Taft Story* and a nationally-syndicated columnist, demonstrates the essential vitality, strength and decency of American politics and its leaders by recounting the manner in which five American "Responsibles"—Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, Robert Taft, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson—handled the major crises of their careers.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

Agony at Easter: The 1916 Irish Uprising. By Thomas M. Coffey. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 271 pp. $1.65. In spellbinding narrative style, Thomas

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Coffey tells the story of the twentieth century's first successful revolution. As he gleans through eyewitness accounts, personal recollections and thoughtful observations, the 1916 Irish Revolution found its impetus in the belief that through defeat and death the Irish people would be aroused to a triumphant fight for independence.

Baldwin: A Biography. By Keith Middlemas and John Barnes. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 1149 pp. $14.95. *Baldwin* is a definitive appraisal of Stanley Baldwin, three times British Prime Minister during the interwar years and one of the more controversial men of the modern era. Viewing him in light of the social history of the period through extensive reliance on political diaries, memoirs and private papers, the authors conclude that he may have been too much a "politician's politician" for public consumption, but that he is the "supreme" example of a statesman in a free society.

British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups. By Robert J. Lieber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. 317 pp. $9.00. Using a good deal of empirical material, Professor Lieber analyzes the origins of "Europeanism" in Britain and the reaction of leading elements in British politics to this trend.

De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons. By John Newhouse. New York: Viking Press, 1970. 371 pp. $8.50. This study appraises de Gaulle's foreign policy as essentially a determination to lessen U.S. influence in Europe by unifying the West European states behind French policy initiatives. It is now apparent, the author maintains, that de Gaulle's design to create a "third bloc" was largely a failure.

Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939: Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Ambassador of Poland. Edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewivicz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 408 pp. $12.50. As the Polish Ambassador to France from 1936 to 1939, Juliusz Lukasiewicz played an important role in the negotiations between France and Poland that preceded the outbreak of World War II. This volume contains his memoirs and his articles on the Rambouillet loan and the Teschen-Silesia problem. The editor has provided supplementary material on the international environment of the years 1936-1939.

The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. By J. C. Masterman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 203 pp. $6.95. Written in the form of a report, this book uncovers the complex story of the "double-cross system" from its origins in 1939, through the early defensive achievements of 1941, the aggressive coups of 1942-1943, and the last years of the war in Europe. Included in detail are the activities of "superspies" to whom the British gave such apt cover names as Tricycle, Garbo and Snow.

Empire to Welfare State: English History, 1906-1967. By T. O. Lloyd. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. 465 pp. $10.00. The first in a series of Oxford Histories, Lloyd's volume covers the period from the Liberal victory of 1906 to the resurgence of Labour Party power in 1967. Stressing economic history, it recounts the enormous changes involved in the evolution of Britain from great power and world empire to insular welfare state of the second rank.

European Political Parties: A Handbook. Edited by Stanley Henig. New York: Praeger, 1969. 565 pp. $13.50. This analysis of the political party as a crucial unit of political organization and power within Western Europe is based on a country-by-country approach. The formula provides for a description of the party system, a structural-functional analysis, and an account of the relationships between the party and its parliamentary group and between its leaders

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and members. The book concludes with a discussion of the prospective role of European parties in nurturing integration.

French Nuclear Diplomacy. By Wilfrid L. Kohl. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 412 pp. $12.50. This analysis of the French development of a *force de frappe* focuses on the role and impact of nuclear weapons' possession in French politics. In emphasizing the discontinuity between de Gaulle's "grandiose designs" and the more "modest" objectives of the Pompidou regime, the author concludes that France's nuclear arsenal will be maintained, not to increase aspirations for an independent role in world politics, but to enhance French status and security in Europe and the Western alliance.

Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement. By Anthony Hartley. New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971. 373 pp. $10.00. Anthony Hartley's analysis of the phenomenon of Gaullism begins with an examination of de Gaulle's philosophy and a glimpse of the background of France's Third Republic. He then traces the development of Gaullism through the war years and the Fourth Republic, and gives detailed attention to the era of its ascendancy in the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle's Presidency. In conclusion he discusses Pompidou's emergence as France's leader, noting how his political style differs from that of de Gaulle, and descries the demise of Gaullism as a powerful political movement.

The Gaullist Phenomenon. By Jean Charlot. New York: Praeger, 1971. 205 pp. $10.00. A compact but wide-ranging and well-documented effort to portray the nature and meaning of Gaullism in all its aspects, including the historical, electoral and organizational. Though the book is written from the Gaullist perspective, it contains much valuable information on and analysis of this mode of French thought.

The IRA. By Tim Pat Coogan. New York: Praeger, 1970. 373 pp. $8.95. In covering the origins of the IRA and its impact upon the Irish nation, the author has presented a study in Irish psychology and patriotism and a subtle yet searching exposition of the Irish national character. Because of his unrivaled sources of information and his firsthand knowledge of events and personalities, Coogan is able to give us a thorough description of IRA activities and a feel for the emotions that arise when one is personally involved in a struggle for independence.

Mussolini's Early Diplomacy. By Alan Cassels. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 425 pp. $12.50. Professor Cassels recounts the efforts of Mussolini during the 1922-1927 period to redress Italy's grievance that her victory in World War I had been "mutilated" at the Paris peace settlement. Dividing the narrative of Fascist Italy's early foreign policy into four phases, he describes the efforts to bring fresh life into Italian diplomacy. As part of the story, the role of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is assessed.

Peace for Our Time: Munich to Dunkirk—The Inside Story, Based on the Hitherto Secret British Cabinet Papers. By Roger Parkinson. New York: David McKay, 1971. 412 pp. $7.95. The recently declassified top-secret minutes of the British Cabinet, and additional verified sources, form the basis for an inside account of events within the Chamberlain Government and the councils of Europe in 1938-1939. Dispelling misleading conceptions about the "Twilight War" which was transformed into World War II, the author discloses the fears and hopes behind Chamberlain's Godesburg and Munich flights; why the British and French did nothing to stop Hitler from seizing the remnants of Czechoslovakia; and the reasons for the Cabinet's commitment of British aid to

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Poland, which led to the abortive negotiations with Soviet Russia, and then to war with Germany.

Politics in Western European Democracies. By G. C. Byrne and K. S. Pedersen. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971. 435 pp. $9.95 ($5.95, paper). The theme around which this collection of articles is grouped is the effort of the West European nations to cope with the task of creating a new identity—or, how to deal with the conflicting demands of tradition and change. Authors whose works are included are Daniel Lerner, Morton Gorden, Stanley Hoffmann, John Ardagh, Joseph La Palombara, Michael Crozier, Pierre Hassner, Ernst B. Haas and David P. Calleo.

The Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Unity. By Richard Mayne. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 375 pp. $8.95. To the accomplishments of a varied career, Richard Mayne has added publication of a useful, and thoroughly readable, history of postwar Europe. Against the backdrop of astounding economic recovery, European political and social developments are clearly traced. The presentation is engaging and balanced, illustrating errors and missed opportunities as well as the brilliant successes of the European revival.

Riding the Storm: 1956-1959. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 786 pp. $15.00. The fourth volume of his memoirs, *Riding the Storm,* continues former British Prime Minister Macmillan's account of his activities in world and Commonwealth affairs. In the last years of the 1950's his major concerns were healing the breach with the United States after the Suez fiasco, coping with recurring hostilities in the Middle and Far East, attending to problems of NATO and European economic integration, and fending off propaganda and power moves from the Soviets. Excerpts from his diary enhance the commentary on personalities and events of the period.

Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline. By Susan Strange. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 363 pp. $13.00. This book argues that there has been a failure in British policy to adapt quickly enough to sterling's loss of monetary status in relation to the dollar. The pressures of 1958 to 1968, which culminated in a series of sterling crises, together with outworn attitudes, frustrated efforts to modernize and reform Britain's domestic economy. The author concludes that, given a measure of prudence and realism in future British policy, sterling can again become a stable international currency.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The Economics of Soviet Merchant-Shipping Policy. By Robert E. Athay. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 150 pp. $7.50. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major naval power has received considerable attention in recent years. Much less coverage has been given to the development of the Soviet merchant fleet, which is now one of the most modern in the world. This specialized study discusses the contribution of Soviet shipping policy to the USSR's overall economic objectives. There are informative chapters on voyage costs and economic benefits, especially as they relate to the Soviet balance of payments problem. While comparative analysis of costs, income and investment return is virtually impossible because of the paucity of relevant Soviet data, the author argues persuasively that the merchant fleet is a net asset.

A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin. By Francois Fejtö. New York: Praeger, 1971. 374 pp. $13.50. The first part of this political, economic, social and cultural treatment of post-Stalin Eastern Europe is concerned with "events," such as the Twentieth CPSU Congress, de-Stalinization,

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the October 1956 revolutions, the struggle against revisionism and national communism, the Sino-Soviet conflict, liberalization under Khrushchev, the second Yugoslav revolution and the Czech tragedy. The second part examines "structures" and "tendencies": contradictions in the communist system, nationalist revival, the lure of the West, developments in cultural affairs and in political and social structures, the breakdown of ideology, and reforms in planning and economic management. The author has been correspondent in charge of foreign affairs for Agence France-Presse since 1951.

In the Name of Tomorrow. By Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 286 pp. $7.50. This moving human story of two intellectuals who spoke out in communist Poland in behalf of freedom of thought and against anti-Semitism, provides an insight into the treatment of political dissenters in communist countries and analyzes Polish communism as a system of rule.

The USSR and Arabia. By Stephen Page. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971. 149 pp. £5.00. Based on Soviet and Western sources, this study of Soviet relations with the countries of the Arabian peninsula—Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the two Yemens—briefly traces the beginnings of Soviet interest from 1917 to 1955 and then concentrates on Moscow's growing involvement in Arabian affairs during the past fifteen years.

V. Middle East and Africa

Africa in the Seventies and Eighties: Issues in Development. Edited by Frederick S. Arkhurst. New York: Praeger, 1970. 405 pp. $15.00. The twelve papers published here were presented at the symposium, "Africa in the 1980's," held in early 1969 under the auspices of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. They deal with the following topics: political heritage, leadership, institutions and ideology; current sociological trends; the political and administrative setting for rural development; the development and reform of law and legal systems; economic progress, with special attention to agriculture; the population of tropical Africa; the outlook for education in Middle Africa; foreign trade and the importance of outside aid; and problems of economic integration.

Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Edited by Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. 303 pp. $11.50. A cross-disciplinary comparison of a pair of African states, contained in eleven papers representing the outcome of a workshop conference sponsored by the Committee on African Studies at the University of Chicago in 1969. Through parallel analyses of major spheres of activities in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, participants sought an understanding of alternative strategies that might be pursued in the development of newly independent nations.

Political Dynamics in the Middle East. Edited by Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander. New York: American Elsevier, 1972. 666 pp. $19.50. Sixteen leading experts on the Middle East (Morocco to Iran) examine the political and social forces—national, regional and extraregional—that have contributed to the dynamics and instability of the area and govern the prospects for conflict and reconciliation. Paul Y. Hammond provides an introductory essay; Malcolm H. Kerr writes on regional Arab politics and the conflict with Israel; Jacob C. Hurewitz, on the military balance; Saul Friedlander, on Israel's policy choices; Nadav Safran, on Israel's internal politics and foreign policy; Kerr, again, on the United Arab Republic's foreign policy; P. J. Vatikiotis, on the politics of the Fertile Crescent; Don Peretz, on the Arab refugee problem;

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and Leonard Binder, on Iran's potential as a regional power. Peter Calvocoressi, Pierre Rondot and William B. Quandt examine the policies of Great Britain, Western Europe and the United States; and Arnold Horelick and Abraham S. Becker discuss Soviet policy toward the Middle East.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Burma: A Profile. By Norma Bixler. New York: Praeger, 1971. 244 pp. $8.50. Writing expressly for the reader with little knowledge of Burma, the author sets out to explain the complex historical and cultural factors that have produced this fiercely independent nation. Ms. Bixler, a journalist and the author of *Burmese Journey,* describes the geography of Burma and its ancient and modern history, and then devotes separate chapters to the country's government, economy, peoples, social organization, educational system and culture.

A Chronology of the People's Republic of China. By Peter Cheng. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1972. 347 pp. $3.95 (paper). Several thousand brief notes on important developments in China's domestic affairs and international relations, arranged chronologically and indexed by subject and nation, make this a useful guide to the history of the People's Republic of China from October 1949 to the end of 1969. An introduction and preface provide supplementary information to October 1971 and the UN vote to admit Peking.

The Dragon Wakes: China and the West, 1793-1911. By Christopher Hibbert. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 427 pp. $10.00. This fascinating and authoritative narrative of the principal events in the troubled history of China's relations with the West, from the famous mission of Lord Macartney to Peking in 1793 to the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, provides the uninitiated reader with the historical background needed to understand the modern Chinese view of the Western powers.

North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos. By Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 262 pp. $5.95. In this study of the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao partnership, the authors reconstruct post-1945 Laotian politics and trace the origins, evolution, organization and leadership of the Pathet Lao. They show that Hanoi's role springs from its interest in protecting its borders, gaining access to South Viet Nam, and establishing a friendly regime in Laos. They conclude that the Viet Minh were a key factor in the genesis of the Pathet Lao and that Hanoi continues to provide essential assistance to its Laotian comrades; yet they feel that the Pathet Lao have not compromised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their common interests with, and heavy dependence on, North Viet Nam.

Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia. Edited by Robert F. Spencer. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. 172 pp. $6.50. Seven case studies and an introductory essay on the contemporary role of religion in Asia as a vital force in the process of development and change. Arthur F. Wright writes on Buddhism in modern China; Joseph M. Kitagawa, on new religions in Japan; I. Milton Sacks, on some religious components in Vietnamese politics; Agehananda Bharati, on Hinduism and modernization; Manning Nash, on Buddhist revitalization in Burma; Aziz Ahmad, on Islam and democracy in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent; and Robert R. Jay, on religious and political conflict in Java.

The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical Perspective. By Peter A. Poole. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970. 180 pp. $8.00. This study of the 70,000-80,000 Vietnamese living in Thailand explores their legal, political and

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cultural status, the international implications of their presence in Thailand, the results of the repatriation program, and the prospects for the assimilation of those who have chosen to remain in the host country.

VII. Latin America

The Caribbean Community: Changing Societies and U.S. Policy. By Robert D. Crassweller. New York: Praeger, 1972. 470 pp. $13.50. A survey of the problems that have arisen in the interplay between change and continuity in the Caribbean and their effects on U.S. interests in and policy toward the area. The author recommends the development of a cooperative association of states and territories—a Caribbean Community—encouraged and assisted, but not led, by the United States.

Conference on the Western Hemisphere: Issues for the 1970's. New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1971. 138 pp. $1.25 (paper). Articles from the conference proceedings carefully outline the major economic and political problems that are likely to emerge in Latin America during this decade. A particularly interesting aspect of the book is the attempt to relate political and economic trends—for example, to what extent will income redistribution be required to maintain political stability and economic growth, and how will the economic desirability of foreign investment temper political demands to control multinational corporations? Some attention is also given to the demands on U.S. policy that may characterize the 1970's.

Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics. By Miles D. Wolpert. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. 308 pp. $15.00. This somewhat dated study, which does not discuss Allende's 1970 electoral victory in Chile, addresses itself mainly to the symbolic impact of the Cuban revolution on Chilean domestic politics.

Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil. By Philippe C. Schmitter. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. 499 pp. $15.00. The author, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, examines the role of interest groups in Brazilian politics. Extensive research, including aggregate analysis and survey data, is marshaled in studying how interest groups have affected and been affected by industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, a growing bureaucracy and other phenomena. He considers the ways in which Brazilian associations have influenced political decision-making, seeks to ascertain the causes for the absence of pluralism in Brazil, and sets forth hypotheses linking delayed development with authoritarian politics.

An Introduction to Brazil. (Revised edition.) By Charles Wagley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 341 pp. $11.00 ($2.95, paper). New data in this edition include an elucidation of the intricacies of Brazilian politics since 1964 and a chapter on the arts, music and literature of Brazil. Otherwise, the author, a social anthropologist who has done extensive research in local communities in Brazil, has not greatly altered the scope and analysis of the original work.

Wealth and Power in Peru. By Richard H. Stephens. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1971. 219 pp. $5.00. This study concentrates on the landowning elite of Peru, described as the "last remaining landed aristocracy" in the world. Their values are explored in the context of the local and national political structures and in relation to those of other groups in Peruvian society. The author, a career diplomat, is presently a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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Monographs and Reports Received

American Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1969-1971: Problems of Principle, Maneuver and Time. By Robert J. Pranger. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. 69 pp. $3.00.

Chronology of the United Nations, 1971. Edited by A. G. Mezerik. New York: International Review Service, March 1972. 111 pp. $7.50.

Europe and America at the Crossroads. By Curt Gasteyger. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers, No. 4, March 1972. 50 pp. $1.70.

The Federal Budget for 1973: A Review and Analysis. By Murray L. Weidenbaum and Dan Larkins. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1972. 86 pp. $3.00.

Fiscal Failure: Lessons of the Sixties. By Charles E. McLure, Jr. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1972. 71 pp. $2.00.

International Migrations and the European Community. By John McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, December 1971. 12 pp. $1.00.

Military Manpower and National Security. By the Research and Policy Committee, CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, February 1972. 41 pp. $1.00.

Multinational Corporations and British Labour: A Review of Attitudes and Responses. By John Gennard. London: British-North American Committee, sponsored by British-North American Research Association (UK), National Planning Association (USA), and Private Planning Association of Canada, January 1972. 53 pp. $2.00.

Peacekeeping: Debut or Denouement? By Henry Wiseman. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, February 1972. 15 pp. 75 cents.

The Political Challenge of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan. By Francine R. Frankel and Karl von Vorys. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 38, March 1972. 46 pp. $2.50.

Press, Politics, and Popular Government. Edited by George F. Will; with contributions by Robert L. Bartley, Irving Kristol, Rowland Evans, Douglass Cater, Paul H. Weaver. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1972. 52 pp. $3.00.

Reapportionment: Law, Politics, Computers. By Terry B. O'Rourke. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February 1972. 111 pp. $3.00.

Soviet Advances in the Middle East. By George Lenczowski. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study No. 2, February 1972. 176 pp. $4.00.

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Sterling, European Monetary Unification, and the International Monetary System. By Richard N. Cooper. Washington: British-North American Committee, sponsored by the National Planning Association (USA), March 1972. 34 pp. $1.00.

Strategy for Peace. Twelfth Conference Report, September 30-October 3, 1971. Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, 1972. 76 pp. n.p.

Tribalism: Integration or Fission? A Decade of Decision in Southern Africa. By Pamela Reynolds Lee. New York: American-African Affairs Association, 1971. 18 pp. $1.00.

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Contributors to this Issue

R. Judson Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of Graduate Studies in Political Science, Louisiana State University in New Orleans.

Jaime Suchlicki, Associate Professor of History and Associate Director of the Institute of Inter-American Studies, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami (Fla.); author of *University Students and Revolution in Cuba* (University of Miami Press, 1969) and of a forthcoming book, *A Short History of Cuba* (Scribner's).

H. Jon Rosenbaum, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College, and Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; formerly, Guest Scholar, Brazilian Institute of International Relations, and Visiting Professor, Brazilian School of Public Administration, Rio de Janeiro; author of numerous articles on Brazil.

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia; in 1970-1971, Senior Fulbright Research Fellow, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, University of Munich; author of *Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia* (Praeger, 1960) and *Political Trends in Brazil* (Public Affairs Press, 1968).

Roland A. Paul, Attorney; formerly served as counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 1969-1970, and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1962-1964.

Amnon E. Rafael is currently engaged in the private practice of law in Tel Aviv, Israel, and is a guest lecturer at the Tel Aviv University Law Faculty; he holds the LL.B. degree from Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the LL.M. and J.S.D. degrees from the New York University School of Law.

James N. Rosenau, Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Mershon Program for Comparative Studies of Foreign Policy and Societal Adaptation, Ohio State University; author of *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (Free Press, 1971), *Linkage Politics* (Free Press, 1969), and two forthcoming books, *The Dramas of Politics: An Introduction to the Joys of Inquiry* and *International Studies and the Social Sciences.*

Justus M. van der Kroef, Charles Anderson Dana Professor of Political Science and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Bridgeport (Conn.); author of *Indonesia Since Sukarno* (Asia-Pacific Press, 1971).

Robert A. Holmes, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Atlanta University; formerly Assistant Professor at Bernard Baruch College, City University of New York.

Robert E. Bedeski, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; currently at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, under a grant from the SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee on Contemporary China, where he is completing work for a book on the evolution of the nation-state in China.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Colin S. Gray, Canadian Institute of International Affairs; beginning July 1, 1972, Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia; author of numerous articles on defense policy, arms races and arms control.

Walter F. Hahn, Visiting Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Deputy Director, International and Social Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses (on leave of absence, 1972); author of numerous articles on European affairs.

Gaddis Smith, Professor of History, Yale University; author of *Dean Acheson* (Cooper Square, 1972), a volume in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series.

Willard Barber, Lecturer in International Affairs, University of Maryland; formerly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and chargé d'affaires at the U.S. embassies in Lima and Bogota.

Robert R. Sullivan, Assistant Professor, Division of Government, History and Economics, The John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.

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Special Analysis. *Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security.* By William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $3.00. June 1971. (Published jointly with the American Enterprise Institute.)

Recent Books

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

Politics and the International System. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969. 514 pp. $4.95 (paper).

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense. By William R. Kintner. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. 413 pp. $6.95.

Contending Theories of International Relations. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 415 pp. $9.95 ($6.25, paper).

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